Case law

In Re Grand Jury Matter, Antoni Gronowicz

764 F.2d 983 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 24, 1985

The grand jury’s interest in investigating and accusing clearly stands on no higher plane than a defendant’s right to compulsory process. … The government has not made a showing of need that would overcome appellant’s qualified privilege to resist disclosure of documents compiled in the preparation of God’s Broker.

D.K. Ex Rel. Stephen K. v. Abington School District

696 F.3d 233 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 11, 2012

Such an exception would swallow the rule established by the limitation period.”). This cannot be the intent of the regulation. … misrepresentation of D.K.’s problems and progress or the withholding of information expressly required by the IDEA statutes and regulations to be disclosed to parents, we hold that neither the District Court nor the state agency clearly

Baez v. Stine

260 F. App'x 494 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 15, 2008

They argued that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the FPC Duluth defendants, that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they were not deliberately indifferent to Baez’s medical needs, and … that the claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity.

United States v. David MacKins

218 F.3d 263 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 12, 2000

That issue, simply *265 stated, is this: does a prior sentence imposed as the result of an Alford plea qualify as a “prior sentence” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(l) for purposes of computing a defendant’s criminal history category … The Court was clearly concerned with the apparent conflict in accepting Alford’s plea of guilty coupled with his assertion of innocence.

United States v. William P. Catena, M.D.

500 F.2d 1319 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 22, 1974

The objectionable but superfluous language italicized above was qualified by the following instruction: It is fraudulent if it is made or caused to be made with the intent to deceive the Government agency to which it is submitted … This relationship was clearly shown by the reimbursement contracts between the carriers and the Government.

Chadwick v. Court of Common Pleas

244 F. App'x 451 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 15, 2007

release him, that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under § 1983 for the claims against defendants Nardolillo and Sexton, and that these defendants are, in any event, entitled to qualified … immunity.

United States v. Capital Blue Cross

992 F.2d 1270 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 16, 1993

Article III of the 65-Special policies excludes from coverage “[a]ny treatment, service or supply which would not or does not qualify for benefits under Medicare.” … Such coverage, as Blue Cross concedes, is clearly “more than just supplementary to Medicare.” Blue Cross Reply Brief at 6.

United States v. Albert Tupone

442 F.3d 145 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 28, 2006

Paragraph 6 of the indictment indicated that Form 1032 “was used to determine whether the claimant qualified for continued benefits and to determine whether an adjustment for continued benefits was warranted.” … Factual findings will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir.2004); United States v. Napier, 273 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir.2001). *150 III.

Haddigan v. Harkins

441 F.2d 844 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 23, 1970

As one might expect, the attorney for plaintiff was considerably more enthusiastic in establishing the extent and valué of the lost services than in establishing tKe. cost of maintenance of decedent. … This rule of damages might have been stated somewhat more clearly, and might more clearly have been related to the survival action rather than the wrongful death action. See Wiest v.

Saunders-El v. United States

144 F. App'x 273 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2005

It is well established that “judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). … Here, the record indicates that the acts complained of– denying habeas relief, dismissing numerous complaints, and ruling on motions– were clearly all performed in the judges’ official capacity.

Renchenski v. Williams

622 F.3d 315 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 4, 2010

The SOTP is run by qualified professionals. … immunity or the appropriateness of monetary damages.

United States v. Jeffrey Lynn Robinson

485 F.2d 1157 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 26, 1973

The indictment clearly specified a continuing duty. … “The first change insures that a registrant who prolongs the litigation of his draft classification beyond the age of 26 would nontheless remain liable for induction if he is later found qualified for induction.

Edil Galeas Figueroa v. Attorney General United States

998 F.3d 77 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 19, 2021

past persecution and thus did not qualify for that presumption. … To qualify for mandatory CAT withholding, an alien must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2020).

Bell, Warner v. United States of America, Department of Labor, the Travelers Insurance Company, Wistar Institute, Callahan, John J. Jr., Bell, Warner, Cross-Appellee v. United States of America, Department of Labor, the Travelers Insurance Company, Wistar Institute, Callahan, John J. Jr. Appeal of the Travelers Insurance Company, Cross-Appellant

754 F.2d 490 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 1, 1985

In arguing for its interpretation, Travelers apparently ignored the import of section 103's qualifying language "of a kind." … As such, a truck clearly comes under the Code's definition of "vehicle."

International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports And Exposition Authority

691 F.2d 155 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 16, 1982

The Authority is established in the Department of Community Affairs, id., and the Governor may veto any action that it takes. … Conrad is clearly distinguishable from this case.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board

131 F.3d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 1997

Clearly, a business is an established property right entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. … In the present case, at least assuming that CSB can establish the elements of its case, the first three requirements of the Parden doctrine clearly have been or will be met.

Basista v. Weir

340 F.2d 74 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 8, 1965

It was not established to whom he made these requests. At any rate Scalese went about his duties and Smith returned to patrol. … Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 , 47 S.Ct. 446 , 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927), the plaintiff, a Negro, a qualified voter, was denied the right to vote at a state primary election. He sued, laying the damages at $5,000.

Brown v. Comm PA Emergency

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 8, 2002

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health was also sued, but that claim was dismissed because it was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Brown v. … Even if we accept everything Appellants allege as true, they will have still failed to establish that the City’s policies caused constitutional harm.

Jeffrey Dock v. Ruth Rush

432 F. App'x 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 22, 2011

Here, the Appellants have sued Snyder County, Pennsylvania, which is clearly a “local agency” under the Act and is, therefore, immune from suit. … Moreover, the individual Appellees are also immune from suit under the Act.

The Mary F. Barrett

279 F. 329 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 24, 1922

the suit was one brought by the libel-ant for general average contribution. [2] Now, of the right of the. lost cargo owner to maintain such an action against the saved ship and the saved cargo there can be no doubt, for clearly … Indeed, to thus hold the seaworthy ship liable for the master’s negligence, it seems to us is to shear every vestige of immunity granted by the Harter Act to the shipowner, who has furnished a seaworthy vessel, and it can