Case law

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  • Bennun v. Rutgers State University

    941 F.2d 154 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 21, 1991

    He reasons that the district court finding that he was qualified for promotion in 1980-81, determined, a fortiori, that he was qualified in 1984-85 when the remanded evaluation of the 1980-81 promotion denial occurred. … We have, however, held that such a dispute will satisfy the earlier hurdle of establishing the qualifications of the professor, as long as the plaintiff demonstrates that “he was sufficiently qualified to be among those persons

    Abrogated on other grounds by St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)Cited 35 timesPublished
  • Stanton T. Story v. Warden Tom Kindt Attorney General Preate

    26 F.3d 402 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 27, 1994

    The Supreme Court “assume[d]” that the studies were “both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that ‘death qualification’ in fact produces juries somewhat more ‘conviction-prone’ than ‘non-death-qualified’ juries … Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 887-97 (3d Cir.1994) (collateral estoppel cannot be applied against a criminal defendant to establish an element of a crime). But see Adams v.

    Cited 64 timesPublished
  • TSG Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

    538 F.3d 264 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 8, 2008

    Under the CAA, the administrator of the EPA (“Administrator”) “shall promulgate regulations establishing emissions standards” for each category of sources of “hazardous air pollutants” (“HAP”). Id. § 7412(d)(1). … The EPA has not clearly erred in declining to construe the term “applied” so narrowly in this context.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner

    614 F.2d 860 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 28, 1980

    While the Schaffans urge that there was no continuity of business enterprise, the record establishes otherwise. … Here, again, the Tax Court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. III.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Roberts v. Fleet Bank

    342 F.3d 260 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 21, 2003

    On the back of the invitation Fleet listed the "TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED OFFER" and the "CONSUMER INFORMATION" sections. … and conspicuously. 28 With that background established, we agree with Roberts that the claims in the introductory letter that the "fixed 7.99% APR" 3 is "NOT an introductory offer" and "won't go up in just a few short months

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Pioneer Aggregates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

    540 F. App'x 118 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 30, 2013

    ’ complaint asserted no violation of a clearly established right (or any right). … substantive due process rights, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Ronald Muth v. Dennis Woodring

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 15, 2018

    Schriver appealed and we remanded to the District Court for further consideration of whether Defendants violated Muth’s clearly established right that barred Schriver from obtaining qualified immunity. See Muth v. … On remand, the District Court concluded that Schriver was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Muth v. Woodring, Civ.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Kania v. Potter

    358 F. App'x 338 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 22, 2009

    To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 4 a plaintiff must show that he (1) has a “disability,” (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, … The District Court determined that Kania failed to establish the first element of his prima facie case because he did not qualify as an “individual with a disability” under any of these definitions. We agree. 5 A.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Mims v. Shapp

    744 F.2d 946 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 1984

    executive immunity; and (3) if they are not so protected, then the damage award is error because the district court failed to find that plaintiff’s confinement was unjustified and it wrongly assessed liability from January … As the Hewitt Court stated, the Pennsylvania regulations which establish administrative segregation also establish “a protected liberty interest [in the inmates] in remaining in the general prison population.” Id.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Service Ass'n of Pennsylvania

    815 F.2d 270 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 1987

    Clearly, the target, in the sense of potential adverse economic effects, was Blue Shield. … The organized dentists’ immunity contention is predicated primarily on the first amendment.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • United States Ex Rel. E & H Steel Corp. v. C. Pyramid Enterprises, Inc.

    509 F.3d 184 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 27, 2007

    The issue here is whether Havens qualifies as a “subcontractor” under this approach. We conclude that it does. … A supplier of pre-cut wooden beams could qualify as well.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc.

    722 F.2d 1141 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 16, 1983

    In any event Bumbarger with 57% and Cole with 51.9% qualify. R.L. Guthrie’s percentage was 47.22%, Boyd R. Guthrie’s 31.65%, Kos’s 33%. … The five section foremen qualify for exemption. 556 F.Supp. at 166-67 .

    Cited 100 timesPublished
  • Joseph Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp

    729 F.3d 350 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 5, 2013

    The plain text of § 1447(d) clearly bars our review of the District Court’s February 29, 2012 remand order. Indeed, in Quackenbush v. … Company, the United States Supreme Court underscored that “only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c)” — namely, remand orders based on the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, like the remand order here — “are immune

    Cited 37 timesPublished
  • Adam Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 26, 2020

    Clearly Established Supreme Court Law on the Fifth Amendment Rosen claims that it is clearly established federal law that impeaching a defendant using evidence from the government’s mental health expert after … Therefore, we cannot conclude that it clearly established an applicable precedent.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Craig Geness v. Jason Cox

    902 F.3d 344 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 28, 2018

    First, no such constitutional right was “clearly established” at the relevant time, as required to overcome qualified immunity. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). … As for the first two, he sufficiently pleaded that he is a qualified individual with a disability. See App. 78; see also Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v.

    Cited 183 timesPublished
  • Nelson v. Jashurek

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 18, 1997

    immunity. … Humphrey 4 and thus she did not consider Jashurek's qualified immunity defense.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2007

    LeBoon argues that despite all this the LJCC is not sufficiently religious to qualify for Section 702 protection. … Looking at the LJCC through this lens, there is no doubt that it does not qualify under § 702(a).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • David Miller v. M. Brady

    639 F. App'x 827 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 11, 2016

    We will uphold a grant of qualified immunity on a 12(b)(6) motion “only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.” Leveto v. … Accordingly, Bonner was entitled to the grant of qualified immunity.

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Kathleen Fowler v. AT&T Inc

    19 F.4th 292 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 26, 2021

    C & C Cola, a Div. of ITT-Cont’l Baking Co., 868 F.2d 59, 64–65 (3d Cir. 1989) (choosing to consider only objective qualifications at the prima facie stage, while declining to establish any “blanket rule” about when more … render her otherwise qualified exists.”

    Cited 95 timesPublished
  • Carmelita Elcock v. Kmart Corporation

    233 F.3d 734 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 20, 2000

    Because we find that the jury’s tainted economic damage award was not clearly distinct and separate from the non-economic portion of its damage verdict, a new trial must be had on all aspects of the damage award. … Rule 703 embodies a similar requirement, which does not clearly set forth the foundation rule used in Gumbs and Benjamin , but which does bear on the analysis inhering in those cases.

    Cited 345 timesPublished

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