Case law

United States v. Davenport

478 F.2d 203 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 27, 1973

But we need hardly rest our decision on the Abrams case alone, since on the present record the Walker test-a showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote-clearly has been met. … possible by separate counsel." 33 To this admonition we add that the warning should come at the earliest stage of the criminal justice process, so that each defendant can be made aware of the advantages, such as grants of immunity

Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance v. Squires

667 F.3d 388 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 26, 2012

Underwriters clearly is distinguishable from this case. We first observe that while, as here, something physically external to a vehicle caused the injuries in U.S. … Clearly, if appellant had encountered the same snow-covered pothole in a different location in the parking lot, this case would not be before us.

Jaswinder Singh v. Uber Technologies Inc

939 F.3d 210 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 11, 2019

Setting aside the affidavit submitted by Uber as not qualifying as any of these, the Amended Complaint and the Rasier Agreement each independently establish that Uber drivers transport passengers. … Id. at 543 n.12 (emphasis added).7 6 The cases that the Court cited in support of this proposition also clearly contemplated the presence of seamen on passenger ships.

Bp Chemicals Ltd. (An English Corporation) v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corporation (A Taiwanese Corporation) Joseph Oat Corporation (A Pennsylvania Corporation)

229 F.3d 254 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 3, 2000

On the other hand, "[i]f the question is whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum,... the answer is clearly … S 158 (emphasis added), the Restatement qualifies this rule, stating: 61 "[s]ituations do arise, however, where the place of injury will not play an important role in the selection of the state of applicable law....

Jones v. Ryan

987 F.2d 960 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 5, 1993

for the removal of Negroes who [had] been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve[d] on petit juries.” … Rather, the comments clearly suggest that the trial court entertained the objection of defense counsel as a charge of systematic racial discrimination.

Hany Mahmoud Kiareldeen v. John Ashcroft

273 F.3d 542 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 2001

First, it must independently establish that the agency action giving rise to the litigation was substantially justified. Second, it must establish that its litigation positions were substantially justified. See id. … INS, 904 F.2d. 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) ("EAJA is a waiver of sovereign immunity, however, so it must be construed strictly in favor of the United States"). 43 To hold otherwise would force lower level supervisors in anti-terrorist

Constructors Association Of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps

573 F.2d 811 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 7, 1978

Such a postponement of the benefits of the Act would clearly have been against the public interest. 29 These considerations buttress our conclusion that Judge Snyder's determination was not an abuse of discretion. 34 F. … Some other mechanism is therefore needed to guarantee participation by available and qualified minority businesses to give them a foothold in the competitive market.

Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Industries, Inc.

610 F.2d 1059 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 1, 1979

The issue then is whether Congoleum’s status as a patent monopolist immunizes this otherwise actionable conduct from antitrust attack. … In such cases, there is no sound reason to immunize the patentee’s conduct from antitrust scrutiny.

In Re Associates

29 F.3d 903 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 1994

This [c]ourt's standard of review is clearly erroneous as to findings of fact by the bankruptcy court, and plenary as to conclusions of law." In re Stendardo, 991 F.2d 1089 , 1094 (3d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). … These facts alone establish that UJB was conferred with a benefit by the delays effected by the sale process, which also caused the taxes to accrue.

Disston v. McClain

147 F. 114 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 9, 1906

and citizen of the state of Pennsylvania, died on June 13, 1900, having first made his last will and testament, duly probated on June 19, 1900, whereby he appointed the plaintiffs in error his executors, who accepted and qualified … With these well-established maxims of interpretation in view, let us examine the language by which Congress has seen fit to impose the taxes in question, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the case of Vanderbilt v.

Roe v. Operation Rescue

919 F.2d 857 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 26, 1990

Sec. 1985 (3) by establishing--(a) sufficient class-based animus, (b) violation of their constitutional rights to abortion and/or travel, and (c) sufficient government involvement to establish an infringement of the abortion … Both claims are unavailing. 55 To begin with, McMonagle's right to free speech does not immunize him from liability for engaging in proscribed conduct.

Onyiuke v. New Jersey State Supreme Court

242 F. App'x 794 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 19, 2007

Supreme Court and the Board of Law Examiners of all authority to establish requirements for admission to the bar and abolish all semblance of objective criteria.’” … As the courts have repeatedly held, states are accorded great deference in establishing standards for licensing professionals within their borders. See Schware v.

In Re Headquarters Dodge, Inc.

13 F.3d 674 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 3, 1994

The district court does not sit as a finder of facts in evaluating them as a court of review, and therefore its evaluation of the evidence is not shielded by the "clearly erroneous" standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), which applies … Again, appellants point to no new evidence it would like to introduce and no facts that even remotely establish a genuine issue of material fact. Their argument on appeal is legal in nature.

United States Ex Rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc.

659 F.3d 295 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 2011

United Health also offers qualified individuals coverage under Medicare Part D which is a voluntary prescription drug benefit program. … Clearly, we need not consider that possibility. 18  2.

Johanna Ong v. Hudson County Superior Court

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 2, 2018

Amendment provides unconsenting states with immunity from suits brought in federal courts by private parties. … Because that decision is clearly a law enforcement function, the HCPO qualifies for immunity.

United States v. Thomas Noble

42 F.4th 346 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 2, 2022

To establish plain error, Noble must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. Id. … This is a misreading of the record, which clearly shows that Noble referred to a “psychiatric” disability. As such, the court’s ruling on the Government’s objection was not erroneous.

Lepage's Incorporated v. 3m (Minnesota Mining And Manufacturing Company)

324 F.3d 141 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 25, 2003

The District Court clearly charged the jury to disregard losses not caused by 3M: "You may not calculate damages based only on speculation or guessing.... … In the circumstances, I am satisfied that this conduct does not qualify as predatory or anticompetitive so as to establish liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 203 LePage's also alleges that 3M entered the retail

United States v. Schiavo

504 F.2d 1 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 8, 1974

To establish the rule in this Circuit, we must await such event. … Rather, the case law establishes quite clearly that such *17 procedural safeguards are required by First Amendment considerations.

Lugo v. Paulsen

886 F.2d 602 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 26, 1989

The district court determined that the surcharge qualified as "debt," but fell within the exception to discharge in 11 U.S.C. … Therefore, we will review the history of the enactment of Sec. 523(a)(9) to ensure that our reading of the statute is not plainly contradicted by clearly expressed legislative intent. I.N.S. v.

Barbara E. Horn, of the Estate of Daniel Ray Horn, Deceased v. Thoratec Corporation

376 F.3d 163 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 2004

Moreover, the exemption of generalized state requirements is never qualified by the further condition that those requirements infringe on a generalized federal requirement. … Id. at 490 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 (plurality). 32 This clearly pro-regulatory, pro-consumer safety purpose of the MDA compels the conclusion that state common-law suits are not impliedly preempted by the MDA.