Rebecca Riker v. Bruce Lemmon

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-2910

REBECCA RIKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRUCE LEMMON, in his official

capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 13, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and RIPPLE, Circuit

Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. While working as an employee of a

contractor at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility,

Rebecca Riker engaged in a romantic relationship with

inmate Paul Vest. When the relationship became known, her

employment ended. She later requested that she be allowed

to visit Vest, but prison officials denied those requests as

2 No. 14-2910

forbidden by the institution’s inmate visitation policy.

Ms. Riker and Vest later submitted an application to marry,

which prison officials also denied.

Ms. Riker then brought this action against several

individual officials of the Indiana Department of Corrections

(“the Department” or “IDOC”), in their official and

individual capacities, challenging the denials of her requests

to visit and to marry Vest. She sought damages against the

individual defendants as well as declarative and injunctive

relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. It concluded that prohibiting Ms. Riker

from visiting Vest was reasonable and that this restriction

did not unconstitutionally burden her right to marry. The

court also granted the individual defendants’ motion for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

In this appeal, Ms. Riker limits her challenge to the

district court’s determination that, based on the summary

judgment record, the defendants’ refusal to permit the

marriage does not violate Ms. Riker’s rights guaranteed by

the Constitution. We respectfully disagree with the district

court and conclude that, on this record, the defendants have

failed to justify adequately the denial of Ms. Riker’s

marriage request. We accordingly reverse the judgment of

the district court and remand the case for further

proceedings.

No. 14-2910 3

I

BACKGROUND

A.

From December 2007 through April 2008, Ms. Riker was

employed by Aramark Correctional Services, Inc.

(“Aramark”). Aramark contracted with the Department to

operate and manage food services in the Department’s

correctional facilities. Ms. Riker worked at the Wabash

Valley Correctional Facility (“WVCF”), a level-four

maximum security correctional facility in Carlisle, Indiana.

She supervised approximately twenty inmates in preparing

and serving meals. As part of her job training, the

Department gave her instruction in security, first aid, and

personal protection skills. She also received training on

WVCF emergency security procedures, including

procedures for evacuation, riots, bomb threats, escape

prevention, security sweeps, hostage scenarios, and

emergency transport.

Ms. Riker met Vest, an IDOC inmate serving a fifty-year

sentence for robbery, while working as his supervisor in the

kitchen at the WVCF. After a couple of months, they began a

romantic relationship, which included sexual intercourse in

a walk-in cooler at the facility. In April 2008, another

Aramark employee witnessed Ms. Riker and Vest kissing in

the walk-in cooler and reported the incident to Ms. Riker’s

supervisor. Ms. Riker quit her job later that day; Vest later

was disciplined by the Department.

After Ms. Riker left her job with Aramark, she

maintained contact with Vest through letters and phone

4 No. 14-2910

calls. In May 2008, she submitted an application for visiting

privileges with Vest. The WVCF denied the application

1

because Ms. Riker had “worked at [the] facility.” In 2008

and 2009, Ms. Riker wrote letters to the Department’s

commissioner and the facility superintendent requesting

visitation privileges with Vest. Both letters met the same

response: the Department’s policy clearly states that “ex-

employees shall not be permitted to visit an offender if the

relationship between the offender and the ex-employee

started … during the ex-employee’s period of employment

2

with the Department.”

In 2010, Ms. Riker accepted a proposal of marriage from

Vest. They completed an application to marry, and Vest

submitted that application to the chaplain at the WVCF. The

application was denied because Ms. Riker was not on Vest’s

3

list of approved visitors.

Formal IDOC and WVCF policies specifically addressed

staff/inmate relationships. Ms. Riker’s relationship with Vest

during her employment at WVCF violated IDOC policy 04-

03-103, which prohibits staff-persons from having “any

personal contact with an offender … beyond that necessary

1R.44-3 at 2. She submitted additional applications in February 2011,

December 2012, and January 2013, all of which likewise were denied.

2 Id. at 4; accord id. at 5.

3 The letter denying the marriage application, which was addressed to

Vest, stated: “Your fiancée would need to be on your approved visiting

list in order for you to be able to be married. Ms. Riker is not on your

list.” R.56-3.

No. 14-2910 5

4

for the proper supervision and treatment of the offender.”

The policy provides several examples of inappropriate

contact, including: “[m]arriage to an offender,” “[s]ocial

relationship of any type with an offender,” and “[p]hysical

contact beyond that which is routinely required by specific

5

job duties.” The policy also notes that “[s]exual contact with

6

an offender is a criminal offense under IC 35-44-1-5.”

Under the IDOC and WVCF offender visitation policies,

former employees must make a written request to visit an

7

offender. Former employees generally “shall not be allowed

to visit an offender who has been housed in the same facility

in which the ex-employee was employed and who was

incarcerated at the facility during the time the ex-employee

8

was employed there.” The superintendent of the facility

reviews the ex-employee’s “request and recommend[s]

whether the visit is in the best interest of the facility and the

9

individuals involved.” Absent special circumstances, an ex-

employee must wait until one year after her employment

has ended before she can visit an offender. However, ex-

employees never are “permitted to visit an offender if the

4 R.44-6 at 19.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Because the WVCF and IDOC visitation policies are fundamentally the

same with only minor stylistic differences, we discuss them in tandem.

8 R.44-11 at 3.

9 Id.

6 No. 14-2910

relationship between the offender and the ex-employee

started or resulted from contact between the ex-employee

and the offender during the ex-employee’s period of

10

employment with the Department.”

The Department also maintains a marriage policy, which

“recognizes that marriage may serve as a rehabilitative tool

which may assist an offender during the community re-entry

11

process.” The policy states that “[t]he approval of an

offender’s request to marry shall be based upon the legality

of the proposed marriage and the safety and security of the

12

facility and the individuals involved.” Notably, the

10 Id. The visitation policy also provides that if “an ex-employee has been

terminated from employment or allowed to resign prior to termination,

or during an investigation arising from a violation of department rules or

procedures involving an offender, … the ex-employee shall be denied

visitation privileges permanently from all department facilities.” Id. at 4.

11R.44-7 at 1. The policy provides that a request to marry may be denied

because:

A. The offender is not legally eligible to marry;

B. The offender is requesting to marry another

offender;

C. The offender is requesting to marry either a staff

member or former staff member of the department;

or,

D. The requested marriage would endanger the safety

and security of the facility, the department, the

individuals involved or the public.

Id. at 4.

12 Id. at 1.

No. 14-2910 7

Department did not reference its marriage policy when

denying Ms. Riker’s marriage application.

B.

In April 2013, Ms. Riker filed this action against several

IDOC officials, including Bruce Lemmon in his official

capacity as commissioner of the Department, challenging the

denials of her requests to visit and to marry Vest. In due

course, the defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. The officials submitted that the Department’s

refusal to permit Ms. Riker to marry Vest “did not violate

13

[Ms.] Riker’s qualified constitutional right to marry.” They

contended that “the same security principles and concerns

apply to the consideration of [Ms.] Riker’s request for

marriage as it does her request for visitation” and that

allowing “[v]isitation between a former staff member and an

offender that developed an inappropriate relationship

during the course of the former staff member’s employment

inside the facility would threaten the security of the

14

facility.” They maintained that, because Ms. “Riker was

working inside the [WVCF] and was trained by the [IDOC]

in security protocols, defense, and emergency security

procedures,” “[i]t was reasonable for [the prison officials] to

conclude that [Ms. Riker] would know the security details of

the [WVCF]” and that “a former staff person in a romantic

relationship with an incarcerated individual might divulge

13 R.45 at 24.

14 Id. at 15, 26.

8 No. 14-2910

security information to that incarcerated individual or assist

15

him in other inappropriate ways.”

The district court granted the defendants’ motion. With

respect to Ms. Riker’s right-to-marry claim, the court

concluded “that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry

was not substantial or direct, but was light or at most

16

moderate.” In support of its conclusion, “the [c]ourt note[d]

that Ms. Riker ha[d] not made a formal request to marry Mr.

Vest” and that “Ms. Riker ha[d] not been absolutely

prevented from marrying a large portion of the eligible

17

population of spouses.” The court then decided that

“[a]llowing Ms. Riker, and other former employees, to visit

inmates is a legitimate security risk” and that, under the

rational-basis standard of scrutiny, it would “not second

guess the security concerns expressed by the correctional

18

authorities.”

Ms. Riker appeals only the district court’s decision that

the defendants did not unreasonably burden her

constitutional right to marry.

15 Id. at 16.

16 R.62 at 13.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 14.

No. 14-2910 9

II

DISCUSSION

Ms. Riker contends that the Department’s decision

preventing her from marrying Vest is unconstitutional. She

submits that prohibiting her marriage to Vest is an

exaggerated response to the prison’s security objectives and

that the prohibition is unnecessary for the maintenance of a

safe and orderly institution. She emphasizes that she seeks

only “a single visit to the institution, of a short duration, for

19

the limited purpose of marrying her fiancé.” She maintains

that “[i]t is implausible to insist that this brief ceremony may

not be accommodated without threatening institutional

security and without imposing more than a de minimis

20

impact on prison resources.”

We review a district court’s decision granting summary

judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d

565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is appropriate

when no material fact is disputed and the moving parties are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

A.

1.

We begin by setting forth the overarching substantive

principles that must guide our analysis. The Supreme Court

19 Appellant’s Br. 19; accord Reply Br. 1–2.

20 Appellant’s Br. 19–20.

10 No. 14-2910

has held “that federal courts must take cognizance of the

valid constitutional claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do

not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the

protections of the Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,

84 (1987) (citation omitted). The Constitution protects a

prisoner’s fundamental right to marry; individuals do not

lose this constitutional protection simply because they are

imprisoned. See id. at 94–96; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135

S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (recognizing that “[o]ver time and in

other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to

marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause”). That

protection, however, “is subject to substantial restrictions as

a result of incarceration.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.

Under the principles articulated by the Supreme Court,

“a prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates’

constitutional rights…is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. The Supreme

21

Court repeatedly has reaffirmed this standard. See Florence

v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct.

1510, 1515 (2012); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003);

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223–24 (1990); O’Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Although

Ms. Riker is not a prisoner, “so far as challenges to prison

21The parties agree that we must proceed under the analysis set forth in

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The district court got off on the wrong

foot when it did not realize that the Supreme Court has held squarely

that when prisoners’ rights or, as here, the rights of prisoners and

outsiders are implicated, the proper analysis is found in Turner. See

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32 (2003); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490

U.S. 401, 410 n.9 (1989).

No. 14-2910 11

regulations as infringing constitutional rights are concerned,

the standard is the same whether the rights of prisoners or of

nonprisoners are at stake.” Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581

(7th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410

n.9 (1989)). In determining a regulation’s reasonableness, we

must balance the constitutional right asserted against the

legitimate penological goals of the prison. See Maddox v.

Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 2011).

2.

The Supreme Court also has given us explicit guidance

on the implementation of the substantive principles

articulated in the cases that we have just discussed. It has

identified four factors that we must consider in determining

the reasonableness of a prison regulation that restricts the

right to marry:

(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists

between the regulation and a legitimate

government interest behind the rule; (2)

whether there are alternative means of

exercising the right in question; (3) what

impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right would have on guards,

other inmates, and on the allocation of prison

resources; and (4) what easy alternatives exist

to the regulation because, although the

regulation need not satisfy a least restrictive

alternatives test, the existence of obvious

12 No. 14-2910

alternatives may be evidence that the

regulation is not reasonable.[22]

22 Although the language used by the Supreme Court in setting forth the

reasonableness test appears similar to the “rational-basis test” used in

other contexts, see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (noting “that the

section is valid if it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state

interest” (internal quotation marks omitted)), the “reasonableness

standard” applied in this context is more demanding, see Thornburgh, 490

U.S. at 414 (“We adopt the Turner standard in this case with confidence

that, as petitioners here have asserted, a reasonableness standard is not

toothless.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The test for whether a

prison regulation impermissibly burdens a prisoner’s constitutional

rights requires a more searching inquiry into the justifications

supporting the regulation. Compare Turner, 482 U.S. at 97–98 (noting that

the regulation “represents an exaggerated response to such security

objectives”), with FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)

(noting that, under traditional rational-basis review, “those attacking the

rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative

every conceivable basis which might support it” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). The court also must determine if there are alternative

means of accommodating the prisoner’s rights. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–

91; see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 n.2 (1987) (noting

that “the presence or absence of alternative accommodations of

prisoners’ rights is properly considered a factor in the reasonableness

analysis rather than a basis for heightened scrutiny”). We also recognize,

however, that the reasonableness “test is less restrictive than that

ordinarily applied to infringements on constitutional rights in

consideration of the need to give appropriate deference to prison

officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial intrusion into security problems

and other prison concerns.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir.

2011); accord Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127,

136 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that “[t]he standard adopted by the Supreme

Court was a compromise between the strict scrutiny standard that

usually would apply to such constitutional claims and the inordinately

(continued…)

No. 14-2910 13

Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90); accord Van Den Bosch v. Raemisch,

658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011). Although all four factors are

important, “the first one can act as a threshold factor

regardless which way it cuts.” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d

529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010). “[A] regulation cannot be sustained

where the logical connection between the regulation and the

asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or

irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. Although “the burden

of persuasion is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of a

regulation,” prison officials “must still articulate their

legitimate governmental interest in the regulation” and

provide some evidence supporting their concern. Van Den

Bosch, 658 F.3d at 786; accord Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d

643, 647 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Once the prison gave

its explanation for denying the supplements, the burden

shifted to Mays to present evidence to call that explanation

into question.”); Shimer, 100 F.3d at 509 (“The prison

administration must proffer some evidence to support its

restriction of prison guards’ constitutional rights.”); see also

Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In

order to warrant deference, prison officials must present

credible evidence to support their stated penological goals.”

(emphasis in original)). “The prison administration cannot

avoid court scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions.” Shimer,

100 F.3d at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the

same time, we recognize that “[w]e must accord substantial

(…continued)

difficult undertaking of running a prison” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

14 No. 14-2910

deference to the professional judgment of prison

administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for

defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for

determining the most appropriate means to accomplish

them.” Singer, 593 F.3d at 534 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

3.

Nor are we without precedent on the application of this

methodology. In Turner, the Supreme Court applied the

factors that it had articulated to hold that the challenged

prison regulation, which permitted an inmate to marry only

after the superintendent found a compelling reason to grant

the prisoner permission, placed an unconstitutional burden

on the prisoner’s right to marry. See 482 U.S. at 96–99. There,

the prison officials had provided two justifications for the

regulation: “[t]he security concern…that ‘love triangles’

might lead to violent confrontations between inmates,” and

the rehabilitative goal of allowing women prisoners, who

“often were subject to abuse at home or were overly

dependent on male figures,” to “develop[] skills of self-

reliance.” Id. at 97. The Court determined that the regulation

was “not reasonably related to these penological interests.”

Id.

The Court explained that the regulation “represent[ed]

an exaggerated response to [the state’s] security objectives”

and that there were “obvious, easy alternatives to the

[challenged] regulation that accommodate[d] the right to

marry while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit of

security objectives.” Id. at 97–98. The Court remarked that it

No. 14-2910 15

was “aware of no place in the record where prison officials

testified that such ready alternatives would not fully satisfy

their security concerns.” Id. at 98.

The Court then decided that the “marriage restriction

[was not] reasonably related to the articulated rehabilitation

goal.” Id. at 98. The Court pointedly noted the disparity

between the prison administrators’ justification for the

prohibition and its application: the regulation swept “much

more broadly than can be explained by petitioners’

penological objectives.” Id. at 98. Therefore, “the almost

complete ban on the decision to marry [was] not reasonably

related to legitimate penological objectives.” Id. at 99.

We also have had occasion to address the contours of an

inmate’s right to marry. In Keeney, a prison regulation

prohibited current employees from “becom[ing] involved

socially with inmates in or out of the [jail].” Keeney, 57 F.3d

at 580 (second alteration in original). The plaintiff, an

employee at the correctional facility, claimed that by

“forcing her to choose between her job and marriage to the

man of her choice, the defendants infringed her

constitutional right to marry.” Id. We first noted that, “[a]s

long as the concerns expressed by correctional authorities

are plausible, and the burden that a challenged regulation of

jail or prison security places on protected rights a light or

moderate one, the courts should not interfere.” Id. at 581. We

then decided that the anti-fraternization rule at issue did not

violate an individual’s right to marry under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See id. at 581–82. Our decision largely rested on

the relatively minimal burden placed on the plaintiff’s right

to marry. The defendants had not forbidden the employee

from marrying her fiancé; instead, they simply forbade her

16 No. 14-2910

from continuing to work in the prison system in which her

spouse was incarcerated. See id. at 580–81. Preventing the

transfer of unlawful communication between the inmate and

others as well as preventing favored treatment, we

explained, justified the minimal burden on the plaintiff’s

23

rights. See id. at 581–82. Because the administrators had a

reason clearly related to prison security, they could forbid

the plaintiff’s marrying the inmate and remaining a prison

guard.

We also addressed a prisoner’s right to marry in Martin

v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). There, we recognized

that qualified immunity was appropriate when a prison

official relied on the institution’s visitation policy to postpone

an inmate’s marriage. In that case, an inmate was prohibited

from marrying because his fiancée had been placed on a

restricted list, which prevented her from visiting the prison.

See id. at 920. The district court dismissed the inmate’s

complaint after concluding that there was no independent

right to visitation. On appeal, we acknowledged that, after

the district court had issued its decision, the inmate had

been allowed to marry after a twelve-month deferral. See id.

In explaining our conclusion that the deferment was not

clearly unconstitutional, we noted that “[r]estrictions on

visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage,

may well justify deferment, so that the sanction for

misconduct will have some sting.” Id. at 922 (emphasis

23 We noted that without the regulation prisoners would “have an

enhanced incentive to ‘romance’ their female guards” and that “[j]ust the

suspicion of favored treatment could create serious problems of morale.”

Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1995).

No. 14-2910 17

added). Because it was not clearly established “that a year’s

delay is unconstitutional when the prisoner’s misbehavior

has led to curtailment of visiting rights,” we held that

qualified immunity was appropriate. Id.

B.

Now that we have set forth the substantive principles

that must control our decision and their application, we turn

to the situation presented by the present case.

The defendants submit that the decision to deny

Ms. Riker’s request to marry Vest furthers the Department’s

“legitimate interest in maintaining security and institutional

24

order.” They provide two security-related justifications for

the decision: first, a former employee who previously

violated Department policies is more likely to engage in

other prohibited acts; and second, a former employee may

share with an inmate confidential information obtained

25

while employed at the prison. The Department also

24 Appellees’ Br. 19.

25 Specifically, the superintendent of the WVCF provided the following

justifications for the ex-employee visitation policy:

There are a number of security concerns associated with

a former employee, including contractors and

volunteers, visiting an offender that developed a

relationship during the course of the former staff

members’ employment in the facility, including, but not

limited to the following:

[1] A former staff member who willingly violated

the DOC’s express prohibition against

(continued…)

18 No. 14-2910

(…continued)

relationships with offenders, may engage in

other prohibited acts detrimental to the safety

and security of the facility and its staff if he/she

were allowed to visit the offender in the facility

(i.e. trafficking with an offender). The offender

may have the ability to further influence or

exploit former staff member [sic] by virtue of

their relationship.

[2] A former staff member has been trained in a

number of security matters which are not

disclosed to offenders and members of the

general public. That confidential security

information could be communicated to the

offender without the knowledge of custody staff

if visits were permitted (Note that all incoming

mail, email and phone calls with offenders are

monitored and recorded for security).

[3] A former staff member may be aware of possible

weaknesses in the security of his/her particular

job area and the facility generally which could

be shared with the offender if visits were

permitted between the former staff member and

the offender.

[4] A former staff member had access to

confidential information such as confidential

policies and procedures, emergency security

procedures and confidential information

contained in other offenders’ packets, which

could be shared if visits were permitted.

[5] The former staff member, by virtue of their

former employment, may have gained

knowledge regarding other staff members’

personal information (such as home address,

(continued…)

No. 14-2910 19

maintains that because Ms. Riker is free to marry anyone but

Vest, the prohibition imposes a minimal burden on Ms.

26

Riker’s right to marry.

The latter argument can be dismissed quickly. The right

to marry includes the right to select one’s spouse. See

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (noting “that the right to

personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the

concept of individual autonomy” and that there is dignity in

27

individuals’ “autonomy to make such profound choices”).

(…continued)

personal phone number, names of family

members), which could be communicated to the

offender, placing staff and staff family members

at risk.

R.44-2 at 2–3; accord Appellees’ Br. 9–11 (citing R.44-2 at 2–3).

26 The Department similarly contends that Ms. Riker’s ability to marry

Vest has not been prohibited; instead, the marriage “has been effectively

deferred” until Vest is released in 2030. Appellees’ Br. 28. Waiting until

Vest’s release, however, is not a realistic alternative to allowing Ms.

Riker to exercise her right to marry. Cf. Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919,

922 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a one-year deferment of an inmate’s

marriage was not clearly unconstitutional). Many (but not all) prisoners

someday will be released. That eventuality does not permit prison

officials to deprive an inmate of their constitutional rights in the interim.

To hold otherwise would extinguish an inmate’s constitutional right to

marry and render futile the analysis set forth in Turner. See Turner, 482

U.S. at 90 (noting that the appropriate analysis considers “whether there

are alternative means of exercising the [constitutional] right that remain

open to prison inmates”).

27 See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) (plurality opin-

ion) (“[T]he regulation of constitutionally protected decisions, such as

where a person shall reside or whom he or she shall marry, must be

(continued…)

20 No. 14-2910

The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether Ms. Riker was

prohibited from marrying the spouse of her choosing.

Because Ms. Riker has not been left with any alternative

means of exercising her right to marry Vest, it is clear that

the burden on that right was not minimal. Cf. Turner, 482

U.S. at 90 (explaining that “where other avenues remain

available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should

be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference

owed to corrections officials…in gauging the validity of the

regulation” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We next must decide whether the Department has

established that its decision barring Ms. Riker from marrying

Vest was reasonably related to its legitimate penological

interests. The fundamental infirmity with the Department’s

position is that it equates Ms. Riker’s one-time request to

enter the prison to participate in a marriage ceremony with a

request for general visitation rights. The Department’s

decision to forbid Ms. Riker’s marriage is premised entirely

on its ex-employee visitation policy and the security

(…continued)

predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the

choice the individual has made.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,

620 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the

State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse.…”); Carey v. Popu-

lation Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (“[A]mong the decisions that

an individual may make without unjustified government interference are

personal decisions relating to marriage….” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Under our Constitu-

tion, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides

with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).

No. 14-2910 21

justifications that support that policy. At bottom, it

maintains that any effect on Ms. Riker’s right to marry

simply is incidental to the application of its visitation

28

policy. Nothing in the record, however, supports equating

general visitation with a single marriage ceremony, and we

previously have indicated that a prison’s visitation policy,

on its own, does not justify prohibiting an inmate’s

28 The Department fundamentally misconceives the issue before the

court. It contends that “[a]t issue here is the IDOC’s application of its

policy preventing Ms. Riker, an ex-employee of an IDOC contractor who

worked the WVCF, from visiting Mr. Vest, who is incarcerated at the

WVCF, because their relationship began while Ms. Riker was employed

through the IDOC.” Appellees’ Br. 15; see also id. at 15 (stating that “[a]

necessary extension of the IDOC’s visitation policy is the IDOC

administrators’ decision denying Ms. Riker’s request to marry Mr.

Vest”); id. at 21 (noting that “WVCF administrators identified a number

of security-related issues that could arise if former employees were

allowed to visit an offender with whom she or he developed a relationship

at the same facility where she worked” (emphasis added)); id. at 22

(noting that “[c]ourts have consistently upheld similar limitations on

visitation by former staff to correctional institutions” (emphasis added));

id. at 25 (noting that “the consequence of [Ms. Riker’s prior] violation

warrants the existence and the application of the visitation policy”

(emphasis added)). Instead, we must consider whether the Department’s

decision preventing Ms. Riker from marrying Vest was justified.

In accordance with its position, the Department relies entirely on the

deposition testimony of the WVCF superintendent, which focused on the

WVCF’s visitation policy. See supra note 25. It also relies on cases such as

Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989),

and Bilka v. Farrey, 447 Fed. App’x 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2011), which

addressed the denial of visitation rights. Because we must focus on the

Department’s decision to prevent Ms. Riker from marrying, the

Department’s reliance on those cases is misplaced.

22 No. 14-2910

marriage. See Martin, 329 F.3d at 922 (noting that

“[r]estrictions on visitation[ are] not enough to justify

prohibiting marriage”).

The Department also submits that the prohibition of

Ms. Riker’s marriage is necessary to serve as a deterrent to

current employees. It submits that “[t]he policy

communicates to IDOC employees that if they begin an

inappropriate relationship with an offender while working

at an IDOC facility, they will not only be held accountable

but also will be prevented from seeing the inmate for as long

29

as he or she is incarcerated.” The Department has not

provided any evidence, however, to support its contention

that prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage acts as a deterrent or

that such deterrence is necessary.

The Department does not otherwise contend that

prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage satisfies the test set forth in

Turner. It fails to explain why allowing Ms. Riker to marry

Vest would pose a security risk or how preventing her

30

marriage furthers its security interests. There is no evidence

in the record supporting the Department’s contention that

prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage is necessary to ensure a

29 Appellees’ Br. 25.

30 The Department maintains that we “must accord substantial deference

to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear

significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections

system and determining the most appropriate means to accomplish

them.” Id. at 17 (quoting Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir.

2010)). Although we agree with that general proposition, the Department

has not demonstrated that WVCF officials used their professional

judgment specifically to deny Ms. Riker’s marriage request.

No. 14-2910 23

safe and orderly institution. Our case law is clear that the

invocation of a general security interest, standing alone, is

insufficient to support the Department’s decision. See Shimer,

100 F.3d at 510 (refusing to accept prison administration’s

rote assertions and noting that we were “reduced to

speculation when not provided with evidence, and, having

speculated, find it difficult to establish a connection between

the prison administration’s unsubstantiated justifications

and its policy”). To satisfy its burden, the Department must

present evidence demonstrating a specific security concern

that bears a nexus to the prohibited conduct, here, Ms.

Riker’s marriage ceremony. The Department has failed to

provide such evidence. Thus, at this juncture, the

Department has not established that its decision prohibiting

Ms. Riker’s marriage has a logical connection to its security

concerns.

Notably, the record does not reveal why prison officials

would have difficulty monitoring the marriage ceremony to

ensure that Ms. Riker does not violate prison regulations or

relay sensitive information to Vest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90

(noting that “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may

be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable”). The

Department offers no explanation for why it could not

permit Ms. Riker’s marriage request while simultaneously

maintaining a secure facility. It is implausible to suggest,

without some supporting evidence, that a brief marriage

ceremony cannot be accommodated without threatening

institutional security and without imposing more than a de

minimis impact on prison resources. Indeed, Ms. Riker

submits that the ceremony would “last but a brief few

24 No. 14-2910

31

minutes in a highly regulated setting.” The Department

does not offer testimony or other evidence to refute

Ms. Riker’s claim. See id. at 98 (noting that the Court was

“aware of no place in the record where prison officials

testified that such ready alternatives would not fully satisfy

their security concerns”). Here, as in Turner, there may well

be “obvious, easy alternatives to the [prohibition of

Ms. Riker’s marriage ceremony] that accommodate the right

to marry while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit

of security objectives.” Id.

Absent significantly more evidence explaining the

importance of banning Ms. Riker’s marriage, Turner does not

allow us to accept at face value the Department’s

unsubstantiated contentions. The Department therefore has

not established that it is entitled to summary judgment.

Conclusion

The district court erred in granting the Department’s

motion for summary judgment and concluding that the

Department’s denial of Ms. Riker’s request for a brief, one-

time visit in order to participate in a marriage ceremony did

not violate her constitutional right to marry. The judgment of

the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Ms. Riker

may recover the costs of this appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

31 Appellant’s Br. 21.