Case law

Purnell, Odessa, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Wise, Larry McKinley Deceased v. Norned Shipping B v. And Chesapeake Trading Corporation v. Wilmington Stevedores and City of Wilmington, (Third Party Defendants). Appeal of Wilmington Stevedores, Inc. Purnell, Odessa, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Wise, Larry McKinley Deceased v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc. Chesapeake Trading Corporation v. City of Wilmington and Norned Shipping B v. (Third-Party Defendants). Appeal of Wilmington Stevedores, Inc. Gist, Brenda, as the Administratrix of the Estate of William Martin Gist, Deceased v. Norned Shipping B v. V. Wilmington Stevedores and City of Wilmington. Appeal of Wilmington Stevedores, Inc. Gist, Brenda, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Gist, William Martin, Deceased v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc. v. City of Wilmington and Norned Shipping B v. And Chesapeake Trading Corporation. Appeal of Wilmington Stevedores, Inc

801 F.2d 152 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 31, 1986

The City correctly points out, however, that there is an exception to this rule where one tortfeasor is immune from liability to the injured party. … In such a situation, the immune tortfeasor cannot be made to pay for the plaintiffs' injuries indirectly through contribution.

United States v. Edward Howard Palmer Actual the Honorable Paul A. Simmons, Nominal

871 F.2d 1202 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 28, 1989

Rather, it is a well-established principle that where a federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, it is to be given its common law meaning, not its state law meaning … Accordingly, the district court clearly erred *1209 by not sentencing him in accordance with its provisions.

Hessein v. American Board of Anesthesiology Inc.

628 F. App'x 116 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 7, 2015

The court reasoned that the physician-plaintiffs did not seek to eliminate the residency training requirement; rather, they sought to restore the practice track as an alternative to residency training so that they could qualify … accepted on his behalf, informing him that because his medical licenses had been suspended, it was initiating proceedings against him to revoke his Board certifications. 4 That the Board has the authority, pursuant to its clearly

Berne v. Continental Insurance

753 F.2d 27 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 1985

Thus the trial court’s finding that the discharge of the pistol did not arise out of operations necessary or incidental to the business of Berne’s Ice Company, Inc. is not clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). … Since the court’s findings of fact establish that the Continental policy does not apply, the declaratory judgment in favor of Continental will be affirmed.

Milton Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc.

550 F.2d 142 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 31, 1977

The sovereign immunity doctrine has no place in this case and the Ryan doctrine was explicitly abrogated by the Congress in enacting P.L. 92-576. See pages 148, 149 above. . … “A rule capable of producing such a result is clearly unacceptable, particularly since its legal underpinnings are just as unsound as its practical result.” 2A A.

Dashawn Burton v. Jeffery Kindle

401 F. App'x 635 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 10, 2010

A § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of must be “committed by a person acting under color of state law”; and (2) this conduct must “deprive[] a person of rights, privileges, or immunities … While a private party can qualify as a state actor when there “is a sufficiently close nexus” between the state and the private party’s conduct, id., Burton has alleged no such connection here.

Katherine L. Taylor v. Phoenixville School District

184 F.3d 296 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 18, 1999

Rieger, agreed that during Taylor’s hospitalization, she “clearly had *303 paranoid delusions” and was hyperactive and psychotic. … Although Taylor clearly was disabled at the time she was hospitalized, she need not prove that she continued to experience symptoms of that magnitude: paranoia and distorted mood can have a “substantial” or “considerable”

Armen De Filippo and Sheldon Fleishman T/a a & S, a Partnership v. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation, in No. 74-1877. Armen De Filippo and Sheldon Fleishman T/a a & S, a Partnership, Inno. 73-1878 v. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation

516 F.2d 1313 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 8, 1975

The first interrogatory was clearly limited to the element of agreement; the jury found only a "contract, combination, or conspiracy entered into between Ford and the Philadelphia area Ford dealers." … The agreement of sale and purchase could cover physical, movable assets, thus qualifying as "goods", as well as other assets such as receivables from their particular lines not so qualifying.

Paul Miller v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Company and Resorts International Hotel

475 F.3d 516 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 29, 2007

The policy establishes that the insured must be totally disabled for six months before benefits are payable. Since Miller was disabled on October 6, 1986, Fortis would first become liable in March or April 1987. … Regarding the first requirement, an underpayment can qualify as a repudiation because a plan’s determination that a beneficiary receive less than his full entitlement is effectively a partial denial of benefits.

United States v. Robert McQuilkin

97 F.3d 723 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 15, 1996

On appeal, McQuilkin contends he did not qualify as a “career offender.” … Construction of the guidelines is subject to plenary review, while factual determinations underlying guideline application are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v.

Tang Jiang Wang v. Attorney General of the United States

189 F. App'x 67 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 2006

The BIA found that: (1) the IJ did not clearly err in his adverse credibility determination; (2) even if Wang were deemed credible, he did not establish eligibility for asylum, because he showed neither past persecution nor … “An alien who fails to establish that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, so as to be eligible for a grant of asylum, necessarily will fail to establish the right to withholding of removal.” Id.

Jody Lutter v. Jneso

86 F.4th 111 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 6, 2023

Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).5 They require genuine upheld due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. … Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”

Pascucci v. Township of Irvington

46 F. App'x 114 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 25, 2002

The District Court concluded that Pascucci had not proven that the defendants’ "’conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.’" App. at 43 (quoting Sherwood v. … Venturi and Palamara’s discretionary exercises of authority, not in violation of any clearly established statutory or constitutional right, are entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court was correct to grant summary

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Intervenors

703 F.2d 700 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 27, 1983

We hold that on this record the agency has failed utterly to establish substantial justification. … NRDC is clearly a “prevailing party.” The court awarded NRDC all the relief that it requested. NRDC v.

In Re: IT Grp Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 25, 2006

Participants claimed that the Plan did not qualify for “unfunded,” “top hat” status under ERISA, and was thus subject to ERISA’s funding and fiduciary duty requirements. … As discussed above, the terms of the Plan and Trust documents clearly and unambiguously evince the Corporation’s intent to create an unfunded top hat plan.

Banks v. Horn

271 F.3d 527 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 31, 2001

We are being asked to determine whether that application of Mills was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. … to clearly established federal law.

Mintzer v. Arthur Wright & Co.

263 F.2d 823 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 17, 1959

The appointment of a receiver was never subject to jury trial, it being an equitable remedy within the discretion of the chancellor to grant upon a showing that the harm accruing to plaintiff by denial clearly overbalanced … We see no bar to the appointment of a receiver if the law of Pennsylvania would grant the appointment. 7 We turn then in this diversity suit to an examination of the law of Pennsylvania in order to ascertain whether the qualified

Gardner v. The Calvert

253 F.2d 395 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 7, 1958

On the other hand, they can maintain complete immunity from all obligation, even though they have expressed agreement orally or informally upon every detail of a complex transaction. … It is settled that in establishing loss of future profits it is only the fact that some loss has resulted from the defendant’s breach of contract which must be proved with certainty.

John DuPree, Sr. v. First Medical Services

646 F. App'x 166 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 14, 2016

The chances of contracting cellulitis are increased by a weakened immune system, a history of cellulitis and exposure to bacteria including staphylococcus and streptococcus, which is often found in prison … Ctr., Inc., 897 A.2d 753, 755 (Del. 2006) (“In Delaware, medical negligence complaints generally must be accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit signed by a qualified expert witness.”).

Delaware Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Control v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

685 F.3d 259 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 3, 2012

The deepening project unquestionably qualifies, as Congress clearly authorized it in the Water Resources Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. … Finally, the canon that “[w]aivers of immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,” see U.S. Dep’t of Energy v.