Case law

Lewis v. Quality Coal Corporation

270 F.2d 140 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 24, 1959

It contends that plaintiffs cannot sue as trustees, for the reason that no trust has ever arisen or been established as to the money sued for, because no money had ever been transferred or delivered to the alleged Fund. … It is a case where the provision is qualified by its own terms so that it meets the test of legality.

Hsuan Wei v. Robert Robinson, District Director, Etc.

246 F.2d 739 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 28, 1957

September 27, 1954—-Waiver, by Wei, of rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities under § 247(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. March 2, 1955—Hearing on Wei’s claims under § 6, Refugee Relief Act. … Clearly from the foregoing time-table, the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 followed after Wei legally entered the United States, 66 Stat. 281 , 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.

Liu, Mei D. v. Ashcroft, John

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 17, 2004

Background The BIA found that even if it accepted Mei Dan’s testi- mony as true, she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. … The Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims advises that “harm a child fears or has suffered . . . may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution.”

Brad Sandefur v. Thomas Dart

979 F.3d 1145 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 4, 2020

His application identified his qualifying disability as os- teoarthritis or a “knee condition.” … To establish an ADA discrimi- nation claim, Sandefur must show that he: (1) was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) was qualified to perform the essential functions of the relevant job either with or with- out reasonable

Christel Van Dyke v. Linda Fultz

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 2, 2020

Johnson, as social workers contracted by DCFS, were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim because there was no clearly established law prohibiting them from entering a foster home without a warrant … Van Dyke argued that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because an Illinois statute gives foster parents the right to reasonable notice before terminating a foster placement. Ms.

Cady v. City of Chicago

43 F.3d 326 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 28, 1994

He alleged that the requirement violated the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the corresponding provisions of the Illinois Constitution. … Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Cady’s goal was to obtain “the ability to exercise his own First Amendment rights — to get an uncensored forum for distribution of his own religious literature.

Arnold Mulzer, Roland Mulzer and Edgar Mulzer, Partners, Etc., (Cross-Appellants) v. J. A. Jones Construction Company, (Cross-Appellee)

397 F.2d 498 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 26, 1968

And from our review of the record we find no basis for concluding that any of the critical factual findings of the District Court are clearly erroneous. … We conclude on this phase of the case that the court’s finding that the plaintiffs delivered an unseaworthy barge is not clearly erroneous.

United States v. John L. Carraway, John H. Bond

108 F.3d 745 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 5, 1997

Such testimony is obviously more than sufficient to establish her culpable involvement as a co-conspirator. … The jury clearly believed that despite her claims of innocence, Wiggins had taken an active role in the conspiracy, and we have no reason to disturb that judgment. 2.

Vladimirova, Detelin v. Ashcroft, John D.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 26, 2004

Vladimirova suffered was insuffi- cient to establish a claim of asylum. He relied upon our opinion in Zalega v. … Clearly, she has not shown that the religious practice of the Word of Life Church extends to other area [sic] of the country.

Daniel Makiel v. Kim Butler

782 F.3d 882 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 10, 2015

Application The state court’s decision that Makiel was not denied his right to compulsory process was not an unreasonable appli- cation of clearly established federal law. … established law.

Roger Whitmore's Automotive Services, Inc. v. Lake County

424 F.3d 659 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 22, 2005

We also conclude that Roger has not established open- ended continuity. … At the time Roger filed his suit, under clearly established law, Lake County was not a proper party defendant under the apparent theory of joint or vicarious liability that Roger pleaded. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Cannon v. University of Chicago

559 F.2d 1063 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 27, 1976

In order for an individual to state a claim under the Act, that individual must be qualified to accept employment and only then have been discriminated against on the basis of age. … Plaintiff’s reliance upon these decisions is clearly misplaced. Title IX, while mentioned in the decisions, was not relied upon as establishÍing jurisdiction.

Hoosier Veneer Co. v. Trusts & Guarantee Co.

283 F. 1 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 22, 1921

The court clearly has jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he thus invokes its aid. … There was no necessity of publication of notice in the federal court in order to warn *8 tlie defendant of the proceeding; he knew of it, and to a qualified extent had appeared in it.”

Bayview-Lofberg's, Inc. v. City Of Milwaukee

905 F.2d 142 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 13, 1990

Sec. 1983 has two elements. (1) The action must have been under color of state law, and (2) the action complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of … Whether there is an overconcentration of licensed establishments in the neighborhood. 27 * * * * * * 28 c-1-f.

Christel Van Dyke v. Linda Fultz

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 2, 2020

Johnson, as social workers contracted by DCFS, were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim because there was no clearly established law prohibiting them from entering a foster home without a warrant … Van Dyke argued that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because an Illinois statute gives foster parents the right to reasonable notice before terminating a foster placement. Ms.

Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development

511 F.3d 707 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 28, 2007

Circuit thought would be a stringent requirement of but-for causation, but it did so solely for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7) (“FSIA”). … By the terms of the FSIA, foreign states are immune from suit in U.S. courts unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 .

United States v. Juan R. Salazar

983 F.2d 778 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 6, 1993

As always in reviewing sentencing decisions, we apply a clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s resolution of that issue (United States v. Hoffman, 957 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir.1992)). … Without the benefit of Jaramillo’s immunized statements, the government viewed that as a very close question which, being that close, should be resolved in Jaramillo’s favor due to his acceptance of personal responsibility

Cecil Wren, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. Nolan Jones, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees

635 F.2d 1277 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 12, 1981

As a procedural matter, the burden of establishing such justification rests upon the defendant. … If the plaintiffs are to recover, the court (or jury) must expressly find that plaintiffs would not have been discharged “but for” the constitutionally immunized activity.

United States v. Gary Williams

738 F.2d 172 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 18, 1984

This court on occasion has tried to establish a formula for striking the delicate balance between prejudice to the defendant and the cause of delay. … Further, the circumstances do not clearly corroborate Berrant’s alleged statements to Vervlied.

Shelby County State Bank, an Illinois Banking Corporation v. Van Diest Supply Company

303 F.3d 832 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 17, 2002

Ambiguity of the “After-Acquired” Clause In the process of divining the meaning of a contractual clause, a court must first establish whether the language in dispute supports more than one interpretation. … The underlying rationale for the decision is equally applicable here: for the notice requirement to be a vabd instrument of protection for potential creditors, that notice must be clearly expressed, and it must be such as