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  • John Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC

    668 F.3d 843 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 21, 2012

    Orton explained how Calamunei qualifies as an employer under § 203(d) when one applies the law of this Circuit 2 and argued that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that Orton was exempt during the … Prior to a ruling, Orton *846 sought leave to file a second amended complaint to add further allegations that would more clearly refute the affirmative defense of exemption and establish Calamunci’s status as an employer.

    Cited 295 timesPublished
  • Clark Regional Medical Center Pattie A. Clay Hospital v. United States Department of Health and Human Services

    314 F.3d 241 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 11, 2002

    It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs qualify as urban hospitals. … Procedural Background Clark Regional qualified for the DSH adjustment for fiscal years 1992 through 1995; Clay qualified for the adjustment for fiscal years 1993 through 1995.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Lydale Shumate v. Johnathon Cleveland

    483 F. App'x 112 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 24, 2012

    The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and governmental immunity, appending several depositions of the parties and other witnesses. … clearly established law.

    Cited 3 timesUnpublished
  • Nathan Roberts v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co.

    Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 19, 2026

    Rather, he must be otherwise qualified to receive the benefit that he was denied because of his race. … In fact, the Court has clearly stated in the standing context that “a plaintiff need not translate his or her desire for a [benefit] into a formal application where that application would be merely a futile gesture.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court

    22 F.3d 653 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 21, 1994

    The first question posed is whether the alleged violation of this plan requirement is a deprivation of a "right, privilege or immunity." … Even assuming appellant would have been able to establish the Juvenile Justice Act was violated, the trial proofs clearly fail to demonstrate that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury. 1 In Doe v.

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Estate of Sowards v. City of Trenton

    125 F. App'x 31 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 24, 2005

    The court granted the motion as to the other defendants, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

    Cited 31 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. William Curro

    847 F.2d 325 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 26, 1988

    At the first grand jury appearance, there is no indication that he had any type of immunity from prosecution. At his second appearance, it is clear that he had been promised immunity. … At the second appearance, Louzon had use immunity and, thus, had additional motivation for telling the truth.

    Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nelson Bernardo Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326 (1991)Cited 30 timesPublished
  • United States v. Frank Stevens

    177 F.3d 579 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 27, 1999

    Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), which arguably qualifies as an unavailable-witness case. … Clearly, the witnesses’ "unavailability” was easily curable. There could hardly be manifest necessity for a mistrial when a short continuance would have sufficed.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Vivian D. Redding v. Beverly St. Eward, Detroit Police Officer

    241 F.3d 530 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 1, 2001

    Eward’s motion for summary judgment, she argued that (1) there was no deprivation of Redding’s constitutional rights, and (2) even if there was a deprivation, St, Eward’s actions were protected by qualified immunity. … She failed to provide any evidence tending to establish that element.

    Cited 374 timesPublished
  • Terrance Kimbrough v. United States

    71 F.4th 468 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 22, 2023

    In 2021, the district court agreed with Kimbrough that attempted Hobbs Act robbery fails to qualify as a predicate offense. But it nevertheless rejected Kimbrough’s claim. … When Kimbrough pleaded guilty, existing precedent did not “clearly foreshadow” Taylor.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Madison-Hughes v. Shalala

    80 F.3d 1121 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 8, 1996

    Based on the use of such qualifying phrases, we believe 45 C.F.R. § 80.6 (b) commits the collection of data to agency discretion, rather than mandating specific requirements. … If regulations do not provide guidance about specific legal standards for judicial review, agency action is immune from such review. Slyper v.

    Cited 62 timesPublished
  • Navistar, Inc. v. Terry Forester

    767 F.3d 638 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 12, 2014

    The BLBA establishes a rebuttable No. 13-3994 Navistar v. Forester, et al. … “To qualify as a ‘miner,’ an individual must establish that: (1) he worked in or around a statutorily defined coal mine (the ‘situs’ test), . . . and (2) his duties involved the extraction or preparation of coal, or involved

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Jerry R. Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc.

    963 F.2d 100 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 21, 1991

    Elrod, 881 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.1989), where the court held, in addressing the question of qualified immunity, that a blanket prohibition against hardcover books was unconstitutional. … However, in Bounds the Supreme Court did not establish a general constitutional right to some minimum amount of time in the prison law library. Walker, 771 F.2d at 932 .

    Cited 151 timesPublished
  • Meadows v. Ford Motor Co.

    21 F. App'x 302 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 9, 2001

    Meadows clearly satisfies two elements of the prima facie test: hired by MSX when he was 59 years old, Meadows was 63 when his position as regional manager was eliminated. … This argument is, however, not relevant to the question of whether or not Meadows himself was qualified for these positions.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Todd Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Community College and Clayton Harris

    314 F.3d 249 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 19, 2002

    Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate four things: (i) he is a member of a racial minority; (ii) he was qualified … The district court held that “even assuming that the SAC found that Zambetti was substantially more qualified than Bibb, Harris’s decision to promote Bibb over Zambetti does not establish pretext.”

    Cited 112 timesPublished
  • United States v. Buford

    632 F.3d 264 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 10, 2011

    Here, both parties clearly established that the search in question occurred after both Buford and his passenger were out of reach of the vehicle’s passenger compartment. … That observation directly supports the conclusion that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in criminal prosecutions because the qualified immunity test turns on the same standard of reasonableness as

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Johnson II v. Karnes

    398 F.3d 868 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 25, 2005

    We express no opinion as to whether he can now assert qualified immunity on remand. 13 Plaintiffs-Appellants do not challenge the district court's finding that, in his individual capacity, Sheriff Karnes was entitled to qualified … immunity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ouida Sue Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Schering-Plough Corporation, and Schering-Plough Health Care Products, Inc.

    99 F.3d 181 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 25, 1996

    Parker’s benefits based on the categorization of her disability as “nervous/mental” clearly meets that standard. Ms. … Insurance products clearly fall within the common and ordinary meaning of the term “goods,” and the provision of insurance coverage clearly falls within the common and ordinary meaning of the term “service.”

    Vacated by Ouida Sue Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 107 F.3d 359 (1997)Cited 35 timesPublished
  • Sierra Club v. Hickel

    467 F.2d 1048 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 22, 1972

    )(3) of this section) unless (1) the Secretary of the Interior determines after consultation with the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission that such lands are no longer needed for the purposes for which the System was established … Such a declaration of the rights of the respondent vis-á-vis the United States would clearly have been beyond the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. p. 689 fn. 9, 69 S.Ct. p. 1461.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Bueno v. Mattner

    829 F.2d 1380 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 30, 1987

    It concluded that defendants did not qualify for the exemption because non-family members performed farm labor contracting activities for the farm. … Benavides performed farm labor contracting activities on their behalf is not clearly erroneous.

    Cited 35 timesPublished

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