Case law

Ray Marshall v. United Steelworkers Of America, Afl-Cio-Clc

666 F.2d 845 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 16, 1981

The attorneys for Sadlowski contend that the work they performed on behalf of their client was a material assistance to the Secretary and qualified under each element of the "common benefit" theory. … However, we cannot say the district court's findings that counsels' work was either duplicative of the Secretary's or was rejected by the court are clearly erroneous.

Scott Lykens v. Colette Peters

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 17, 2025

Because sovereign immunity shields the United States and its employees from liability, the government asserted that the exclusive remedy for Lykens’ claims is the limited waiver of immunity contained within Section 2674 … Thus, “even unauthorized acts”—including “intentional or criminal” conduct—“may be within the scope of employment ‘if they are clearly incidental to the [employer’s] business.’”

United States v. Butler

208 F. App'x 167 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 18, 2006

Manslaughter, as the Application Note clearly states, is among the specifically enumerated crimes qualifying as a crime of violence. See Stinson v. … Fry, 51 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding conviction for involuntary manslaughter was a crime of violence as clearly indicated by the commentary to the guidelines); United States v.

Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon

807 F.2d 1150 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 1986

Were we to hold otherwise, the very substantial claims of the plaintiffs would be immunized from judicial review forever. II. … The reasoning in Sullivan , however, is heavily dependent upon this court’s clearly articulated policy against allowing interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions, see, e.g. Gardner v.

United States v. Robert Tequan Nappi, A/K/A Quan Nappi, A/K/A Keith Wade, Robert Tequan Nappi

243 F.3d 758 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 21, 2001

because it entitles counsel for the defendant and the government, at the sentencing hearing, to an “opportunity to comment on ... matters relating to the appropriate sentence.” 2 Nappi maintains *763 that the state PSI qualifies … Nappi’s state PSI clearly constitutes a “matter relating to the appropriate sentence.” Id.

Walker v. City of Wilmington

360 F. App'x 305 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 14, 2010

Walker, a reasonable jury could clearly not find that Lawson had the claimed knowledge. The only reason tendered by Plaintiffs is that Plaintiffs are African-Americans. … With respect to those claims, the District Court did not reach Lawson’s qualified official immunity defense or the issues raised by the City under Monell v.

Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Bohler-Uddeholm Corporation, a New York Corporation v. Ellwood Group, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Ellwood Quality Steels Company, a Pennsylvania Business Trust Ellwood Specialty Steel Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation David E. Barensfeld, an Individual v. Bohler-Uddeholm Coporation, a New York Corporation Uddeholm Limited, a Canadian Corporation Ellwood Group, Inc. Ellwood Quality Steels Co. Ellwood Specialty Steel Co. David Barensfeld Bjorn E. Gabrielsson

247 F.3d 79 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 4, 2001

Thus, the meaning of language cannot be distorted to establish the ambiguity." … This point is not clearly defined by Pennsylvania law.

Jules Link v. Mercedes-Benz Of North America, Inc.

550 F.2d 860 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 11, 1977

But proof of such a violation does not establish civil liability under § 4 or § 16 of the Clayton Act. … A conspiracy to establish maximum price fixing, for example, would clearly violate the Sherman Act, 13 but would not be a cognizable action under § 4 on behalf of retail consumers since they would have suffered no injury

Montgomery County v. Microvote Corporation

320 F.3d 440 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 26, 2003

An abuse of discretion occurs when "the district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact." … In Daubert , the Supreme Court established a "gatekeeping role for the judge" in determining the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony under FRE 702. Id. at 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 .

Grandillo v. Comm Social Security

105 F. App'x 415 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 30, 2004

Even if such conclusory statements alone were sufficient to undermine the ALJ’s determination—which they are not—the only side-effects she reports are tiredness and an inability to “think clearly and concentrate” due to … Baker is a far cry from mandating a showing that the applicant be able to “compete with other workers for the jobs for which he is qualified.”

Nolan v. Judicial Council

481 F.2d 41 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 23, 1973

For example, section 157 provides generally that before an attorney can be appointed to represent a trustee he must qualify as a disinterested person. 11 U.S.C. § 556 . … At the time that Judge Shaw removed him, Nolan clearly fell within the definition of interested persons contained in section 158.

Mudric v. Atty Gen USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 24, 2006

Furthermore, “to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. … The petitioner challenged the IJ’s determination that he did not qualify for an exception to the one-year filing deadline.

Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano

568 F.2d 333 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 6, 1977

Carney interprets § 212 as establishing a separate "minimum income level" floor on benefits for grandfathered Supplemental Security Income recipients. … Carney, at least, would appear to qualify as an adequate class representative.

United States v. King

322 F.2d 317 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 13, 1963

269 U.S. 483, 490 , 46 S.Ct. 176 , 70 L.Ed. 368 (1926). 7 14 That the debt owing from Seeley to the United States is one afforded priority under Section 191 is an issue that requires no extended discussion for the debt is clearly … construed the additional, albeit somewhat vague, designation "or other person" as being "limited to those who stand as personal representatives not only by the application of the principle of ejusdem generis but by the language qualifying

Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, a Corporate Instrumentality and Agency of the United States v. Robert N. Reeves, and Frank E. Williams, Jr. Seymour S. Abensohn E. Fulton Brylawski W. Evans Buchanan John C. Kelly Glen J. Koepenick, Jr. Robert K. Maddox Harry H. Semmes, Jr. Abe Pollin Thomas J. O'halloran, Jr. Raymond L. Ellis, Jr. Leolla L.J. Fisher Michael L. Heup Samuel J. Pierce Walter L. Hagman Richard A. Reed Real Property Associates, Inc., a Maryland Corporation Lee Shoe Arthur C. Older Sharon A. Manuel O'halloran, and Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, the United States of America, and John Doe, One or More Unknown Agents of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (Fslic) And/or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Fhlbb), Counterclaim v. Metropolitan Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bethesda and Hoye, Graves, Bailey & Associates, P.A., Third Party Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation a Corporate Instrumentality and Agency of the United States v. Leolla L.J. Fisher, and Frank E. Williams, Jr. Robert N. Reeves Seymour S. Abensohn E. Fulton Brylawski W. Evans Buchanan John C. Kelly Glen J. Koepenick, Jr. Robert K. Maddox Harry H. Semmes, Jr. Abe Pollin Thomas J. O'halloran, Jr. Raymond L. Ellis, Jr. Michael L. Heup Samuel J. Pierce Walter L. Hagman Richard A. Reed Real Property Associates, Inc., a Maryland Corporation Lee Shoe Arthur C. Older Sharon A. Manuel O'halloran, and Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, the United States of America, and John Doe, One or More Unknown Agents of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (Fslic) And/or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Fhlbb), Counterclaim v. Metropolitan Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bethesda and Hoye, Graves, Bailey & Associates, P.A., Third Party Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, a Corporate Instrumentality and Agency of the United States v. Robert N. Reeves Leolla L.J. Fisher, and Frank E. Williams, Jr. Seymour S. Abensohn E. Fulton Brylawski W. Evans Buchanan John C. Kelly Glen J. Koepenick, Jr. Robert K. Maddox Harry H. Semmes, Jr. Abe Pollin Thomas J. O'halloran, Jr. Raymond L. Ellis, Jr. Michael L. Heup Samuel J. Pierce Walter L. Hagman Richard A. Reed Real Property Associates, Inc., a Maryland Corporation Lee Shoe Arthur C. Older Sharon A. Manuel O'halloran, and Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, the United States of America and John Doe, One or More Unknown Agents of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (Fslic) And/or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Fhlbb), Counterclaim v. Metropolitan Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bethesda and Hoye, Graves, Bailey & Associates, P.A., Third Party

816 F.2d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 9, 1987

The FSLIC's subsidization and supervision of the merger qualifies the FSLIC as a party to the acquisition for the purpose of resolving the issue of the applicability of the Bangor Punta holding in this case. 11 622 F.Supp … They merely noted, without explanation or discussion, that the plaintiffs were alleging violations of the "standards of conduct" established by the criminal statutes 11 As we earlier observed (note 1, supra ), defendants

Virginia J. Barry Melville v. American Home Assurance Company

584 F.2d 1306 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 5, 1978

Under Pennsylvania law, it is firmly established that this approach is applicable in tort actions. See McSwain v. *1312 McSwain, 420 Pa. 86 , 215 A.2d 677 (1966) (inter-spousal tort immunity); Elston v. … ---infra, which establishes to our satisfaction that Griffith has been extended to contract actions.

Borman v. Raymark Industries, Inc.

946 F.2d 1031 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 21, 1991

This disjunctive language clearly indicates that Congress intended for § 362(a)(1) to stay actions against the debtor that are not necessarily brought to recover a claim. … The automatic stay is now statutory, and its plain language is no longer qualified by jurisdictional limitations.

In re Diet Drugs

92 F. App'x 890 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 12, 2004

“External actions that would disturb that balance, by altering the number of opt outs through a different mechanism, clearly would substantially interfere with MDL 1203.” Id. … She contends that this discovery could reveal negotiations between her counsel and Wyeth over settlement and could establish that Wyeth had constructive notice of her intent to opt out.

Cgb Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. Rha Health Services Inc.

357 F.3d 375 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 28, 2004

The actions of a principal's agent are afforded a qualified privilege from liability for tortious interference with the principal's contract. See Maier v. … Faced with these facts, the District Court concluded that "[Sunrise]'s motion was clearly the product of bad planning and, most likely, bad faith." Id. at 7.

United States v. Peter J. Serubo, Donald H. Brown, United States of America v. W. Thomas Plachter, Jr.

604 F.2d 807 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 11, 1979

LaSalle National Bank , establishes two important limitations upon the validity of an IRS civil summons. … With respect to the 13 subpoenas issued during this phase, individual determinations of noncriminal purpose were clearly required.