Case law

Patel v. Holder

387 F. App'x 639 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 3, 2010

The Board concluded that the IJ’s denial of his application for asylum was not based on clearly erroneous facts. … To qualify for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3), an alien is required to establish there exists a “clear probability” — i.e., it is more likely than not — he will be subjected to persecution in the proposed

Joseph Mitchell v. Gary L. Clayton

962 F.2d 10 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 3, 1992

immunity. … The defendants now appeal from the denial of qualified immunity pursuant to Mitchell v.

Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority

892 F.2d 583 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 15, 1990

Under this rationale, § 1985(3)’s protection would clearly extend to white persons and whites as a class of persons. … Clearly, discrimination against an Hispanic was no more in the mind of Congress in 1871 than was discrimination against whites.

Unicon Management Corp. v. City of Chicago

404 F.2d 627 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 20, 1968

The court was influenced by the introductory clause of GC120 and considered the body of the Section to be too ambiguous to immunize the City from paying damages for any delays. … Although Article 30 was entitled “Unavoidable Delays,” the Illinois Supreme Court held that the title was “a mere recital and can not be construed as limiting or controlling matters covered by clearly expressed stipulations

Knapp v. United States

110 F.2d 420 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 24, 1940

He entered the service on September 19, 1917; on September 21, 1917, he was examined at Camp Taylor, Kentucky, and found physically qualified for military service. … Tyrakowski, 7 Cir., 50 F.2d 766, 771 , and the finding should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52, 28 U.S.C.A. .following § 723c.

Linda Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 8, 2019

Toledo,  446  U.S.  635,  640–41  (1980)  (qualified  immunity  is  affirmative defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; relevant facts are  peculiarly  within  knowledge  and  control  of  defendant);  Wright  &  Miller,  Federal  … Four elements  must be satisfied to establish a violation of Section 504: (1) the  plaintiff must be a handicapped individual as defined by the  Act; (2) the plaintiff must be “otherwise qualified” for partic‐ ipation in the

United States v. Timothy Durham

766 F.3d 672 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 4, 2014

Simply continuing to holding [sic] a security does not qualify. … But he inadver- tently omitted the qualifier “if.”

Illinois Bible Colleges Ass'n v. Anderson

870 F.3d 631 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 29, 2017

After graduating from high school, students who go on to college hope to receive a degree to qualify for future employment. … Establishment Clause The Bible Colleges first argue that the Illinois higher-education statutes violate the Establishment Clause which, of course, provides that “Congress shall make no law' respecting an establishment of

Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority

100 F.3d 1287 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 20, 1996

The Court has clearly abandoned the content-neutrality standard, but the relevance of motive in the Court’s opinions has varied. … Although Lubavitch’s viewpoint discrimination claim clearly derives from a long line of Free Speech Clause case law, Lubaviteh argues on appeal that amended Rule 13 also violates the Establishment Clause.

United States v. Rafael Lozano

511 F.2d 1 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 7, 1975

Although it was clearly false to say that the parties had resided together at Lozano’s address since the date of the marriage, the indictment did not make that charge. … He first asserts that the interpreters who translated Pantoja’s testimony were not properly qualified; were biased in that they were employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and mistranslated an important phrase

United States v. Damon Pippen, Kenya Lark, and Thomas Jones

115 F.3d 422 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 20, 1997

sentencing hearing: Based on everything that’s in front of me, the evidence that I heard, the Lark trial, the documents that were presented, the Defendant’s own statement, that there is no doubt in my mind that [Pippen] does qualify … While this may have been hearsay, it is well established that the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings, see United States v.

Alicia Royal v. Myikell Payne

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 2, 2022

Nevertheless, the court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even accepting Royal’s facts as true, the rights she sought to vindicate were not clearly established by precedent. … When qualified immunity—as here—is raised as a defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that there was a violation of a “clearly established” right. Humphries v.

Arthur P. Baird, II v. Cecil Davis, Superintendent

388 F.3d 1110 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 12, 2004

Ordinarily of course a litigant can ask a lower federal court for an innovative constitutional interpretation, such as a new immunity from the death penalty. … The opening brief quoted subsection (c)(6) as well as (c)(2), and said that “the evidence presented at Baird’s trial and at his sentencing hearing clearly established the existence of both statutory mitigators.”

Klunk v. County Of St. Joseph

170 F.3d 772 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 19, 1999

Thus, the rule clearly contemplates that a factual dispute regarding one element of a claim or defense will not bar judgment as a matter of law if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the other elements … Under facts similar to this case, the district court refused to grant summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity.

Mei Dan Liu v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States

380 F.3d 307 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 17, 2004

Background The BIA found that even if it accepted Mei Dan’s testimony as true, she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. … The Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims advises that “harm a child fears or has suffered ... may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution.”

United States v. Jose Manuel Anaya-Ag

704 F.3d 514 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 10, 2013

The relationship of the privilege against self-incrimination to a defendant’s voluntary decision to make a mitigating argument at sentencing for which he clearly has the burden of proof is tenuous at best. … assessment of the number of pro- grams for which he would not qualify.” 675 F.3d at 636.

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Tommy G. Thompson

161 F.3d 449 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 17, 1998

United States, 391 U.S. 404 , 88 S.Ct. 1705 , 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968) (recognizing the Tribe’s immunity from state hunting and fishing rules on reservation lands under the 1854 Treaty). … Clearly, by the terms of the 1848 Treaty, the Menominee relinquished title to their Wisconsin land.

Derrick Searcy v. Danny D. Jaimet, Warden, Hill Correctional Center

332 F.3d 1081 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 23, 2003

The Supreme Court has stated that only “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta,” of that Court’s deci *1088 sions qualify as “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of AEDPA. Williams v. … The state court’s application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v.

In the Matter of Joseph E. Namoff and Julius Namoff, Etc., Alleged Bankrupt v. Hyland Electrical Supply Company

275 F.2d 14 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 22, 1960

This broad statutory power bestowed upon a district court is qualified by General Order in Bankruptcy 47, following Section 53, which provides, “ * * * the report of a referee * * * shall set forth his findings of fact and … conclusions of law, and the judge shall accept his findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.”

Gateway Eastern Railway Co. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis

35 F.3d 1134 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 14, 1994

First, we note that we are bound by the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. … Thus, the findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous and shall not be disturbed. Cf. International Kennel Club v.