Case law

Victoria Jackson v. Ford Motor Company

842 F.3d 902 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 29, 2016

Just as the Supreme Court began Iqbal “by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity,” 556 … must plead to state a products-liability claim under Tennessee law. 3 Similarly to the Tennessee Supreme Court standard described above, the United States Supreme Court has held that proximate cause is established

Argo-Collier Truck Lines Corporation v. United States

611 F.2d 149 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 13, 1979

It is also troubling that the ICC failed to address points of error which were clearly not frivolous and which the protestants urged with vigor. … Thus, although existing carriers are not given complete immunity from competition, the grant of additional service must be found to serve the public interest as articulated by Congress.

Grant Toner v. Village of Elkton

547 F. App'x 720 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 26, 2013

The court also concluded that even if Doan’s use of force was objectively unreasonable, he was entitled to qualified immunity. We held that “[t]he district court’s analysis [was] sound.” … Since there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not reach the question whether Jobes is entitled to qualified immunity.

Elizabeth Harris v. James B. Turner

329 F.2d 918 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 7, 1964

We further agree with the District Court that appellant has failed to establish any right of action for common law conspiracy. … Since we find upon the record in this case that no unlawful conspiracy existed on the part of appellees, it is not necessary to reach the question of the immunity of the State Circuit Judge, the District Attorney General

Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., Consolidated Rail Corporation, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee

240 F.3d 534 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 13, 2001

The mere proximity of petroleum businesses is not sufficient to render the court's finding clearly erroneous. … D. 42 APU argues that the court erred in concluding that CFA qualifies for CERCLA's "innocent landowner" defense, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (b).

Farmer v. Rogers

839 F.2d 269 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 11, 1988

At this time Farmer was working at a small mine, with no more than ten employees, and he agreed to continue working until the owner could find a qualified replacement. … Sec. 902 (f)(1)(B) clearly attaches that requirement only to claims of living miners.

United States v. Casaneyl Valentine

100 F.3d 1209 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 12, 1996

Valentine qualified for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a final adjusted offense level of 28. … The Guidelines established an elaborate system to weigh all, or virtually all, of the facets of an offender’s criminal activities.

Dominion National Bank v. Martha B. Olsen

771 F.2d 108 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 20, 1985

The plaintiff banks clearly satisfy the Article III requirements. … Although the Supreme Court subsequently overruled the Colgate Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis, see Madden v.

United States v. Anthony Douglas Graham

483 F.3d 431 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 12, 2007

Here, in contrast, it is undisputed that stopping a vehicle where signs clearly prohibit parking is against Dayton City law. … Noting that it was the government's burden to establish that reasonable suspicion existed, see Florida v.

Tumblebus Inc. v. Meredith Cranmer, D/B/A Tumblebus of Louisville

399 F.3d 754 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 15, 2005

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that TUMBLEBUS is not a generic term incapable of obtaining protected status. … "Section 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32, which applies to registered marks, but it is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying

Middleton v. City of Flint

92 F.3d 396 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 6, 1996

The court concluded that, although the police department had clearly discriminated in its hiring policies and practices prior to 1973, [sjince that time, it is also apparent that the City has attempted to remedy many of the … Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 , 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1271 , 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)), our review clearly indicates that the fact pattern in Paradise does not prevail in this case.

United States v. Terrence C. May

399 F.3d 817 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 23, 2005

The district court’s factual findings are upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, but its “legal conclusions as to the existence of probable cause are reviewed de novo.” United States v. … Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 480 (6th Cir.2001) (“Sixth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that the affiant need only specify that the confidential informant has given accurate information in the past to qualify as reliable.”

Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller

129 F.3d 833 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 3, 1997

If Congress determines that the voting requirements established by a state do not sufficiently protect the right to vote, it may force the state to alter its regulations. … stance as enunciated in Order 1995-1 and its failure to come into compliance despite ACORN’s complaints (which were made in compliance with the statutory notice provisions and prior to the suit filed by these plaintiffs) clearly

United States v. Catherine Johnson

414 F.2d 22 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 19, 1969

She was thereupon brought before a United States District Judge and granted immunity in relation to her testimony under the immunity provision of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 409(l) (1964). … We think it is much too late to doubt that the grant of immunity to appellant was coextensive with the relevant answers she gave to the questions asked under the grant of immunity. Murphy v.

Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler

132 F.2d 498 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 5, 1942

This was testified to by a qualified disinterested witness, we well as by several employees of the appellant. The record establishes that appellant is one of the largest distributors of bread in Kentucky. … However, the record clearly shows that the appellant had built up a state-wide business in “Honey-Krust” bread products long prior to appellee’s use of the particular label.

Beverly Biggs-Leavy v. Ladel Lewis

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 10, 2025

App’x 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] legislator’s exercise of discretionary . . . powers are entitled to legislative immunity.”). Lewis is thus entitled to absolute immunity. … That is so because Lewis, the purported retaliator, had to be aware of the protected activity to establish a retaliation theory. See Hill v.

Shelby v. Bank One, NA

58 F. App'x 175 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 4, 2003

Turning first to Shelby’s ADEA claim, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment must be affirmed because the claim is clearly time-barred. … The demotion is clearly time-barred, and each subsequent action is both discrete and admittedly not discriminatory.

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r of Internal Rev.

28 F.4th 700 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 14, 2022

Once that is established, we turn to the facts of this case. A. … This type of gift may qualify for a deduction if it is “of a qualified real property interest,” “to a qualified organization,” and is “exclusively for conservation purposes.” I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A)–(C).

United States v. Christopher Yancy

725 F.3d 596 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 6, 2013

The court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous. See United States v. … Within the context of the application note, this conduct certainly qualifies as “directing, commanding, encouraging, . . . counseling, [or] training” the minor for the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1.

United States v. Rankin

1 F. App'x 389 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 10, 2001

The district court’s decision to attribute the 24.3 grams to the defendant was not clearly erroneous. E. Apprendi v. … We review the *396 district court’s findings under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.