Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersca3

9,730 results

0.63s

  • Henry Buczynski, Alex Borusovic, and Other Retirees Similarly Situated v. The General Motors Corporation, State of New Jersey, Intervenor. Joseph Alessi, Raymond Buisson, Stephen Michalski, Charles Repka, Helen Vogt and T. Edward White v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. Employee Retirement Plan, Jointly, Severally or in the Alternative, State of New Jersey, Intervenor

    616 F.2d 1238 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1980

    . § 1053 (a) (1976), cannot be sustained: The legislative history affirmatively supports the Treasury regulation, and, at the very least, any conflict between the regulation and the statute, if one indeed exists, is clearly … benefits differ because of any retirement benefit created under State or Federal law, will not be discriminatory because of such exclusion or difference, provided the total benefits resulting under the plan and under such law establish

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • United States v. Price

    13 F.3d 711 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 11, 1994

    In any event, it was elicited by the defendant’s own questions, and thus falls outside of the principle established in Griffin v. … None of these findings are clearly erroneous.

    Cited 154 timesPublished
  • United States v. Robert Asmar and Kathleen Asmar

    827 F.2d 907 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 1987

    The government does not argue that the district court’s finding on the IRS agents’ misrepresentations 7 was clearly erroneous. … We need not address whether Asmar’s reliance was reasonable in light of our holding that Asmar did not establish detrimental reliance.

    Cited 87 timesPublished
  • Adel Fadlala Jarbough v. Attorney General of the United States

    483 F.3d 184 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 11, 2007

    In contrast, we have recognized that § 1252(a)(2)(D) confers upon us jurisdiction over purely legal questions such as whether a particular offense qualifies as an aggravated felony under the definition set forth in 8 U.S.C … Recasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under § 1258(a)(2)(D).

    Cited 376 timesPublished
  • Yongxin Chen v. Attorney General of the United States

    248 F. App'x 265 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 2, 2007

    Chen challenges the IJ’s determination that he did not qualify for an exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. … Rather, Chen relied on his testimony alone to establish that he was a bona fide practitioner. (Petr.’s Br. 20-21.)

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lovell Manufacturing v. Export-Import Bank of the United States

    843 F.2d 725 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 1988

    Lovell I thus establishes that there is no direct governmental interest in this case. Without any such interest, we are unable to find any jurisdictional basis upon which to ground this cause of action. … After all, the purpose of § 1442 removal is to protect federal officials from unfriendly state forums, to allow the official to raise defenses (such as immunity) arising out of his official duties, and to insure an impartial

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • The Central West Utility Company v. Federal Power Commission

    247 F.2d 306 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 6, 1957

    Without more specific legislative direction, we cannot ascribe to Congress a purpose to repeal the prohibition against compulsory enlargement of transportation facilities, a provision so clearly set out in section 7(a) of … “(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in subsection (e) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Schwartz v. Commissioner

    348 F. App'x 806 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 9, 2009

    “We review the Tax Court’s legal determinations de novo, but we do not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399, 401 (3d Cir.2006). III. … In handling the Schwartzes’ case, the IRS followed its established procedures.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Controlled Sanitation Corporation v. District 128 Of The International Association Of Machinists And Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio

    524 F.2d 1324 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 23, 1976

    In so doing, it points to the procedures established in Article XIII, Section 2(A), (B), and (C). … only if it could confidently be said not only that a claim was strictly 'procedural' and therefore within the purview of the court, but also that it should operate to bar arbitration altogether, and not merely limit or qualify

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Rennie v. Klein

    653 F.2d 836 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 1981

    The district court defined a qualified constitutional right to refuse treatment and issued a preliminary injunction directing New Jersey to establish an independent review mechanism that went beyond procedures already prescribed … These findings are not challenged as clearly erroneous. Krasnov v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Marcus Pough

    636 F. App'x 125 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 2016

    established that he was involved as a get-away driver after a murder took place and that this conduct was in violation of the terms of his supervised release.” … The line of questioning initiated by the prosecutor clearly relates to Pough’s written statement.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Mitchell A. KRAMER and David C. Harrison v. SCIENTIFIC CONTROL CORP. Et Al. Appeal of ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.

    534 F.2d 1085 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 20, 1976

    We hold, therefore, that the order denying the motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel qualifies for immediate review. II. … Having established our appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to disqualify, we now properly turn to the question of the scope of our appellate review.

    Cited 130 timesPublished
  • FMC Corp. v. US Dept of Comm.

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 5, 1994

    In January 1942, an executive order established the WPB. … It is of course well established that the government waives only so much sovereign immunity as it has chosen to waive in clear and express language. See Un States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Snell v. CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA

    564 F.3d 659 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 27, 2009

    Agency, 261 F.3d 912 , 921-22 *673 (9th Cir.2001) (“Because the excessive force and false arrest factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of probable cause to make an arrest does not establish an excessive force … We do not address qualified immunity or Snell’s right to specific relief, as these issues were not decided by the District Court. S.A. 32-33. 13 .

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • James Chizmar v. Borough of Trafford

    454 F. App'x 100 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 2011

    In the current case probable cause is clearly demonstrated by the judicial determination that Mr. … Chizmar, and the subsequent reversal do not establish that the appellees lacked probable cause given the facts just stated.

    Cited 4 timesUnpublished
  • Francis A. Deisler v. McCormack Aggregates, Co. Dredge "Sandy Hook", Her Boilers, Engines, Tackle, Appurtenances, Etc.

    54 F.3d 1074 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 3, 1995

    “[T]he seaman’s right was firmly established in the maritime law long before recognition of the distinction between tort and contract.” … However, the Supreme Court has shown no. inclination to depart from its long established solicitude for seamen.

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • Dunn v. United States

    842 F.2d 1420 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 23, 1988

    The threshold inquiry for a district court when presented with an application for attorneys’ fees is whether the claimant qualifies as a prevailing party. … The Act establishes the requirements for these cooperative agreements.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • In re the Morristown & Erie Railroad

    677 F.2d 360 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 10, 1982

    In addition, the Trustee will be freed of the burden of running the railroad, while individuals better qualified in the day-today operation of the railroad will be enabled to assume those responsibilities. … Section 17(b)(3) clearly is a uniform bankruptcy law — assuming that it is, in fact, a bankruptcy law 8 — because it applies to all railroads in the country undergoing reorganization, save the Milwaukee.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Leo Tarr v. City of Pittsburgh

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 21, 2020

    “Probable cause exists 2 The District Court also held that Officer Ruiz was entitled to qualified immunity. … Given our conclusion below that Tarr failed to make out a constitutional violation, we need not decide whether Officer Ruiz is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. 3 where

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Rahman Fulton

    837 F.3d 281 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2016

    Agent Scartozzi testified that records of Barnes’ phone calls established that he was on the phone when the robbery occurred. … An opinion only qualifies as helpful “if it aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise be as competent to understand.” 91 Thus, where a witness is not in a better position than the jurors to form an opinion

    Cited 72 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.