Case law

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  • United States v. Franklin, Cleveland

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 27, 2008

    Consequently, in this court the indictment “is immune from attack unless it is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense by any reasonable construc- tion.” United States v. … Franklin next argues that the mandatory minimum sentences established by Congress in § 841 are an unconsti- tutional deprivation of his due process rights.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • National Labor Relations Board v. Local 307, Plumbers, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry

    469 F.2d 403 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 24, 1972

    Spitale explained that a “fair” contractor was someone who was “fair with us” and who “paid the prevailing wages established in the area,” whereas Meyer hired “foreigners” and did not pay them more than $4.00 an hour. … Thus, if the union’s purpose in picketing were to coerce the secondary employer, and that purpose were communicated to the secondary, formal compliance with the standards will not immunize a union or its agents from an action

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Northern Illinois Gas Company v. United States

    743 F.2d 539 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 13, 1984

    The IRS merely ruled that utility trucks with pintle hooks qualified as "equipped for use” in combination with trailers. … This clearly was interpretative rulemaking, not legislative rulemaking, and thus it was exempt from the procedural requirements of § 553 of the APA. See generally Wing v.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • 34 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1622, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,535, 5 Employee Benefits Ca 1745 Gerry W. Monroe, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervening v. United Air Lines, Inc., and Air Line Pilots Association International, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. Lee F. Higman, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervening v. United Airlines, Inc., and Air Line Pilots Association International, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. Eugene J. Gorman v. United Airlines, Inc.

    736 F.2d 394 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 21, 1984

    Greyhound did make clear that an employer could establish the second aspect of a BFOQ by demonstrating either that substantially all individuals over the qualifying age are unable to perform the job or that it is impractical … In McDonnell Douglas the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (i) that he belongs to a protected group; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.

    768 F.3d 682 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 25, 2014

    Those entities are clearly covered by the statute. … But again, Burlington Northern establishes that not all parties fitting that bill will qualify as arrangers.

    Cited 57 timesPublished
  • Cass County Music Company v. Vasfi Muedini D/B/A Port Town Family Restaurant

    55 F.3d 263 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 16, 1995

    Therefore, chain stores, like Claire’s Boutique, would be able to qualify under the § 110(5) exemption. … (rejecting the size of the establishment as a decisive factor in light of the fact that the Congress "did not even qualify the exemption by limiting its availability to a 'small commercial establishment’ ”), cert. denied,

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • June Carlson v. Scott Bukovic

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 2, 2010

    The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on those same issues and also asserted that Officer Bukovic was entitled to qualified immunity. … The district court also denied Officer Bukovic qualified immunity due to the factual differences. However, the district 7 The parties agreed to have the case tried before a magistrate judge.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Truman Tolson and Darrell Tolson

    988 F.2d 1494 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 19, 1993

    This finding was not clearly erroneous. … is not included in establishing the defendant's offense level under this guideline.”

    Declined to follow by United States v. Cazares, 121 F.3d 1241 (1997)Cited 124 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

    977 F.2d 1106 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 14, 1992

    Freeman [a neurosurgeon] and the claimant tends to establish that the work worsened the original injury and that the claimant was negligent in performing that work because Dr. … Under this test there might be some doubt whether simple negligence could qualify as a supervening cause. But we leave that question to another day.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Coles

    97 F. App'x 665 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 3, 2004

    Chatmon, 324 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir.2003) (constructive possession of a firearm is established by evidence demonstrating control); United States v. … Coles could not establish that the relatedness determination was clearly erroneous, see United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1094-95 (7th Cir.2001), so any effort to press the argument on appeal would be frivolous.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co.

    188 F.3d 709 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 29, 1999

    Eager was qualified to testify as to the conclusions reached by the Joint Research. Dr. … Eager was not qualified to testify as to the health effects of breathing welding fumes and the Plaintiff established this fact during cross-examination; and (3) Jones introduced a substantial amount of evidence to show that

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Levin v. Attorney Registration And Disciplinary Commission Of Illinois

    74 F.3d 763 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 20, 1996

    If his disbarment stands, Levin would no longer have a personal stake in a general declaration that the Illinois bar rules, which only apply to lawyers, are unconstitutional. 5 Because Levin could not establish more than … Il.Sup.Ct.R. 383(a) (1995) 3 Revealingly, Levin's federal complaint contains similar claims to those found in his Rule 383 motion, which clearly requested that the Illinois Supreme Court review Levin's disciplinary proceedings

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Bradford-Scott Data Corporation, Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.

    128 F.3d 504 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 14, 1997

    To obtain a stay of a district court’s judgment, the appellant must establish irreparable harm and a significant probability of success on the merits, against a background norm that appellate courts are reluctant to disturb … Nor does it argue that any individual claim against PCN and VERSYSS is clearly non-arbitrable, making it unnecessary to decide whether a district court could proceed on such a claim even when an appeal confined to a different

    Cited 87 timesPublished
  • James C. Dugan v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services

    957 F.2d 1384 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 18, 1992

    The Secretary’s 1983 decision to reinstate Dugan's disability benefits would initially appear to qualify as such a reenti-tlement decision. … A Social Security memorandum dated July 6, 1981 refers to “copies of documents” in the file which establish that Dugan was convicted of a felony in 1978. Tr. at 162.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • United States v. Alfred Dillard and Marco Garza

    43 F.3d 299 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 20, 1994

    Although Garza testified that he was unaware of the Dillard-Holloway checks, handwriting evidence established that his signature was on two of the checks. … More importantly, the plea agreement is silent as to whether Dillard qualified as a supervisor or a manager under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b).

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • United States v. Bob Brumley

    217 F.3d 905 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 12, 2000

    Brumley objected to this testimony on the ground that the agent was not qualified to testify as an expert. … But the district court was clearly aware that it could depart for an unjustified disparity, and found that the disparity here was justified by the factual circumstances of this particular case.

    Cited 55 timesPublished
  • United States v. Rocco E. Infelise, Cross-Appellee, and Ann M. Infelise, Claimant-Appellant

    159 F.3d 300 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 23, 1998

    The annuity is governed by the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 408 (b), which Infelise argues immunize the asset from criminal forfeiture. … The conclusion they draw is that tainted property does not qualify as a substitute asset.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Earl Billish, John Carasotti, Martin Dunne, Richard A. Graf, John Herling, Edward Jaquszewski, Dennis R. Smith, Henry Scavone and John Schmidt v. City of Chicago and Louis T. Galante, Individually and Officially, Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, John M. Craven and Larry W. Anoman v. Richard M. Daley, Louis T. Galante and Jesse Hoskins, Nos. 90-1650, 90-2182

    962 F.2d 1269 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 8, 1992

    Plaintiffs raised this on appeal as an "Issue for Review," but failed to make any argument to this court other than a brief comment in a footnote to their brief that the grant of qualified immunity was "premature." … Even if the issue were properly briefed, we would not reach it because our disposition of the merits of the case renders moot any question of qualified immunity 5 See Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2 v.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan

    797 F.2d 383 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 21, 1986

    All employee benefit plans must be “established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,” section 1102(a)(1), and ERISA plan administrators are required to act consistently with the Plan’s written terms. … The defendants had clearly complied with both the written terms of the Plan and their fiduciary duties. That should have ended the matter.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Shemika Mitchell v. Durham Enterprises, Inc.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 25, 2024

    The estate’s Rooker–Feldman argument is clearly fore- closed by Lance and De Grandy. Subject-matter jurisdiction is secure. … The insurer has the burden to establish that it owes no duty to defend. Id. at 543; see also Allen, 512 S.W.3d at 31.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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