Case law

Commissioner v. Drovers Journal Pub. Co.

135 F.2d 276 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 30, 1943

Respondent admits that the cases cited are authority for the rules quoted, but he makes the point that they may not be applied to establish a taxpayer’s “eligibility to the general expense deductions such as interest.” … •shown that its claimed deduction clearly fell within the terms of the statute.

United States v. Khalil Muhammad, A/K/A Jerry Jackson

928 F.2d 1461 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 4, 1991

Although the affidavit could have more clearly explained the circumstances of the pur *1466 suit and apprehension of both Muhammad and Edmonds, noting that the two were together when the police arrived and that thereafter … . “ ‘The phrase “qualified witness” is to be broadly interpreted as requiring only someone who understands the system.’ ” United States v.

Mansoor Rana Nasir v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

122 F.3d 484 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 2, 1997

The immigration judge first stated that there had been no request for an interpreter but, after listening to a tape recording of the prior hearing, he acknowledged he was wrong, for the request had clearly been made. … Then the relevant issue is whether he qualifies as a “refugee,” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42), based on a well-founded fear of future, not past, persecution.

Rolfs v. Commissioner

668 F.3d 888 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 8, 2012

Where “the size of the payment is clearly out of proportion to the benefit received,” taxpayers can deduct the excess, provided that they objectively intended it as a gift. … Thus, the donation was deemed allowable as a legitimate charitable deduction, and the court proceeded to value the donation using the established insurance loss figure for the building.

Ann L. Nielsen v. David D. Dickerson

307 F.3d 623 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 9, 2002

In order to qualify as a debt col *640 lector, an individual must have some involvement in the effort to collect another’s debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). … See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318 (“[a] single violation of § 1692e is sufficient to establish civil liability under the FDCPA”). Accordingly, we do not resolve this question. D.

United Fire Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

768 F.2d 164 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 19, 1985

But if this is the test, then policies reserved under the two-year preliminary term method clearly cannot qualify during their first two years. … Thus even under the “dual obligation” reading of the regulations, a company like United might fail to qualify as a life insurance company when it uses a preliminary term method of reserving, although it would have qualified

David Brown v. Timothy Budz

398 F.3d 904 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 16, 2005

In these types of cases, the victim and assailant are readily identifiable, and the custodian’s deliberate indifference is based upon knowledge of a clearly particularized risk. … Official Immunity To survive dismissal, Brown’s claims must also be sculpted to conform with the constraints of the Eleventh Amendment.

Darrell Albedyll v. Wisconsin Porcelain Company Revised Retirement Plan

947 F.2d 246 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 22, 1991

The Company has established the Plan with the bona fide intention and expectation that from year to year its Active Partners will deem it advisable to make contributions and to provide the benefits herein established. … One function of ERISA is to establish clearly when rights shift from participants to employers, and permitting an 11.04 exception here would circumvent this clear purpose. 40 Third, we think that the phrase "limitation upon

Charles COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.J. KIBORT and Educational Therapy Center, Defendants-Appellants

143 F.3d 331 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 1, 1998

During that school year, Kibort met with Estes and Collins to establish their respective responsibilities. … of that business activity to make records, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or otherwise qualified witness.’”

Kizer v. Children's Learning Center

962 F.2d 608 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 29, 1992

To meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, [the plaintiff] must therefore show both that she was qualified for and satisfactorily performing the duties of her job. Lee v. … Thus, in order to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Kizer “must therefore show both that she was qualified for and satisfactorily performing the duties of her job.” Id.

United States v. Village of Little Chute, Wisconsin and Paul Kostka, President of the Village

248 F.2d 228 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 24, 1957

No officer has authority to waive that immunity in the absence of express provision by Congress. United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 1947, 329 U.S. 654, 660 , 67 S.Ct. 601 , 91 L.Ed. 577 . … This it clearly had no legal right to do. The injunction was properly issued. The judgment is Affirmed.

Norberto Torres v. Kent Brookman

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 17, 2025

I have, finally, considered whether the defendants are en- titled to qualified immunity. … Legitimate qualified-immunity arguments must rest on the particular facts of the case and on the state of the law at the time the defendants acted. The defendants’ ar- gument below was deficient in both respects.

United States v. Lee A. Wilson

437 F.3d 616 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 2, 2006

State law does have a role to play in the federal statutory scheme, but that role is limited to the determination of whether the defendant is a convicted felon. *620 Once the felony conviction is established, federal law … If the pardon, expungement, or restoration of rights provides that the convicted person may not possess firearms, the conviction remains a qualifying predicate for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co.

61 F.3d 560 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 28, 1995

In a class action, whether or not the class has been certified, it is sufficient for the notice to name one person qualified to bring the appeal as representative of the class.... … Keystone claims that the rule requires Murphy to (1) name at least one person qualified to bring the appeal, and (2) name that person as a representative of the class.

Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hollobow

702 F.2d 643 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 11, 1983

These allegations do not establish the requisite actual malice. … Clearly, however, the SEC did not issue any such order.

Doctors Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. Sebelius

613 F.3d 672 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 16, 2010

Second, Gao did not establish a general rule that agencies may divest courts of jurisdiction by reopening final decisions. … We cannot say that “good cause” is so clearly lacking that the district court would abuse its discretion if it remanded the case to the agency.

United States v. Joyce Kay Ogle

425 F.3d 471 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 5, 2005

In return, the government granted Ellebracht immunity from prosecution for any other crimes arising out of the drug conspiracy known by the government at that time or that might become known as a result of his cooperation … The record clearly establishes that, instead of attempting "to replace truth with fabrication,” the prosecutor was actually doing his best to elicit the truth from Ellebracht. Id.

Norberto Torres v. Kent Brookman

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 17, 2025

I have, finally, considered whether the defendants are en- titled to qualified immunity. … Legitimate qualified-immunity arguments must rest on the particular facts of the case and on the state of the law at the time the defendants acted. The defendants’ ar- gument below was deficient in both respects.

United States v. Cheryl A. Hunte

196 F.3d 687 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 4, 1999

Hunte had no prior juvenile or adult criminal history and, therefore, qualified for a criminal history category of I. … Here, we find the evidence indicates Hunte’s role qualified her for at least a two-level reduction as a minor participant, although we leave it to the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether she qualifies

United States v. Arthur Nasser, United States of America v. Richard W. Hauff

476 F.2d 1111 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 16, 1973

This is most clearly illustrated in dueling, adultery, and bigamy. See Perkins, Criminal Law 535 (1957). … He said he did not remember the matter of immunity coming up and that the government had not made any promises to him for testifying.