Case law

Furlong v. Gudknecht

808 F.2d 233 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 19, 1986

It was not qualified *236 with respect to supervising personnel in the office. … We have noted that Branti established a "new test” for adjudging patronage cases. See Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1064 (3d Cir.1980) (per curiam). .

Vfb Llc v. Campbell Soup Company

482 F.3d 624 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 2007

Even if, as VFB implies, the market was suffering from some "irrational exuberance" in establishing VFI's stock price, that gives me no basis for second-guessing the value that was fairly established in open and informed … That contention is clearly wrong.

Nitram, Inc. v. Motor Vessel Cretan Life, Her Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Etc., in Rem., Skopi Shipping Co., Ltd., in Personam, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee v. Italmare Shipping Company, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. Montedison, S.P.A., Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Eller and Company, Intervenor

599 F.2d 1359 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 3, 1979

We are, of course, bound by the trial court's findings unless we find them to be clearly erroneous. … The plaintiff serves, and must establish a prima facie case by proving both delivery of the goods to the carrier in good condition and outturn by the carrier in damaged condition.

Espinosa-Cortez v. Attorney General of United States

607 F.3d 101 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 2, 2010

-13-  An asylum applicant who cannot establish past persecution does not enjoy the benefit of such a presumption but may still demonstrate eligibility for asylum by establishing that … But she also testified that she would be targeted by the FARC in the future for betraying them, which, when coupled with the government’s unwillingness to control the FARC, could well qualify as

Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Secretary, United States Department of Labor

776 F.3d 157 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 15, 2015

[t]he qualifying words ‘in . . . any enterprise’ narrowed § 1963(a)(2), but in no way affected § 1963(a)(1)” (emphasis added; second omission in original)). … In passing the RSIA, Congress was clearly concerned about the safety implications of how employees perform their duties.

Joseph Wilson and Margaret Wilson, His Wife, and Dominick Triola and Genevieve Triola, His Wife, and Romolo Timoteo and Carolyn Timoteo, His Wife, and Claire Sims and Albert Sims, Her Husband and Helen Adams and John Adams, Her Husband v. Asten-Hill Manufacturing Company and Raybestos Manhattan, Inc. And Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., and Cassiar Asbestos Corp., Ltd. And United States Gypsum Company, and National Asbestos Company, Inc. v. Amatex Corporation and Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. And Johns-Manville Corporation and Southern Asbestos Corporation and Turner & Newall, Ltd. And Carolina Asbestos Company and H.K. Porter and Asten Hill, Inc. And Brinco Mining Limited. Appeal of Joseph and Margaret Wilson, Dominick and Genevieve Triola, Romolo and Caroline Timeteo, Claire and Albert Sims, and Helen and John Adams

791 F.2d 30 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 21, 1986

In return for these guaranteed payments, the employer was given immunity from common law suits by employees. 77 Pa.Stat.Ann. Secs. 481(a), 1403. … Clearly, these allegations should properly be aligned with those presented to our Supreme Court in Evans, supra.

Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board Of Education

307 F.3d 243 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 3, 2002

But the possibility that the policy may become unconstitutional is clearly an undesirable feature. … The Foxworthy T-shirt, however, is clearly not in this category.

United States v. Rosemary Zavrel

384 F.3d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 21, 2004

To the extent that the Court would apply a broader reading of the statute than the one I suggest, I would conclude that the doctrine of lenity is clearly implicated. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I. … Himelright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1994) (“[T]o establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c), the government bore only the burden of proving that [the defendant] acted knowingly and willfully when he placed the threatening

United States v. Dixon

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 9, 2002

Based on these misunderstandings, the plea agreement clearly stated that Dixon faced a total maximum sentence of 20 years on each count, for a total of 40 years. … However, Dixon never clearly and unmistakably asserted that had he been correctly informed of the sentence he faced, he would, in fact, have pled not guilty and gone to trial.

Citizens Fin Grp Inc v. Citizens Natl Bank

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2004

F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) than 2,400 separate branches; “Citizens” is (upholding determination that hearsay the ninth most commonly used bank name; statements did not qualify … No infringer is use of their marks when use by another immune from challenge because of its size.

Patel v. Attorney General of the United States

435 F. App'x 155 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 6, 2011

voluntary departure because the alien was unaware of his/her right to request withdrawal at the time of filing the motion to reopen and because the motion coupled with the alien’s “decision to remain in the United States, clearly … Patel had requested voluntary departure in the course of her removal hearing and the IJ found that Patel qualified for that relief based on her testimony. See A.R. at 32, 59, 71-72, 97-99. .

Joseph Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI

939 F.3d 260 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 2019

We may overturn a state-court holding only where it “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination … Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (“As the statutory language makes clear . . . § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established Federal law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.”).

Ardolina v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

186 F.2d 176 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 2, 1951

Viewed piecemeal, or as a whole, the agreement challenged is so nearly alike the prior agreements as to clearly indicate no change in business operation. … The Tax Court’s ultimate finding of fact that “petitioner and his wife did not actually intend to join together as partners in the conduct of the enterprise” is clearly wrong.

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,223 Shirley Woolf and Robert Milberg v. S. D. Cohn & Company and Sidney D. Cohn, Defendants-Third-Party v. Fiberglass Resources Corporation, Third-Party Shirley Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Company, Defendants-Third-Party v. Fiberglass Resources Corporation, Third-Party

515 F.2d 591 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 3, 1975

We refined the tests established in Hill York by focusing upon the information about Continental that each of the offerees possessed. … We have indicated some of the inadequacies in the record, and, on remand, the burden is on the defendants to establish the availability of the exemption.

Joyce A. Rutherford v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

399 F.3d 546 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 3, 2005

ALJ Reddy issued an opinion on August 31, 2001 that concluded that although Rutherford had impairments that qualified as severe, she was not entitled to benefits because she retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC … all of a claimant’s credibly established limitations (see Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431 ). 8 Our cases have established some guidelines as to when a limitation is credibly established, and the governing regulations have something

Mildred Anderson v. George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital, Surgidev Corporation, Chattahoochee Valley Hospital Society, Inc., D/B/A George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital and Nursing Home, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, a Body Corporate for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hugh Davis and Howard D. Clem, Sr., Third-Party Defendants-Cross-Appellees. Floareod Hodo v. George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital, Surgidev Corporation, Chattahoochee Valley Hospital Society, Inc., D/B/A George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital and Nursing Home, Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, a Body Corporate for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hugh Davis and Howard D. Clem, Sr., Third-Party- Defendants- Cross-Appellees, Alabama Hospital Association Trust, Defendant-Intervenor. Jack Lindsey v. George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital, Surgidev Corporation, Chattahoochee Valley Hospital Society, Inc., D/B/A George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital and Nursing Home, Defendant-Third-Party Appellee-Cross-Appellant, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, a Body Corporate for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hugh Davis and Howard D. Clem, Sr., Third-Party- Defendants- Cross-Appellees, Alabama Hospital Association Trust, Defendant-Intervenor. Charles Williams, an Individual, Marlene Williams, an Individual v. Vicki L. Torsch, as of the Estate of Theodore Torsch, Deceased, Chattahoochee Valley Hospital Society, Inc., D/B/A George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital and Nursing Home, Third Party Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, a Body Corporate for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hugh Davis and Howard D. Clem, Sr., Third Party Defendants-Cross-Appellees

982 F.2d 1513 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 12, 1993

Under the FDA's regulatory scheme, Surgidev was the "sponsor" of the IOL program and Lanier Hospital was the institutional site of study. 2 As the institutional site of study, FDA regulations required Lanier Hospital to establish … The district court also granted the Board's motion to dismiss Lanier Hospital's third-party complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity.

Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps

573 F.2d 811 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 7, 1978

Such a postponement of the benefits of the Act would clearly have been against the public interest. These considerations buttress our conclusion that Judge Snyder’s determination was not an abuse of discretion. 34 F. … Some other mechanism is therefore needed to guarantee participation by available and qualified minority businesses to give them a foothold in the competitive market.

United States v. Keith Cooper

750 F.3d 263 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 10, 2014

Under this test, a delegation is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” … Thus, the Supreme Court has “‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”

Government of Virgin Islands v. Rosado

699 F.2d 121 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 24, 1983

When asked on direct examination why she remembered the morning of June 4 so clearly, she replied, “[T]his was the first day of baccalaureate practice.” … The case was clearly one for the jury and we may not disturb its verdict.

Foraker v. Chaffinch

501 F.3d 231 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 30, 2007

Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. … Price and Warren further assert that their speech to the State Auditor qualifies for protection under the Petition Clause.