Case law

James E. Pinkston v. Anthony Madry and Janiene Grisselle

440 F.3d 879 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 14, 2006

Under the clearly erroneous standard we may not “reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because ... [we] would have decided the case differently.” Anderson v. … At the evidentiary hearing Pinkston failed to establish either prong of this long-standing test.

Zachary Mulholland v. Marion County Election Board

746 F.3d 811 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 20, 2014

The district court agreed, holding that any injunction limiting the Board’s ability to subpoena Mulholland to a hearing about the slating violation would “clearly interfere with the ongoing state administrative proceedings … immunity to a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Orville Oney v. Leroy Nennig, Jr., Wolfgang Schrauth, Richard Davis

142 F.3d 440 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 27, 1998

In analyzing the defense of qualified immunity, this court first looks to whether the alleged conduct set out a constitutional violation and whether the constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question … Moreover, even if the affidavit had not been sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary for the warrant, Nennig still would be entitled to qualified immunity.

United States v. Lewis, DeWayne

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 15, 2005

Agent Loran’s affidavits, however, do not clearly indicate what the employees witnessed. … There is nothing “official” about Lewis’s action, and thus it does not qualify for the exemption recognized by § 1515(c).

Harris Trust And Savings Bank v. Provident Life And Accident Insurance Company

57 F.3d 608 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 14, 1995

Sec. 1002 (21)(A). 24 Plaintiffs contend that Provident has the type of discretionary authority and responsibility necessary to qualify as a plan fiduciary, and is therefore liable for any breach of its contractual and fiduciary … To establish entitlement to the relief it seeks, Campbell must, therefore, demonstrate that: 39 (1) [it] had a reasonable expectation of payment, (2) the [plaintiffs] should reasonably have expected to pay, or (3) society's

Charles Doll v. Jesse Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

75 F.3d 1200 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 18, 1996

Liability was established here by the fact that the Rehabilitation Act imposes on federal employers a positive duty (here violated) of accommodation to any known physical or mental handicap of a qualified applicant or employee … Clearly the judge did not have an absolute duty to order Doll reinstated. But if he had a reason not to order Doll made foreman — concern with friction in the workplace, cf. Avitia v.

United States v. Michael Nagel

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 24, 2009

The factual basis for the plea established that Nagel had extensive sexually explicit computer chats and phone conver- sations with “Maria,” who identified herself as a 14-year- old girl from Milwaukee. … As indicated above, the legislative history clearly indicates a congressional belief that at- tempted sexual enticement of a minor is a serious offense even where a law enforcement agent poses as the minor victim and that

Porter B. Williamson v. Bendix Corporation

289 F.2d 389 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 27, 1961

Navy in order to qualify him for work which required such clearance. … This is a corporation policy which is well established and well understood.

Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners

708 F.3d 921 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 26, 2013

B ACKGROUND In Wisconsin, police recruits must successfully complete a period of probation before becoming fully qualified officers. … We established earlier that we can no longer grant relief to Ramskugler.

In Re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation

630 F.3d 622 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 29, 2010

Yet the question’s narrowness should not dis- qualify it, at least in the rather special circumstances presented by the appeal. … Twombly, even more clearly than its successor, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.

Wesley-Jessen Division of Schering Corporation v. Bausch & Lomb Incorporated

698 F.2d 862 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 19, 1983

WesleyJessen contends that the court, by relying on books not in evidence, in effect took judicial notice of the contents, which did not qualify for Rule 201 notice. … The district court concluded that Bausch & Lomb would likely establish that U3 and U4 are protectible trademarks because they had acquired secondary meaning.

United States v. Long

639 F.3d 293 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 22, 2011

Nos. 09-3493 & 09-3636 11 specified in the counts of conviction that qualify as “relevant conduct” under the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) & cmt. 12. … The affidavit here was more than adequate to establish necessity, especially under our deferential standard of review.

Peabody Coal Company v. Benefits Review Board

560 F.2d 797 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 16, 1977

Hence, to be fair, he qualified his statement. … First, the doctor's determination was qualified rather than certain.

Sanchez v. Edgar

710 F.2d 1292 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 11, 1983

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 , 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) as empowering him to cut corners in protection of persons with qualified immunity against frivolous litigation. … One still may hope some better way to establish the facts will be found than the fishing expedition the appellants desire. The state admits that a memo exists.

Ecos Electronics Corporation, an Illinois Corporation v. Underwriters Laboratories

743 F.2d 498 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 10, 1984

The district court found that UL established ECOS’s failure to submit its tester. … ECOS’s claim, although couched in terms of deprivation of an “unfettered opportunity” to sell its product, is clearly directed toward lessening competition.

Pamela K. Larsen and Peter A. Larsen v. City of Beloit, Daniel T. Kelley, and Richard v. Holm

130 F.3d 1278 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 5, 1997

. § 1983 must possess two elements: the conduct complained of must have been under color of state law, and it must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the … The case is clearly distinguishable, however, because it involved the firefighter’s substantive entitlement to the payments themselves, rather than the right to a particular method of payment. 2.

Bennie Bailey v. Northern Indiana Public Service Company

910 F.2d 406 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 9, 1990

The vast majority of his claims — discriminatory job assignments, discipline, denial of sick leave pay and “bird-dogging” — are clearly no longer actionable under § 1981. Cf. … The record reveals that Bailey did not establish these elements.

Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.

653 F.3d 582 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 8, 2011

Kraft says that all of the applicants were sufficiently qualified for the job, so it hired according to seniority. … At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs’ brief does not clearly state whether Robles is pursuing a disparate pay or a failure-to-promote claim.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 2150 v. Nextera Energy Point Beach, LLC

762 F.3d 592 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 11, 2014

Pursuant to those standards, we find that the Union’s grievance, on its face, clearly falls within the scope of the White Book arbitration clause. … The program was unilaterally established, and it no more forcefully establishes a mutual intent to exclude covered material from arbitration than the fact that NextEra employed its own internal disciplinary procedures establishes

Loyola University of Chicago, Cross-Appellant v. Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Cross-Appellee

905 F.2d 1061 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 21, 1990

statutory jurisdiction, or falling short of statutory right; reached in violation of established *1067 procedure; or unsupported by substantial evidence.” … In reaching the determination that offset was appropriate under 42 C.F.R. § 405.423 (1982), the Secretary merely found that “the funds were clearly restricted because they were designated specifically for research and education