Case law

Lavino Shipping Co. v. S. C. Loveland Co.

114 F.2d 964 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 24, 1940

To controvert the testimony offered by Loveland, Lavino produced one witness (Schaumburg), who qualified as an expert. Schaumburg, also, was *967 interested. … It was, therefore, not error for the trial court to reject Schaumburg’s testimony that the lighter was unseaworthy; and, without that testimony, her seaworthiness was clearly established.

20 Employee Benefits Cas. 1914, Pens. Plan Guide P 23,928 Donald R. Kurz William Anderson James E.W. Beck William T. Bergen Charles W. Bowden William H. Brown Richard Cahill Armando L. Capoferri Robert C. Demarco James J. Dilolle, Sr. Vincent J. Dimaggio John J. Divalentino, Jr. William E. Drumel Victor J. Gibialante Francis T. Golden James J. Granger Elmer D. Greim, Jr. James H. Hair John M. Hoopes Benjamin J. Kilian George C. Linthicum Hubert A. McKown Jr. Henry P. McNamee Oliver K. Messner Robert E. Miller John A. Morse Samuel J. Mullen John A. Munley Stanley B. Myers John J. Nusspickel James W. Patterson Alfred B. Schumann Joseph C. Sharkey William H. Smoyer Woodrow E. Snyder James D. Sutliff Edward J. Vetner Dominic C. Viglianese G. Earle Watt Frederick W. Winterling John R. Young v. Philadelphia Electric Company Service Annuity Plan of Philadelphia Electric Company Charles L. Fritz J.L. Everett, Iii, John H. Austin, Jr., John J. Divalentino, Jr., William E. Drumel John A. Morse Samuel J. Mullen Stanely B. Myers Dominic C. Viglianese James J. Dilolle Benjamin J. Kilian Charles W. Bowden Elmer D. Greim, Jr. Frederick W. Winterling James W. Beck James H. Hair Robert C. Demarco Alfred G. Schumann Richard Cahill James W. Patterson John M. Hoopes Hubert A. McKown Jr. Robert E. Miller James D. Sutliff Henry P. McNamee Francis T. Golden William T. Bergen George C. Linthicum William W. Anderson: John R. Young Vincent J. Dimaggio Shields L. Daltroff Richard O. Folkman Alfred E. Stavola Robert H.C. Less Samuel E. Bell Donald F. Washington Frank J. Gallagher Maurice M. Peitzman Harry G. Turner, Jr. Robert I. Friend Donald C. Robinson William J. Leaman, Jr. Augustus W. O'Malley Dallas S. Scott, Jr. John S. Stillwagon Robert C. Heckesser William R. Travetti William B. Horlock James States Thomas W. Rayer John H. Vonrhine Walter Allwoerden George C. Wiedersum, Jr. James R. McCarron Salvator J. Destefano John C. Garvin A. William Lancaster Joseph A. Focht Robert Mitchell Joseph P. Subranni John F. Crawford William G. Taylor Kenneth R. Sedgley, Jr., Irwin G. Blackburn Charles R. Carey John R. Young Jessee E. Gray, Jr. James D. Derstine Allen H. Braid Paul L. Thomas Stephen Micklosh, Jr. William L. Gibbons Russell B. Murray Roland J. Markun Ernest W. Beam Raymond W. Scholl, Jr. John F. Parker Joseph F. McBride Vincent S. Boyer Martin M. Morgan and David Monzo, in 95-1795. Donald R. Kurz William Anderson James E.W. Beck William T. Bergen Charles W. Bowden William H. Brown Richard Cahill Armando L. Capoferri Robert C. Demarco James J. Dilolle, Sr. Vincent J. Dimaggio John J. Divalentino, Jr. William E. Drumel Victor J. Gibialante Francis T. Golden James J. Granger Elmer D. Greim, Jr. James H. Hair John M. Hoopes Benjamin J. Kilian George C. Linthicum Hubert A. McKown Jr. Henry P. McNamee Oliver K. Messner Robert E. Miller John A. Morse Samuel J. Mullen John A. Munley Stanley B. Myers John J. Nusspickel James W. Patterson Alfred B. Schumann Joseph C. Sharkey William H. Smoyer Woodrow E. Snyder James D. Sutliff Edward J. Vetner Dominic C. Viglianese G. Earle Watt Frederick W. Winterling John R. Young v. Philadelphia Electric Company Service Annuity Plan of Philadelphia Electric Company Charles L. Fritz J.L. Everett, III John H. Austin, Jr., Peco Energy Company, Formerly Known as Philadelphia Electric Company, Service Annuity Plan of Philadelphia Electric Company, Charles L. Fritz, J.L. Everett, III and John H. Austin, Jr., in 95-1796

96 F.3d 1544 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 1, 1996

Op. at 25 ("[t]he class action complaint clearly sounds in concealment"). … See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 235 . 47 We have never clearly defined "extraordinary circumstances," relying instead on case law to establish its parameters. Id.

Andrews v. Chemical Carriers, Inc.

457 F.2d 636 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1972

three mates (including the chief mate), there was evidence to support the district court’s finding that on the voyage into drydock in preparation for the annual inspection of the tanks by shipyard officials, it was the established … matter of law either (a) because Andrews could have avoided the overwork and resulting stress which caused his injuries by delegating supervision of the tank cleaning operations to one of the many others on board who were qualified

Abdullah Tanzil Hameen, A/K/A Cornelius Ferguson v. State of Delaware Cornelius E. Ferguson, Jr., A/K/A Abdullah Tanzil Hameen

212 F.3d 226 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 17, 2000

Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor amplified the meaning of AEDPA’s requirement that a state court decision be “contrary to,” or involve “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined … Thus, “a federal habeas court may., not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly

United States v. Diallo

575 F.3d 252 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 31, 2009

The evidence at trial established that Diallo had purchased the counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags in New York and was, when arrested, en route to Indianapolis to sell the handbags at his retail store. … One may also say: “The lieutenant governor enjoys qualified immunity.” These two sentences mean very different things.

Melissa Andrews, Administratrix of the Estate of Leo Andrews, Jr., Melissa Andrews, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward Andrews and Melissa Andrews in Her Own Right v. United States of America and Carl Andrews, Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Andrews. Walter J. Smith, Administrator of the Estate of David Alan Smith v. The United States of America. Carl Spiker, Administrator of the Estate of Carla Marie Spiker v. The United States of America and Carl Andrews, Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Andrews, Deceased. Appeal of Melissa Andrews, as Administratrix of the Estate of Leo Andrews and Edward Andrews, and in Her Own Right Carl Spiker, Administrator of the Estate of Carla Spiker and Walter Smith, Administrator of the Estate of David Smith. Carl Andrews, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Laverne Andrews, in No. 85-3698 v. United States of America. Lucille Karns, Personal Representative of the Estate of Nancy Karen McCleese A/K/A Nancy Karen McCleese Andrews, Deceased, in No. 85-3699 v. United States of America and Carl Andrews, Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Andrews, Deceased

801 F.2d 644 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 1986

II 7 The following facts were stipulated to by the parties or were found by the district court and are not clearly erroneous. … Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by not holding the United States negligent for its failure to establish and maintain a warning system at the dam sufficient to alert boaters who were unfamiliar with the river

James Pepper v. Attorney General Pennsylvania

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 13, 2024

immunity.” … To qualify for that exception, however, the official must have “some connection with the enforcement of the” allegedly unconstitutional “act.”

United States v. Frederick Urban

140 F.3d 229 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 20, 1998

Fred-man establishes that intent to use the components as a weapon is a required element when the components are commercial in nature and are not designed or redesigned for use as a weapon. In United States v. … Fred-man for the proposition that ”[f]or unassembled components to qualify as a ‘firearm’ there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the components were intended for use as a weapon.”

United States v. Huet

665 F.3d 588 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 5, 2012

Although the District Court did not explicitly designate the Second Amendment violation as an alternative basis for dismissal, it clearly viewed it as such. … Otherwise illegal conduct does not somehow become immunized because possession of a firearm is involved in the offense. See, e.g., United States v.

Teen-Ed, Inc., Trading as New Jersey Piano and Organ Co., in No. 79-1324 v. Kimball International, Inc., and Edward Cohen, Individually and Trading as the Piano Factory. Teen-Ed, Inc., Trading as New Jersey Piano and Organ Co. v. Kimball International, Inc., and Edward Cohen, Individually and Trading as the Piano Factory, Cross-Appellant

620 F.2d 399 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 23, 1980

Lost profits were to be established by testimony to the following calculations. … The essential difference, however, is that a qualified expert may answer hypothetical questions.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by William Sheppard, Insurance Commissioner v. National Association of Flood Insurers, an Unincorporated Association

520 F.2d 11 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 13, 1975

immunity. … If jurisdiction is not established under the Act through compliance with its requirements, jurisdiction cannot be established at all.

Erdman v. Nationwide Insurance

582 F.3d 500 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 23, 2009

Rather, she relies on the ADA’s association provision, which prohibits excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified … The statute clearly refers to adverse employment actions motivated by “the known disability of an individual” with whom an employee associates, as opposed to actions occasioned by the association.

Sathianathan v. Pacific Exchange, Inc.

248 F. App'x 345 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 14, 2007

We agree with the District Court that the plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants in this case. … (citation omitted)). 5  Appellant also suggests that the suspension of arbitration proceedings does not qualify for arbitral immunity because defendants made a system-wide

D'iorio v. County Of Delaware

592 F.2d 681 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 20, 1978

D'Iorio's discharge was found to be in violation of the procedures established by the Charter for termination of county employees. … Our independent review of the clarity of state law was evidenced by our holding: "Here we hold that the statute is not of an uncertain nature and, therefore, the case does not qualify for application of the abstention doctrine

Everett Melvin Roberts v. United States of America, and Union Carbide Corporation, Etc.

316 F.2d 489 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 18, 1963

Peskin was not qualified to testify because he has had no practical experience in the manufacture of abrasive wheels. “Defendant’s arguments are addressed to the wrong forum. … There was also sufficient evidence to establish actual or constructive knowledge of harm from the type of exposure to which plaintiff was sub *495 jected.

Showers v. Beard

635 F.3d 625 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 28, 2011

He therefore advised Rudinski to secure a qualified expert to address the impossibility of disguising Roxanol, and provided him with contact information for three potential witnesses. … Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court’s decision here is contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

New Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co.

277 F.2d 409 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 19, 1960

It is also hornbook law that findings of fact made by a trial court cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C. … a qualified expert, show that “Armorhide” was a new and useful product. 3 The judgment of the court below will be affirmed. 1 .

Dorothy Daniels v. Philadelphia School District

776 F.3d 181 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 20, 2015

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint about this incident did not qualify as protected activity. See id. at 270, 121 S.Ct. at 1509. … Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (termination of employment clearly suffices); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).

United States v. Anthony Stewart

452 F.3d 266 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 19, 2006

However, Becotte clearly expressed that Stewart’s medication regimen was crucial to his stability. … On appeal, Stewart argues that the District Court committed clear error because the evidence he presented at the hearing clearly and convincingly established that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily

George L. Reynolds v. Jack C. Ellingsworth, Warden and Charles M. Oberly, III

843 F.2d 712 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 24, 1988

Noia deliberate bypass test, 372 U.S. 391, 438 , 83 S.Ct. 822, 848 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), it did not immunize these requirements from scrutiny. … This witness, Detective Perry, had been qualified at the hearing as an expert on "body language."