Case law

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  • Maria A. Warren D/B/A Warren's Grocery v. United States

    932 F.2d 582 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 10, 1991

    But in the instant case we believe that Plaintiff established the invalidity of the administrative action by a preponderance, and the district court's ruling to the contrary is clearly erroneous. … The record discloses no allegations of impropriety on Plaintiff's part, and the United States admits that Plaintiff is otherwise fully qualified to participate in the food stamp program.

    Cited 37 timesPublished
  • Sharpe v. Cureton

    319 F.3d 259 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 13, 2003

    The individual defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds; however, the district court denied the motion and this Court affirmed the lower court’s decision on interlocutory appeal. See Sharpe v. … The district court found that the pre-trial offers failed to set forth clearly defined terms upon which there could be a meeting of the minds.

    Cited 107 timesPublished
  • Edward Abney, Barbara Allen, James Day, Robert Green, Delbert Jackson, James Pugh, Roger L. Thacker, and Daniel Hunter Webster v. Amgen, Inc.

    443 F.3d 540 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 29, 2006

    Antibodies are proteins produced by the immune system that attack substances such as viruses, bacteria, and in some cases, synthetic proteins like GDNF. … Where there is no evidence of a promise, promissory estoppel cannot be established.

    Cited 118 timesPublished
  • Knox v. Neaton Auto Products

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 9, 2004

    Even if this did qualify as a meaningful demotion, however, Knox is unable to establish that the decision to remove her The district court properly determined … Neaton clearly informed Knox correctly determined that because Matlock’s statements about that she was being stripped of her position as group leader not wanting women working for him and about Knox “being

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Marta Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Merrick B. Garland

    114 F.4th 487 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 9, 2024

    to qualify for asylum necessarily does not qualify for withholding of removal.”) … All of this was well established in the record and had no bearing on Marta’s past in Guatemala.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Danta Davis v. Dennis Straub, Warden

    445 F.3d 908 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 21, 2006

    This means that to determine what constitutes “clearly established” law, we look to the law established by Supreme Court holdings, and not its dicta. Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Ruimveld v. … An explicit statement from the Supreme Court is not necessary; rather, “the legal principles and standards flowing from [Supreme Court] precedent” also qualify as “clearly established law.”

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Mohamed Ajami v. Daniel Saab

    436 F. App'x 458 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 19, 2011

    The defendant may immediately appeal a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds “if (1) the defendant is a public official asserting qualified immunity, and (2) the issue on appeal is not what facts the … parties may be able to prove, but whether the plaintiff’s facts, taken at their best, show a violation of clearly established law.”

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Broska v. Henderson

    70 F. App'x 262 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 30, 2003

    Since the United States was presumptively cloaked with its inherent sovereign immunity, Broska could therefore not recover a money judgment under the state-law claim unless the United States waived that immunity. … The Retaliation Claim In order to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation in our circuit, a plaintiff must make a showing of four elements: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise

    Cited 37 timesPublished
  • United States v. Garcia-Morones

    49 F. App'x 556 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 18, 2002

    “The defendant bears the burden of proof in establishing his entitlement to the reduction.” Sabino, 274 F.3d at 1073 . … Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Garcia-Morones was not a minor participant in the offense.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Lewis v. Hager

    956 F.2d 1164 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 10, 1992

    The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for applying qualified immunity in Harlow v. … We therefore affirm the District Court's holding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because defendants have not violated a clearly established constitutional right.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Jennifer Leech v. John Mayer

    588 F. App'x 402 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 22, 2014

    immunity grounds. … that constitutional right was clearly established such that a ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Simmonds v.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • Herbert Vanderklok, Cross-Appellee v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., Inc., Cross-Appellant

    956 F.2d 610 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 13, 1992

    Because the court found that the medical evidence established that plaintiff could perform light work, the court concluded that plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled and therefore did not qualify for disability … the proof submitted does not establish that the insured is totally and permanently disabled from all work for the remainder of his life.

    Cited 136 timesPublished
  • Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,523 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Guaranty Bond and Securities Corp., James C. Barbour, Receiver

    496 F.2d 145 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 23, 1974

    Therefore, the filing of the original S.E.C. action did not prevent Guaranty from conducting normal business after the effective date of the Act and thus qualifying as a broker-dealer. … The customers of Guaranty and their representative clearly meet this broad standard. See also Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 . 7 .

    Reversed on other grounds by Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975)Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Unites States Ex Rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc.

    552 F.3d 503 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 14, 2009

    complaint clearly was a “public” disclosure. … Poteet wisely does not contend that she qualifies as an original source.

    Abrogated on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Azam Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813 (2021)Cited 83 timesPublished
  • Onilea Neal v. Robert Bergland

    646 F.2d 1178 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 1, 1981

    None of these provisions include a clearly defined obligation on the part of FmHA running to plaintiff to perform any supervisory function, but instead speak in terms of discretion on the part of FmHA to render such assistance … The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., authorizes suit against the United States for this kind of claim since the act constitutes a waiver by the United States of its immunity from liability in tort for the

    Cited 59 timesPublished
  • Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington, Ohio

    905 F.3d 357 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 18, 2018

    It contends that because Tree of Life's "proposed primary use" was to establish a private school, it does not qualify as a "place of worship, church" as that phrase is used in the ordinance. … App'x 566 , 569 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that, in the qualified immunity context, "[o]ne does not forfeit [an argument] by making [other] arguments that, if accepted, establish [the first argument]").

    Cited 139 timesPublished
  • Williams v. Wci Steel Company, Inc.

    170 F.3d 598 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 17, 1999

    The source of funding is the residue of the $21 million trust established by the agreement. … The Memorandum Agreement clearly states that the $21 million set aside is to be allocated among the Recipient Employees.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Herbert E. Downing v. Michael A. Rumer

    875 F.2d 863 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 22, 1989

    Telb, 831 F.2d 673 (6th Cir.1987) (sua sponte dismissal on basis of qualified immunity is improper). … Under these circumstances, and unlike qualified immunity, the sua sponte dismissal of a suit is proper where it is obvious from the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant is absolutely immune from suit.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • Juan Sanchez Alvarez v. MarkWayne Mullin

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 11, 2026

    Page 31 immigrants subject to § 1226(c) do not qualify for this benefit. … There, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” in an exception to a sovereign-immunity waiver. Ali, 552 U.S. at 218 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Jotham Clement Johnson v. City of Saline

    151 F.3d 564 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 6, 1998

    The definition of a “qualified individual with a disability” clearly fore *568 sees an employment relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8). … We cannot conclude in this case, however, that the state established as a matter of law that no reasonable accommodation was required or alternately that no reasonable accommodation was possible.

    Cited 119 timesPublished

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