Case law

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  • William Joe Johnson v. Harry S. Avery, Commissioner of Correction, and C. Murray Henderson, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary

    382 F.2d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 31, 1967

    The perspective through which we view this question, even though it seems one of first impression, must be framed by the well-established reluctance of the Federal Courts to intervene in internal affairs of state or Federal … Petitioner does not allege that he has complied with any of these laws, despite the fact that his activities clearly constitute unlawful practice in Tennessee 2 .

    Reversed on other grounds by Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)Cited 24 timesPublished
  • United States v. Gregory Franklin, II

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 16, 2021

    The district court did not clearly err in denying Franklin’s motion to suppress We now address the issues raised by Franklin. … Based on this testimony, the government clearly established that Smith had the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” necessary to give his expert opinion on matters concerning drug trafficking. See Fed.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

    167 F.2d 126 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 5, 1948

    petitioner assails the order on the ground that the Board made no independent findings; that the findings and conclusions of the trial examiner, which it adopted, were arbitrary and biased; and that the evidence fails to establish … unorganized for reasons therein detailed, but in which he advised the men that they were free to join the union; that this would not affect their position and that the company would continue to afford the right to work to qualified

    Reversed on other grounds by National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949)Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Kenneth D. Widgren, Jr. And Kenneth D. Widgren, Sr. v. Maple Grove Township H. Wayne Beldo Louis Lenz, Jr.

    429 F.3d 575 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 17, 2005

    The Dunn court established four factors for determining whether an area is a home’s curtilage: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding … We also decline to reach the merits of the availability of qualified immunity.

    Cited 68 timesPublished
  • Telespectrum, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky Brenda J. Helton, in Her Official Capacity as Chairman and Commisioner of the Public Service of Kentucky Edward J. Holmes, in His Official Capacity as Vice-Chairman and Commissioner of the Public Service Commission of Kentucky Gary W. Gillis, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Public Service Commission of Kentucky 99-5822) Donald R. Chambers Connie Chambers (99-5871/5919)

    227 F.3d 414 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 8, 2000

    [state officials] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159 . … We find nothing in this language signaling that the order is an interim one; rather, it seems to clearly state that the order is a denial of a certificate to build the tower.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Omar Pouncy v. Carmen Palmer

    846 F.3d 144 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 13, 2017

    No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), govern this case, meaning that we can only grant habeas relief where the state court’s reasoning is “contrary to” or constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme … The evidence establishes that Pouncy felt that he was being forced to represent himself because his only other option was to have Breczinski represent him, despite being unprepared to do so.

    Cited 122 timesPublished
  • Edward Thomas Illsley v. Attorney General of the United States William Story Norman Carlson Eugene Ray and William Peters

    805 F.2d 1034 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 8, 1986

    immunity. … They are thus shielded from liability for civil damages unless plaintiff can demonstrate that their conduct violated plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Service Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue

    724 F.2d 519 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 29, 1983

    Profit Sharing Trust (Penn Trust), were established as profit sharing trusts qualified under Sec. 401(a) by Service Bolt & Nut Co., Inc. (SBN Co.), Service Bolt & Nut of Akron, Inc. … SBN Lorain and SBN Cleveland each established a qualified profit sharing plan and trust: Service Bolt & Nut of Lorain, Inc. Profit Sharing Trust and Service Bolt & Nut of Cleveland, Inc.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Hancock v. Dodson

    958 F.2d 1367 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 23, 1992

    The stipulation occurred because discovery had established that Schrah had never touched Hancock. … immunity because he acted reasonably under the circumstances.

    Cited 385 timesPublished
  • United States v. McNeese

    819 F.3d 922 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 18, 2016

    McNeese responds that the facts recited in his plea agreement clearly show that his sixty-three-month sentence derives from a Guidelines sentencing range of sixty-three to eighty-seven months. Appellant Br. 20-21. … Garrett, 758 F.3d 749 (6th Cir.2014), we held that Malcolm Garrett qualified for § 3582(c)(2) relief because his plea agreement showed that “the sentence was based, at least in part” on a Guidelines range.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Chrysler Group LLC v. Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc.

    776 F.3d 411 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 16, 2015

    In any event, the instant case, like inter-governmental immunity cases, involves how the federal government spends its funds. … Chrysler’s argument that “Section 747 and state establishment laws speak to wholly distinct phases of the establishment process,” similarly misses the mark.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Baker v. City of Detroit

    217 F. App'x 491 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 16, 2007

    The mother and personal representative of the estate of Stacey Baker appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in favor of the City of Detroit and Marcus Townsend, a former … With only the federal law claims remaining, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity and other grounds, and the district court granted the motion on August 5, 2005.

    Cited 13 timesUnpublished
  • Amer Canoe Assn v. Louisa Water & Sewer

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 1, 2004

    Moreover, their ability to propose legislation and to bring litigation based upon the information collected by the defendants is clearly hampered. … Lujan and Morton clearly counsel against such a broad grant of standing. I cannot read Akins and Public Citizen as demanding it.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Douglas Stewart v. O'Bell "Tom" Winn

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 27, 2020

    Spencer’s claim fails because he has not identified a Supreme Court holding that clearly establishes his asserted legal rule. … Stewart’s reliance on these snippets to satisfy § 2254(d)(1)’s requirement of “clearly established” law has two problems.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Kenneth T. Richey v. Betty Mitchell, Warden

    395 F.3d 660 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 25, 2005

    Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling on transferred intent was neither contrary to nor involved *690 an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. … I suggest that the Ohio Supreme Court did not make any unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law here, nor was it contrary to Fiore or Bouie .

    Overruled on other grounds by Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005)Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Lynn Hoffman v. Professional Med Team, a Michigan Corporation

    394 F.3d 414 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 7, 2005

    Its conclusions on this question were not clearly erroneous and are affirmed. … The district court’s conclusion that disorderly conduct formed the true motivation for Hoffman’s discharge therefore is not clearly erroneous.

    Cited 64 timesPublished
  • Jihan Hatem Almuhtaseb v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General

    453 F.3d 743 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 14, 2006

    Chen held that “[t]he term ‘constitutional claims’ clearly relates to claims brought pursuant to provisions of the Constitution of the United States.” 434 F.3d at 151. … opinion) required under the INA, but rather must establish a “particularized threat of torture.”

    Abrogated on other grounds by Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020)Cited 314 timesPublished
  • Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc.

    799 F.2d 1128 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 2, 1986

    A summary judgment movant bears the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light … See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitations — A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 Ins.L.J. 535, 542.

    Cited 217 timesPublished
  • Connie Reguli v. Lori Russ

    109 F.4th 874 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 31, 2024

    In both, an official’s speech qualified as the “adverse action” that the plaintiff sued over. … So the date of the harmful speech in these cases (the public disclosures or defamatory statements) qualified as the date of the adverse actions.

    Cited 39 timesPublished

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