Case law

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  • D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co.

    760 F.2d 1474 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 25, 1985

    As has been noted in another context: The statute [Section 503] does not confer a clearly defined right on the benefitted class. … D’Amato has established no facts that would indicate that the Union would breach its duty of fair representation to him.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center v. Department of Health and Human Services, St. James Hospital v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services

    698 F.2d 1337 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 1, 1983

    Qualified hospital providers such as Saint Mary's are entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable costs of providing medical treatment to those qualified for Medicare benefits under the Social Security Act, as defined in … The Secretary's regulation banning the reimbursement of the cost of a telephone used for a Medicare patient's personal comfort is clearly authorized by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395y(a)(6).

    Disagreed with by University of Cincinnati, D/B/A University Hospital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 809 F.2d 307 (1987)Cited 51 timesPublished
  • Dennison v. Mony Life Retirement Income Security Plan for Employees

    710 F.3d 741 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 6, 2013

    It too is a defined benefits pension plan, but it is an unfunded one—that is, the benefits are paid directly by the employer rather than by a trust established and funded by the employer, and there are no special tax advantages … Formal adjudicators, such as judges, jurors, arbitrators, administrative law judges, and members of appellate boards of agencies, are largely insulated by immunity doctrines from interrogatories and depositions aimed at finding

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Carriers Traffic Service, Inc. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.

    881 F.2d 475 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 7, 1989

    There are several established exceptions to this stringent rule. Where tariffs are ambiguous, the ICC and the courts have permitted departures from the filed rates. … In Cooper the court quite clearly reviewed under both the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence” standards.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • National Acceptance Company of America v. Joseph S. Bathalter, Jr.

    705 F.2d 924 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 20, 1983

    Statements made under this threat would be “immunized” by Garrity . … In such a situation, treatment of the claim of privilege as an admission would clearly impose a substantial cost upon the exercise of the privilege.

    Cited 92 timesPublished
  • Northwest Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Service Corp., Blue Cross Association, Patricia Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services

    687 F.2d 985 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 25, 1982

    The Commissioner based his decision, in part, on 45 C.F.R. § 405.419 (c), which provides that to qualify as an allowable Medicare cost, interest expense must be incurred on indebtedness established with lenders or lending … Such third-party financing, of course, would have resulted in a much higher cost to the government than if the expenses disallowed here are reinstated, since commercial interest expense clearly qualifies as a reimbursable

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago

    988 F.3d 978 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 23, 2021

    But a municipality is immune from punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). … Note the qualifier: “its own violations.”

    Cited 261 timesPublished
  • Jack W. Turner v. Ronald Marvin Pfluger

    407 F.2d 648 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 14, 1969

    There was no evidence to support such a conclusion and in fact the evidence on this point establishes the contrary. … Fox was not qualified to testify whether the use of a seat belt would have reduced the severity of the injuries suffered.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Nazani Yadegar-Sargis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

    297 F.3d 596 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 22, 2002

    In order to qualify as a refugee, the asylum applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of the statutorily protected categories. … Sargis to qualify as a refugee, she also has to establish that complying with the dress code would, for her, rise to the level of persecution. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242 .

    Cited 58 timesPublished
  • Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Darla C. Senn, Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc., Dragomir Kresovic, Borislav Kresovic, Linda Hintz v. Donald E. Percy, Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Darla C. Senn, Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Darla C. Senn

    738 F.2d 836 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 30, 1984

    The three exhibits which plaintiffs assert establish injury to their reputation fail to name the individual plaintiffs and cannot be reasonably construed to establish damage to the individual plaintiffs' reputations. … Nor do the individual plaintiffs establish any alteration of legal status.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • United States v. David Lanzotti, Connie L. Hughes, Kenneth W. Smith, Mary Freeman, and Allstar Music, Inc.

    90 F.3d 1217 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 17, 1996

    As in Hall , the defendants’ conduct here clearly “was criminal at the time [they] engaged in it.” 481 U.S. at 404 , 107 S.Ct. at 1827 . … The prosecution’s factual theory of the case clearly constituted a violation of state law under the latter two legal theories, but was not (according to the district court) sufficient to establish a direct violation of subsection

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • The Waldinger Corporation v. Crs Group Engineers, Inc., Clark Dietz Division, the Waldinger Corporation v. Ashbrook-Simon-Hartley, Inc., Crs Group Engineers, Inc., Clark Dietz Division

    775 F.2d 781 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 14, 1985

    The law of Illinois is clearly to the contrary. … Fuller, 719 F.2d at 1330 -31 9 Although Ballou refers to quasi-judicial immunity, we prefer the term qualified privilege.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Czarniecki v. City of Chicago

    633 F.3d 545 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 21, 2011

    At the same time, the district court denied summary judg- ment on the individual claim against Tobias, rejecting Tobias’s defense of qualified immunity under § 1983. … Title VII claims are not immune from res judicata, as the plain- tiff seems to suggest. See Herrmann, 999 F.2d at 225.

    Cited 99 timesPublished
  • Cheryl L. Hyman v. Dick Tate and Harry Kirlin, D/b/a/ Tate & Kirlin Associates

    362 F.3d 965 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 1, 2004

    Instead, Hyman asserts that prior to mailing collection letters, T & K had to establish its own proactive procedure (such as checking the bankruptcy records or using the on-line service of “Banko”) to assure that the accounts … However, the FDCPA does not require collectors to independently verify the validity of the debt to qualify for the “bona fide error” defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Cf. Jenkins v.

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Sarbjit Singh v. Jefferson B. Sessions III

    898 F.3d 720 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 26, 2018

    Rather, the court record establishes that the conviction was vacated as a result of a plea agree- ment between Singh and the state prosecutor. … LEXIS 4234, at *3 (BIA Aug. 30, 2010) (holding that a potential sentence of one year qualifies as “one year or longer”).

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Rodica Pop v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

    270 F.3d 527 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 2, 2001

    We need not travel very far down the road suggested by either claim, however, because Judge Fujimoto found that Pop did not meet her burden of establishing past persecution (at all) because her claim was not credible. 5 An … The written transcript clearly reveals inconsistencies in Pop’s testimony. Further evidence in the record supports Judge Fujimoto’s determination.

    Cited 67 timesPublished
  • Colleen M. Wales v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 300

    120 F.3d 82 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 21, 1997

    The district court granted summary judgment to the District — not because the memo was unrelated to the discharge (though the record does not establish any link), or because it caused relations to deteriorate and therefore … Open-ended balancing approaches of the sort announced in Pickering create unavoidable risks and costs for well-intentioned public employers, risks that the doctrine of qualified immunity reduces but not to zero.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • William J. Kross v. Western Electric Company, Inc.

    701 F.2d 1238 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 9, 1983

    Clearly, Congress would not have adopted such broad and encompassing language had it intended that § 510 be read as narrowly as the district court in the instant case has construed it. … no protection to a more senior employee who had already qualified for participation in the insurance plan.

    Modified by Charles DALE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRIBUNE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, 797 F.2d 458 (1986)Cited 212 timesPublished
  • David R. Wilson v. The Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County

    620 F.2d 1201 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 28, 1980

    Summary judgment is appropriate when a rule of law as applied to uncontested facts clearly leads to a certain conclusion. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56. … Of course, remaining issues regarding the proper measure of damages and applicable immunities should also be addressed as necessary.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • United States v. Johnson

    497 F.3d 723 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 15, 2007

    Johnson objected to the PSR, challenging its findings that he qualified for the obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement and that he did not qualify for the safety valve and acceptance of responsibility reductions. … This finding was not clearly erroneous, and the district court did not err by enhancing Johnson’s sentence two levels pursuant to the obstruction of justice enhancement. B.

    Cited 3 timesPublished

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