Case law

United States v. Grey

87 F. App'x 254 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 15, 2004

In this case the state court sentenced Grey to a maximum 23-month term which clearly qualifies as a year or more. … It is true that when an individual is sentenced to a 4 Three other courts of appeals have held that statutory rape qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude. See Gonzalez-Alvarado v.

In Re Craftmatic Securities Litigation

890 F.2d 628 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 30, 1990

We refuse to adopt this approach, which would clearly circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe." … This is an addition to the $53 million expected from our established products ...

Roland Stucke v. City of Philadelphia

685 F. App'x 150 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 12, 2017

, the District Court was correct that vaguely referring to filing a lawsuit is insufficiently specific to qualify as protected activity under Title VII. … , 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006). 17 Id. at 343. 10  Stucke’s filing of a PHRC complaint in 2011, on the other hand, is undoubtedly protected activity, since it clearly

United States v. Dominique Johnson

899 F.3d 191 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 7, 2018

Supreme Court precedent establishes that we review the trial record in cases like this one. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470. … We also relied on our precedent, which “establishes that § 2113(a)’s prohibition on taking . . .

United Industrial Ex Rel. Bason v. Government of the Virgin Islands

746 F.3d 115 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 19, 2014

a statute of the Virgin Islands is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity … Bason’s death clearly moots any reinstatement claim on his behalf.

Van Orman v. American Insurance

680 F.2d 301 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 1, 1982

All statements in the foregoing outline and explanations are qualified by reference to the Plan itself.” Both the letter and the booklet summarize employees’ rights under TARP. Mr. … Moyer Trust Fund, 441 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D.Pa.1977), aff’d mem., 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978), is clearly misplaced.

Amber Cook v. GameStop Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 7, 2025

She maintains that whether product preferences qualify as personal or sensitive information is a merits issue. … Cook highlights that we said the harm was “clearly particularized, as each plaintiff complains about the disclosure of information relating to his or her online behavior.” Id. at 274.

Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co.

763 F.2d 1482 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 30, 1985

The business of Tunis Brothers had been established in 1934 by Richard M. Tunis and his brother Robert. … this veritable mountain of briefs and appendices, the trial judge, unintentionally of course, tilted the scale against plaintiffs by failing to factor into the overall conspiracy equation certain significant evidence that clearly

Business Association Of University City v. Landrieu

660 F.2d 867 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 13, 1981

It must be remembered that the agency most qualified to make coordinated decisions of future land utilization the local zoning agency must approve each project before construction begins. … His rental charge is limited to no more than 10% over the fair market rental for the unit as established by HUD. 42 U.S.C. 1437f(c)(1) (1976).

United States v. Anderson J. Coleman

805 F.2d 474 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 17, 1986

Upon retirement, he established a tax and financial consulting service. … In contrast, section 207(b) establishes only a two year ban for the conduct it covers.

Patricia Sue Battle, by Her Parents and Next Friend June E. Battle and Donald E. Battle and June E. Battle and Donald E. Battle in Their Own Right, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Caryl M. Kline, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, the Abington School District, Dr. Carl B. Hoffman, Superintendent of the Abington School District, the Woods Schools, Dr. Harold S. Barbour, President of the Woods Schools. Bernard, Natalie, a Minor, by Her Parents and Natural Guardians Bernard, Clara M. And Bernard, Robert A. In Their Own Right, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Kline, Caryl, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, the Marple Newtown School District, Sanner, Glenn, Superintendent of the Marple Newtown School District, Elwyn Institute, Clard, Dr. Gerald R., President of the Elwyn Institute. Armstrong, Patricia and John, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child, Gary Armstrong and Norma H., Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Richard H., on Behalf of Themselves and All Those Similarly Situated v. Kline, Caryl, Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Individually and in Her Official Capacity, the School District of Philadelphia, Michael Marcase, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Philadelphia and Arthur W. Thomas, Mrs. Edward Oberholtzer, Augustus Baxter, Mrs. Lawrence Boonin, Robert Sebastian, Mrs. Michael Stack, George Philip Stahl, Jr., and Dr. Nicholas Trolio, Individually and in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia

629 F.2d 269 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 15, 1980

Moreover, the Act clearly places ultimate responsibility for compliance with the Act upon the state educational agency. Id. § 1412(b). … This position goes far beyond "establishing the direction toward which the programs required by the statute should aim," Judge Sloviter's concurring and dissenting op. at 286 (emphasis added), and clearly intrudes upon the

Hassine v. Jeffes

846 F.2d 169 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 29, 1988

Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. 14 We will not rehearse completely the litany of complaints that were raised. … ("the plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation ... and ... must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 , 95 S.Ct

Jason Fetter v. Maersk Line Ltd

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 15, 2021

The Supreme Court has articulated a two-prong standard to determine who qualifies as a seaman. See Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. … The parties appear to agree that § 933(i) immunity can extend to 3MC – Higgs’s nominal employer – in these circumstances, and we accept that for purposes of this appeal. Khan v.

United States v. Michael August Polizzi

493 F.2d 570 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 8, 1974

Polizzi reported to AFEES on the scheduled day and was found qualified for military service. He refused, however, to submit to induction despite warnings that such refusal would subject him to specified sanctions. … In none of these cases, however, was the Ehlert principle being applied to a registrant who had refused induction in a circuit whose prevailing law at the time of his refusal was clearly contrary to this rule. 7 Three other

United States v. Smith

123 F.3d 140 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 19, 1997

Therefore, the newspapers have not established a common law right of access to the briefs or the hearing. V. … The order, therefore, clearly ran afoul of the line of Supreme Court prior restraint cases, such as Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.

Dontaie Anderson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 21, 2022

We 2 He titled this filing “Amended Complaint,” see ECF No. 5 at 1, but as the District Court noted, “Anderson clearly intended that the Amended Complaint supplement, rather than replace, his Complaint,” Mem. 2 n.3, ECF … Anderson’s complaint failed to state a claim because he did not allege that the quarantine conditions were specifically imposed for the purpose of punishing him, and he did not establish that they were unconnected to a

Marvin Lumber and Cedar Company Marvin Windows of Tennessee, Inc. v. Ppg Industries, Inc., Third Party v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., Third Party Minnesota, Amicus on Behalf Of

223 F.3d 873 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 22, 2000

At all times, Marvin had access to each of the very facts that establish Marvin's breach of contract action, namely PILT's alleged failure to prevent rot on Marvin's products. … Given our conclusion that no fact question exists as to the fraudulent concealment of Marvin's contract claims, Marvin's Tennessee statutory claims are clearly barred.

Agathos v. Starlite Motel

977 F.2d 1500 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 28, 1992

As to each unreported employee, Starlite may avoid contributions only by establishing that the employee no longer has a colorable claim for benefits. … An employee has no colorable claim if a plan would not properly entertain the claim because it is time-barred, the employee has ceased working for Starlite and therefore no longer qualifies, or federal labor law precludes

Kindler v. Horn

542 F.3d 70 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 3, 2008

The warrant identified Bernstein as the informant, and Kindler subsequently learned that Bernstein had been granted immunity so he could testify against Kindler. … The district court reasoned: ‘In considering [the prosecutor’s argument], we find it clearly constituted improper vouching and harmful, constitutional error.

Americans United For Separation Of Church And State, Inc. v. United States Department Of Health, Education And Welfare

619 F.2d 252 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 8, 1980

Government that does not establish religion. … much taxpayers as separationists, and their main concern is not a reduction in taxes, but their declared goal of separation of church and state. 23 As enunciated in Flast, the doctrine of taxpayer standing was not meant to qualify