Case law

Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.

333 F.3d 450 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 23, 2003

In their submissions below, the parties did not vigorously contest the issue of whether Keystone qualifies as a “fiduciary” under ERISA. See Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., No. … She has clearly failed to do so.

United States v. Harry Katzin

732 F.3d 187 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 22, 2013

The Jones majority clearly rejected the concurrence‘s suggestion that it do so. Compare Jones, 132 S. … See Sparks, 711 F.3d at 66–67 (concluding good-faith exception applied to GPS surveillance because Knotts ―clearly authorized the agents to use a GPS- based tracking device‖).

Eichleay Corp. v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers

944 F.2d 1047 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 1, 1991

Eichleay representatives then met with USS Poseo officials to get preap-proved for the short bid list, qualifying Eichleay to submit a final bid on the project. … duty to refrain from establishing a separate company.

Specter v. Garrett

971 F.2d 936 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 20, 1992

The Act sets a very stringent timetable for the various stages of the process it establishes and Congress clearly intended that the final decision on base closing and realignment be reached with alacrity. … First, the Secretary's recommendations are clearly committed to his discretion under the Act.

Philadelphia & Reading Corporation v. United States

944 F.2d 1063 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 4, 1991

While this is clearly the correct result in regards to statutory assessment, I discern nothing to compel this conclusion with respect to the agreement of the parties. … As the Supreme Court has stated: "The assessment, essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made when the Secretary or his delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax rolls." Laing v.

Pittston Co. Ultramar America Ltd. v. Allianz Insurance

124 F.3d 508 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 1997

the agreements are not ambiguous and that section two of part one clearly does not provide stand-alone pollution coverage. … In addition, Part One, Section One contains the qualifying phrase, “subject to the conditions of this policy,” which also links that section to other parts of the policy. By contrast, Section Two has no express link.

In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation

751 F.2d 562 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 13, 1984

Clearly, however, the letters are hearsay, and thus inadmissible against the objectors unless they qualify under one of the exceptions in Rule 803. … We have in Part V.B., supra, held that they do not qualify under Rule 803(24)(B). The only other exception arguably relevant is Rule 803(6), records of regularly conducted business activity.

Mid-American Salt LLC v. Morris County Cooperative Pric

964 F.3d 218 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 6, 2020

And “[u]nder Rule 12(c), judgment will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” … Amendments to pre-trial pleadings that do not qualify for amendment as a matter of course are governed by Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

United States v. The City of Philadelphia the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations and Barbara W. Mather, Philadelphia City Solicitor. Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education v. The City of Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. Appeal of Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task Force, Richard Brown, Lesbians and Gays at Penn, Larry Gross, Lois Rothenberger, Jim Bahr, Ken Blochowsky, Peter Antony, Robin Sweeney, and Ilse De Veer, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants. Appeal of City of Philadelphia Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations and Barbara W. Mather, Philadelphia City Solicitor

798 F.2d 81 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 1, 1986

While ostensibly a question of governmental immunity, see, e.g., id. at 269 , 63 S.Ct. at 620 , this issue is perhaps "best understood as posing an issue essentially of federal preemption." 5 L. … integral part of its military recruiting policy, and that the Order significantly impairs the military's ability to recruit the skilled personnel it requires. 10 20 We conclude, therefore, that the Order conflicts with a clearly

Mei Bin Chen v. Attorney General of United States

365 F. App'x 392 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 17, 2010

The BIA concluded that Chen failed to show that the factual findings underlying the IJ’s adverse credibility determination were clearly erroneous. … Chen failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the claim that she satisfied her burden of proof to qualify for relief.

John C. O'Mara v. Captain William Zebrowski, U.S.A.R., Commanding Officer and the Honorable Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army

447 F.2d 1085 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 10, 1971

V, 1969), the statutory basis for his involuntary activation, is qualified or modified by 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1) (1964) and/or 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964). These statutes were enacted prior to 10 U.S.C. § 673a (Supp. … The district court found that the military *1088 authorities followed the procedures of Army Reg. 135-91 in activating O’Mara, and O’Mara does not contend that this finding is clearly erroneous. 6 .

Zolinda Kiriakidis v. Borough of Vintondale

609 F. App'x 713 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 2015

While the appropriate limitations period is established by state law, federal law controls when her claim arose. Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998). … For the same reason, we need not reach the question of qualified immunity.

United States v. Ebon P.D. Brown

765 F.3d 278 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 2014

stated, that a fingerprint could only smudge or smear glass, not put fingerprints on it, which is — he could suggest that is common sense, that that’s a fact, but it’s not — we didn’t hear testimony on that, so we need a qualifier … To do so, the prosecution “must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed [the proffered prior offense], he therefore

Swie Lan Ong v. Attorney General of the United States

371 F. App'x 325 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 17, 2010

To qualify for withholding, petitioners had to show that it is more likely than not that they will face persecution if returned to Indonesia. See INS v. … The same is clearly the case with respect to Irawan, as well. 6 Petitioners contend that the BIA erred by failing to account for the mental suffering that Ong experienced, and they argue that because Ong claims to have suffered

United States v. Shedrick

493 F.3d 292 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 19, 2007

This case falls well within well-established precedent: defense counsel’s conjectures to his client about sentencing are irrelevant where the written plea agreement and in-court guilty plea colloquy clearly establish the … We noted, however, that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically held that ineffective assistance of counsel qualifies as a miscarriage of justice sufficient to overcome a waiver-of-appeal provision.

Rasheed Waters v. Cheltenham Township Police Dep

700 F. App'x 149 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 18, 2017

Here, Waters was arrested pursuant to a warrant, which generally establishes the proceeding was initiated with probable cause. … immunity, id. at 21–23; and that Waters cannot establish a valid Monnell claim against the Township, id. at 23–25. 6 for probable cause, as Waters does, we must determine

Swie Lan Ong v. Attorney General of the United States

371 F. App'x 325 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 17, 2010

To qualify for withholding, petitioners had to show that it is more likely than not that they will face persecution if returned to Indonesia. See INS v. … The same is clearly the case with respect to Irawan, as well. 6 Petitioners contend that the BIA erred by failing to account for the mental suffering that Ong experienced, and they argue that because Ong claims to have suffered

Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny

271 F. 810 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 4, 1921

cases, it was again decided that, as by virtue of the patent law, one who had sold a patented machine and. received the price, and had thus placed 1he machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent law, could not, by qualifying … Ed. 471 , was clearly shown not to overrule or modify that of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.

Mohamed Barry v. David Anderson

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 6, 2023

The District Court declined to reach the question of whether Zamar was entitled to qualified immunity. Barry timely appealed. II. … We have considered Barry’s arguments and conclude that the 3 We have no need to reach the separate question of whether Zamar is entitled to qualified immunity. Bistrian v.

Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh

742 F.2d 94 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 23, 1984

As is apparent from the preceding discussion, the Supreme Court in the Lugar trilogy clearly treated the symbiotic relationship test as a viable framework of analysis, but concluded that Burton was inapposite to the factual … regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities