Case law

United States v. John Doe

810 F.3d 132 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 9, 2015

Hendricks by a lawyer who miscalculated a well- established deadline. Indeed, Doe’s lawyer was not negligent at all. … That contention is clearly wrong. First, Rule 60(b)(6) has no built-in time limit.

United States v. Wise

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 12, 2008

Casteneda, however, is clearly distinguishable. … Sentencing Commission are wrong in establishing different penalties for different types of controlled substances.” Id. at *2.

17 Fair empl.prac.cas. 687, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8306 William H. Bolden, Iii, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. The Pennsylvania State Police, Colonel James D. Barger, Individually and in His Capacity as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, Milton J. Shapp, Individually and in His Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Ernest P. Kline, Individually and in His Capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Chairman of the Governor's Affirmative Action Council, Ronald G. Lench, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of the Office of Administration of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Richard Madison, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Bureau of Personnel of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Grace Hatch, John McCarthy C. Herschel Jones, Individually and in Their Capacities as Chairwoman and Commissioners of the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, and Richard A. Rosenberry, Individually and in His Capacity as Executive Director of the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission. Appeal of Applicants for Intervention, Danny R. McKnight John Dudinskie and Albert Minnick, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Pennsylvania State Police Lodges of the Fraternal Order of Police, in No. 77-2323. Appeal of Applicants for Intervention Robert W. McDonald and Donald S. Millard, Jr., on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, In

578 F.2d 912 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 1978

These suits challenged certain eligibility criteria established by the consent decree for appointment to the State Police cadet class. … The decree provided that until a new examination should be validated as job-related, the old examination should be retained and those scoring 60 or more should be deemed qualified.

Joso Milutin v. E. P. Bouchard, District Director for Thenew Jersey District, Immigration and Naturalization Service. No. ,13651

299 F.2d 50 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 23, 1962

The statute and regulations are clearly protective of the rights of the man who, it is claimed, is subject to being deported. … receive the ultimate relief;' Here, Congress clearly provided such a standard, and if the Attorney General has misapplied it, his action is subject to review.

Sheridan v. Cabot Corp.

113 F. App'x 444 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 19, 2004

qualifies as a functional impairment–and her chronic beryllium disease, thus failing to establish a compensable injury under Pennsylvania law. … Without such evidence, Sheridan’s shortness of breath does not qualify as a physical or functional impairment.

Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit

420 F.3d 181 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 29, 2005

Of course, the issue here is not whether Part C and Part B are the same; they clearly are not. … Congress has clearly recognized that needs of disabled children do not fit neatly into the age-defined stages suggested by the AIU.

National Surety Corporation, a Corporation of the State of New York v. The Midland Bank, a Corporation of New Jersey

551 F.2d 21 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 25, 1977

Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 , 61 S.Ct. 347 , 85 L.Ed. 327 (1941) established this rule for diversity cases. … The court rejected this construction, finding that the qualifying language applied only to commissioner-designated “other classes of insurance.”

Lehigh Valley R. v. Clark

207 F. 717 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 25, 1913

It concerns the past and not the future conduct of the carrier, and, though this right of action for damages is qualified by making it depend in certain cases upon the precedent award of reparation by the Commission, such … That means that it shall bo established, prima facie, the facts therein contained unless contradicted or explained.

United States v. Lawrence Neadle, Jr.

72 F.3d 1104 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 29, 1996

Section lB1.3(a) establishes several important interpretive rules. … An insurance company, once qualified, is not required to keep the full $700,000 as part of its capital structure.

Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit

420 F.3d 181 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 29, 2005

Appellee's Br. at 10. 33 Of course, the issue here is not whether Part C and Part B are the same; they clearly are not. … Although Part H and Part B "are distinct in notable respects, their basic structure and purpose are strikingly similar...." id., at 892 , Part B establishes an IEP, and part H establishes an IFSP. 13 The District Court reached

Greenway Center, Inc. v. Essex Insurance Company, Annette Maione, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Mark Willet

475 F.3d 139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 30, 2007

At a hearing to review the proposed settlement, the court considered a petition by a woman named Rossi, who sought to be declared Gaylor’s common law wife, so as to qualify her for a share of the proposed settlement. … Yet, it clearly was in Ranger’s interest that the court grant Rossi’s petition.

Juvelis Ex Rel. Juvelis v. Snider

68 F.3d 648 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 10, 1995

DPW contends Niki is not "otherwise qualified" because he lacks the capacity to form the intent to establish Delaware County or Pennsylvania as his residence. … Furthermore, within his limited ability to do so, Niki has expressed a subjective attachment to Melmark.0 Finally, his parents are clearly acting in good faith and in Niki's

Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc.

849 F.2d 805 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 14, 1988

Obviously Congress purposefully established a system that would apply without regard to physical location. … The Supreme Court held that because Gray's employment was not inherently "maritime," he did not qualify for benefits under the LHWCA. Herb’s Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 427 , 105 S.Ct. at 1429 .

Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Insurance Co. of North America

595 F.2d 128 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 5, 1979

.-5, 35 requires only that the self-insuring motor carrier establish its ability “to satisfy its obligations for bodily injury liability . .,” not any other party’s obligations. … denying reargument (114a-115a) that it looked solely to the federal motor carrier requirements for the source of the duties to pay and defend: “The primary responsibility to defend the Babcock action by Refrigerated is clearly

American International Insurance Co. of Puerto Rico v. Lampe GMBH

307 F. App'x 645 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 12, 2009

analysis be referencing our recent discussion regarding its task in determining the applicable law in diversity cases now that there is a Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands: Going forward, now that the Virgin Islands has established … Since 1999, the Restatement (Third) has clearly and unambiguously required a “discharge by settlement or judgment,” and we predict that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court will give the Restatement its plain meaning.

United States v. Weatherly

525 F.3d 265 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 2008

presence” jury instruction in order to explain to the jury the legal justification for his defense theory: “Mere presence in the area of any contraband, including a firearm, or awareness of its location is not sufficient to establish … Specifically, Weatherly asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because the jury, not the District Court, should determine whether any of his prior convictions qualified as “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses

Louis Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers

903 F.2d 253 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 1990

Accordingly, in Armcor, we directed the NLRB to “clearly explicate the basis for its decision to issue a bargaining order.” Id. at 244. … He cannot remedy that defect by establishing in the claim brought under section 7(a) of the FLSA that which he should have established under section 301 of the LMRA.

Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers

855 F.2d 1080 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 31, 1988

The record so clearly supports the district court’s dismissal on a variety of grounds that we might dispose of this issue summarily. … Congress, by its limited waiver of sovereign immunity, intended to limit the government’s liability, not its recovery. Accord Harris v.

Crystal Byrd v. Aaron's Inc

784 F.3d 154 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 16, 2015

And their usage of the owner/lessee’s computers can also be easily objectively established.” … Here, the Byrds are not relying solely on unverified affidavits to establish ascertainability.

Estate of Bennett v. Philadelphia

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 22, 2007

The district court granted summary judgment App. at 40; and (2) wrongful death and survival act claims against the City and Maiden on the ground that they are immune from tort liability pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Political … Rather, we explained that DeShaney clearly holds that “no affirmative duty to protect arises from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament.”