Case law

United States v. Goodman

519 F.3d 310 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 17, 2008

The government bears the burden of establishing that a conviction qualifies for an ACCA sentence enhancement.” United States v. Lancaster, 501 F.3d 673, 675 (6th Cir.2007); see also United States v. … This statement, if true, establishes only that Goodman or the victim took the gun when they left.

Raymond v. Moyer

501 F.3d 548 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 21, 2007

Raymond alleges that he was qualified for admission and submitted all the necessary paperwork, but that on May 25, 2005, he was informed that the Ohio Supreme Court had denied his application for admission without examination … If Raymond plans to apply again for admission to practice law in Ohio without examination, and is denied, he can likely establish standing to bring a general challenge to the rules and practices of the Ohio Supreme Court,

Brotherton v. Cleveland

968 F.2d 1214 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 30, 1992

Cleveland should receive qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly-established law. … Cleveland clearly acted in bad faith. 9 We agree with the district court that Dr. Cleveland is entitled to qualified immunity in his personal capacity.

United States v. David W. Lanier

201 F.3d 842 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 22, 2000

The Court held that we committed error by holding that due process under § 242 requires more than the “clearly established” qualified immunity test pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. … He also admitted that he established the alias of Aubrey Lane Thompson and resided in Mexico for the purpose of eluding capture.

Tawana Wilson v. Boyce Wilkins

362 F. App'x 440 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 19, 2010

Wilkins occurred, he is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right at the time of the incident that would have informed him that he was violating the Constitution. … A court required to rule on the qualified immunity issue must consider whether the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that constitutional right was clearly established.

Smith v. Berghuis

543 F.3d 326 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 24, 2008

Instead, a federal habeas court may reverse only where the state court’s *335 application of clearly established law is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1521. … The Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary, he argues, constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as announced in Taylor v.

Jessie Harrison v. State of Michigan

722 F.3d 768 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 10, 2013

Sovereign Immunity The district court correctly held that the State, MDOC, and the state parole board were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. … Page 5 It is well established that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, see Quern v.

Martin v. Weaver

666 F.2d 1013 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 3, 1981

Agnew also established that the Lingo decision was an exception to that general rule. … This was clearly "such a dangerous situation that it would excuse the defendant from being liable for his negligent conduct." Lingo v.

Jim David, Jr. v. City of Bellevue, Ohio

706 F. App'x 847 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 24, 2017

City of Bellevue “It is undisputed that the right at issue in this case—the right against unreasonable deadly force—is a clearly established constitutional right.” Margeson v. White County, 579 F. … Accordingly, the district court’s grant of qualified immunity and summary judgment to Lawson and Matter was in error with respect to their shooting David.

Buttino v. City of Hamtramck

87 F. App'x 499 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 7, 2004

Frederick also argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. … immunity, it was not necessary to decide that issue because Buttino had not satisfied the requirements for demonstrating a constitutional violation.

Franklin Smith v. Jeff Patterson

430 F. App'x 438 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 14, 2011

To overcome qualified immunity, it does not suffice to show that the “right is ‘clearly established’ in the abstract.” Id. … These circumstances remove the case from the clearly established rule articulated in Harris and preserve Officer Patterson’s qualified immunity.

Danny Roberson v. Darrell Wynkoop

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 9, 2021

“We analyze whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity using two steps: (1) whether the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time … Because Wynkoop’s actions did not violate clearly established law and because we do not have the benefit of adequate briefing from either party, we need not address the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis here

Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus

497 F.2d 1172 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 5, 1974

The language of section 304 does not require that suit be deferred until an actual violation of an established emission standard occurs. … Sub-section (f)(1) clearly permits the filing of an action for violation of a schedule or timetable of compliance.

Philip Apsey v. Chester Township, OH

608 F. App'x 335 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 15, 2015

Because no genuine disputes of material fact exist concerning Apsey’s arrest and prosecution, this court may address the purely legal question of whether the undisputed facts give rise to a violation of clearly established … Qualified Immunity as to Brickman A.

Fawaz Ghaith v. Don Rauschenberger, Jr.

493 F. App'x 731 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 14, 2012

State officials are shielded from liability in a § 1983 case by qualified immunity where (1) there has been no violation of a constitutional right or (2) the right at issue was not “clearly established at the time of [the … Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000), the dearth of guidance on the scope of this right in the relevant context suggests it likely is not sufficiently clearly established to defeat qualified immunity.

Green v. Taylor

239 F. App'x 952 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 30, 2007

Robert Taylor appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. … Clearly Established Right “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

Vito Decore v. City of Parma, Ronald Mottl, Jr., Mark Daniels, Michael Ries

977 F.2d 580 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 7, 1992

There was a substantial conflict in the testimony and, in order to determine the issue of qualified immunity, it is necessary to determine that the defendants acted objectively reasonable under clearly established law. … Fitzgerald, 452 U.S. 800 , 815, 818 (1982). 18 In deciding a motion for summary judgment that is based upon qualified immunity, the district court must first determine if a clearly established right existed at the time of

Pamela Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, Ohio

349 F. App'x 70 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 20, 2009

Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability “for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … and (2) whether that right was clearly established.

Wrenn v. Gould

808 F.2d 493 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 9, 1987

Wrenn claims, however, that the manifest weight of the evidence established that Hill was hired as a mere pretext to avoid hiring him and that he was the only qualified candidate for the position. *502 It may be worthwhile … But Wrenn claims that he was not rejected from a pool of qualified candidates. Rather, he argues he was the only qualified candidate.

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus

497 F.2d 1172 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 5, 1974

The language of section 304 does not require that suit be deferred until an actual violation of an established emission standard occurs. … Sub-section (f)(1) clearly permits the filing of an action for violation of a schedule or timetable of compliance.