Case law

Walter H. Kaltreider and Irene C. Kaltreider v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

255 F.2d 833 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 17, 1958

houses ($350.00) was reported as ordinary income in Schedule “C” and one half ($10,478.90) of the profit allocated to sale of the lots 8 was reported as long-term capital gain in Schedule “D”. 9 The allocation procedure established … well-settled that such findings are “in the nature of an ultimate finding of fact and since such finding is but a legal inference from other facts it is subject to review free of the restraining impact of the so-called ‘clearly

General Electric Company v. Deutz Ag

270 F.3d 144 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 31, 2001

In sum, the behavior of Deutz and its officials clearly amounts to “purposeful direction” of business activity toward General Electric, a Pennsylvania resident. … Although the jury unquestionably has a more important role in the American jurisprudential system than in that of any other nation, its verdict is neither infallible nor immune from judicial scrutiny.

United States v. John Bazzano

570 F.2d 1120 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 21, 1977

Testimony established that one of the operators of the gambling operation directed an assistant to give an envelope to Orsini. … "I didn't want immunity." Question (by Assistant U.S. Attorney): "Were you granted immunity?" A: "Yes, against my rights." Q: "And you were ordered to testify?"

Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania

916 F.2d 903 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 24, 1990

The court thus held that such a scheme does not qualify for protection under the market participant doctrine and hence violates the commerce clause. Id. at 495, 496 . 13 Respectfully, we disagree. … The Seventh Circuit also held that the statute was unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. . See City of Trenton v.

Ali v. New Jersey Superior Court Board of Bar Examiners

494 F. App'x 262 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 2012

Title I prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge … R. 1:23-4 (establishing funding for the Board from fees paid by candidates for admission to the bar and from funds provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts), is an entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

Shardar v. Atty Gen USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2007

As noted, “[a] motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for [the relief sought].” Guo, 386 F.3d at 563. … We noted that “the record clearly shows that Vente’s asylum claim is based not on allegations of general social unrest in Columbia but on the specific threats that he received.” Id.

Aurelio Cagno v. Administrator New Jersey State

642 F. App'x 189 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 24, 2016

Because we conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Cagno’s constitutional claims was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, we will affirm … For these reasons, we conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Cagno’s confrontation claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Horace Branch v. Cindy Sweeney

758 F.3d 226 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 9, 2014

A state court decision unreasonably applies clearly established law if it either “unreasonably applies [the law] to the facts” of the case or “unreasonably extends,” or fails to extend, Supreme Court precedent in the case … established Federal law.”

Jerry v. Carter v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, A. C. Woods, Third-Party

473 F.2d 1071 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 16, 1973

Here the facts quite clearly establish that Aetna learned from the complaint that Carter claimed Woods owned the car which collided with him. … A policy endorsement specifies that a transferee of a vehicle under an agree-meat of sale does not qualify ns an insured.

Mortellite v. Novartis Crop Protection, Inc.

460 F.3d 483 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 21, 2006

Such an event "merely motivates an optional decision" to change a label and therefore "does not qualify as a requirement" to change a label. Id. … The failure-to-warn claim 30 Unlike the previous claims, Plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim clearly fulfills the first requirement of the Bates test by creating a labeling requirement for a product.

Erie Sand and Gravel Company, a Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission

291 F.2d 279 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 29, 1961

In these circumstances, the functional interchangeability of pit and bank sand with lake sand was overwhelmingly established. … Thus, the question of what can economically be sold — -the “line of commerce” question — • and the question where it can be sold— the “section of the country” question— will often be so related that the answer to each qualifies

Miller Ex Rel. MM v. Mitchell

598 F.3d 139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 17, 2010

U.S. 452, 454 (1974) (where “a state prosecution has been threatened, but is not pending,” federal declaratory relief is available). 12 application . . . of Younger abstention w[ould be] clearly … Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), and is well-established by long-standing Supreme Court precedent. See Meyer v.

News America Marketing In-store Services, LLC v. Floorgraphics, Inc.

576 F. App'x 111 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 13, 2014

When FGI entered into the Release, FGI clearly knew of Henderson’s testimony and contemplated that it was not truthful. FGI believed that Henderson was the NAM hacker. … Even if we were to follow Acton , however, it would not establish our appellate jurisdiction over the cross-appeal.

Andrea Patricia Duvall, (Nee Andrea Patricia Phillips) v. Attorney General of the United States

436 F.3d 382 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 7, 2006

To apply the doctrine in a case such as this, where a clearly deportable alien continues to commit criminal acts after initial proceedings are terminated, would frustrate this statutory purpose. … This prospective immunization against removal is plainly contrary to congressional intent.

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re R.M.L. Inc.)

92 F.3d 139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 1, 1996

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Committee has established that Mellon failed to confer reasonably equivalent value.... ” Id. at 469 . c. … We also acknowledge that whether a contemplated investment provided a significant “chance” to receive value more often than not will be bound up in the bankruptcy court’s factual determinations and, thus, largely immune from

Roger Dale Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., Defendant/third-Party and Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Alvarez-Donnaway-Passons, Inc., Third-Party and National Union Fire Insurance Co., Third-Party

791 F.2d 411 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 28, 1986

This finding of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). … Upon a review of the entire record, we cannot conclude that the district court's finding that Smith was a seaman is clearly erroneous. 15 The test for seaman status under the Jones Act is well-established in this Circuit.

United States v. Navarro

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2007

Stat. § 3502(a) (requiring proof of entry in a building, but not possession of a firearm, to establish burglary), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(I) (requiring proof of possession of a firearm, but not entry into a building, to establish … The standard is clearly met when the defendant trades a firearm for drugs, the Court concluded, because without the firearm “the deal would not [be] possible.” Id.; see also United States v.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Douglas

812 F.2d 822 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 19, 1987

Defendant removed the case to the federal district court, which concluded after the jury returned a guilty verdict that the defendant had a valid immunity defense. … Whether the sentence under § 559.225 is imposed consecutively or concurrently, it is clearly “over and above” that imposed for the basic felony.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Vidal Galdon Aquino, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ishmael Guillerma Reyes

378 F.2d 540 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 19, 1967

414 In determining whether unavailability was shown, it is necessary to consider closely the nature of the doctrine, repeated in innumerable cases, that the absence of the witness from the jurisdiction and his consequent immunity … In these circumstances it cannot be said that the prosecution satisfactorily established the burden which rested on it to show that she was unavailable at the time of trial.

Henry Saludes v. Evelyn Ramos, M.D., and Government of the Virgin Islands. Appeal of Government of the Virgin Islands

744 F.2d 992 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 28, 1984

Section 3408 of the Act conditionally waives the Government’s immunity from tort liability and states that the Government “consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions … The affidavit must establish that the claimant had a “reasonable excuse” for failing to comply, and that the Government had “actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim” within the original ninety day time period