Case law

Schum v. Bailey

578 F.2d 493 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 26, 1978

On the other hand, while New York has no compensation interest here, its deterrence and cost policies are clearly involved. … The only evidence which might conceivably qualify is the evidence revealing Bailey’s New Jersey affiliations.

Christine RUSH v. SCOTT SPECIALTY GASES, INC., Appellant

113 F.3d 476 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 16, 1997

Rush contends, and Scott agrees, that it did not consider Rush for this promotion, explaining that in its view Rush was not qualified for this position. … There is authority that a trial court’s ruling on whether there is a continuing violation is reviewed on the clearly erroneous st&ndard.Calloway v.

Patpanathan v. Attorney General United States of America

553 F. App'x 261 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 4, 2014

The BIA asked the IJ to consider whether the brothers had established a well-founded fear of persecution and warranted asylum as a matter of discretion or qualified for withholding of removal. … To be sure, the BIA could have explained its rationale more clearly.

Cooper Laboratories, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Company

802 F.2d 667 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 6, 1986

Consequently, we agree that the physicians do not qualify as vendors within the meaning of the endorsement, and are not covered by ISLIC’s policy. *673 The hospital, however, did purchase the substance and kept it in its … Mathematical computation establishes that figure to be $190,000.

Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip

954 F.2d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 8, 1992

Relying on cases construing this standard policy language, Protexa argued that the Port Captain’s order alone established conclusively that the removal was “compulsory by law.” … This placement suggests that the language qualifies the duty imposed by the language preceding the proviso, i.e., the insured’s obligation not to “interfere in any negotiations” carried on by the insurer.

United States v. White

145 F. App'x 786 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 2005

These roadways clearly come within the definition of ‘highway’ when a realistic application of the term is made. 195 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. … It thus qualifies as a trafficway. Needless to say, we do not hold that the Army Depot is “open to the public” in any way that would threaten “national security,” as White cautions we should not.

Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Company v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc

19 F.3d 125 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 15, 1994

Bowman’s testimony clearly shows was intended. Rorer’s rewriting of its intent is therefore unconvincing. … But even if we agree that Johnson-Merck has presented evidence of Rorer’s intent to mislead, this alone is insufficient to qualify for the burden shifting presumption set forth in Smithkline Beecham.

In Re the Grand Jury Empaneling of the Special Grand Jury

171 F.3d 826 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 19, 1999

On October 27, 1998, the District Court issued an order immunizing the witnesses in order to overcome any Fifth Amendment obstacle to their giving testimony. … The reporters argued that the First Amendment guarantee of Free Speech and Free Press implicitly established a qualified privilege against disclosing news sources.

Robert Swinton, Jr. v. United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 3, 2023

Ct. 2005) (requiring a plaintiff to establish that a medical provider breached a duty, and the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm). … Swinton did not plausibly allege a physical injury, and none of the facts he presented qualify as a “sexual act” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2246.

United States v. Fulton Distillery, Inc., Highlands Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Waterfill & Frazier, Inc., Canco, Inc. And Waterfill Land Company, Inc., Third-Party

571 F.2d 923 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 21, 1978

United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 363 , 63 S.Ct. 573 , 87 L.Ed. 838 , the outcome is clearly a matter of federal substantive law. … The attempt by Highlands to distinguish that case on the basis that no regulations were involved ignores those principles it clearly espoused.

United States v. Joseph F. O'Neill and Frank A. Scafidi

619 F.2d 222 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 13, 1980

It is clearly inappropriate to invoke the work product protection for documents which were not the product of any attorney preparation, such as complaints filed by citizens, records of action taken by the Police Department … Thus, the relevance and need for the information sought in this case were established, and the inquiry must shift to the nature of protection from discovery claimed by the City. V.

Mark Levy v. Sterling Holding Company, LLC National Semiconductor Corporation Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc

314 F.3d 106 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 19, 2002

In this case, however, the SEC has not set forth its interpretation clearly so our threshold challenge is to ascertain what in fact was its interpretation. … Indeed, the release clearly hedges on the point and thus supports a conclusion that some but not all reclassifications are exempt from section 16(b)’s restrictions.

Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Commissioner

97 F.2d 272 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 6, 1938

shares, and that therefore the first condition of affiliation clearly was fulfilled. … Clearly the pe-titioners. have not shown that the Coal Company and. the Supply Company were engaged in a. closely related business.”

Fagan v. City of Vineland

22 F.3d 1296 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 29, 1994

Thus, the author of the Collins opinion had clearly indicated in another context that reckless as well as negligent conduct would work a deprivation. … Justice Powell, the author of the Daniels rule, thus clearly did not envision that only conscience-shocking conduct violates the Due Process Clause.

United States v. Richard Stevens

935 F.2d 1380 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 12, 1991

Rule 702 of .the Federal Rules of Evidence “authorizes the admission of expert testimony so long as it is rendered by a qualified expert and is helpful to the trier of fact.” DeLuca v. … The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the evidence clearly had some relevance to the case. Id. at 451 ; 388 A.2d at 590 .

National Labor Relations Board v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc.

730 F.2d 119 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 1984

Jones, 231 Pa.Super. 300 , 332 A.2d 464 (1974), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that in order to qualify for a claim of self-defense a person confronted with non-deadly force must not use excessive force in retaliation … As a matter of law, its use was unreasonable and clearly *127 excessive. The Board erred in adopting the ALJ’s decision to the contrary.

Howard Allison v. Superintendent Waymart SCI

703 F. App'x 91 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 9, 2017

In other words, “[h]abeas relief may not be granted on the basis that the state court applied clearly established law incorrectly; rather, the inquiry is ‘whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal … Allison, however, cannot identify clearly established Supreme Court precedent that such evidence constitutes a violation of due process. See Estelle v.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

893 F.2d 541 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 5, 1990

Her smoking from 1952 to 1966 could clearly have been found to be “a substantial contributing factor” in the development of her lung cancer. … This issue should not be re-tried; the existence of this duty has been properly established.

George Phillips Philip Vitale v. Borough of Keyport Victor Rhodes Board of Adjustment

107 F.3d 164 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 21, 1997

The panel held that “[tjhese actions ... if proven, are sufficient to establish a substantive due process violation_” Id. at 1129-30 . … In my view, this analysis is clearly flawed. In the first place, neither Daniels v. Williams, supra, nor Davidson v.

In the Matter of the Estate of Charles Redfield Vose, A/K/A C. R. Vose, Deceased. In the Matter of the Petition of the Executors of Said Estate for the Construction of Said Decedent's Will and Instructions as to the Property Distributable to 'Charles R. Vose, Inc.,' and the Persons to Whom and the Shares in Which the Stock of Said Corporation Should Be Distributed, , Pursuant to Article 'Fourth' of Said Will, Charles R. Rose, Inc., Charles R. Vose, Inc. v. William Houston Evans, as Executors of Estate of C. R. Vose, Deceased(two Cases). Charles R. Vose, Inc. v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc.

317 F.2d 281 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 10, 1963

As indicated above, the headquarters and all but one of the branch offices had been well-established prior to 1945. 14 Other evidence to support this finding is seen in the testimony of testator's sister-in-law, Mrs. … He owned all but the directors' qualifying shares in Tropical.