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  • Charlie Lilly v. City of Erlanger

    598 F. App'x 370 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 23, 2015

    officers’ position, would not know he was violating Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.” … that constitutional right was clearly established such that a ‘reasonable official would -13- No. 14-5069 Lilly v.

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Frederick W. Walton v. Richard M. Rogers J.R. Dickey, Officer 1-50, Wright Sheffield, Officer Richard B. McQuade Jr., Judge James G. Carr, Mag.

    860 F.2d 1081 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 19, 1988

    Furthermore, we find no error in the district court's granting of summary judgment to defendant Sheffield on the basis of qualified immunity. … Plaintiff did not respond to the motion by pleading facts describing a violation of a clearly established right. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

    Cited 4 timesUnpublished
  • Hal Brian Stickney v. Chrysostomos Trikes and Leland Young, Individually and as Police Officers, City of Sterling Heights

    909 F.2d 1485 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 3, 1990

    Upon a review of the record, we conclude, as did the district judge, that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm. … That, however, is a question of fact and does not constitute the predicate for a claim of qualified immunity.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • Matthew Kelly v. Clinton Sines

    647 F. App'x 572 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 6, 2016

    The officers respond that they did not use excessive force and should be granted qualified immunity. … Whether a defendant receives qualified immunity turns on two questions: did the defendant violate a constitutionally protected right, and if so, was the right clearly established at the time the act was committed?

    Cited 12 timesUnpublished
  • Carolyn Carter v. University of Toledo

    349 F.3d 269 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 12, 2003

    To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected group, (2) she was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4 … The court concluded that “[t]he mere fact that each of these men was a ‘manager’ within the expansive Spiegel organization is clearly insufficient to establish that matters bearing upon Hill’s discharge were within the scope

    Cited 187 timesPublished
  • John Swanson, M.D. v. University of Cincinnati and University Hospital, Inc.

    268 F.3d 307 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 20, 2001

    Bower that his medication enabled him to follow patients more clearly and improved his reading and retention skills as well as his performance at the University of Nevada. … Thus, this court held that a plaintiff had to establish disability at the time of the discriminatory acts to recover under the ADA.

    Cited 69 timesPublished
  • Dillery v. Sandusky

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 18, 2005

    To make out a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) she has a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits … immunity for her actions; and (7) the defendants are entitled to immunity under Ohio law.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins Co

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 24, 2008

    In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee must establish that (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse … An employee’s dissemination of confidential documents in other situations, however, might qualify as participatory.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Medina-Almaguer

    559 F.3d 420 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 12, 2009

    Medina-Almaguer’s appeal raises one issue: Does his 1989 state-court conviction qualify as a “drug trafficking offense” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)? … Just as a charging document, written plea agreement or plea-colloquy transcript— which sentencing courts clearly may use, see Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20-21 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 — may not suffice to show that a defendant was previously

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Dressman v. Costle

    759 F.2d 548 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 17, 1985

    Kentucky was one of the states that qualified and applied for more time to attain the reduction of ozone. … In Garcia , the Court, recognizing that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable but inconsistent with established principles

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • 79 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1603, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,389 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. The City of Warren, Michigan, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, the City of Warren Police and Firefighter Civil Service Commission, Rule 19(a) Party, (97-1024)

    138 F.3d 1083 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 16, 1998

    The standard of review is clearly erroneous. If the findings of the district court are not clearly erroneous, we must affirm. … court's findings were not clearly erroneous.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • United States v. Regina R. Hood (92-3532) Margaret E. Gibbs (92-3602, 92-3887) Larry J. Gibbs (92-3657) Ronnie T. Gibbs (92-3659) Charles M. Nallie (92-3979)

    14 F.3d 603 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 6, 1994

    Regina Hood then requested that the court require the government to grant the witnesses use immunity from prosecution. This request was denied. … This request was denied as well. 18 The issue of judicially mandated immunity from prosecution was fully discussed by this court in United States v.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Mary K. HOLLOHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

    805 F.2d 143 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 10, 1986

    In order to qualify for retirement benefits, plaintiff needs twenty-six quarters of coverage. … Hollohan did not establish that she was engaged in a separate trade or business.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • J.P. Silverton Industries L.P. v. Sohm

    243 F. App'x 82 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 26, 2007

    Sohm This court reviews the question of whether a defendant is “‘entitled to absolute or qualified immunity de novo, as that issue is a question of law.’” Barnes v. … Second, “government officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity and are protected from civil damages so long as ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established

    Cited 21 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Araiza

    643 F. App'x 524 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 8, 2016

    Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err by applying the enhancement at Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1). … A defendant qualifies for a leadership enhancement if the government establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that he has exercised decisionmaking authority, recruited accomplices, received a larger share of the

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Janis Bomis, Debtor-Appellant v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., Creditor-Appellee

    25 F.3d 1047 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 23, 1994

    First, the bankruptcy court noted that Bomis did not purport to qualify for accredited investor status through his income. … The standard for reviewing a bankruptcy court's factual findings in Sec. 523(a)(2)(B) cases is the "clearly erroneous" standard.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Greg Oliver, Kate Oliver v. Evert Elkins, Elizabeth McNamara Dennis M. Straub, John Jabe, Robert Brown, Jr.

    925 F.2d 1465 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 8, 1991

    immunity from damages liability because they violated no clearly established rights under the first, eighth, or fourteenth amendments. 1 5 Oliver filed timely objections to the magistrate's report. … immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Matthew Streater v. Felici M. Courtright

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 15, 2009

    a defendant was protected by qualified immunity. … If it so determined, the court was then required to determine whether the right violated was clearly established. Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Johnson v. Weaver

    248 F. App'x 694 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 24, 2007

    Assuming that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment under Randolph , qualified immunity — specifically, its “clearly established” prong— shields them from personal liability. … Thus, because the officers did not violate a right clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, their claim to qualified immunity prevails.

    Cited 7 timesUnpublished
  • Quiana Johnson v. Metro Government of Nashville

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 15, 2014

    After completion of discovery, Shelton moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. … However, “a defendant denied qualified immunity may appeal . . . if the issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff’s facts, taken at their best, show that the defendant violated clearly established law.” Quigley v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished

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