Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • James Galdikas, Catherine Hansen, Carol D. Hedgspeth v. Stuart I. Fagan, Paula Wolff, Harry Klein

    342 F.3d 684 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 16, 2003

    Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. 4 However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied … The plaintiffs, of course, argue that GSU qualified as a public forum during the alumni events.

    Abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (2004)Cited 51 timesPublished
  • Deputy, Doris v. Lehman Brothers Inc

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 29, 2003

    Specifically, in her opinion letter Marsh stated: “This opinion is qualified as my examination was made from photocopies. … Thus, factually the district court clearly erred.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Dennis G. Antzoulatos

    962 F.2d 720 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 29, 1992

    Even if we were to accept that Antzoula-tos has a generalized liberty interest in selling lawfully acquired cars, we do not believe that the interest stretches so widely to immunize Antzoulatos’ conduct in this case. … The district judge’s determination in this regard is a finding of fact that we may overturn only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • United States v. Wash, Kevin

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 2, 2000

    Wash contends that neither Consuela Jones nor Antonio Jones were qualified as experts on the issue of controlled substances and therefore the testimony they presented was lay opinion. … This court must uphold such findings unless they are clearly erroneous." Tringali, 71 F.3d at 1381 (citations omitted).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • National Railway Labor Conference v. International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers

    830 F.2d 741 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 21, 1987

    In M-K-T the Court held that injunctions restraining unions from striking during minor disputes could be qualified by conditions against self-help by the railroad “at least where they [the conditions] are designed not only … Despite the contrary arguments of the unions we do not think this finding clearly erroneous, and when this dispute is viewed in its light we are *748 constrained to conclude that even applying substantial impact analysis,

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • United States v. Sanapaw, Roger D.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 27, 2004

    Gavic, 520 F.2d 1346, 1352 (8th 1 Although Sanapaw provides no citations in his brief to establish the polytypic nature of marijuana, United States v. … As even Sanapaw admits, strict construction of statutory language “is to be avoided when the result would be senseless or clearly at odds with the evident purpose of the statute.” See Veprinsky v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ronald Sweatt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co

    796 F.3d 701 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 6, 2015

    Clearly then, Sweatt’s injury manifested itself well be- fore November 30, 2009—the critical three-year mark from his filing in district court. See Green v. … The comparators, therefore, are not directly comparable in all material re- spects, Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846, and Sweatt cannot establish his prima facie case for race discrimination.

    Cited 133 timesPublished
  • Judith Volovsek v. Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection

    344 F.3d 680 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 18, 2003

    The plaintiff must establish that 1) she is a member of a protected class (or performed the protected act of filing a complaint), 2) she is qualified for the position or, if already employed, has met the defendant’s legitimate … If these elements are established, the prima facie case of intentional discrimination is established and the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id.

    Cited 113 timesPublished
  • Johnson, Michelle v. West, Togo D.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 5, 2000

    That burden requires the employer to establish two points, not just one. … Johnson does not point to anything to suggest these findings are clearly erroneous.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Anne Dolder, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Lawrence Dolder, Iii, Deceased v. Martinton Township, a Municipal Corporation

    998 F.2d 499 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 26, 1993

    Kirsehner established that Schoonveld was not intoxicated. … That clearly is not the case before us. Therefore, we disagree with the district court and hold that it should not have entered the JNOV in favor of the plaintiff on the question of comparative negligence. II.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Irene GARFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

    732 F.2d 605 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 24, 1984

    This finding was essential to the conclusion that she could perform her previous jobs and, therefore, did not qualify for disability benefits. … The Social Security Act, as amended in 1980, provides for remand of cases in several situations, none of which clearly apply in this case.

    Cited 365 timesPublished
  • McGeshick v. Choucair

    9 F.3d 1229 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 15, 1993

    McGeshick had failed not only to establish who at the clinic was negligent, but also to establish how the alleged negligence affected Mr. MeGeshick’s condition. … Clearly his testimony does not establish either the Clinic’s breach or how this breach caused Mr. McGeshick’s injuries. In addition, Dr. Millikan testified on Mr. MeGeshick’s behalf.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • United States v. Rafael Mercado Berrios

    53 F.4th 1071 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 18, 2022

    Mercado also established that Alexis had not used marijuana. … Beyond these two comments by Carter as Alexis, Mercado points to what he believes are “plus” factors that qualify the government’s conduct here as inducement. We consider each in turn. 1.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Joshua Kanter v. CIR

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 1, 2009

    That evidence, the Commissioner believes, establishes that money flowed from the Five to Kanter, Lisle, and Ballard. … To determine whether someone qualifies as a partner, this court consults whether, considering all the facts—the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. v. The Home Indemnity Company

    773 F.2d 121 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 30, 1985

    The district court initially found that, since the accident occurred at a clearly covered location, it met the test under the Declarations of having occurred "at or from" such a covered workplace. … We believe the prepositions "at or from" used in connection with "workplace" are intended to establish the relationship of "operations" involving an employee to a workplace.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 45,581 Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services, Inc. v. Joseph Leean

    122 F.3d 443 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 14, 1997

    Insofar as the suit seeks damages from a state official in his official capacity, it is clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 , 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). … Such a law would prima facie violate the right to travel or relocate from one state to another, a right that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by the privileges and immunities clauses in Article IV and the Fourteenth

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Frances B. Smith v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a Body Politic

    853 F.2d 517 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 22, 1988

    Temporary employees are those who have not taken, or been qualified by, an examination given by the City of Chicago. … But the rules, even if constitutional in their application, seem clearly deficient in allowing this bizarre scenario to unfold.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Robert E. Disch v. Faye F. Rasmussen

    417 F.3d 769 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 9, 2005

    If she is arguing that orders of discharge are somehow immune from reconsideration because of their very nature, we must again disagree. … We do not read Bozeman as establishing such a bright-line rule.

    Cited 59 timesPublished
  • In the Matter of Palmer Trading, Inc. Appeal of Irving Gordon, Trustee

    695 F.2d 1012 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 17, 1983

    Having established that the unorthodox business practices were deceitful, the bankruptcy court briefly addressed the third ground of its holding. … The district court, conceding the impropriety of the affiliates’ bookkeeping and business practices, nonetheless concluded that GNB’s aim of reorganizing its business in order to qualify for a license was not unlawful and

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Lowell Peterson v. Kenneth E. Lindner, Secretary of the Department of Administration, State of Wisconsin

    765 F.2d 698 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 25, 1985

    For court reporters hired after August 1, 1978, the salary range is established in § 20.923(7), Wis.Stats. This salary range is not tied to the former county supplement pay system. … Eliminating all supplements, on the other hand, would have required many court reporters to take a cut from their existing salaries and might have resulted in the loss of some reporters, at least some of whom were presumably qualified

    Cited 74 timesPublished

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