Case law

Dats v. Attorney General

362 F. App'x 322 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 28, 2010

The BIA further concluded that the materials proffered were “not sufficiently relevant to hardship to the qualifying relative to warrant reopening” for reconsideration of cancellation of removal. Id. … The BIA clearly *326 took into account the evidence Petitioners sought to introduce. A.R. 166-67. .

United States v. Hon. Judge Almeric L. Christian

660 F.2d 892 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 1981

Nor is it clearly implied by necessity from the Fifth Amendment’s command, for it was settled at the time our nation began acquiring territories that, at least with respect to prosecutions under local law, specific protections … The court shall direct that a sufficient number of legally qualified persons be summoned to meet this requirement.

Dats v. Attorney General

362 F. App'x 322 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 28, 2010

The BIA further concluded that the materials proffered were “not sufficiently relevant to hardship to the qualifying relative to warrant reopening” for reconsideration of cancellation of removal. Id. … The BIA clearly *326 took into account the evidence Petitioners sought to introduce. A.R. 166-67. .

In Re Grand Jury Investigation. Appeal of David Oreski

865 F.2d 578 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 9, 1989

Subsequently, the district court granted Oreski immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 and directed that he be returned to the grand jury to give testimony. … The amendment was designed to close a loophole in the general federal escape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751 (1988), which establishes criminal liability for persons who escape from custody that is imposed ‘Try virtue of an arrest

United States v. Henry Helstoski. Henry Helstoski v. United States of America, Honorable H. Curtis Meanor, United States District Judge, Nominal

576 F.2d 511 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 1978

Moreover, the requisite number of duly qualified grand jurors had returned the bill. Accordingly, the writ was denied. … As established in Costello v.

United States v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co.

459 F.2d 771 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 2, 1972

Clearly, however, this theory runs counter to that advanced by Attorney Kline: We had many, many conferences, lot of time spent, as I say, in perpetuating this fund, not only in effectuating it, but in protecting it, and … In the district court proceeding which determined the priority of liens, the court found that although the fee did not qualify as a bona fide lien under state law, the attorney was entitled to a fee approximating that set

Francis C. O'Neill and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States v. Ambrose-Augusterfer Corporation. Francis C. O'Neill and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States v. Ambrose-Augusterfer Corporation

450 F.2d 1012 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 22, 1971

We do not find the district court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. … That he may no longer be immune to law suits even though he participates in and contributes to the compensation program would be a consideration of great weight to an employer.

Smith Trucking, Incorporated v. Cotton Belt Insurance Co., Inc., Defendant-Third-Party v. Tate Insurance Agency, Inc., and John G. Effler, Third-Party

556 F.2d 1297 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 5, 1977

Applying the clearly erroneous standard, McAllister v. … into effect prior to the accident then the trailer in question is clearly covered by the written policy.

Bradley v. Attorney General of the United States

603 F.3d 235 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 22, 2010

We are further persuaded that § 1187(b)(2) is not jurisdiction-stripping because it does not clearly and explicitly deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. See Calcano-Martinez v. … Nevertheless, Bradley’s declaration establishes that, after his arrival, he signed a form, presented that form to a customs officer, and was admitted into the United States.

State Auto Insurance v. Summy

234 F.3d 131 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 30, 2001

Clearly, the case at hand falls outside the area outlined by Brillhart and Wilton as appropriate for the District Court to exercise its jurisdiction. … When the state law is firmly established, there would seem to be even less reason for the parties to resort to the federal courts.

Doe v. Attorney General of the United States

659 F.3d 266 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2011

Subsection (c)(2)(A) provides that an applicant must establish, “clearly and beyond doubt,” that he is entitled to admission, but this does not apply to the predicate question of whether the alien is an applicant. … Because Rodov’s offense (aiding and abetting wire fraud) clearly “involves fraud or deceit,” it qualifies as an “aggravated felony” if “the *275 loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(M)(i

EP MedSystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc.

235 F.3d 865 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 26, 2000

Indeed, the qualifying language accompanied the representation and we see no reason why the “bespeaks caution” doctrine would be inapplicable. … We noted that a per se rule would immunize companies from "the need to speak truthfully about the future.”

Adapt of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

433 F.3d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 9, 2006

The District Court, refusing to read a wheelchair or similar requirement into the Agreement and declining to establish a rigid hierarchy among eligible disabled persons, concluded that PHA, in placing the individuals in question … Conceptually speaking, Lazy Oil construed the Cape May Greene rule as broader than the limitations established by FirsTier , thus encompassing more situations than those strictly controlled by FRAP 4(a)(2).

Frederick F. KELLER, Appellant, v. ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE, INC.

130 F.3d 1101 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 24, 1997

First, Keller clearly established that he was quali- *1122 fled for the position of Chief Operating Officer. … In light of this evidence, a factfinder could conclude that Credit Alliance’s claim that Keller was not qualified is pretextual.

Wagner v. Fair Acres

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 15, 1995

professionals, and medical treatment decisions are generally immune from scrutiny under section 504. … Wagner failed to establish a case for relief under section 504.

United States v. Davies

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 13, 2005

This view is clearly sound. In Massaro v. … Thereafter, it determined that the evidence as a whole established Davies’s guilt.

Edward Johnson v. Sword Line, Inc., a New York Corporation

257 F.2d 541 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 13, 1958

In concluding that the shipowner’s right to recovery arose under a right of indemnification, implied contractually, the Court necessarily held that the doctrine of the employer’s statutory defense of immunity 7 for liability … that it can be gathered from the deposition and from the record that Johnson was injured while he was in the hold of the vessel and may or may not have been in a position to see what events had happened or to give properly qualified

Government of the Virgin Islands Ex Rel. Lillian Bodin v. Dennis Neville Ansel Brathwaite

459 F.2d 543 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 5, 1972

Bradshaw, 6 V.I. 386, 390 (1968), the Municipal Court concluded in dictum that "actual presence in an established home, whether for a definite or indefinite period of time, [was] sufficient." … This was not sufficient to qualify Mrs.

Doe v. C A R S Protection

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 30, 2008

The plaintiff must be qualified for her job and she must have suffered an adverse employment decision. … Conclusion Doe has established a prima facie case.

In Re: Commonwealth's Motion v.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 12, 2015

established Federal law.” … implement a new constitutional rule announced by the United States Supreme Court.13 Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that the state court, ethics board, or other appropriate entity can make and enforce clearly-established