The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DWIGHT C. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD DANZIG, United States
Secretary of the Navy,
No. 99-1652
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN H. DALTON, Secretary,
Department of the Navy,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(CA-98-1466-AM)
Submitted: August 24, 1999
Decided: September 20, 1999
Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Dwight C. Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Leslie Bonner McClendon,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Dwight C. Brown appeals the order of the district court entering
judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy and denying Brown's
employment discrimination claim filed pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999). Finding no error, we affirm.
Brown first claims that the district court erred in denying his claim
of retaliatory discharge. We find no error because the evidence clearly
established that Brown's termination was based on his numerous
unauthorized absences, and not because of any protected activity. See
Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994).
Brown next claims error in the district court's refusal to consider
his claims of race and gender based discrimination. In order for a fed-
eral employee to proceed on a claim of discrimination under Title VII,
he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See Young v.
National Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir.
1987). Brown was required to file a formal complaint within fifteen
days of his final counseling session with his EEO counselor. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.107 (1999). It is uncontradicted that he failed to do so.
Because Brown has failed to administratively exhaust his claims of
gender or race discrimination below, he is barred from litigating those
matters in the federal courts.
We accordingly affirm the order of the district court. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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