Case law

Local Union No. 5 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Mahoning and Trumbull County Building Trades Welfare Fund

541 F.2d 636 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 15, 1976

thing[s] of value” from employers to the Fund as a “representative” of employees. 3 Even assuming that the “sole and exclusive benefit” requirement applies to trustees’ rule-making, in addition to the “establishfment]” of qualified … Clearly, the district court had jurisdiction of the purported section 186(c)(5) violation. See, e. g., Alvares v.

Laura Beck-Wilson v. Anthony Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

441 F.3d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 17, 2006

Thus the district court’s grant of the VA’s motion for summary judgment can be upheld “only if the record shows that [the VA] established the defense so clearly that no rational jury could have found to the contrary.” … We do not agree that the VA has established this defense so clearly.

Hooks v. Hooks

771 F.2d 935 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 23, 1985

He held that while Cornett would also be entitled to such immunity, the complaint failed to state a claim against Cornett since it did not allege any unlawful action by him (presumably because he did not participate in the … “If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”

Dennis Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc. Kentucky Producers' Self-Insurance Fund and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor

227 F.3d 569 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 7, 2000

If this is so, Cornett's ailments do not qualify as statutory pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. 718.201. But, of the three, only Dr. … Vaezy's opinion "little weight" because he relied, in part, on a pulmonary function study that "yielded numbers above the qualified amount." J.A. at 23.

Thomas R. Warren, Jr. v. Larry Lack, Penny Bernhardt, Ronald McRady and Dennis Talley

915 F.2d 1574 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 9, 1990

known. 9 When the issue of qualified immunity is raised, "the plaintiff is obliged to present facts which if true would constitute a violation of clearly established law." … Appellants were entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects an official from monetary damages but not from injunctive relief. Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 273 (6th Cir.1988).

Fletcher Molden v. Braceville Police Department, Township of Braceville, F/k/a Village of Braceville, Bishop, Officer.

936 F.2d 573 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 3, 1991

A. 7 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields certain public officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … fact) involving an issue on which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights. 9 Poe v.

Greer v. Holt

718 F.2d 206 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 11, 1983

The attorneys have cited several cases which purport to show how courts have expanded their interpretation of the statute’s qualifying phrase “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce.” See, e.g., Ciechon v. … Attorneys Sorak and Coleman clearly accepted an unpopular case involving a client whose status in the community could hardly have been worse, whose only witnesses were convicted felons and who was indigent.

Hawkins v. Coyle

547 F.3d 540 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 18, 2008

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. … The district court correctly concluded that the judgment of the Ohio courts was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Johnson v. Bell

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 29, 2008

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set … A state-court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case,” id.

Wirtz v. Steepleton General Tire Company

330 F.2d 804 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 27, 1964

particular industry; or * * * (4) any employee employed by an establishment which qualifies as an exempt retail establishment under clause (2) of this subsection and is recognized as a retail establishment in the particular … industry notwithstanding that such establishment makes or processes at the retail establishment the goods that it sells * * *."

Charles E. Buck v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration

960 F.2d 603 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 6, 1992

Buck also appears to argue that he was not required to file a jurisdictional statement because the defendants’ decision to remove the case to federal court established subject matter jurisdiction. … Clearly analogous to the present case are those in which a party fails to comply with a district court’s order requiring particular steps to be taken within a stated time. In Carter v.

United States v. Presser

828 F.2d 340 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 31, 1987

But, before reaching that conclusion, the court states: “We believe there is clearly a tradition of accessibility to disqualification proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) … Rather, from the premise that there is “clearly a tradition of accessibility to disqualification proceedings ” (emphasis added), the court leaps to the conclusion that there is a first amendment qualified right of access

T. Marzetti Co. v. Roskam Baking Co.

680 F.3d 629 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 25, 2012

After conducting a bench trial, the district court held: (1) the mark “Texas Toast” is generic as applied to croutons; therefore, the mark does not qualify for trademark protection; and (2) Roskam’s use of the words “Texas … Moreover, the district court’s discussion clearly indicates that it defined the “genus” as Texas toast and determined that the parties’ products were “species.”

United States v. Carl Brown (99-5613) Carl Scruggs (99-5687)

276 F.3d 211 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 7, 2002

After reviewing the record, we hold that the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and that its application of the Guidelines to those facts is clearly correct. … We have held that once the government has established that the defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it is clearly improbable that the possession of the

Charles Ollis v. Henry Wood, Knox County, Tennessee, Pamela Self, Susan Arwood, David Rutherford and Martha Rutherford

810 F.2d 202 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 25, 1986

established statutory or constitutional right; and that appellee Wood's failure to disclose the gonorrhea evidence to the magistrate was protected by a qualified immunity. … Absent the shield of immunity, these allegations sufficiently state a constitutional deprivation. II. 11 The Supreme Court established an objective test for qualified immunity in Harlow v.

Charlotte Mays v. Buckeye Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. And Frederick B. Parker

277 F.3d 873 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 22, 2002

was qualified for the credit; and (4) despite Plaintiffs qualification, Defendants denied her credit application. … Plaintiff clearly had no intention to invoke federal constitutional rights, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs “due process and natural justice” claim solely pursuant to a Fourteenth Amendment

Michael Cooney, M.D. And Karen Cooney v. The United States of America

630 F.2d 438 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 12, 1980

The hospital’s three-year internship and residence Medical Training Program was established under the auspices and approval of thq American Medical Association. … Although the hospital provided the training necessary to qualify as a specialist, the program participants were not degree candidates.

Geraldine Fuhr, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Ppellant v. School District of the City of Hazel Park, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee

364 F.3d 753 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 24, 2004

Fuhr, however, points to the evidence at trial that clearly established a pay differential between the position that she already had and the position that she sought. … Clearly it would have. Contrary to Hazel Park’s assertion, Fuhr did suffer an adverse employment action.

Brown v. City of Louisville

33 F.3d 54 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 23, 1994

The order of a district court denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Kennedy v. … To find that a clearly established right exists, the district court must find binding precedent by the Supreme Court, this court, the highest court in the state in which the action arose, or itself, so holding.

Awkal v. Mitchell

559 F.3d 456 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 16, 2009

We have held that "clearly established law under [AEDPA] encompasses more than just bright-line rules laid down by the [Supreme] Court. … Her testimony demonstrates that she was clearly qualified to act as an expert witness on Awkal's behalf. See Joyce-Couch v.