Case law

Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. Hon. Hazel O'leary, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of Energy

93 F.3d 103 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 20, 1996

We therefore turn to the legislative history and purpose of the statute to determine whether they clearly reveal a contrary intent. … States have the duty to provide for disposal of all waste indefinitely, but they are judged based on their success during this clearly defined time period.

Sullivan v. Barnett

139 F.3d 158 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 13, 1998

Clearly, however, the statutory provision permitting the termination of benefits in Barnes and the supersedeas provisions at issue here vary significantly. … Safety, 131 F.3d 1415 , 1419 (10th Cir.1997) (raising Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity sua sponte ); Suarez Corp. Indus. v.

Mollo v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners

406 F. App'x 664 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 20, 2011

. § 1291.2 2 We note, as a preliminary matter, that PVSC raised a defense of qualified immunity before the District Court. … A prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires showing that a person acting would have been entitled to qualified immunity.” App. at 25 n.9.

Alkon v. United States

43 V.I. 325 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 4, 2000

reflecting the Congressional intent when a defined term is used even in subsequent legislation, it is not controlling where consideration of the term’s immediate context and its place in the overall Congressional scheme clearly … The United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity for interest for purposes of the FTC A is set forth at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 and is subject to strict construction. See, e.g., Andrulonis v.

Sinaloa Lake Owners Association v. City of Simi Valley, James Doody, Defendants-Cross-Defendants/appellees. v. Donald G. Tudor Jennie P. Tudor, Third-Party-Defendants/appellees, County of Ventura, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff/cross-Claimant

882 F.2d 1398 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 9, 1989

To establish a violation of substantive due process, the plaintiffs must prove that the government's action was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or … The question of immunity, in turn, hinged on the warden's knowledge that the searches violated the Constitution. Digital rectal searches are clearly justified under certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.

Melendez- Spencer v. Gloria Shack

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 27, 2018

Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d employees were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim, we held, because there was “no consensus of authority”—i.e., no clearly established law—that temporarily removing a child, after the … Because the employees in Mammaro challenged on interlocutory appeal only the district court’s qualified immunity determination, we had no occasion there to review its absolute immunity determination and the applicability

United States v. Criden

633 F.2d 346 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 19, 1981

Recognition of the newsgatherers' privilege surely does not carry with it the notion that reporters are immune from giving non-privileged evidence, or that, unlike all other witnesses, reporters need answer only those questions … Defendants quite clearly have no other source from which they can acquire this insight. 68 The final criterion under Riley, relevance and importance to the particular proceeding, follows from the preceding discussion.

Weir v. Fada

123 F.3d 281 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 25, 1997

Schlumberger Tech., Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir.1991) ("Federal courts have established no hard and fast rule that an individual must suffer a period of unemployment to qualify for severance benefits under ERISA. … Under the second definition, the FDIC is clearly a Successor to FADA; upon passage of FIRREA, the FDIC had authority to appoint all of FADA's directors.

Leheny v. City Of Pittsburgh

183 F.3d 220 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 7, 1999

This presumption remains intact until the employee presents evidence to establish that the resignation or retirement was involuntarily procured. Id. … The arbitration award clearly states that every police officer who has attained 50 years of age and 25 years of service is entitled to receive a 75% pension upon retirement from the police force.

In Re Wm. Akers, Jr., Co.

121 F.2d 846 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1941

Clearly the line here runs between tax and regulatory expropriation. As the Supreme Court has now spoken any extended discussion would be presumptuous. … The question was the familiar one of the "immunity of instrumentalities." [24] Before that question is even reached, a tax has to be found.

James F. Pastore v. Taiyo Gyogyo, K.K. v. Lavino Shipping Co. And City of Philadelphia

571 F.2d 777 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1978

The precise way in which the plaintiff fell was, perhaps, not clearly foreseeable. … We agree with the district court that in this context there appears to be no basis for distinguishing between an employer’s federal and state statutory immunity from suit.

United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less

576 F.2d 983 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 27, 1978

Their holding extends the Ratay/Pritchard/McNello rule far beyond its limited scope of requiring reversal when a court fails to charge according to clearly established principles of law. … The italicized language is clearly inconsistent with the language of 564.54 Acres I quoted above.

Kobell ex rel. National Labor Relations Board v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 23

788 F.2d 189 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 16, 1986

Ill We cannot say that the factual findings of the district court are clearly erroneous. … However, appellant expressly disavows any argument that the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Appellant’s Reply Brief p. 18. .

Keystone Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

181 F.2d 402 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 1950

On'the other hand, a group of people with a common object may, quite clearly, not constitute a club. … Automobile clubs were granted tax immunity by O.D. 643, 3 Cum.Bull. 241 (1920). That ruling was followed by G.C.M. 2867, VII-1 Cum.Bull. 115 (1928); G.C.M. 3555, VII-1 Cum.Bull. 117 (1928).

Mary Smakula v. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education & Welfare

572 F.2d 127 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 1, 1978

The regulations thus clearly contemplate that lay evidence of a miner’s chronic respiratory impairment may support a presumption that he suffered from pneumoconiosis prior to his death. … Smaku-la most probably would have qualified, on the present record, as totally disabled due to pneu-moconiosis.

United States v. Dante Dixon

308 F.3d 229 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 9, 2002

Based on these misunderstandings, the plea agreement clearly stated that Dixon faced a total maximum sentence of 20 years on each count, for a total of 40 years. … However, Dixon never clearly and unmistakably asserted that had he been correctly informed of the sentence he faced, he would, in fact, have pled not guilty and gone to trial.

Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc.

848 F.2d 424 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 3, 1988

The district court then established timetables for motions and responses, and stayed discovery until it decided the issue of its jurisdiction. … Because no claim can be maintained under section 1986 unless a cause of action has been established under section 1985, see Rogin v.

Powell v. Ridge

247 F.3d 520 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 6, 2001

In my view, Larsen establishes our jurisdiction here to review the merits of the claimed immunity. … Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 529- 30 (1985) (same with respect to qualified executive immunity).

Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of Readington

555 F.3d 131 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 4, 2009

After all, the developer “would still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and carry through with construction.” Id. … The developer still would have needed “to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and carry through with construction.” Id. at 261 , 97 S.Ct. 555 .

Brayan Guzman Orellana v. Attorney General United States

956 F.3d 171 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 2020

rises to the level of persecution; whether Guzman’s imputed membership in that group is a central reason for his persecution; whether the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control MS-13; and whether it is clearly … , the IJ must ask (1) how public officials will likely act in response to the harm the petitioner fears and (2) whether the likely response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence.38 Whereas the first part of both