Case law

William T. Turner v. Schering-Plough Corporation

901 F.2d 335 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 23, 1990

However, it was appealed to the district court, which concluded that the magistrate’s determination that the discovery period should not be reopened was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. … We do not rule out the possibility that an employee with a vested pension can establish a prima facie case by showing a pension reduction of such size that it might reasonably be considered to have motivated the discharge

Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Graves

25 F.2d 705 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 3, 1928

Did the evidence show these necessary facts so clearly as to leave no question for the jury? … He affirmed that point, with the following qualification: “We affirm that, and qualify it by stating that here, where the defense sets up suicide — if" the defense establishes suicide — proves suicide by the fair weight or

United States v. Gutierrez

41 F. App'x 563 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 26, 2002

Perjurious testimony qualifies a defendant for the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. … The evidence in this case was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Woods

915 F.2d 854 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 1, 1990

Clearly, the appellants should have recognized that it was. Woods’ conduct readily satisfies the relatedness plus continuity test of H.J. Inc. … We have carefully examined these contentions under the appropriate standards of review and have concluded they are clearly without merit. IV.

United States v. Charles Navarro

476 F.3d 188 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2007

establish unlawful possession of a stolen firearm). … The standard is clearly met when the defendant trades a firearm for drugs, the Court concluded, because without the firearm “the deal would not [be] possible.” Id.; see also United States v.

Rosetti v. Shalala

12 F.3d 1216 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 9, 1994

If the claimant cannot qualify under the listings, the analysis proceeds to the fourth and fifth steps. … Davis clearly and repeatedly states our conclusion that the plaintiff there lacked standing to bring her suit and that consequently, we had no need to reach the question of mootness.

United Steelworkers of America v. Crane Company and Its Subsidiary, Acheson Manufacturing Company

605 F.2d 714 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 1979

That instrument only confirms the eligibility established by section 18(B)(4)(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. … It clearly and unmistakably must be established before it can be relied upon as a bar to recovery. Radio Television Technical School v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 457 , 461 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis supplied and citation omitted).

United States Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

644 F.2d 286 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 19, 1981

If it appears that they would not be kept on as employees if they failed to qualify in the managerial jobs to which they are assigned, the factor is met. Third, there must be a planned management trainee program. … The ALJ’s opinion 10 in that case clearly stated that all four factors discussed above were to be analyzed in evaluating the interests of managerial and supervisory trainees.

Parastoo Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

12 F.3d 1233 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 20, 1993

The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. … in order to qualify for withholding of deportation or asylum based on membership in such a group.

Nina Shahin v. State of Delaware

531 F. App'x 200 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 22, 2013

The District Court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the State was immune from suit under the ADEA, that Shahin had not established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, and that the record … To establish a prima facie case, Shahin needed to show that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action was

In re United States

367 F.2d 505 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 12, 1966

The United States is suable here because Congress has waived sovereign immunity from liability for damage “caused by a public vessel of the United States”. 46 U.S.C. § 781 . … The short answer is that the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that the Jones Act remedy is exclusive and, when applicable, bars relief against the same defendant under a state wrongful death statute. Gillespie v.

Benjamin Blackburn v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Patricia Knowles

179 F.3d 81 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 7, 1999

and UPS’s failure to act on them, they are clearly irrelevant to the pretext issue. 4. … This clearly fails to meet the standards we have outlined for reputation evidence uri-der Rule 803(19).

United States v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation

305 F.2d 121 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 29, 1962

Plaintiff offered evidence sufficient to establish the full amount of its claim and thereupon rested its case. Defendants produced no evidence. … The reports qualify as business records within the meaning of the Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 , and the testimony of the witness was clearly sufficient to establish their authenticity. United States v.

Wilson v. Asten-Hill Manufacturing Co.

791 F.2d 30 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 21, 1986

In return for these guaranteed payments, the employer was given immunity from common law suits by employees. 77 Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 481(a), 1403. … Clearly, these allegations should properly be aligned with those presented to our Supreme Court in Evans, supra. No allegation is made that Kelsey-Hayes intended to injure Higgins.

Drake v. Filko

724 F.3d 426 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 31, 2013

III Pursuant to the first prong of the test we established in United States v. … Accordingly, unless history and tradition speak clearly, we should hesitate to recognize new exceptions.

Lifewatch Services Inc v. Highmark Inc

902 F.3d 323 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 28, 2018

As we and other courts have observed, “[c]oncerted action is established . . . … As Blue Cross acknowledged at oral argument, a defendant bears the burden of establishing its immunity under that Act. See Doctors, Inc. v.

Cronin v. CitiFinancial Services, Inc.

352 F. App'x 630 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2009

See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (stating that “the appellate proceedings clearly manifest an intent to appeal”). The issue has now been fully briefed by both parties on appeal. … The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 , et seq., establishes “a strong federal policy in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration.” Alexander v.

Bonita Perry v. Commonwealth of PA

328 F. App'x 785 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 11, 2009

Supreme Court had granted certiorari on the immunity question, and she stated clearly that she wished to pursue only her state law claims in state court. … This is a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, and we are in accordance with the District Court that it is one that fails to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

Beatrice Mulanga v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States of America

349 F.3d 123 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 14, 2003

In order to qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show a “clear probability” that his or her life or freedom would be threatened if s/he is deported. Lin v. … In fact, other than the evidence of general country conditions, which clearly documented numerous acts of political repression, Mrs. Mulanga was in no position to document her story.

Vincent Fischetti v. Philip Johnson Gerald J. Pappert.

384 F.3d 140 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 22, 2004

We also conclude, however, that the trial court’s decision did not violate clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court and did not unreasonably apply that law. … Instead, Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing § 2254(d)(1) has established that determining the “clearly established” benchmark should be done on a case-specific level.