Case law

United States v. Jonathon Chase Vowels-Harper

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 25, 2025

See Cover, 800 F.3d at 281 (distinguishing prior cases that involved a “clearly prepubescent” victim). We decline to create such an anomaly in our doctrine. … Doe’s age places this case at the borderline to automatically qualify for a two-level enhancement.

Estate of Dustin Barnwell v. Mitchell Grigsby

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 21, 2020

Further, the law is clear that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, regardless of the alleged factual dispute. … That is to say, the officers acted in a law-enforcement capacity and were thus not entitled to qualified immunity.

Greene v. City of Memphis

610 F.2d 395 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 1, 1979

I think if you ever wanted to create a monument to increased hostility, you would do that and that would serve as a magnet to bring people to a street to demonstrate very clearly that that is evidence of people being able … “The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights,, specifically defined in terms of racial equality.” George v.

Talley v. Family Dollar Stores

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 11, 2008

Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to establish discrimination through indirect, rather than direct, evidence, we require the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, followed by the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting … To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show “(1) that she or he is an individual with a disability, (2) who was otherwise qualified to perform a job’s requirements, with or without

Stephanie Ann Brown v. The County of Genesee, Michigan Council 25, Afscme Afl-Cio, Local 2259

872 F.2d 169 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 11, 1989

It is well established that a “court must enforce the settlement as agreed to by the parties and is not permitted to alter the terms of the agreement.” Brock v. … The stipulated facts clearly indicated that, after its offer was rejected, the “defendant requested that counsel for Plaintiff have his client put her settlement demands in writing, signed by her, and forward them to counsel

Brian Palmer v. Bill Schuette

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 5, 2019

They contended that the Eleventh Amendment precluded any official capacity claims, that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to individual capacity claims, and that they were entitled to immunity with … not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. S-W Industries, Inc.

23 F.3d 970 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 7, 1994

Ohio’s workers compensation scheme provides no immunity for an employer’s intentional torts against its employees. … Blankenship did not “invent” or “recognize” a cause of action or “revoke” any employer’s immunity, as the appellee-insurers contend.

25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1750, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,876 Martha Frances Franks, Martha Ann Thweatt, Plaintiffs-Movant v. The Kroger Company

649 F.2d 1216 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 29, 1981

Given the fact that the record reflects that the district judge was clearly aware of the problem of placing a greater burden on the class than required by law, I am simply unable to interpret the settlement agreement ultimately … the request, and any reasons given for the denial; (4) the name of the employee awarded the training or promotion in question and the approximate date of the award; (5) the class member’s basis for claiming that she was qualified

Nashville Warehouse & Elevator Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

105 F.2d 883 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 28, 1939

The pertinent facts as found by the Board are in substance as follows: In June, 1928, petitioner acquired certain elevator property ' in Indianapolis, Indiana, and established a branch of its business there. … This amount clearly cannot be calculated as part of the cost.

Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

48 F. App'x 140 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 2, 2002

Beside the fact that the Board’s interpretation is clearly inapposite to the plain language of the statute, such a rule would render the statute of limitations essentially useless. … If the miner establishes the existence of that element, he has demonstrated as a matter of law, a material change.

Nancy Dickenson, Conservator for Sandra Robinson v. Cardiac and Thoracic Surgery of Eastern Tennessee, P.C. And Robert Rosser, M.D.

388 F.3d 976 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 25, 2004

In fact, “the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience.” … In this case, however, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Dr. Michalik called upon Dr. Rosser to “assume that responsibility” and “it was Dr. Rosser who ordered the extubation of the tube.”

United States v. Placide

110 F. App'x 574 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 8, 2004

We lack any significant basis to say that the district court got it clearly wrong. See United States v. … The Commentary does provide that a defendant may still qualify for the departure if she “goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g. to make a constitutional challenge to a statute

Belville Mining Company, Cross-Appellants v. United States of America, Cross-Appellees

999 F.2d 989 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 26, 1993

Rejecting an argument that the grant of a right to mine at will impliedly granted immunity from liability for damage to the surface, the Ohio Supreme Court said that “the rule announced in Burg-ner v. … A right of subjacent support of the surface is clearly pointless if the parties contemplate that the surface will be removed.

Robert Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable Hca Corp.

944 F.2d 1272 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 11, 1991

In order to establish that he or she “may become eligible” for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled … Clearly, appellants’ claims are preempted by ERISA.” Maj. op. at 1276.

Charles Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc.

930 F.3d 415 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 5, 2019

In this case, Defendant is clearly the entity “most likely to compensate” Plaintiffs for their injuries. See Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 432. … Section 323 states: 6Accordingly, we need not decide whether the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C § 230, grants Defendant immunity from Plaintiffs’ TPLA claim.

Renfro v. IN MI Power Co

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 18, 2007

The Walling Court also noted that the district court was not “clearly wrong,” citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)’s requirement that a district court’s finding of fact after a bench trial be upheld unless clearly erroneous. … And because establishing the applicability of an FLSA exemption is an affirmative defense, AEP has the burden to establish the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) that it pays the [technical writers

Utility Workers Union of America Afl-Cio v. Consumers Power Company

637 F.2d 1082 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 3, 1981

In establishing standards for qualified pension trusts in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a)(15)(A), Congress provided that, 26 A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless under the … In this regulation, the Treasury Department stated that "the total benefits resulting under (a qualified pension) plan and under such (federal or state) law (must) establish an integrated and correlated retirement system

United States v. Everett Cunningham

25 F.3d 1051 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 2, 1994

We cannot say that the district court's decision to credit Officer O'Donnell's testimony over that of defendant's is clearly erroneous. … Once again, nothing in the record suggests that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. In sum, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. B.

Debra A. Fazio and Dean Fazio v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services

750 F.2d 541 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 19, 1984

There was, therefore, no medical testimony before the AU which established an impairment or disability within the meaning of the law or regulations. … The claimant does not have a medically determinable impairment of comparable severity to that which qualifies an individual age 18 or over. 6.

Armco, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission

669 F.2d 417 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 1, 1982

Armco fails to establish why the ICC's reading of such clear language should be rejected. … Even if the record were clearly to establish such a practice-which it does not-the 1973 record-keeping requirements can only be understood to require some degree of corroboration between in- and out-bound rail traffic seeking