Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,730 results
1.15s
State of New Jersey v. Department of Health and Human Services
670 F.2d 1262 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 23, 1981
that, to qualify for federal financial participation, a state must draw its IV-D plan in accord with certain statutory requirements, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 654 . … Nonetheless, it reasoned that, “in the absence of an express reference in Title IV-D to services provided prior to the effective date of that title, it [cannot] clearly be inferred that new applications are not required.”
Cited 58 timesPublishedEric Davin v. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
60 F.3d 1043 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 5, 1995
In reviewing the government’s withholding of records under any subsection of § 552(b)(7), the district court must first be satisfied that those materials qualify as “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes … The declaration clearly identifies David Lasser and the WAA as the targets of the investigations, thereby fulfilling the first prong of the Pratt test.
Cited 123 timesPublished943 F.2d 270 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 16, 1991
As is well established under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Lewis v. … As a consequence of the new structure of law that evolved in the post-Civil War era, “the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established.” Mitchum v.
Cited 64 timesPublishedGulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
706 F.2d 444 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 21, 1983
The ALJ held that Gulf had not made out a prima facie case to establish force maj-eure volumes. … Storms qualify as a force majeure event because they are unexpected, and out of the party’s control. (II App. p. 21).
Cited 6 timesPublishedNational Casualty Co. v. Borough of Wyomissing
57 F. App'x 62 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 29, 2003
the plaintiff’s decedents; (c) Failing to follow appropriate departmental guidelines pertaining to initiation, maintenance and/or discontinuance of high speed motor vehicle pursuits; (d) Failing to establish … . § 8541, and that the only relevant exception to the immunity provision is for operation of a motor vehicle, under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Cited 4 timesUnpublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 19, 2007
A party seeking to avoid arbitration for a statutory claim has the burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the claim. … Clearly, if Gay objected to the terms of the Agreement she could have walked away from it.
Cited 0 timesPublished903 F.2d 961 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 21, 1990
We do not believe that negotiations to obtain legal objectives can immunize the resulting illegal objective. … Proposal of the illegal hot cargo clause after this date, however, did not immunize the strike from the causal effects of the clause.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 4, 2007
Even if, as VFB implies, the market was suffering from some “irrational exuberance” in establishing VFI’s stock price, that gives me no basis for second-guessing the value that was fairly established … That contention is clearly wrong.
Cited 0 timesPublishedBender v. Williamsport Area School District
741 F.2d 538 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 1984
Although the Supreme Court has noted, for instance, that the Establishment Clause “may” provide a compelling state interest which would override free speech rights (Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 , 102 S.Ct. at 275 ), it clearly … the Establishment Clause.
Vacated on other grounds by Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986)Cited 20 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 5, 1994
In January 1942, an executive order established the WPB. … It is of course well established that the government waives only so much sovereign immunity as it has chosen to waive in clear and express language. See Un States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
Cited 0 timesUnknown952 F.2d 715 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 12, 1992
It was established as a privately owned dealership by John Wenner, a former Parts Operations Manager for Ford in Michigan, in 1977. … Despite his assurances that plaintiffs would be approved, Nickel's New Dealer Prospecting Report stated that de la Rigaudiere and Smith were not qualified businessmen and did not have adequate financing to be approved for
Cited 68 timesPublishedGarden State Bar Ass'n v. Middlesex County Ethics Committee
643 F.2d 119 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 24, 1981
After plaintiffs conducted extensive discovery, the court held hearings but concluded, after two days, that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof to establish that the case fell within the Dombrowski exception … Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 , 100 S.Ct. 1967 , 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980), the Court analyzed state bar disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of determining when immunity is appropriate.
Cited 10 timesPublished944 F.2d 1106 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 1991
This notion, however, is unsupported by any established fact. … Nor was the court’s determination of Surratt’s offense level clearly erroneous.
Abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Richard Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (2013)Cited 177 timesPublished923 F.2d 284 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 16, 1991
This unrestricted consideration of mitigating circumstances clearly meets the Eighth Amendment’s requirements. … Schneider or another professionally qualified witness respecting the pertinent mitigating circumstances. 143. Mr.
Questioned by Steele v. Beard, 830 F. Supp. 2d 49 (2011)Cited 200 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 9, 1995
of the well-established injunction against recognizing a waiver of federal sovereign (..continued) Government authority or pursuant to the provisions of section 3413(l) of this title shall … it here asserts against the IRS, the facts that give rise to liability under that claim involve misrepresentations or deceit (..continued) Accordingly, a showing of a violation of federal law will not alone suffice to qualify
Cited 0 timesUnknown427 F.2d 1334 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 23, 1970
We agree that the form of the transaction cannot create a tax immunity where it is designed to avoid legitimate taxation. But we hasten to echo the observation of the court in Edwards v. … In such a case, the burden is upon the taxpayer to establish the existence of true indebtedness rather than a disguised capital contribution. See P. M. Finance Corp. v.
Cited 0 timesPublished645 F.3d 564 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 13, 2011
Id. 46 litany of enumerated media that could qualify as “informational materials.” Id. … Quite clearly, Amirnazmi envisioned ChemPlan as being of singular functional utility to Iranian users.
Cited 31 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 24, 2008
Judgment will only be granted where the moving party clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. … Relying on such a comparison, however, would directly contravene established New York law.
Cited 0 timesPublished757 F.3d 113 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 7, 2014
established federal law” and (2) “whether the Superior Court’s failure to remand to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether [Cox] wanted to proceed pro se or with counsel establishe[d] cause to overcome … Rather, we have consistently articulated a more qualified position: that intervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from final judgments under 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Reform Party of Allegheny Cnty. v.
Cited 304 timesPublishedBurlington Northern Railroad Company v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.
63 F.3d 1227 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 20, 1995
Court of Claims, that time spent as a Naval Academy cadet during the Civil War qualified as “service] during the civil war”, entitling him to a pension enhancement under an applicable pension statute. … In a later case, which did not involve Moser, the Court of Claims changed its interpretation of the pension statute and concluded that service as a naval cadet did not qualify as “serv[ice] during the war” under the statute
Cited 143 timesPublished
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