Case law

United States v. Daniel Sexton

894 F.3d 787 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 5, 2018

“There can . . . be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. … “In calculating restitution, ‘the loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order.’” Id. (quoting Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990)).

Jerry Stafford v. Rick Hallock

933 F.2d 1009 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 17, 1991

immunity. … , thus precluding a grant of qualified immunity.

United States v. Ford

344 F. App'x 167 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 26, 2009

This payment also established a basis for the enhancement under § 2C1.1(b)(1). … The payments made to Ford were made in a manner to clearly influence more than one event. The evidence establishes that each payment was accomplished by another action by Ford in his authority as a state senator.

Toni Stahl v. Coshocton Cty.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 31, 2018

This court has summarized the doctrine of qualified immunity in these terms: Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly … We therefore affirm the grant of qualified immunity to Deputy Snyder with respect to his use of deadly force.

Feterle v. Chowdhury

148 F. App'x 524 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 14, 2005

Chowdhury claim against Chowdhury in his individual capacity, Chowdhury will be protected by qualified immunity “unless he knew or should have known that his conduct violated clearly established rights.” Dominque v. … We therefore need not reach the question of qualified immunity for Chowdhurry.

In Re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litigation

527 F.3d 517 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 15, 2008

First, the witness must be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R.Evid. 702. … If credited, therefore, Leitzinger’s testimony clearly established evidence of injury to the named Plaintiffs and the class as a whole, and measurable damages to the named Plaintiffs and the class as a whole....

Fair Housing Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights

209 F.3d 626 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 13, 2000

that would qualify for the exemption, not the scrutiny to be Advocates Ass’n, 998 F. Supp. at 829. For example, Martin given after deciding that the exemption in fact applies. … The required to establish that the ordinances were unreasonable, ordinances are facially neutral and apply equally to families as opposed to requiring the Cities to establish that the and unrelated individuals

Junior Blackston v. Lloyd Rapelje

780 F.3d 340 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 17, 2015

The state’s arguments against the existence of clearly established law are unconvincing. The state challenges the existence of clearly established confrontation law. … That tension arises within the context of a clearly established legal landscape.

United States v. King

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 14, 2008

Thus, the decision to disclaim § 4A1.2’s time limits within § 4B1.4 may not in fact establish § 4A1.2’s role as a default and may instead have more to do with the Sentencing Commission’s (“Commission”) need to ensure that … The Eleventh Circuit’s rationale is compelling because it is clearly true that application notes to § 2L1.2 cross reference two sections that already included time limits.

Rex Ramey v. John Block, Secretary of Department of Agriculture

738 F.2d 756 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 11, 1984

of what he must prove in order to qualify for deferral relief. … Although we have concluded that the Secretary must (1) create a procedure under which borrowers who have requested deferral relief can establish their eligibility for relief, (2) consider in good faith the borrower’s offer

Jeannie Parsons v. MDOC

491 F. App'x 597 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 7, 2012

The idea that failing to provide medication like Dilantin can amount to a constitutional violation was therefore “clearly established” in 2004 when these events took place. See Leary v. … In other words, because Parsons’s constitutional right was clearly established in 2004, the defendants are only entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if Parsons has not demonstrated evidence of a constitutional

Village of Grafton v. Rural Lorain Water

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 23, 2005

To establish that it is entitled to protection under § 1926(b), RLCWA must show that: “(1) it is an ‘association’ within the meaning of the Act; (2) it has a qualifying outstanding [RECDS] loan obligation; and (3) it has … In this case, the parties do not dispute that RLCWA is a qualified “association” that has been indebted to RECDS since January 2002.

Donnita Carmichael v. City of Cleveland

571 F. App'x 426 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 7, 2014

immunity for political subdivisions and their employees. … available at common law or established by the Revised Code.”

Rodriguez v. Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare Fund

89 F. App'x 949 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 6, 2004

In the INITIAL ELIGIBILITY section, the plan clearly requires an employee to work before the employee is eligible for benefits. … We need not decide whether Rodriguez qualified for FMLA protection.

Patricia Parish v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

642 F.2d 188 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 25, 1981

To qualify for child disability benefits, claimant is also required to prove that she satisfied both these criteria of eligibility prior to her 22nd birthday, which in Miss Parish’s case was October 19,1973. … Mathews, 542 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1976), is clearly distinguishable.

Joan Sherfel v. Reggie Newson

768 F.3d 561 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 30, 2014

The terms of Nationwide’s plan, whose participants extend across 49 States, allow its administrator to pay “short-term disability” benefits only to Nationwide employees who qualify as short-term disabled as defined by the … Husted, 694 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir.2012); and the defendants are not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because the plaintiffs requested, and the district court awarded, only prospective, injunctive relief.

Patrick A. Engler v. The Township of Spring Valley, Stanley C. Vint, Sgt., Individually and as Officer and Agent of the State of Ohio

924 F.2d 1057 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 7, 1991

From the orders denying a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity within the meaning of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and Anderson v. … This is not to say that defendant Vint must as a matter of law be found after trial to have been altogether without a qualified immunity.

United States v. Character

76 F. App'x 690 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 25, 2003

The trial court’s rejection of this double-counting argument thus is not clearly erroneous. 2. … The finding is not clearly erroneous. 3.

United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp

436 F.2d 1256 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 23, 1970

Accordingly, we are here required to affirm the District Court unless we conclude its finding to have been “clearly erroneous” under the definition provided by the Supreme Court: “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although … Where the plaintiff consults a doctor solely to qualify him to testify in his behalf at trial, any statements made to the doctor must be highly suspect as a basis for a diagnosis.

In Re Ethelrine Moreland, Debtor. Resolution Trust Corporation v. Ethelrine Moreland

21 F.3d 102 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 6, 1994

The bankruptcy court makes the initial findings of fact, and both the district court and this court are bound by those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. … Instead, Owen establishes an outer boundary defining the extent to which states can limit exemptions in the context of lien avoidance. In re Braverman, 150 B.R. at 684 .