Case law

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  • Raymond J. Ryan and Helen Ryan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    568 F.2d 531 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 15, 1977

    The court, not the witness, must decide whether the witness’s claim is justified and the court may order the witness to answer if it clearly appears that no danger of prosecution exists. Hoffman v. … be used against them to establish fraud.

    Cited 122 timesPublished
  • Jane Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc.

    925 F.2d 1007 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 1, 1991

    These facts establish that Allied exercised substantial control over Doe’s work. 3 As a matter of law, Allied was Doe’s employer, entitled to immunity from this lawsuit; therefore, summary judgment was correctly entered. … But the distinction between the right to control and the actual exercise of control was created so that one who possesses the right but rarely exercises it will still qualify as an employer. See Gibbs v.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • Ross v. United States

    910 F.2d 1422 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 10, 1990

    Specifically, she claims that the district court erred in dismissing the substance of her complaint and in ruling that Deputy Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity. … Because Deputy Johnson acted under the color of state law to cause this deprivation, he is liable unless he is entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law was not clearly established at the time of the accident

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • Ahmmad Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Incorporated, Steve Lindgren, Larry Williams, City of Gary, Indiana, Nakon Security, Incorporated

    449 F.3d 751 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 25, 2006

    Williams asserts that he had probable cause to arrest Pourgho-raishi on both charges, and, even if he did not, he was entitled to qualified immunity on both claims. … If so, we move on to inquire whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged injury; that is, whether a reasonable officer would have known that his actions were unconstitutional.

    Cited 183 timesPublished
  • In the Matter of Jack Korman and Robert W. Likas, Witnesses Before the Special February 1971 Grand Jury

    449 F.2d 32 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 20, 1971

    Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 411 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943), the Court again reaffirmed that Counselman required transactional immunity, stating that Counselman “indicated clearly that nothing short of absolute immunity … We believe that the inference from that language in Brown is clearly that only when such immunity is granted is the fifth amendment privilege displaced. 7 .

    Reversed on other grounds by Catena v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 952 (1972)Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Denius, Ronald C. v. Dunlap Wayne

    330 F.3d 919 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 30, 2003

    The district court granted summary judgment for Dunlap on the ground that Denius did not have a clearly established constitu- tional right to refuse to sign the First Authorization and therefore Dunlap was protected by qualified … This was plainly unrea- sonable, so the district court was correct to deny Dunlap’s defense of qualified immunity. C.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Aaron Campbell, Administrator of the Estate of Raymond Campbell, Deceased v. United States

    904 F.2d 1188 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 20, 1990

    The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under … Thus, we will again apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. Consequently, the question we must decide on appeal is whether the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that Dr.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • James T. Durhan v. Robert Neopolitan

    875 F.2d 91 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 20, 1989

    The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of claim preclusion and qualified immunity of the defendants. We affirm on more limited grounds. I. … Prior to determining that the federal suit was barred by the prior state proceeding, the district court concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Rebecca Riker v. Bruce Lemmon

    798 F.3d 546 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 14, 2015

    The court also granted the individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In this appeal, Ms. … Because it was not clearly established “that a year’s delay is unconstitutional when the prisoner’s misbehavior has led to curtailment of visiting rights,” we held that qualified immunity was appropriate.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago, and Thomas Braham, James Zarno and William Duffy

    766 F.2d 315 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 15, 1985

    The jury found that all four defendants had violated SACC’s first amendment rights but granted the three individual defendants qualified immunity. … City, the only non-immune defendant. 1 SACC appeals the grant of qualified immunity to each of the individual defendants and the finding that none of the three individual defendants had the mental state necessary to be held

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Brewer v. Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation Services

    21 F. App'x 457 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 16, 2001

    But we need not address immunity. Brewer’s official capacity claims and her claims against the DVR, a state agency, may not proceed because § 1983 does not authorize damages suits against states. See Vt. … To establish a § 504 violation, Brewer must demonstrate that (1) she is a handicapped individual as defined by the Rehabilitation Act; (2) she is otherwise qualified for participation; (3) the program receives federal financial

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Elder S. Chambers v. James Maher

    915 F.2d 1141 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 15, 1990

    There is one final point for us to briefly address: Maher argues that even if we were to find that he violated Chambers’ fourth amendment rights, he would nevertheless be immune from damages under the doctrine of qualified … immunity.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Larry L. Lee v. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni

    16 F.3d 1225 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 28, 1994

    Vallabhaneni is qualifiedly immune from liability for damages in his personal capacity because his treatment of Lee under Illinois' pre-1990 procedures for medicating prisoners did not violate clearly established constitutional … Neither qualified immunity nor the Eleventh Amendment shields Dr. Vallabhaneni from the request for injunctive and declaratory relief. Knox, 998 F.2d at 1412-13 .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Armstrong v. Squadrito

    152 F.3d 564 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 24, 1998

    and because he did not violate a “clearly established” right. … In other words, because Coleman clearly established a right to a prompt appearance after arrest pursuant to a warrant, the individual defendants in this case cannot claim an entitlement to qualified immunity.

    Cited 141 timesPublished
  • Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago

    811 F.2d 1129 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 10, 1987

    At the conclusion of the trial in 1984, the jury found that all four of the defendants had violated SACC’s First Amendment rights but granted the three individual defendants qualified immunity. … Here the plaintiff attempted and failed to establish a basis for recovering from the individual defendants damages separate and distinct from the compensatory award it sought against all of the defendants.

    Cited 63 timesPublished
  • Daniel P. Duncan v. State of Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services

    166 F.3d 930 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 3, 1999

    Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), or any other case addressing the doctrine of qualified immunity. This is not enough to join issue with the district court’s decision. … Moreover, this failure to cite relevant precedent betrays an inability to show that the state officials violated a clearly established rule of constitutional law, as is required by Harlow and Anderson v.

    Cited 57 timesPublished
  • Gary A. v. New Trier High School District No. 203

    796 F.2d 940 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 18, 1986

    In order to qualify for such assistance, a state must establish a program that “assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education”. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1). … Illinois could have established a single state agency to control all public education instead of establishing local school districts. By doing so it might have conferred eleventh amendment immunity on that agency. Cf.

    Cited 45 timesPublished
  • Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee

    123 F.3d 586 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 15, 1997

    Likewise, “[b]ecause we find that there was no constitutional violation, it is unnecessary to consider whether [the officers] w[ere] entitled to qualified immunity.” Kraushaar v. … Phillips’ constitutional rights; thus, there is no need to decide if those rights were clearly established at the time of the encounter. See Siegert v.

    Cited 140 timesPublished
  • Edward Jarecki v. United States

    590 F.2d 670 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 23, 1979

    The history amply supports the GSA’s position that it has the power to establish the FPS. … The plaintiffs rely on a provision of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2), to establish jurisdiction over the back pay claim. 10 .

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Charles E. Sweeney, Jr. v. Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana

    361 F.3d 327 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 6, 2004

    Because no such right has been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Sweeney’s petition. … Supreme Court precedent clearly established such a rule. Here, it is clear that the Supreme Court has not taken the step that Sweeney needs.

    Cited 64 timesPublished

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