Case law

Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 12, 2021

It was not clearly established that their decision to fire at Green in light of that concern was unreasonable. … A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity when his or her conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. E.g., Kisela v.

Grayson, Mickey R. v. City of Chicago

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 28, 2003

Cir. 2002) (holding that an employee cannot establish an adverse action on the basis that a reassignment deprives him of prestige). … However, should there be in the future a possible promotion to a clearly higher (with higher responsibilities, salary or benefits) position open to both a Foreman and to a Sub-foreman, an actual promotion, it might well be

Richard Cullom v. Jesse Brown, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs

209 F.3d 1035 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 20, 2000

Thus, it qualifies as an “adverse action” for purposes of Title VII (and the VA concedes as much). See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir.1998). … The question is whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Cullom “established a causal link between his protected expression in filing EEO complaints and his failure to be promoted.”

David W. Erickson, Doing Business as Erickson Hair and Scalp Specialists v. Federal Trade Commission

272 F.2d 318 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 19, 1959

From the record before us we find that the following relevant facts were well established. … The Commission’s qualified medical witnesses testified that most eases of baldness are accounted for by a condition known as male pattern baldness.

34 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1622, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,535, 5 Employee Benefits Ca 1745 Gerry W. Monroe, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervening v. United Air Lines, Inc., and Air Line Pilots Association International, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. Lee F. Higman, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervening v. United Airlines, Inc., and Air Line Pilots Association International, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. Eugene J. Gorman v. United Airlines, Inc.

736 F.2d 394 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 21, 1984

Greyhound did make clear that an employer could establish the second aspect of a BFOQ by demonstrating either that substantially all individuals over the qualifying age are unable to perform the job or that it is impractical … In McDonnell Douglas the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (i) that he belongs to a protected group; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer

Levin v. Attorney Registration And Disciplinary Commission Of Illinois

74 F.3d 763 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 20, 1996

If his disbarment stands, Levin would no longer have a personal stake in a general declaration that the Illinois bar rules, which only apply to lawyers, are unconstitutional. 5 Because Levin could not establish more than … Il.Sup.Ct.R. 383(a) (1995) 3 Revealingly, Levin's federal complaint contains similar claims to those found in his Rule 383 motion, which clearly requested that the Illinois Supreme Court review Levin's disciplinary proceedings

Schmidt v. United States

198 F.2d 32 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 6, 1952

Again the Commission was acting clearly within the scope of its discretionary authority. The same thing is true as to the third act. … It seems therefore to be perfectly clear that under the terms of the applicable statutes the plaintiff in this controversy cannot upon a trial establish a case which would entitle the Tucker Corporation to damages from the

United States v. Rocco E. Infelise, Cross-Appellee, and Ann M. Infelise, Claimant-Appellant

159 F.3d 300 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 23, 1998

The annuity is governed by the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 408 (b), which Infelise argues immunize the asset from criminal forfeiture. … The conclusion they draw is that tainted property does not qualify as a substitute asset.

Sexton Mfg. Co. v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co.

194 F. 56 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 27, 1911

If so, we should think that the legislators would have employed language clearly indicative of such a purpose. Further, light is afforded by a brief review of Illinois mechanic’s lien legislation. … or thereafter to be established by Congress. ' Thus the statute stood till 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 219).

Righi v. SMC Corp.

632 F.3d 404 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 14, 2011

“probable cause” to believe the employee may qualify for FMLA leave). … That said, our caselaw also suggests that an employee may waive his FMLA rights if he clearly expresses to his employer that he does not wish to use the protections of the FMLA. See id.

United States v. Delon Echols

104 F.4th 1023 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 26, 2024

Binding precedent establishes that Burns’ prior consistent statement was made too late to be in- troduced under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). … Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2020) (de- clining to decide whether third element was satisfied because fourth element clearly was not).

Shemika Mitchell v. Durham Enterprises, Inc.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 25, 2024

The estate’s Rooker–Feldman argument is clearly fore- closed by Lance and De Grandy. Subject-matter jurisdiction is secure. … The insurer has the burden to establish that it owes no duty to defend. Id. at 543; see also Allen, 512 S.W.3d at 31.

United States v. Fleischli, Joseph

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 12, 2002

Federal regulations provide that qualified manufacturers may “import and manufacture machine guns . . . for use by dealers qualified under this part as samples as provided in paragraph (d) of this sec- tion.” 27 C.F.R. § … In particular, the court referenced Application Note 2 and then noted: 24 No. 01-2703 And here the government clearly established at trial that the defendant procured

The Reedsburg Bank v. Apollo v. Herbert R. Nicholls and Joan S. Nicholls, Proposed Intervenors-Appellants

508 F.2d 995 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 7, 1975

Since the Nicholls do not contend that the mortgage fails to qualify as a preferred ship mortgage under the definition in 46 U.S.C. § 922 , or that they qualify as lienors, the narrow scope of the in rem foreclosure proceeding … Clearly, the federal court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims relating to guarantees of indebtedness secured by a ship mortgage.

Jackson v. Kotter

541 F.3d 688 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 2, 2008

The FTCA does not specifically address relation back of amendments, but it clearly prohibits actions “begun” after the statute of limitations period: “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred ... unless … Because the FTCA effects a waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity, see United States v.

Mark Mlsna v. Union Pacific Railroad Compan

975 F.3d 629 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 14, 2020

. § 227.115, railroads must establish a hearing conservation pol‐ icy with programs to protect the hearing of vulnerable em‐ ployees. … Pretext is the third step in the three‐step burden shifting pro‐ cess established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–07 (1973).

United States v. Mandel

15 F. App'x 369 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 31, 2001

Stack qualified for the mortgage, and the Giampas kept the house and the loan money. Mandel and Carcerano paid Stack for her participation and Mandel received over $10,000 in commissions on the transaction. … Well, given that, and given all the facts contained in the [PSR], I, once again, just will state that I find that the use of the supervisory enhancement is appropriate and is established by a preponderance of the evidence

United States v. Dennis Birkley

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 25, 2025

Most of it was clearly proper, summarizing the con- tent of voluminous financial documents and communications from and between Fenner and Birkley. … We have never held that a statement short of express acceptance of liability is immune from a Bruton challenge. See United States v.

Indianapolis Power and Light Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America

687 F.2d 1098 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 3, 1982

IPL’s construction treats the Section as if it came to a full stop after “enacted,” and the language about antitrust immunity did not exist. … Before the passage of the Staggers Act, rate bureaus enjoyed the broad antitrust immunity under 49 U.S.C. 10706(a)(2)(A).

Sublett, Lateirra R. v. John Wiley & Sons

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 13, 2006

She therefore has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that: “1) she is a member of a protected group; 2) she was qualified for the position sought; 3) she was rejected for … class and was not as qualified as the plaintiff.