Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Van Zandt v. Thompson

    839 F.2d 1215 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 29, 1988

    But we think a room decorated and furnished with its own symbols and employed in its own way, speaks for itself far more clearly and authoritatively than does a moment of silence in the schools. … Thus, if accommodation referred only to those exceptions to the general rules of nonestablishment that are mandated by free exercise, H.R. 408 would not qualify as an accommodation. 37 The second, more expansive meaning of

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Mark Mlsna v. Union Pacific Railroad Compan

    975 F.3d 629 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 14, 2020

    . § 227.115, railroads must establish a hearing conservation pol‐ icy with programs to protect the hearing of vulnerable em‐ ployees. … Pretext is the third step in the three‐step burden shifting pro‐ cess established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–07 (1973).

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • United States v. Mandel

    15 F. App'x 369 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 31, 2001

    Stack qualified for the mortgage, and the Giampas kept the house and the loan money. Mandel and Carcerano paid Stack for her participation and Mandel received over $10,000 in commissions on the transaction. … Well, given that, and given all the facts contained in the [PSR], I, once again, just will state that I find that the use of the supervisory enhancement is appropriate and is established by a preponderance of the evidence

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • United States v. Brian Fenner

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 25, 2025

    Most of it was clearly proper, summarizing the con- tent of voluminous financial documents and communications from and between Fenner and Birkley. … We have never held that a statement short of express acceptance of liability is immune from a Bruton challenge. See United States v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Oliver W. Picketts

    655 F.2d 837 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 17, 1981

    defendant’s guilt, the prosecution had to establish that he lied as to each of the six named electricians. … We find that materiality of the declarations of Picketts to the grand jury was proved clearly.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • United States v. Dennis Birkley

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 25, 2025

    Most of it was clearly proper, summarizing the con- tent of voluminous financial documents and communications from and between Fenner and Birkley. … We have never held that a statement short of express acceptance of liability is immune from a Bruton challenge. See United States v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Indianapolis Power and Light Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America

    687 F.2d 1098 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 3, 1982

    IPL’s construction treats the Section as if it came to a full stop after “enacted,” and the language about antitrust immunity did not exist. … Before the passage of the Staggers Act, rate bureaus enjoyed the broad antitrust immunity under 49 U.S.C. 10706(a)(2)(A).

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • United States v. Fermin P. Castillo

    814 F.2d 351 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 10, 1987

    Miller testified, under a grant of immunity, that when first hired he was told his sales pitch to investors would be that their money would be reinvested (to gain control over United Savings or in real estate) at a great … “The standard of review of a determination that a statement is admissible as a co-conspirator’s declaration is the clearly erroneous standard.” Andrus, 775 F.2d at 840 ; United States v.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • United States v. Kasuboski

    834 F.2d 1345 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 31, 1987

    Rule 36(b) provides that a matter admitted is "conclusively established." Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b). Summary judgment is provided for in Rule 56. … so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Granite City Steel Company v. Environmental Protection Agency

    501 F.2d 925 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 22, 1974

    As against that attack, the dates are clearly reasonable and must be upheld, for they cannot all be delayed without violating the previously established December 31, 1974, compliance date. … It may seek to qualify for an extension of time under several Sections of the Act.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Western Radio Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission

    339 F.2d 937 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 23, 1964

    forth in conjunction therewith. *939 No objection was made before the Commission to the order to cease and desist from representing (c) That any product is guaranteed unless the terms and conditions of such guarantee are clearly … Reference to the Commission’s opinion shows that the word “establish” there was qualified to mean “unless they are able to establish.”

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Wisconsin Right to Life State v. Timothy Vocke

    751 F.3d 804 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 14, 2014

    defeat of a candidate who is clearly identified.” … Under the new law, any communication made within 60 days of an election that “‘includes a reference to … a clearly identified candidate’” qualified as a communication made for political purposes, thus triggering political-committee

    Cited 60 timesPublished
  • Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan

    697 F.3d 464 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 10, 2012

    Illinois defines “electioneering communication” as: any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, including radio, television, or Internet communication, that (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate ..., clearly … That makes sense only if they each already qualify as political committees independent of the particular transfer.

    Cited 106 timesPublished
  • Toliver, Stephen v. McCaughtry, Gary R.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 27, 2008

    Toliver] was not prej- udiced by his trial counsel’s failure to call Angeal Toliver and Harvey Toliver is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court prece- dent.” … Toliver contends that the Wisconsin appellate court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it determined that the information con- tained in Smith’s letter did not constitute material, excul

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Jason Dade

    787 F.3d 1165 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 3, 2015

    Because the court did not clearly err in applying the adjustment, we affirm. I. … Dade encouraged Buyer A to acquire a third property, and Chism told Dade how much income Buyer A would need to qualify for another loan.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • United States v. William C. Brown

    742 F.2d 363 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 22, 1984

    According to Brown, the government failed to establish that every individual listed on the time sheets was certified. … Since physicians provide many kinds of treatment, Medicare has developed guidelines for determining which items qualify for reimbursement.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • United States v. Correy Jefferson

    334 F.3d 670 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 2, 2003

    “[A] constructive amendment occurs where proof at trial goes beyond the parameters of the indictment in that it establishes offenses different from or in addition to those charged by the grand jury. … While we agree with the general approach of Monteleone , its holding is not as clearly applicable here as the government would have us believe.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • George LYNCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELDEN AND COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee

    882 F.2d 262 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 16, 1989

    Lynch clearly informed the jury that his discrimination claims (whether characterized as refusal to transfer or as failure to promote) were based on his failure to receive these two positions. … In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by the indirect method, a plaintiff need only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he applied for an available position for which he was qualified, but

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • David H. Orth and Barbara A. Orth v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    813 F.2d 837 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 9, 1987

    The sales took place in 1978 and January of 1979____ In light of stipulations 19 and 21, the taxpayers argue that the fair market value established by the Commissioner and af *841 firmed by the tax court, $100 per lithograph … The tax court’s finding on fair market value “must stand unless it is clearly erroneous.” Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir.1964).

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc.

    736 F.2d 394 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 30, 1984

    Greyhound did make clear that an employer could establish the second aspect of a BFOQ by demonstrating either that substantially all individuals over the qualifying age are unable to perform the job or that it is impractical … In McDonnell Douglas the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (i) that he belongs to a protected group; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer

    Cited 23 timesPublished

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