Case law

Dart Industries, Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company

489 F.2d 1359 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 21, 1973

The record plainly establishes that the completed product was on sale before the critical date. … His own testimony, quoted above, clearly exposes the mixed character of his motivation.

National Labor Relations Board v. Local 307, Plumbers, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry

469 F.2d 403 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 24, 1972

Spitale explained that a “fair” contractor was someone who was “fair with us” and who “paid the prevailing wages established in the area,” whereas Meyer hired “foreigners” and did not pay them more than $4.00 an hour. … Thus, if the union’s purpose in picketing were to coerce the secondary employer, and that purpose were communicated to the secondary, formal compliance with the standards will not immunize a union or its agents from an action

Walter W. Donald v. Polk County

836 F.2d 376 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 13, 1988

Donald’s liberty clearly includes the custody of their minor children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Lossman, 707 F.2d at 290 . … Although collateral estoppel does apply to issues actually litigated in a previous action, the Court in Allen qualified their holding by noting that "this case does not involve the question whether a § 1983 claimant can litigate

Owen A. Moran and Jean B. Moran v. United States

63 F.3d 663 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 24, 1995

Lower courts have since debated what rule Rosenman established or implied. … Given that the tax years in question were 1980 and 1981 and the payments were made in 1985 and 1986, 1991 was clearly too late a date to initiate a refund claim.

Thor Power Tool Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

563 F.2d 861 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 29, 1977

Thor contends that these provisions established a presumption in its favor. … The highly qualified members of the accounting profession Thor called as experts did not testify that its 1964 income had been clearly reflected in its tax return, or that the accounting method used was necessary in order

Pens. Plan Guide P 23918c Raymond K. Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation and Cbi Industries, Incorporated

74 F.3d 786 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 19, 1996

This claim is sufficient to qualify Panaras as a participant for purposes of § 1132(a) standing. III. … It is true that LCI’s old severance plan clearly reserved a right to modify, or even terminate the plan.

Cook County, Illinois v. Chad F. Wolf

962 F.3d 208 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 10, 2020

If Congress has not spoken clearly, then we move on to step two, in which we consider whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a permissible con- struction of the statute. Id. at 843. … But when the term “public charge” was imported into fed- eral law, it was unclear how much state aid qualified someone as a “public charge.”

Laura Hatcher v. Board of Trustees of Southern

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 14, 2016

 better  qualified  for  the  position  at  issue.  … Hatcher’s  tenure  vote  was  more divided than her comparators, so she cannot argue she  was  clearly  better  qualified  for  the  position  at  issue. 

United States v. Carletos E. Hardamon, Also Known as Cj

188 F.3d 843 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 17, 1999

Under the clearly erroneous standard, “ ‘if two permissible views exist, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’ ” United States v. … Hardamon clearly qualifies as an organizer or leader of the conspiracy.

Cass County Music Company v. Vasfi Muedini D/B/A Port Town Family Restaurant

55 F.3d 263 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 16, 1995

Therefore, chain stores, like Claire’s Boutique, would be able to qualify under the § 110(5) exemption. … (rejecting the size of the establishment as a decisive factor in light of the fact that the Congress "did not even qualify the exemption by limiting its availability to a 'small commercial establishment’ ”), cert. denied,

June Carlson v. Scott Bukovic

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 2, 2010

The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on those same issues and also asserted that Officer Bukovic was entitled to qualified immunity. … The district court also denied Officer Bukovic qualified immunity due to the factual differences. However, the district 7 The parties agreed to have the case tried before a magistrate judge.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellants

560 F.2d 224 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 9, 1977

Teamsters establishes “the legality of the seniority system insofar as it perpetuates post-Act discrimination” because “Section 703(h) on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not distinguish between … Since the employer has also consented to company seniority, layoff and recall seniority will not be a question of when a transferee became qualified for a job so long as he is qualified when he applies. 14 .

United States v. Charles Hoffman, Jr.

415 F.2d 14 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 8, 1969

Each of these cases is clearly distinguishable from the case before us. … The cases cited by Hoffman clearly fall within this general rule. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, Lisenba v.

Mary Ann Carter RENNIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DALTON, Secretary of the Navy,* Defendant-Appellee

3 F.3d 1100 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 27, 1993

Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the district court finding was not clearly erroneous and that the isolated incidents fall short of the requisite level of hostility or pervasiveness needed to establish a … We affirm the trial court’s finding that Rennie was not qualified for soldering and that NAC’s regulations prohibited transferring her to another position.

NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.

768 F.3d 682 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 25, 2014

Those entities are clearly covered by the statute. … But again, Burlington Northern establishes that not all parties fitting that bill will qualify as arrangers.

United States v. Truman Tolson and Darrell Tolson

988 F.2d 1494 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 19, 1993

This finding was not clearly erroneous. … is not included in establishing the defendant's offense level under this guideline.”

Daniela Javier v. City of Milwaukee

670 F.3d 823 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 2, 2012

City of Milwaukee, 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court partially abrogated common- law governmental immunity in 1962, see Holytz v. … The scope and proper application of governmental immunity continues to vex Wisconsin courts to this day. See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v.

Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.

561 F.3d 698 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 6, 2009

But it is not enough that the proposed testimony comes from a qualified physician. As we have said: “[Q]ualifications alone do not suffice. … When, as here, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress so clearly falls below the threshold requirement of a severe emotional injury, we will not hesitate to dismiss it at the summary judgment stage.

Jones v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

977 F.2d 1106 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 14, 1992

Freeman [a neurosurgeon] and the claimant tends to establish that the work worsened the original injury and that the claimant was negligent in performing that work because Dr. … Under this test there might be some doubt whether simple negligence could qualify as a supervening cause. But we leave that question to another day.

Michael Johnson v. Jason Dalke

933 F.3d 871 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 13, 2019

Neither of those cases qualified as a “strike” under the PLRA, and it is undisputed that had he disclosed them, Greyer could have proceeded with this suit in forma pauperis. … B Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that the district court’s findings about Greyer’s and Johnson’s in‐ tent are not clearly erroneous, the court erred by failing to 12