Case law

Smith v. Holtz

210 F.3d 186 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 2000

As noted above, the prosecutor clearly thought such evidence exculpatory, and stated as much in the memorandum he wrote mid-trial. … Therefore the District Court clearly stated that it would have decided that the lifters were immaterial as a matter of law.

Simon v. Cebrick

53 F.3d 17 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 26, 1995

When a court interprets a statute, "[i]t is not lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to depart from a long established policy." United States v. … In light of the governmental role played by the FDIC in the instant case, we find that it qualifies for the federal instrumentality exception to the TIA.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co.

550 F.2d 115 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 12, 1977

The gasoline war cases, then, suggest that the category of price exchanges that qualify as “controlling circumstances” is quite broad. … Those cases also cite Justice Fortas’s Container concurrence, suggesting that Container did not establish a per se rule against information exchanges, but left some to qualify as legitimate under the Sherman Act.

Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC

935 F.3d 187 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 20, 2019

The Act and Regulation Z require a “creditor” extending credit to make certain disclosures24 before the “consummation” of the credit transaction.25 To be subject to the Act’s disclosure requirements, a lender must qualify … Under the staff’s official interpretation, those allegations are insufficient to establish a “written agreement.”

United States v. Hamilton

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 23, 1995

The number of nonexcludable days clearly exceeded the limits of the Speedy Trial Act,7 and we will affirm the order dismissing the indictment without prejudice.8 7 . … The seventy-day time period established by the Speedy Trial Act therefore began to run on May 13, 1993. See Lattany, 982 F.2d at 871 (date of arraignment is excluded from Speedy Trial Act calculations).

Cornel Cameron v. Attorney General United States

641 F. App'x 139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 17, 2016

Cameron’s conviction clearly meets these requirements, as § 843 is part of the CSA, and prescribes a maximum penalty of four years.2 21 U.S.C. § 843(d); see also Khan v. … Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To establish a violation of due process, the petitioner[] must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural errors.”).

Hughes v. Shestakov

76 F. App'x 450 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 2003

Hughes contends that Deborah Shestakov’s credibility is suspect and her testimony alone cannot establish probable cause. … For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 2 Because we find no constitutional violations, we do not reach the question of qualified immunity.

Cleopatra McDougal v. Alexis M. Herman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor

184 F.3d 207 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 2, 1999

implemented by regulation: If there should be disagreement between the physician making the examination on the part of the United States and the injured employee’s physician, the Office shall appoint a third physician, qualified … By contrast, in FISA Congress has spoken clearly and directly: “[NJo court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or order under this section. ” 12 USC

United States v. Leahy

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 24, 2006

Clearly, this was in error, as the burden of proof was on the Government. … Furthermore, the majority’s reading of Khorozian is clearly foreclosed by Thomas.

Pittsburgh, S. & N. R. Co. v. Lamphere

137 F. 20 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 1, 1905

Nor do we see why a witness, who has qualified himself as an expert in railroad management, cannot testify what good railroading in his opinion requires, in the respect under consideration, nor do we think if defendant had … The .sixth and seventh assignments were not insisted upon at the argument, and we are clearly of opinion that they present-no-reversible error.

Reading Co. v. Larkin

114 F.2d 416 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 17, 1940

The action of the parties, upon which the defendant here relies to establish a termination of the movement forward of the “spilled coal”, is the change in ownership brought about by the defendant’s purchase of the coal. … All of this clearly appears from the testimony of the yard master, a witness for the defendant.

United States v. Reynos

680 F.3d 283 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 2012

Furthermore, the record conclusively establishes that Reynos forced the victims to accompany him to facilitate the robbery of the cash register. See, e.g., United States v. … The analysis of what qualifies as an abduction, and what does not, is subtle and nuanced. Reasonable people can differ, and the side of the line I land is different than my colleagues.

B.H. Ex Rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District

725 F.3d 293 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 5, 2013

Justice Breyer would have avoided the “difficult First Amendment issue” and concluded that “qualified immunity bars [Morse’s] claim for monetary damages.” … Feb. 6, 2012) (“When one reads the entire phrase, it is clearly a message designed to promote breast cancer awareness.”).

Jett Elad v. NCAA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 25, 2025

It is well-established that a “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation omitted). … Maxcy’s factual findings, the District Court clearly erred. Dr.

Jack E. COUP, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services

834 F.2d 313 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 23, 1987

Moreover, “for the government, in relying entirely on a legal argument, to establish that its position was substantially justified, it must demonstrate that that argument presented an unsettled or close question of law.” … Johnson , Judge Rosenn would have imposed an even higher burden on the government: a showing that its position was “clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid tbough not necessarily correct.” 799 F.2d at 41 .

Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc.

673 F.3d 221 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 14, 2012

Thus, in order to qualify as a question of arbitrability that the court may consider, the challenge must “relat[e] to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. … The Supreme Court has clearly established that ambiguities in arbitration agreements must be interpreted by the arbitrator. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v.

R. M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

591 F.2d 248 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 26, 1979

Having established that the calculation was in error, Smith was not required to prove the correct figure. The Commissioner had the burden of establishing the proper valuation and thus the actual tax owed. … It inherited a sound marketing program established in North and South America.

Jack Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Company

935 F.2d 1407 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 19, 1991

On November 25, 1985, Fisher offered its employees an early retirement program for which Colgan qualified, but on January 15, 1986, he declined to participate in the program. … The statement clearly signaled that Colgan had an opportunity to redeem himself by an improved performance over the next 60 to 90 days.

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College

784 F.2d 505 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 3, 1986

may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. … Shallabarger’s conception of the bill’s scope was much broader, and clearly not limited to a taxonomic definition of the key term in the bill.

Francis Edward McGillick Foundation v. Commissioner

278 F.2d 643 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 26, 1960

Since we have found that the Foundation qualifies under Section 101(6) we need not discuss the applicability of Section 162(a). … This is the first explicit statement as to the establishment of the Foundation, though prior language in the indenture in effect treats the Foundation as if already established. .