Chapman v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

TINA CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-1349-CLM

KILOLO KIJIKAZI,

Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security

Administration,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tina Chapman seeks disability, disability insurance, and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) from the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) based on several impairments. The SSA issued

Chapman a partially favorable decision in an opinion written by an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who found that Chapman became

disabled on June 23, 2018.

Chapman argues: (1) that the ALJ failed to adequately explain why

she was discounting the opinions of Dr. David Wilson, a consultative

psychologist; (2) that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of her

treating physician; (3) that the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to the

opinions of consultative examiner Dr. June Nichols; and (4) that

substantial evidence doesn’t support the finding that Chapman can

perform light work.

The court agrees that the ALJ didn’t adequately explain her

decision to discount Dr. Wilson’s opinions. So the court will REVERSE

the SSA’s denial of benefits and REMAND this case to the Commissioner

for further proceedings.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the second time that Chapman has appealed the SSA’s

determination about her claim for benefits. In her first appeal, Chapman

successfully argued that the SSA’s Appeals Council erred in denying her

request for review without considering a new, chronologically relevant,

and material opinion from Dr. Wilson. On remand, the ALJ held a hearing

and issued a new decision. That decision is the subject of this appeal.

A. Chapman’s Disability, as told to the ALJ

Chapman was 51 on her alleged disability onset date. (R. 143). She

was 55 on the day the ALJ found she became disabled. (R. 143, 513).

Chapman alleged that she was disabled because of degenerative disc

disease, obesity, bipolar disorder, and anxiety/depression. (R. 180–88,

199–213, 227–35). Chapman has past work as a home health aide and

certified nursing assistant. (R. 512).

At the ALJ hearing, Chapman testified that she has osteoarthritis

pain in her arms, hands, neck, and shoulders. (R. 548–59). And Chapman

said her neck pain is worse than it was at the time of the first ALJ hearing.

(R. 542). According to Chapman, Neurontin helped relieve her neck pain

but her doctors took her off that medicine to see if pain management

would work. (Id.).

Chapman says she typically must prop her legs up for 7 hours

between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM. (R. 547). Chapman also claims

that her medicine often makes her feel like she must lie down for hours at

a time. (Id.). And Chapman can only stand in one spot for 10 minutes

before needing to sit down or move around. (R. 548).

Chapman has panic attacks that sometimes last 30 minutes. (R.

538). Chapman is also being treated at CED mental health center for

bipolar disorder. (R. 541). Chapman’s mental health problems include

hearing voices, hearing knocks on the door, and seeing things. (R. 549).

Chapman lives in an apartment with her 19-year-old son. (R. 540).

Chapman performs very little chores but does laundry. (R. 540–41).

Sometimes Chapman has trouble doing laundry because she cannot bend

over and pick the laundry up. (R. 551). And though Chapman still drives

some, her driving hurts her neck. (R. 541, 551).

B. Determining Disability

The SSA has created the following five-step process to determine

whether an individual is disabled and thus entitled to benefits under the

Social Security Act:

The 5-Step Test

Step 1 Is the Claimant engaged in If yes, claim denied.

substantial gainful activity? If no, proceed to Step 2.

Step 2 Does the Claimant suffer from a If no, claim denied.

severe, medically-determinable If yes, proceed to Step 3.

impairment or combination of

impairments?

Step 3 Does the Step 2 impairment meet If yes, claim granted.

the criteria of an impairment listed If no, proceed to Step 4.

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appx. 1?

*Determine Residual Functional Capacity*

Step 4 Does the Claimant possess the If yes, claim denied.

residual functional capacity to If no, proceed to Step 5.

perform the requirements of his

past relevant work?

Step 5 Is the Claimant able to do any If yes, claim denied.

other work considering his If no, claim granted.

residual functional capacity, age,

education, and work experience?

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 404.1520(b) (Step 1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)

(Step 2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 (Step 3); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e-f) (Step 4); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (Step 5).

C. Chapman’s Application and the ALJ’s Decision

The SSA reviews applications for benefits in three stages: (1) initial

determination, including reconsideration; (2) review by an ALJ; and (3)

review by the SSA Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(1-4).

Chapman first brought this application for benefits in August 2014,

claiming that she could not work because of various ailments, including

degenerative disc disease, obesity, bipolar disorder, anxiety, and

depression. After the SSA denied Chapman’s claim, Chapman appealed

to this court and filed two new claims for disability benefits. This court

remanded the claim before it to the Commissioner for consideration of Dr.

Wilson’s opinion. On remand, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to

consolidate Chapman’s three claims and issue a new decision. The ALJ

conducted a hearing in August 2020 and ultimately found that Chapman

became disabled on June 23, 2018. (R. 496–514).

At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Chapman was not engaged in

substantial gainful activity and thus her claims would progress to Step 2.

At Step 2, the ALJ determined that Chapman suffered from the

following severe impairments: obesity, degenerative disc disease,

depression, degenerative joint disease, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and

panic disorder.

At Step 3, the ALJ found that none of Chapman’s impairments,

individually or combined, met or equaled the severity of any of the

impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. So the

ALJ next had to determine Chapman’s residual functional capacity.

The ALJ determined that Chapman had the residual functional

capacity to perform light work with these added limitations:

• Chapman can lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently.

• Chapman is limited to sitting 6 hours in an 8-hour workday

and standing/walking 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.

• Chapman can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.

• Chapman can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs,

balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl.

• Chapman can only occasionally reach overhead.

• Chapman can understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions.

• Chapman can maintain attention and concentration for 2-

hour periods at a time.

• Chapman can perform jobs that don’t require interaction with

the general public as part of the job duties, but she can have

occasional interaction with co-workers.

• Chapman can adapt to routine and infrequent workplace

changes.

• Chapman can make simple work-related decisions.

At Step 4, the ALJ found that Chapman could not perform her past

relevant work.

At Step 5, the ALJ determined that before June 23, 2018 Chapman

could perform jobs, such as laundry worker, marker, and garment sorter,

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy and thus

Chapman was not disabled under the Social Security Act. But the ALJ

found that Chapman’s age category changed on June 23, 2018 and

starting on that date there weren’t any jobs in the national economy that

Chapman could perform. So the ALJ issued Chapman a partially

favorable decision, finding that Chapman became disabled on June 23,

2018 and continued to be disabled through the date of the ALJ’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social

Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of the court’s review is limited to

(a) whether the record contains substantial evidence to sustain the ALJ’s

decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838

(11th Cir. 1982), and (b) whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards, see Stone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th

Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004)). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Chapman makes four arguments for why the ALJ erred. First,

Chapman argues that the ALJ didn’t adequately evaluate the opinions of

Dr. Wilson. According to Chapman, Dr. Wilson’s opinions establish that

she’s entitled to benefits under former Listings 12.04. and 12.06. Second,

Chapman asserts that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of her

treating physician, Dr. Griffith. Third, Chapman contends that the ALJ

wrongly rejected the opinions of Dr. June Nichols. Finally, Chapman

states that substantial evidence doesn’t support the ALJ’s finding that she

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work.

The court agrees that the ALJ failed to provide a reasonable basis

for discounting Dr. Wilson’s opinions. (Though the court thinks it’s best

for the ALJ, not the court, to re-evaluate whether Chapman meets

Listings 12.04 and 12.06). So the court needn’t address Chapman’s other

arguments for reversal. Before explaining how the ALJ erred, the court

will recap Dr. Wilson’s opinions and the ALJ’s reasons for assigning those

opinions little weight.

1. Background: After the ALJ issued her first decision on

Chapman’s application for benefits, Chapman had a consultative exam

with Dr. Wilson. Chapman then submitted several materials from Dr.

Wilson to the Appeals Council. (R. 485–90). In the summary section of his

psychological evaluation, Dr. Wilson stated that Chapman had serious

problems with her mood and panic attacks. (R. 488). He also said that

Chapman’s “ability to withstand the pressures of day to day occupational

functioning is highly impaired.” (Id.). And Dr. Wilson noted that Chapman

“would have difficulty with both the task and interpersonal aspects of job

environments and her anxiety and panic attacks would make it very

difficult for [Chapman] to work.” (Id.). Finally, Dr. Wilson determined

that “[i]t is unlikely that [Chapman’s] condition will improve in the next

12 months.” (Id.).

Dr. Wilson also filled out a mental health source statement and

mental health questionnaire on behalf of Chapman. (R. 489–490). In the

mental health source statement, Dr. Wilson circled ‘yes’ when asked if

Chapman could “understand, remember or carry out very short and

simple instructions.” (R. 489). But he said that Chapman could not: (1)

maintain attention, concentration, or pace for periods of at least 2 hours;

(2) perform activities within a schedule and be punctual with customary

tolerances; (3) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; or

(4) adjust to routine and infrequent work changes. (Id.). Nor could

Chapman interact with supervisors, interact appropriately with co-

workers, maintain socially appropriate behavior, or adhere to basic

standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Id.). In the mental health

questionnaire, Dr. Wilson responded that Chapman suffered from several

limitations, including (1) marked restrictions in the ability to understand,

remember, or apply information; (2) marked difficulties in the ability to

interact with others; (3) marked difficulties in the ability to concentrate,

persist, or maintain pace; and (4) marked limitations in the ability to

adapt or manage oneself. (R. 490).

The Appeals Council denied Chapman’s request for review without

considering the evidence from Dr. Wilson. On appeal, this court

determined that the Appeals Council erred in not considering the new

evidence from Dr. Wilson because it was chronologically relevant and

there was a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative

result. See Chapman v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 2019 WL 1429630, at

*4–6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2019). The court noted that Dr. Wilson found that

Chapman had marked limitations in all four areas of mental functioning,

which could lead a factfinder to determine that Chapman’s impairments

meet Listings 12.04 or 12.06. Id. at *5. And though the court recognized

that there was some inconsistency between Dr. Wilson’s opinions and

Chapman’s treatment notes, the court explained that “[t]reatment records

from a single month documenting improvement and stability do not

render Dr. Wilson’s psychological evaluation inconsistent with those

records viewed in their entirety.” Id.

On remand, the ALJ afforded Dr. Wilson’s opinions little weight,

finding that Chapman’s treatment records contradicted them. (R. 509–

10). The ALJ noted that Chapman arrived at Dr. Wilson’s appointment on

time and had neat hygiene and appearance. (R. 509). The ALJ also stated

that though Chapman described some social limitations, none would

suggest the inability to be around others at work. (Id.). The ALJ then

noted that Chapman “reported going to the store, having friends who visit,

going to church sometimes” and that Chapman’s “main complaint is

crowds.” (Id.). According to the ALJ, Chapman’s providers at CED didn’t

note these limitations or any socially unacceptable behaviors from

Chapman. (Id.). The ALJ also described Chapman’s recent treatment

notes as documenting that Chapman’s doing “very well” and explaining

that Chapman was having issues staying home during COVID. (Id.). And

the ALJ pointed out that Chapman’s therapist stated that she could

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Id.).

The ALJ also addressed this court’s determination that Dr. Wilson’s

opinions could change the administrative result. The ALJ explained that

this court’s conclusion that a factfinder could reasonably determine that

Dr. Wilson’s opinions established that Chapman met Listings 12.04 or

12.06 acknowledges that a factfinder could reach the opposite conclusion.

(R. 510). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Wilson’s opinion was “only one

opinion in [Chapman’s] voluminous medical record” and that Dr. Wilson

was hired by Chapman’s attorney and only evaluated her once. (Id.). The

ALJ then explained that though the court correctly noted that Chapman’s

panic attacks caused her to quit a job after only two days, the vocational

expert classified that job as a semiskilled job. (Id.). And the jobs the ALJ

found that Chapman could perform were all unskilled. (Id.). Finally, the

ALJ stated that during appointments Chapman attended after August

2015, she reported doing okay and recently reported doing well on her

current medication. (Id.).

2. ALJ’s error: Under the regulations that apply to Chapman’s claim

for benefits, “the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to

different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). While an

ALJ needn’t defer to the opinions of one-time examiners, like Dr. Wilson,

see McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987), the ALJ must

“state with at least some measure of clarity the grounds” for assigning a

particular weight to the consultative examiner’s opinion, Winschel, 631

F.3d at 1179. So an ALJ errs when she fails to provide a reasonable basis

for discounting the opinion of a consultative examiner. See Simon v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 F.4th 1094, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 2021).

The main reason the ALJ gave Dr. Wilson’s opinions little weight

was that she found them to contradict Chapman’s medical records from

CED. In support of this finding, the ALJ pointed to Chapman’s treatment

records from December 2019 and April 2020 when Chapman reported that

she was “doing okay” and “doing very well.” (R. 1101–07). But “[m]any

mental disorders—and bipolar disorder in particular—are characterized

by the unpredictable fluctuation of their symptoms, and thus it is not

surprising that even a highly unstable patient will have good days or

possibly good months.” Simon, 7 F.4th at 1106. And “[f]or those who suffer

from such disorders, a snapshot of any single moment says little about [a

person’s] overall condition.” Id. So ALJs should not “rel[y] on such

snapshots to discredit the remainder of a psychiatrist’s findings.” See id;

see also id. at 1108–09 (finding that ALJ hadn’t provided a reasonable

basis for discounting consultative examiner’s opinions).

After reviewing Chapman’s treatment records from CED, the court

sees no obvious inconsistency between Dr. Wilson’s opinions and the CED

records viewed in their entirety. In fact, Chapman’s treatment records are

filled with reports that she suffers from auditory and visual

hallucinations, suicidal ideation, depression, anxiety, panic attacks,

anger, and aggression. (R. 444, 447, 468, 473, 943–44, 957, 998–99, 1009).

For example, Chapman repeatedly told her mental health providers that

she had daily anger outbursts towards her teenage son who was one of the

only people she saw each day. (R. 943, 957). There very well might be a

valid reason to find that Dr. Wilson’s opinions don’t align with Chapman’s

treatment notes. But given that many of Chapman’s medical records seem

to support Dr. Wilson’s opinions, the ALJ erred in discussing only isolated

entries when discrediting Dr. Wilson. See Simon, 7 F.4th at 1106.

The ALJ also erred in not adequately explaining why she thought

the social limitations Chapman described to Dr. Wilson wouldn’t affect

Chapman’s ability to be around others at work or what social

limitations/socially unacceptable behaviors Chapman reported to Dr.

Wilson but not her CED providers. Consistent with what she told Dr.

Wilson, Chapman told her CED providers that she had stopped visiting

friends, had trouble leaving her home, and experienced panic attacks in

crowded environments like her son’s graduation and Walmart. (R. 943–

44). So it’s difficult to discern what the ALJ meant when she said, “[n]one

of these are noted by any of her providers at CED. They have never noted

any socially unacceptable behaviors, etc.” (R. 509). Plus, the ALJ didn’t

explain why evidence that Chapman suffers from panic attacks around

groups of people wouldn’t make it difficult for her to be around others. The

ALJ thus didn’t provide “some measure of clarity” for why she found that

the social limitations noted by Dr. Wilson didn’t support his opinions.

The court recognizes that the ALJ found that Chapman’s reported

daily activities, such as going to the store, having friends who visit, and

going to church sometimes, contradicted Dr. Wilson’s opinions. But

Chapman qualified her participation in these daily activities when she

reported them to Dr. Wilson. For example, Chapman stated that she

doesn’t see any of her family, has just two or three friends, and has only

one friend who comes over. (R. 487). That friend often wants Chapman to

run her to the store, but as Chapman earlier explained to Dr. Wilson, the

crowds at Walmart have caused her to suffer from panic attacks. (Id.).

And Chapman doesn’t “drive unless I have to” because she doesn’t “like

leaving the house” and it’s “hard to get out.” (R. 486). So though Chapman

goes to church “sometimes,” she doesn’t “go a lot.” (R. 487). To use this

evidence to discount Dr. Wilson, the ALJ needed to acknowledge

Chapman’s limiting description of these activities and provide a

reasonable explanation for why completing these tasks would undermine

Dr. Wilson’s opinions. See Simon, 7 F.4th at 1108 (“Without some

reasonable explanation from the ALJ as to why completing basic

household chores is inconsistent with a finding of disability, this evidence

was not sufficient to discredit Dr. Turner.”).

The ALJ did correctly note that statements from Chapman’s

therapist that Chapman could adhere to basic standards of neatness and

cleanliness and that Chapman had neat hygiene and appearance at her

appointment with Dr. Wilson contradicted Dr. Wilson’s statement that

Chapman couldn’t adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness.

(R. 509). But these facts have little to no bearing on Dr. Wilson’s opinions

on the issues that he thought Chapman’s mood swings, panic attacks, and

anxiety—which are at the heart of her disability claim—would cause. Nor

does the fact that Chapman arrived on time to her appointment with Dr.

Wilson, on its own, provide a reasonable basis to discount each of Dr.

Wilson’s opinions.

Plus, nothing in the ALJ’s discussion of this court’s determination

that Dr. Wilson’s opinion was material shows that the ALJ gave a valid

reason for discounting Dr. Wilson’s opinions. To be sure, as the ALJ noted,

Dr. Wilson examined Chapman only one time and was hired by

Chapman’s attorney. But the ALJ didn’t discount the opinions of the other

consultative examiners because they just examined Chapman once, so she

couldn’t use this rationale to discount Dr. Wilson’s opinions. See Schink v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 945 F.3d 1245, 1261 (11th Cir. 2019) (ALJ’s rationale

for discounting medical opinions should be the same across the board

unless inconsistency is explained). Indeed, “[t]he fact that [Dr. Wilson]

was a one-time consultative examiner retained by the claimant rather

than the Commissioner is not, standing alone, a valid basis for rejecting

his medical opinion.” Hickel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F. App’x 980, 987

(11th Cir. 2013). And that the job that caused Chapman to suffer from

panic attacks was semiskilled doesn’t negate the court’s point that there

is no obvious inconsistency between Dr. Wilson’s opinions and Chapman’s

treatment records. So the ALJ didn’t articulate a valid reason to afford all

of Dr. Wilson’s opinions little weight.

The Commissioner says the court should still affirm the ALJ’s

evaluation of Dr. Wilson’s opinions because they contradict exam findings

from Dr. Nichols and Dr. Bentley. (Doc. 15 at 11–12). The Commissioner

also notes that Dr. Bentley suggested that there was symptom

exaggeration, and that Chapman did not truly have psychotic disorder.

(Id. at 12). The problem with this argument is that the ALJ didn’t discuss

Dr. Nichols or Dr. Bentley’s findings when evaluating Dr. Wilson’s

opinions. (R. 509–10). And this court cannot “affirm simply because some

rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” See Owens v.

Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984). In short, without more

explanation from the ALJ, the court cannot say that she had an adequate

reason to discount Dr. Wilson’s opinions.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the ALJ failed to articulate valid reasons for discounting

each of Dr. Wilson’s opinions. So the court will remand this case to the

Commissioner for the ALJ to reassess Dr. Wilson’s opinions. Though the

court doesn’t reach Chapman’s arguments about the other opinion

evidence, the ALJ should also re-evaluate those opinions considering

Chapman’s medical records as a whole. In reaching this decision, the court

isn’t holding that the ALJ must afford Dr. Wilson’s opinions a particular

weight. The court is instead merely requiring the ALJ to articulate

adequate reasons for the weight she assigns Dr. Wilson’s opinions.

The court will enter a separate final order that REVERSES the

ALJ’s decision and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Done on August 1, 2022.

COREY / MAZE 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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