Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,730 results
0.63s
616 F.2d 1238 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1980
. § 1053 (a) (1976), cannot be sustained: The legislative history affirmatively supports the Treasury regulation, and, at the very least, any conflict between the regulation and the statute, if one indeed exists, is clearly … benefits differ because of any retirement benefit created under State or Federal law, will not be discriminatory because of such exclusion or difference, provided the total benefits resulting under the plan and under such law establish
Cited 1 timesPublished13 F.3d 711 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 11, 1994
In any event, it was elicited by the defendant’s own questions, and thus falls outside of the principle established in Griffin v. … None of these findings are clearly erroneous.
Cited 154 timesPublishedUnited States v. Robert Asmar and Kathleen Asmar
827 F.2d 907 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 1987
The government does not argue that the district court’s finding on the IRS agents’ misrepresentations 7 was clearly erroneous. … We need not address whether Asmar’s reliance was reasonable in light of our holding that Asmar did not establish detrimental reliance.
Cited 87 timesPublishedAdel Fadlala Jarbough v. Attorney General of the United States
483 F.3d 184 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 11, 2007
In contrast, we have recognized that § 1252(a)(2)(D) confers upon us jurisdiction over purely legal questions such as whether a particular offense qualifies as an aggravated felony under the definition set forth in 8 U.S.C … Recasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under § 1258(a)(2)(D).
Cited 376 timesPublishedYongxin Chen v. Attorney General of the United States
248 F. App'x 265 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 2, 2007
Chen challenges the IJ’s determination that he did not qualify for an exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. … Rather, Chen relied on his testimony alone to establish that he was a bona fide practitioner. (Petr.’s Br. 20-21.)
Cited 0 timesPublishedLovell Manufacturing v. Export-Import Bank of the United States
843 F.2d 725 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 1988
Lovell I thus establishes that there is no direct governmental interest in this case. Without any such interest, we are unable to find any jurisdictional basis upon which to ground this cause of action. … After all, the purpose of § 1442 removal is to protect federal officials from unfriendly state forums, to allow the official to raise defenses (such as immunity) arising out of his official duties, and to insure an impartial
Cited 9 timesPublishedThe Central West Utility Company v. Federal Power Commission
247 F.2d 306 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 6, 1957
Without more specific legislative direction, we cannot ascribe to Congress a purpose to repeal the prohibition against compulsory enlargement of transportation facilities, a provision so clearly set out in section 7(a) of … “(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in subsection (e) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service
Cited 5 timesPublished348 F. App'x 806 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 9, 2009
“We review the Tax Court’s legal determinations de novo, but we do not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399, 401 (3d Cir.2006). III. … In handling the Schwartzes’ case, the IRS followed its established procedures.
Cited 0 timesPublished524 F.2d 1324 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 23, 1976
In so doing, it points to the procedures established in Article XIII, Section 2(A), (B), and (C). … only if it could confidently be said not only that a claim was strictly 'procedural' and therefore within the purview of the court, but also that it should operate to bar arbitration altogether, and not merely limit or qualify
Cited 11 timesPublished653 F.2d 836 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 1981
The district court defined a qualified constitutional right to refuse treatment and issued a preliminary injunction directing New Jersey to establish an independent review mechanism that went beyond procedures already prescribed … These findings are not challenged as clearly erroneous. Krasnov v.
Cited 2 timesPublished636 F. App'x 125 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 2016
established that he was involved as a get-away driver after a murder took place and that this conduct was in violation of the terms of his supervised release.” … The line of questioning initiated by the prosecutor clearly relates to Pough’s written statement.
Cited 0 timesUnpublished534 F.2d 1085 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 20, 1976
We hold, therefore, that the order denying the motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel qualifies for immediate review. II. … Having established our appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to disqualify, we now properly turn to the question of the scope of our appellate review.
Cited 130 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 5, 1994
In January 1942, an executive order established the WPB. … It is of course well established that the government waives only so much sovereign immunity as it has chosen to waive in clear and express language. See Un States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
Cited 0 timesUnknownSnell v. CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA
564 F.3d 659 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 27, 2009
Agency, 261 F.3d 912 , 921-22 *673 (9th Cir.2001) (“Because the excessive force and false arrest factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of probable cause to make an arrest does not establish an excessive force … We do not address qualified immunity or Snell’s right to specific relief, as these issues were not decided by the District Court. S.A. 32-33. 13 .
Cited 40 timesPublishedJames Chizmar v. Borough of Trafford
454 F. App'x 100 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 2011
In the current case probable cause is clearly demonstrated by the judicial determination that Mr. … Chizmar, and the subsequent reversal do not establish that the appellees lacked probable cause given the facts just stated.
Cited 4 timesUnpublished54 F.3d 1074 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 3, 1995
“[T]he seaman’s right was firmly established in the maritime law long before recognition of the distinction between tort and contract.” … However, the Supreme Court has shown no. inclination to depart from its long established solicitude for seamen.
Cited 53 timesPublished842 F.2d 1420 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 23, 1988
The threshold inquiry for a district court when presented with an application for attorneys’ fees is whether the claimant qualifies as a prevailing party. … The Act establishes the requirements for these cooperative agreements.
Cited 25 timesPublishedIn re the Morristown & Erie Railroad
677 F.2d 360 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 10, 1982
In addition, the Trustee will be freed of the burden of running the railroad, while individuals better qualified in the day-today operation of the railroad will be enabled to assume those responsibilities. … Section 17(b)(3) clearly is a uniform bankruptcy law — assuming that it is, in fact, a bankruptcy law 8 — because it applies to all railroads in the country undergoing reorganization, save the Milwaukee.
Cited 1 timesPublishedLeo Tarr v. City of Pittsburgh
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 21, 2020
“Probable cause exists 2 The District Court also held that Officer Ruiz was entitled to qualified immunity. … Given our conclusion below that Tarr failed to make out a constitutional violation, we need not decide whether Officer Ruiz is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. 3 where
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedUnited States v. Rahman Fulton
837 F.3d 281 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2016
Agent Scartozzi testified that records of Barnes’ phone calls established that he was on the phone when the robbery occurred. … An opinion only qualifies as helpful “if it aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise be as competent to understand.” 91 Thus, where a witness is not in a better position than the jurors to form an opinion
Cited 72 timesPublished
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