Case law

Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' International Union

28 F.3d 347 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 1994

Consistent with that observation is the fact that neither party clearly notified the other—whether by an express 15 or clearly implicit disavowal, see supra at 356 n. 14, or by clearly incompatible conduct, see infra at 357 … n. 16—that it was unilaterally revoking or repudiating the arbitration provision so well established between the parties.

26 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1569, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,160

662 F.2d 975 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 1981

and denies 'any person ... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups." … Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 , 91 S.Ct. 849 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), the courts-not Congress-have established a dichotomy that recognizes claims established by proof of disparate impact as well as disparate treatment.

Kute v. United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 22, 1999

The district court also rejected Kute's assertion that the payments at issue did not flow from a qualified plan because their source was the State Police benefit account established by 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. … Overall, we are satisfied that the district court clearly reached the correct result. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the order for summary judgment entered January 15, 1999, will be affirmed.

Horizon Coal Corporation v. United States of America, Jerry Kohl D/B/A Kohl Industries, Third-Party

43 F.3d 234 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 27, 1994

The court found that Horizon qualified for the exception set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (28)(A) and therefore could not be assessed reclamation fees. … Kohl clearly saw this as a money-making venture.

Christopher Ware v. Todd Riley

587 F. App'x 705 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 8, 2014

Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that Ware remained naked only for a short period of time. … immunity.

Mohamed Abdille v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States

242 F.3d 477 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 7, 2001

resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(A)(vi); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (c)(1) (2000) (“For applications filed on or after April 1, 1997, an applicant *483 shall not qualify … Section 208.15 clearly states that a prima facie case of firm resettlement is established once the evidence shows that the asylum applicant received “an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type

United States v. Amin De Castro

49 F.4th 836 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 27, 2022

However, De Castro was allowed to depart voluntarily to the Dominican Republic in 2017 after an immigration judge determined he qualified as a legal permanent resident. … Analogizing to habeas is also unnecessary here because Ragbir clearly sets forth the framework for analyzing a petition for coram nobis relief.

In Re: Pillowtex, Inc. Patricia A. Staiano, the United States Trustee

304 F.3d 246 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 23, 2002

At the oral argument, Jones Day contended that all bankruptcy lawyers find themselves with past due bills from puta *255 tive debtors on the eve of bankruptcy and seek to clear the accounts so that they are qualified to serve … The reference is to the United States Trustee authorized to supervise the administration of bankruptcy cases in "[t]he judicial districts established for the States of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,” 28 U.S.C. §

Emil Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 14, 2018

A district court abuses its discretion if its decision not to draw the inference rests upon “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Meditz v. … Despite the “acceptable reasons” for the officers to clear the search area which risked “effectively immunizing officers from property-damage claims by preventing a plaintiff from observing the person responsible for the

United States v. Jose Casiano, A/K/A Jose Rivera Jose Casiano, United States of America v. Alfredo Dejesus

113 F.3d 420 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 7, 1997

A district court’s discretion not to depart in the face of a motion under § 5K1.1 should be as broad as its discretion not to depart under § 5K2.0, and therefore unless there has been legal error, it should be similarly immune … A departure for substantial assistance is a narrow, albeit authorized, exception to the established guideline sentencing range.

Keith Schroeder, a Minor, Etc. v. C. F. Braun & Co., Appellees-Appellants v. Cooling Tower Erectors, Inc., Third-Party-Defendant-Appellant

502 F.2d 235 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 22, 1974

Second, the Illinois Health and Safety Act Rules were admissible to establish the standard of care to be exercised by defendants. Cf. Darling v. … Such evidence of industry standards was clearly admissible in this kind of case. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).

Tri-State Truck Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

616 F.2d 65 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 13, 1980

Clearly, on the basis of the whole record, more credence should be given to the testimony of a party to the conversation than to someone who claims to have overheard one half of the conversation. … But we noted that a conversation which qualifies as concerted activity must be related to group action: It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and

Guinn v. Rispoli

323 F. App'x 105 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 22, 2009

. § 1997e, and that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Guinn did not file a response to defendants’ motion, but filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. … The court also found that the lack of clothing was not an Eighth Amendment violation where only minimal injury was alleged and Guinn otherwise failed to establish that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life

Ray Marshall v. United Steelworkers Of America, Afl-Cio-Clc

666 F.2d 845 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 16, 1981

The attorneys for Sadlowski contend that the work they performed on behalf of their client was a material assistance to the Secretary and qualified under each element of the "common benefit" theory. … However, we cannot say the district court's findings that counsels' work was either duplicative of the Secretary's or was rejected by the court are clearly erroneous.

Douglas El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Septa"), Defendant/third-Party v. J & D Jagicla Enterprises, Inc., Trading as Liberty Vans King Limousine Service, Inc. Anderson Travel Krapfs Cps, Inc. Community Transit, Inc. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc. Triage, Inc. Edens Corporation King Paratransit Service, Inc., Third-Party

479 F.3d 232 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 19, 2007

Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 292 ("It would clearly be unreasonable to require SEPTA applicants to score so highly on the run test that their predicted rate of [job] success be 100%. … Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 , 91 S.Ct. 849 ("Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins.").

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the United States Department of Health & Human Services

724 F.3d 377 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 26, 2013

Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause. … More fundamentally, the government mistakes the scope of the Establishment Clause.

Stern v. United States

193 F. 888 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1912

Stern & Sons, and thereupon was duly and legally qualified as such. … It is difficult to imagine circumstances under which the burden of explaining a fact or situation would be more clearly and peremptorily cast upon those charged with a criminal offense, than was the burden in this case cast

E. L. Wiegand Division, Emerson Electric Company v. National Labor Relations Board, International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, (Uaw), Local 1020 v. National Labor Relations Board

650 F.2d 463 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 3, 1981

Therefore, even if Wiegand might properly have relied on Southwestern Electric to immunize its action, a question we consider hereafter, the Board might still conclude that Wiegand did not in fact do so. … As we have recently said, "(i)t is our duty to insure that the Board adheres to its established criteria unless it clearly decides to modify or alter those standards." NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. James R. Gould, Doing Business as Brokers for Agricultural Cooperativeassociations

629 F.2d 847 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1980

The next issue which we must examine is whether the ICC has conformed to the procedures established by statute and case law. … However, the ICC did answer Gould’s interrogatories under oath, Fed.R.Civ.P. 33, and its sworn answers clearly reveal that the four-pronged Powell test has been met.

United States v. Robert Tequan Nappi, A/K/A Quan Nappi, A/K/A Keith Wade, Robert Tequan Nappi

243 F.3d 758 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 21, 2001

because it entitles counsel for the defendant and the government, at the sentencing hearing, to an “opportunity to comment on ... matters relating to the appropriate sentence.” 2 Nappi maintains *763 that the state PSI qualifies … Nappi’s state PSI clearly constitutes a “matter relating to the appropriate sentence.” Id.