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  • United States v. Yolanda Wilson (97-1810) and Marlon Wilson (97-1695)

    168 F.3d 916 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 25, 1999

    But there’s clearly enough to show that conservatively there were 15 kilograms involved in this matter.” … Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir.1995), which circumscribed the ability of a sentencing court to consider the facts of a Defendant’s prior conviction, we suggested that where a statute does not clearly establish that the offense

    Cited 100 timesPublished
  • Martin v. Barnsville

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 21, 2000

    Lillard, MOWERY & YOUELL, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disability. We Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant. John C. … The arbitrator based his decision solely on the terms of such employee," thereby clearly distinguishing the issue of the bargaining agreement between the union and defendant, misconduct from one's status

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Fletcher Molden v. Braceville Police Department, Township of Braceville, F/k/a Village of Braceville, Bishop, Officer.

    936 F.2d 573 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 3, 1991

    A. 7 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields certain public officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … fact) involving an issue on which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights. 9 Poe v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Gerald K. Groves v. State of Ohio Larry Peck Brad Copeland Scott Doty

    959 F.2d 234 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 9, 1992

    Plaintiff has appealed only the award of summary judgment as to the defense of qualified immunity. 1 4 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. … Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), governmental officials "performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Hooks v. Hooks

    771 F.2d 935 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 23, 1985

    He held that while Cornett would also be entitled to such immunity, the complaint failed to state a claim against Cornett since it did not allege any unlawful action by him (presumably because he did not participate in the … “If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”

    Cited 554 timesPublished
  • Dennis Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc. Kentucky Producers' Self-Insurance Fund and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor

    227 F.3d 569 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 7, 2000

    If this is so, Cornett's ailments do not qualify as statutory pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. 718.201. But, of the three, only Dr. … Vaezy's opinion "little weight" because he relied, in part, on a pulmonary function study that "yielded numbers above the qualified amount." J.A. at 23.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Greer v. Holt

    718 F.2d 206 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 11, 1983

    The attorneys have cited several cases which purport to show how courts have expanded their interpretation of the statute’s qualifying phrase “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce.” See, e.g., Ciechon v. … Attorneys Sorak and Coleman clearly accepted an unpopular case involving a client whose status in the community could hardly have been worse, whose only witnesses were convicted felons and who was indigent.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Bradley v. Milliken

    540 F.2d 229 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 4, 1976

    Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 , ( 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ) (1971), Arizona and Pennsylvania welfare officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. … The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., (209 U.S.) at 159-160 ( 28 S.Ct. 441, at 454 ).

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Local Union No. 5 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Mahoning and Trumbull County Building Trades Welfare Fund

    541 F.2d 636 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 15, 1976

    thing[s] of value” from employers to the Fund as a “representative” of employees. 3 Even assuming that the “sole and exclusive benefit” requirement applies to trustees’ rule-making, in addition to the “establishfment]” of qualified … Clearly, the district court had jurisdiction of the purported section 186(c)(5) violation. See, e. g., Alvares v.

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Cohen v. Smith

    58 F. App'x 139 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 12, 2003

    Without deciding this issue, I would find that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. … At the time of the alleged incidents in this case, it was well-established that arresting or detaining an individual in retaliation for criticizing the police, even through the use of crude language, violates the First Amendment

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Trey Cholewa v. United States

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 29, 2024

    We have jurisdiction because the denial of Westfall Act immunity qualifies as a reviewable final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 238. … As the Supreme Court has made clear, the Westfall Act confers on a qualifying federal employee an immunity “not simply from liability, but from suit.” Osborn, 549 U.S. at 238.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Awkal v. Mitchell

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 16, 2009

    We have held that “clearly established law under [AEDPA] encompasses more than just bright-line rules laid down by the [Supreme] Court. … Her testimony demonstrates that she was clearly qualified to act as an expert witness on Awkal’s behalf. See Joyce-Couch v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Charles Ollis v. Henry Wood, Knox County, Tennessee, Pamela Self, Susan Arwood, David Rutherford and Martha Rutherford

    810 F.2d 202 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 25, 1986

    established statutory or constitutional right; and that appellee Wood's failure to disclose the gonorrhea evidence to the magistrate was protected by a qualified immunity. … Absent the shield of immunity, these allegations sufficiently state a constitutional deprivation. II. 11 The Supreme Court established an objective test for qualified immunity in Harlow v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Charlotte Mays v. Buckeye Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. And Frederick B. Parker

    277 F.3d 873 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 22, 2002

    was qualified for the credit; and (4) despite Plaintiffs qualification, Defendants denied her credit application. … Plaintiff clearly had no intention to invoke federal constitutional rights, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs “due process and natural justice” claim solely pursuant to a Fourteenth Amendment

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • Mitchell v. Chapman

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 11, 2003

    In the context of claim preclusion, particularly claims of qualified immunity, to determine “privity . . . means a successor in interest to the party, one whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the potential … The Court reasoned that such a 11 In addition, the un ique waiver o f sovereign immunity applicable theory “would absolutely immunize

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Elgharib v. Napolitano

    600 F.3d 597 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 30, 2010

    Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999) (noting the Ex parte Young sovereign-immunity exception is necessary “if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land”); Harry W. … Therefore, we reject Elgharib’s first argument, and we hold that the Constitution qualifies as “any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory)” under all subsections of § 1252.

    Cited 75 timesPublished
  • Michael Cooney, M.D. And Karen Cooney v. The United States of America

    630 F.2d 438 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 12, 1980

    The hospital’s three-year internship and residence Medical Training Program was established under the auspices and approval of thq American Medical Association. … Although the hospital provided the training necessary to qualify as a specialist, the program participants were not degree candidates.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • United States v. King

    516 F.3d 425 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 14, 2008

    Thus, the decision to disclaim § 4A1.2’s time limits within § 4B1.4 may not in fact establish § 4A1.2’s role as a default and may instead have more to do with the Sentencing Commission’s (“Commission”) need to ensure that … The Eleventh Circuit’s rationale is compelling because it is clearly true that application notes to § 2L1.2 cross reference two sections that already included time limits.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Abx v. Afl-Cio

    266 F.3d 392 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 19, 2001

    STANDARD OF REVIEW 11 The district court's "factual findings must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous." Taylor and Gaskin v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1277 (1984) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). … increased operational costs, and efforts to discourage business resulted in economic harm sufficient to qualify as a strike.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Gooch

    850 F.3d 285 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 2, 2017

    Second Bank Robbery No testimony or other record evidence established – or rebutted – that defendant knew Williams possessed a firearm during the second bank robbery. … Section 1951(b)(1) clearly “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” as necessary to constitute a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).

    Cited 112 timesPublished

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