Case law

Barbara Jo Palmer, Plaintiff-Appellee v. United States of America, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee

146 F.3d 361 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 4, 1998

We have previously held that the Act does not waive sovereign immunity for prejudgment interest. Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 159 (6th Cir.1992) (Kirchgessner). … Using the definition of “punitive” established in Kalavity, we must reverse the district court’s exclusion of estimated future income taxes from the damage award.

Lee Hampton v. Ron Hobbs

106 F.3d 1281 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 13, 1997

For a prisoner who qualifies for poor person status, there is no cost to bring a suit and, therefore, no incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance of success. … Hampton, however, has not established that the Act violates any “right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or by federal statute.”

Bobbie L. Sherrod v. General Motors Corporation

33 F.3d 636 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 30, 1994

We affirm the order of the district court because 117 of the plaintiffs raise issues concerning collectively bargained plans that do not qualify as ERISA plans and the remaining plaintiff failed to allege a cause of action … The pension program is clearly regulated by ERISA.

United States v. Jeffery Havis

907 F.3d 439 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 22, 2018

Supreme Court authority thus established the boundaries of deference. … Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (“Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.

Lester Siler v. Gerald Webber

443 F. App'x 50 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 22, 2011

They interpret the magistrate’s order not as denying their Rule 56(f) motion, but as staying it pending a ruling on qualified immunity. … P. 15(b)(2) (2008), as evidenced by the Supervisors including a section on qualified immunity in their answer and motion.

Awkal v. Mitchell

613 F.3d 629 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 23, 2010

A federal court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. … Rizk was not “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,” see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Vespasian v. Sweeney

52 F.3d 327 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 6, 1995

Under the facts alleged in the complaint, the district court said, Blue Cross clearly was not a fiduciary for the purpose of notification relating to termination. … The problem with this theory is that the right to continued coverage under Sec. 1161(a) extends only to a "qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as the result of a qualifying event."

Vakilian v. Shaw

302 F. App'x 350 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 24, 2008

The district court denied summary judgment to Shaw based on qualified immunity. … In Vakilian I, we explained that to overcome Shaw’s entitlement to qualified immunity, Vakilian was required to establish: (1) a substantial showing that Shaw stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard

Mickey Gregory, as Administrator of the Estate of Gerald Gregory, Plaintiff-Appellant(98-5913/5976/6174)/cross-Appellee v. Shelby County, Tennessee A.C. Gilless, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee Jerry Ellis

220 F.3d 433 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 12, 2000

We believe the award was not clearly excessive and that ample evidence was presented to establish an award of this amount. 71 The evidence adduced at trial shows that Gerald Gregory suffered severe injuries as a result of … Ann Arbor Sch Bd., 699 F.2d 309 , 313 (6th Cir. 1983). 87 The first theory advanced by Appellant is clearly without merit.

United States v. Smith

549 F.3d 355 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 2, 2008

These factual assessments of the district court are far from clearly erroneous. … Smith has three qualifying convictions for controlled substances offenses, dating from May 5, 1997, May 6, 1997, and March 12, 1998, respectively.

A. Z. Abdul F/k/a George Steward v. Stoney R. Lane, Warden

588 F.2d 1178 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 28, 1978

Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1978): The fundamental rules to be applied in cases charging grand jury discrimination are well established. … The record demonstrates that the findings of fact of the district court are not clearly erroneous, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), but to the contrary, they are supported by substantial evidence.

Gerald Ostipow v. William Federspiel

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 18, 2020

Federspiel asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to each of the Ostipows’ constitutional claims. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim. … To overcome Federspiel’s qualified immunity defense here, the Ostipows must show not only that their injury constitutes a Takings Clause violation, but also that such a violation was clearly established at the time of the

Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

180 F.2d 731 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 8, 1950

, for it agrees that .the Ferbert letters have been “immunized” by this provision and that no order of the Board could restrain the use in the future of such statements 'as the Ferbert letters. … However, the record clearly shows this was not a single incident.

William Lemmon v. City of Akron, Ohio

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 4, 2019

Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, “the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established.” … As for the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, because there is no constitutional violation, we have no need to evaluate whether the law was clearly established. See Hoover v.

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA

538 F.3d 469 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 18, 2008

debtor “validation rights can be triggered” under the FDCPA; (2) Defendants’ alleged mistake as to the written-dispute requirement was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) Defendants are absolutely immune … Jerman further argues that had Defendants established any meaningful procedures they would have either (1) sought a formal advisory opinion from the Federal Trade Commission on the “in writing” requirement, or (2) adopted

Kiran K. SHAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee

816 F.2d 264 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 20, 1987

; viz., (1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) he was discharged, and (3) he was qualified for the position, plaintiff’s evidence did not establish the fourth element; i.e., that plaintiff was replaced by … We join a number of other jurisdictions which hold that parties may enter into a contract of employment terminable only pursuant to its express terms — as “for cause” — by clearly stating their intention to do so, even though

Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper Co.

14 F. App'x 482 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 10, 2001

“A person seeking relief under the ADA for termination must establish (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act, (2) that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without … Brown’s disability quite clearly does not impede his ability to request an accommodation, so he must request it in the first instance.

Gerard W. McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company

844 F.2d 294 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 24, 1988

Michigan clearly has an interest in regulating employment discrimination. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. … the agreement establishing it."

Montgomery v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc.

47 F. App'x 342 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 24, 2002

their cases through inferential and circumstantial proof as established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. … “The defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,” reasons for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

Traci Miskel v. James A. Karnes and Dwayne Maynard

397 F.3d 446 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 24, 2005

As debatable as Vega may be, 6 we conclude that its application in Petitioner’s case was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. A. … Under AEDPA, if there is no “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” that supports a habeas petitioner’s legal argument, the argument must fail.