Case law

Reynaldo Ayala v. Kevin Chappell

829 F.3d 1081 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 20, 2016

Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), is the clearly established law applicable to this biased-juror claim. … Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), is the relevant clearly established federal law.

Hughes v. United States

953 F.2d 531 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 9, 1992

First, the claim of mere financial hardship does not establish irreparable harm. … The section, however, also creates an exception to the waiver of immunity.

Saumur v. Robles

65 F. App'x 132 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 8, 2003

The officers who executed the warrant were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. … See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); see also Alameda Newspapers

Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.

437 F.3d 923 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 14, 2006

To establish that a petition to the court is a sham, the party seeking to impose liability must establish both that the legal claim is objectively baseless and that the suit was brought for an anticompetitive purpose. … RICO’s general definition of racketeering activity does not in terms clearly reach the conduct at issue here.

Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom

957 F.2d 707 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 25, 1992

The Judgment Immunity Rule 27 Kroll argues that the district court should have held it immune under California law. Liability for legal advice in California is limited by the Judgment Immunity Rule. … The record establishes that McKay would be indisposed for one to two weeks.

Souders v. Lucero

196 F.3d 1040 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 15, 1999

DISCUSSION 10 To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. … Because we find that Souders has not established a prima facie case under S 1983, we need not reach the district court's alternate holding granting qualified immunity.

Robichaud v. Ronan

351 F.2d 533 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 8, 1965

The district court clearly erred in so basing the dismissal, and appellees do not here contend that no personal jurisdiction existed. … Although admitting that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for holding plaintiff as charged, the defendants refused to dismiss the complaint upon forming the belief that she would not be retained

William Hibbs, United States of America, Intervenor v. Department of Human Resources Charlotte Crawford Nikki Firpo

273 F.3d 844 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 11, 2001

In Kimel , the Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 , clearly expressed congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, because the ADEA incorporates by … The Court found that, read together, § 216(b) and § 203(x) clearly express congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits by individuals. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74 , 120 S.Ct. 631 .

Brown v. Li

308 F.3d 939 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 24, 2002

Qualified Immunity on the First Amendment Claim 44 We apply a three-step test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on a federal constitutional claim. … Qualified Immunity on the Procedural Due Process Claim 85 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants violated his clearly established right to due process when they "withheld [Plaintiff's] degree and otherwise harmed [him] without

Christopher Harbridge v. Reed

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 8, 2024

But the court concluded that Reed’s retaliatory threat was implied, not explicit, and that Reed was entitled to qualified immunity at step 2 because it was not clearly established at the time of Reed’s conduct that implicit … But because qualified immunity is an “objective inquiry,” the “qualified immunity inquiry should concentrate on the objective aspects of the constitutional standard,” and that remains true “even where the clearly established

Mary L. Brandt and Natalie Z. Shell v. Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior

427 F.2d 53 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 11, 1970

The district court’s jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision in these circumstances is well established in the Ninth Circuit. In Coleman v. … Having established a system of appeals, 3 the Secretary is constitutionally bound to administer that system in a manner consistent with established concepts of due process.

American Greyhound Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Western Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Tp Racing Lllp, an Arizona Limited Liability Partnership v. Jane Dee Hull, Governor of Arizona State of Arizona Janet Napolitano, Attorney General of the State of Arizona State of Arizona, and Richard Romley, County Attorney of Maricopa County, Arizona v. Tucson Greyhound Park, Inc., Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee. American Greyhound Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Western Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Tp Racing Lllp, an Arizona Limited Liability Partnership v. Jane Dee Hull, Governor of Arizona State of Arizona Janet Napolitano, Attorney General of the State of Arizona Richard Romley, County Attorney of Maricopa County, Arizona State of Arizona v. Tucson Greyhound Park, Inc., Plaintiff-Intervenor. American Greyhound Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Western Racing, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Tp Racing Lllp, an Arizona Limited Liability Partnership v. Jane Dee Hull, Governor of Arizona State of Arizona Janet Napolitano, Attorney General of the State of Arizona State of Arizona, and Richard Romley, County Attorney of Maricopa County, Arizona v. Tucson Greyhound Park, Inc., Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant

305 F.3d 1015 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 19, 2002

Indeed, some courts have held that sovereign immunity forecloses in favor of tribes the entire balancing process under Rule 19(b), but we have continued to follow the four-factor process even with immune tribes. … In any event, the Supreme Courts of Arizona and New Mexico have clearly pointed out the limits of the Clark ruling.

Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

621 F.2d 323 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 28, 1980

Footnote 16 of Illinois Brick, which apparently establishes an exception to the ban on pass-on theories “where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer,” is only illustrative of the real exception: where … If the plaintiff purchased a defendant’s goods through the defendant’s own wholesaling division, the plaintiff would qualify as a “direct purchaser” from the corporate defendant and could sue for the entire amount of the

Arizona Public Service Company, an Arizona Corporation v. Jayne Aspaas, Virgil Kirk, Sr., Wallace Charley, Helen Bonnaha, Roger Pablo, Roy Begay, Honorable Tom Tso, Honorable Homer Bluehouse, and Honorable Raymond D. Austin, Arizona Public Service Company, an Arizona Corporation v. Jayne Aspaas, Virgil Kirk, Sr., Wallace Charley, Helen Bonnaha, Roger Pablo, Roy Begay, Honorable Tom Tso, Honorable Homer Bluehouse, and Honorable Raymond D. Austin

77 F.3d 1128 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 11, 1996

We review a district court's determination of federal question jurisdiction de novo, but we accept the district court's factual findings on jurisdictional issues unless clearly erroneous. Stock West, Inc. v. … Indian tribes may not be sued absent an express and unequivocal waiver of immunity by the tribe or abrogation of tribal immunity of Congress. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.

Marceau v. Blackfeet Housing Authority

519 F.3d 838 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 19, 2008

In our earlier opinion, we held that the Blackfeet Tribe waived tribal immunity through the enabling ordinance that established the Housing Authority. 3 Marceau, 455 F.3d *843 at 978-83 . … The Blackfeet Tribal Court of Appeals held that the original Housing Authority enabling ordinance “is an indisputable qualified waiver of immunity by the Blackfeet Tribe and housing authority for a breach of contract action

Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

639 F.3d 876 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 9, 2010

ODNI VIII of the Act, section 802, “Procedures for Implementing Statutory Defenses,” established the immunity procedure. … Though this may be a closer question than the government describes, we assume without deciding that the documents at issue here qualify as “similar files.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Phonetele, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

664 F.2d 716 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 3, 1981

of necessity may be established as a matter of fact in individual cases. … This would also put a clearly improper burden upon the manufacturers and users of other devices.

Mabel Grunnet v. United States

730 F.2d 573 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 10, 1984

Consequently, this alleged act of negligence is immune from suit under the foreign country exception. … Grunnet has wholly failed to establish any duty on the part of the United States to warn Patricia’s relatives that the People’s Temple posed a danger to her.

Dufresne v. Veneman

114 F.3d 952 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 9, 1997

Her claim for money damages from the federal defendants is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Lane v. … .-, -, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2097 , 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (“The clarity of expression necessary to establish a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages ... is lacking in the text of the relevant provisions

Langham v. Noyd

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 23, 2025

is entitled to qualified immunity. … And none of the cases cited by the majority provide clearly established law. Start with United States v. Place.