Rogers v. Alabama, State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

FRANKIE THOMAS ROGERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No.: 2-21-cv-01065-ACA

)

STATE OF ALABAMA, ET AL., )

)

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are two motions to dismiss Plaintiff Frankie Thomas Rogers’

amended complaint, one filed by the State of Alabama (doc. 10), and the other filed

by the City of Oneonta, Charles Clifton, Richard Phillips, Amanda Stanfield, and

Matthew Suddeth (collectively the “Oneonta Defendants”) (doc. 11).

Mr. Rogers’ amended complaint asserts various constitutional claims and

state law torts against nine different defendants: (1) the State of Alabama (“the

State”); (2) The City of Oneonta; (3) Oneonta Police Chief Charles Clifton; (4)

Oneonta Mayor Richard Phillips; (5) Oneonta city clerk Amanda Stanfield; (6)

Oneonta police officer Matthew Suddeth; (7) Jason Moore, owner of Skint Knuckle

Garage and Towing; (8) Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing; and (9) Blount County

Sheriff Mark Moon. (Doc. 9 at 1).

Jason Moore and Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing have answered Mr.

Rogers’ original complaint (doc. 1-1), but have not yet responded to the amended

complaint. Mr. Rogers has not yet served Mr. Moon, who was not a named

defendant in the original complaint. (Id.). The remaining defendants have moved

to dismiss the entirety of Mr. Rogers’ claims against them. (Docs. 10, 11).

Because Mr. Rogers’ claims against the State are barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity, the court GRANTS the State’s motion to dismiss WITH

PREJUDICE. For reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART the Oneonta Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

At this stage, the court must accept as true the factual allegations in the

complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Butler v.

Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012).

Mr. Rogers alleges that on June 24, 2021, he was pulled over by the City of

Oneonta police officer Matthew Suddeth for his failure to have a license plate on his

truck. (Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 7).1 After pulling Mr. Rogers over, Officer Suddeth asked for

Mr. Rogers’ driver’s license, to which Mr. Rogers responded that he was not driving

a “vehicle,” but was driving an “automobile.” (Id.). Officer Suddeth then requested

1 Mr. Rogers includes two paragraphs numbered 7 in his complaint. (See doc. 9 at 1–2).

The court references Mr. Rogers’ second paragraph numbered 7, which begins on the second page

of his complaint and is located under the “FACTS” heading. (Id. at 2)/

Mr. Rogers’ proof of insurance. (Id.). The complaint does not state whether such

proof was provided, but it does state that Officer Suddeth issued Mr. Rogers a

citation during the traffic stop. (Id.).

According to Mr. Rogers, Officer Suddeth then called Skint Knuckle Garage

and Towing after issuing him a citation. (Id.). Officer Suddeth told Mr. Rogers that

he was impounding his 2002 Chevy Silverado pickup truck pursuant to Alabama’s

Safe Streets Act. (Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 7). Mr. Rogers alleges that this statute was repealed

in 1998 and that Officer Suddeth did not have a warrant to confiscate his property.

(Id. at 2 ¶¶ 7, 8).

After impounding Mr. Rogers’ truck, Officer Suddeth and Blount County

Sheriff Mark Moon searched the truck and confiscated Mr. Rogers’ pistol without a

warrant or probable cause. (Id. at 2 ¶ 7). Mr. Rogers was also apparently arrested

in conjunction with this traffic stop, although the facts do not clearly state at what

time the arrest occurred or what defendant effectuated the arrest. (Id. at 7–8 ¶¶ 40,

42, 44). Upon his arrest, Mr. Rogers stayed in jail for an unspecified amount of time.

(Id. at 8 ¶ 44). While in jail, Mr. Rogers stayed in a crowded cell and contracted

Covid-19 as a result. (Id.).

To regain custody of his truck, Mr. Rogers had to pay fines that he could not

afford. (Doc. 9 at 5 ¶ 22). He alleges that Officer Suddeth, Sheriff Moon, Mr.

Moore, and Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing imposed those fines. (Id.). He also

alleges that Sheriff Moon remains in possession of his pistol, despite Mr. Rogers’

numerous requests to have it returned. (Id. at 7 ¶ 38).

II. DISCUSSION

The State moves to dismiss Mr. Rogers’ claims against it for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 10). The Oneonta Defendants move to dismiss Mr.

Rogers’ amended complaint, contending that: (1) the complaint remains a shotgun

pleading, and (2) Mr. Rogers’ federal and state law claims fail to state a claim. (Doc.

11).

1. Mr. Rogers’ claims against the State

Mr. Rogers brings two counts against the State. (Doc. 9). In Count One, Mr.

Rogers asserts a claim for state law conversion, arguing that the State unlawfully

stole his truck and pistol under the guise of a long-repealed state law. (Id. at 2 ¶¶ 8,

9). In Count Six, Mr. Rogers alleges that the State violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights by taking his property without due process. (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 18, 19).

The State moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 10). It makes two jurisdictional

arguments. First, the State argues that it has Eleventh Amendment immunity from

Mr. Rogers’ claims. (Id. at 4–7). Alternatively, it argues that Mr. Rogers lacks

standing to bring his claims against it. (Id. at 7–10). Because the court finds the

State’s sovereign immunity bars Mr. Rogers’ claims against it, the court will not

address the issue of standing. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping

Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[T]here is no mandatory sequencing of

jurisdictional issues.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment states that

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI.

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Eleventh Amendment

broadly and “held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal

courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974). A citizen may sue a State only if Congress

has abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has waived its sovereign

immunity. Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013). Alabama has

not waived its immunity. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.

1990) (citing Article 1, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901). Nor did

Congress abrogate sovereign immunity when it passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is

the statute through which litigants like Mr. Rogers can assert claims for violations

of their constitutional rights. Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337–41

(1979)).

In his response to the State’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Rogers argues that the

State is not entitled to immunity because it is a “fictitious, corporate, territorial State”

that is a subdivision of the corporate United States. (Doc. 18 at 1). Mr. Rogers also

argues that, as a citizen of Alabama, he is not barred from suing the State under the

plain language of the Eleventh Amendment. (Id. at 1–4). Mr. Rogers’ arguments

lack merit. As stated above, the Supreme Court has long held that sovereign

immunity extends to suits by non-citizens and citizens alike. Edelman, 415 U.S. at

662–63. The court declines Mr. Rogers’ invitation to question the well-established

principles of state immunity.

Next, Mr. Rogers argues that the allegations in his amended complaint “void[]

any immunity” that Alabama claims to have. (Doc. 18 at 3). In support of this

argument, Mr. Rogers cites Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), for the proposition

that an official loses the protection of immunity when he or she violates a clearly

established constitutional right. (Doc. 18 at 3). But qualified immunity for state

officials and sovereign immunity for the State itself are distinct legal concepts, and

only the latter is argued in the State’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, Mr. Rogers’

argument is misplaced. The only exceptions that exist for state immunity are

abrogation by Congress or waiver by the State. Stroud, 722 F.3d at 1298. Neither

exception applies here.

Sovereign immunity bars Mr. Rogers’ claims against the State. Accordingly,

the court DISMISSES Counts One and Six against the State WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to term the State as a defendant.

2. Mr. Rogers’ claims against the Oneonta Defendants

Before analyzing the Oneonta Defendants’ arguments in their motion to

dismiss, the court must clarify some preliminary issues regarding Mr. Rogers’ claims

in his amended complaint. On two occasions in his motion to dismiss, Mr. Rogers

makes allegations against the Oneonta Police Department. (Doc. 9 at 5–6 ¶¶ 22, 30).

However, Mr. Rogers does not include the Oneonta Police Department as a named

defendant, nor was the Oneonta Police Department ever served in conjunction with

this case. The court will analyze Mr. Rogers’ claims only against those named

defendants specified in each count.

Next, the court notes that Mr. Rogers did not specify in his complaint whether

his suit is against the defendants in their individual capacities, official capacities, or

both. The Oneonta Defendants assumed that Mr. Rogers brought his claims against

them only in their official capacities. (Doc. 11 at 16). Therefore, their motion to

dismiss does not address why Mr. Rogers’ claims against them in their individual

capacities should be dismissed. (Id. at 14–24).

The court cannot, at this early stage, assume that Mr. Rogers intended his

claims to be against the Oneonta Defendants only in their official capacities. “When

it is not clear in which capacity the defendants are sued, the course of the proceedings

typically indicates the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” Young

Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1047 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quotations omitted). While it would have been “clearly preferable” for Mr. Rogers

to state in which capacity the defendants are being sued, he was not required to do

so in his complaint. Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, the court will treat Mr.

Rogers’ claims as brought against the defendants in both their official and individual

capacities.

Mindful of the liberal interpretation afforded to complaints filed by pro se

litigants, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the court interprets

Mr. Rogers’ complaint as asserting the following claims against the Oneonta

Defendants: (1) state law conversion against the City of Oneonta (“Count One”); (2)

a Fourth Amendment violation against Officer Suddeth in his official and individual

capacity (“Count Two); (3) state law fraud against Officer Suddeth in his official

and individual capacity (“Count Three” and “Count Seven”); (4) a Fifth Amendment

violation against Officer Suddeth in his official and individual capacity (“Count

Four”); (5) a Tenth Amendment violation against Officer Suddeth in his official and

individual capacity (“Count Five”); (6) a Fourteenth Amendment violation against

the City of Oneonta, Richard Phillips, Chief Clifton, Amanda Stanfield, and Officer

Suddeth in their official and individual capacities (“Count Six”); (7) an Eighth

Amendment violation against the City of Oneonta and Officer Suddeth in his official

and individual capacity (“Count Eight”); (8) state law conspiracy against the City of

Oneonta and Officer Suddeth in his official and individual capacity (“Count Ten”

and “Count Eleven”); (9) state law negligence against Chief Clifton in his official

and individual capacity (“Count Twelve”); and (10) state law conversion against the

City of Oneonta, Richard Phillips, Chief Clifton, Amanda Stanfield, and Officer

Suddeth in their official and individual capacities (“Count Thirteen”).

In their motion to dismiss, the Oneonta Defendants argue that Mr. Rogers’

amended compliant remains a shotgun pleading and should be dismissed in its

entirety. The Oneonta Defendants also argue that Mr. Rogers’ claims fail as a matter

of law and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

A. The amended complaint is not a shotgun pleading

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) requires a

complaint to contain “numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a

single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The Eleventh Circuit has

explained that pleadings “that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are

often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).

Shotgun pleadings fall into “four rough types of categories.” Id. at 1323. The

first “is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that

came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. The

second is a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not

obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. The third is one that

does “not separate[] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.”

Id. And the fourth type is a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which

acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id.

This court previously determined that Mr. Rogers’ original complaint filed in

state court (doc. 1-1) was a shotgun pleading of the fourth type and ordered him to

replead (doc. 8). In its order, the court directed Mr. Rogers to file an amended

complaint that includes separate counts for each claim and identifies the specific

defendant or defendants against whom each count is brought. (Id.). Pursuant to the

court’s order, Mr. Rogers filed an amended complaint on September 7, 2021. (Doc.

9).

The Oneonta Defendants argue that Mr. Rogers’ amended complaint remains

a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 11 at 8–9). The court disagrees. First, Mr. Rogers is a

pro se litigant, and therefore his “complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson,

551 U.S. at 94 (quotations omitted). While Mr. Rogers’ amended complaint “is not

a model of efficiency or specific, . . . it does adequately put [the defendants] on

notice of the specific claims against them and the factual allegations that support

those claims.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325. In his original complaint, Mr. Rogers

did not specify which defendants were included in each count, instead referring to

all defendants collectively as “respondents.” (See doc. 1-1). But in his amended

complaint, Mr. Rogers does name specific defendants in each count. (See e.g., doc.

9 at 5 ¶ 26). This is sufficient for the Defendants to determine the basic allegations

against them.

Accordingly, the court DENIES the Oneonta Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Mr. Rogers’ claim as a shotgun pleading.

B. Mr. Rogers’ constitutional claims against the Oneonta Defendants

The amended complaint alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 9 at 2–5). Pointing out that Mr. Rogers did not

cite to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his complaint, the Oneonta Defendants argue that all of

Mr. Rogers’ constitutional claims must fail because “a plaintiff may not bring claims

directly under the United States Constitution against [a defendant].” (Doc. 11 at 10).

While this argument is technically correct, “no heightened pleading rule requires

plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983

expressly in order to state a claim.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11

(2014).

For Counts Two and Six, the Defendants do not provide an alternative ground

for dismissal other than that Mr. Rogers cannot directly assert Constitutional claims.

The court will not address or advance arguments the Defendants themselves have

not made. Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion to dismiss Counts Two and

Six. In denting the motion to dismiss those counts, the court does not address

whether Mr. Rogers has sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The court now turns to the Defendants’ argument for dismissal of Counts Four, Five,

and Eight.

i. Count Four

In Count Four, Mr. Rogers alleges that Officer Suddeth, Sheriff Moon,

Mr. Moore, and Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing violated the Fifth Amendment

by taking his property without probable cause. (Doc. 9 at 3 ¶¶ 14, 15). The Oneonta

Defendants argue that Count Four must be dismissed because the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process clause applies only to the federal government. (Doc. 11

at 10).

“The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution restrains the federal

government, and the fourteenth amendment, section 1, restrains the states, from

depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Buxton

v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1041 (11th Cir. 1989). Mr. Rogers’

complaint does not allege that any of the Oneonta Defendants were federal actors.

(See doc. 9 at 1 ¶¶ 1–7). In his response to the Oneonta Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, Mr. Rogers claims that the individual defendants are federal officers

because they work for a political subdivision of the State of Alabama, which Mr.

Rogers argues is a political subdivision of the United States. (Doc. 15 at 4). This

argument is meritless. Because Mr. Rogers’ claims against the Oneonta Defendants

do not allege the existence of any federal action, his Fifth Amendment claim fails as

a matter of law. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Oneonta Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Count Four against Officer Suddeth WITH PREJUDICE.

ii. Count Five

In Count Five, Mr. Rogers alleges that Officer Suddeth, Sheriff Moon, Mr.

Moore and Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing violated the Tenth Amendment by

“exerting powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution or prohibited

to it by the states.” (Doc. 9 at 4 ¶¶ 16, 17).

The Oneonta Defendants move to dismiss Count Five against Officer Suddeth.

(Doc. 11 at 11–14). They argue that the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable to the

facts in Mr. Rogers’ case because it acts as a constraint on the federal government’s

power and does not confer individual constitutional rights. (Id. at 11–12).

The Tenth Amendment “restrains the power of Congress” and “confirms that

the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may . . . reserve power

to the States.” New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992). As explained above,

Mr. Rogers’ complaint does not allege that any of the Oneonta Defendants were

federal actors, nor does it attribute any of the alleged violations to the federal

government. Therefore, Count Five suffers the same fatal flaw as does Count Four

in that it fails to allege the federal action necessary to state a Tenth Amendment

claim.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Oneonta Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Count Five against Officer Suddeth WITH PREJUDICE.

iii. Count Eight

In Count Eight, Mr. Rogers alleges that the City of Oneonta, Officer Suddeth,

Sheriff Moon, Mr. Moore, and Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing violated his

Eighth Amendment right against excessive bail. (Doc. 9 at 5 ¶¶ 22, 23). According

to Mr. Rogers, those Defendants required excessive bails and fines in order for Mr.

Rogers to regain custody of his seized property. (Id.). Mr. Rogers alleges that he is

indigent and cannot afford these charges. (Id.).

The Oneonta Defendants move to dismiss Count Eight against the City of

Oneonta and Officer Suddeth. (Doc. 11 at 11–14). They argue that “the Eighth

Amendment prohibits the government from subjecting an incarcerated person to the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and that “a plaintiff in an Eighth

Amendment excessive force case generally must be a person who has

been . . . sentenced to prison.” (Id. at 11) (emphasis in original). Because Mr.

Rogers does not allege that he was incarcerated, the Defendants reason that his

Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. (Id.).

The Defendants misstate Mr. Rogers’ claim in Count Eight. Mr. Rogers does

not allege that Officer Suddeth and the City of Oneonta subjected him to cruel and

unusual punishment or used excessive force against him. Instead, he alleges that

Officer Suddeth and the City of Oneonta charged him excessive fines to regain

custody of his property. (Doc. 9 at 5 ¶ 22). The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

Amendment “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash

or in kind, as punishment for some offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.

321, 328 (1998) (quotations omitted). Further, no criminal proceeding is required

to invoke the protections of the Excessive Fines Clause, as “[t]he notion of

punishment . . . cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law.”

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (quotations omitted).

The Oneonta Defendants have not adequately moved to dismiss Count Eight

on any other grounds. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss Count Eight and will

not address whether the amended complaint sufficiently alleges facts indicating that

the City of Oneonta and Officer Suddeth violated Mr. Rogers’ Eighth Amendment

right against excessive fines.

Therefore, the court DENIES Oneonta Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count

Eight against the City of Oneonta and Officer Suddeth.

C. Mr. Rogers’ state law claims against the Oneonta Defendants

Mr. Rogers asserts state law claims for conversion, fraud, conspiracy, and

negligent training against the Oneonta Defendants. (Doc. 9 at 2–6). The Oneonta

Defendants argue that Mr. Rogers’ claims in Counts One, Three, Seven, Ten, Eleven,

and Thirteen are barred by Alabama Code § 11-47-190. (Doc. 11 at 15–19).

Additionally, the Oneonta Defendants argue that Mr. Rogers does not plead his fraud

claims in Counts Three and Seven with the requisite specificity. (Id. at 19–20).

Lastly, the Oneonta Defendants contend that Count Twelve should be dismissed

because “no cause of action exists in Alabama against an individual supervisor for

the torts of wrongful hiring, training, or supervision.” (Id. at 20).

i. Mr. Rogers’ claims asserting intentional torts

In his amended complaint, Mr. Rogers asserts claims against the Oneonta

Defendants for conversion, fraud, and conspiracy. (Doc. 9 at 2–6 ¶¶ 8, 12, 20, 26,

30, 36). The Oneonta Defendants argue that Alabama Code § 11-47-190 precludes

municipal liability for intentional torts and that, accordingly, Counts One, Three,

Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen should be dismissed. (Doc. 11 at 14–19).

Section 11-47-190 of the Alabama Code states that Alabama cities and

municipalities are not vicariously liable for the torts of their agents unless the agent

acted with “neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness.” Ala. Code § 11-47-190 (1975).

Pursuant to this statute, “a city is liable for negligent acts of its employees within the

scope of their employment, but not intentional torts of its employees.” Brown v. City

of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 743 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Ex parte City of

Gadsden, 718 So. 2d 716, 721 (Ala. 1998). Moreover, a plaintiff may not assert

intentional tort claims against city officials in their official capacity, as claims

against an official in his or her official capacity are “to be treated as a suit against

the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

Under Alabama law, conversion, fraud, and conspiracy are each intentional

torts. Schaeffer v. Poellnitz, 154 So. 3d 979, 989 (Ala. 2014) (“Conversion is an

intentional tort.”) (emphasis and quotations omitted); Aliant Bank, a Div. of

USAmeribank v. Four Star Investments, Inc., 244 So. 3d 896, 927 (Ala. 2017)

(“[F]raud claims [are] among those claims barred by § 11-47-190); id.

(“[C]onspiracy . . . is an intentional tort, and conspiracy claims are barred by

§ 11-47-190.”). Therefore, § 11-47-190 precludes Mr. Rogers’ claims in Counts

One, Three, Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen against the City and against the

officials in their official capacities.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS IN PART the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Counts One, Three, Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen. The court

DISMISSES Count One against the City of Oneonta and against Officer Suddeth in

his official capacity, Count Seven against Officer Suddeth in his official capacity,

Count Ten against the City of Oneonta and against Officer Suddeth in his official

capacity, Count Eleven against Officer Suddeth in his official capacity, and Count

Thirteen against the City of Oneonta and against Amanda Stanfield, Officer Suddeth,

Chief Clifton, and Mayor Phillips in their official capacities WITH PREJUDICE.

The Oneonta Defendants provide no argument as to why the court should

dismiss Mr. Rogers’ intentional tort claims against them in their individual

capacities. The court will not make arguments to dismiss on the Defendants’ behalf.

Therefore, the court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts One, Three,

Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen against the Oneonta Defendants in their individual

capacities. The court does not address whether Mr. Rogers adequately states a claim

against the Defendants in their individual capacities.

ii. Mr. Rogers’ fraud claims

In determining whether Counts Three and Seven are plead with sufficient

particularity, this court looks to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not Alabama Rules

of Civil Procedure. See generally Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 (2010). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 requires

that a plaintiff allege “(1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations

made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content

and manner in which these statements misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what the

defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Am Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d

1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).

In Count Three, Mr. Rogers alleges that Officer Suddeth, Jason Moore, and

Skint Knuckle Garage and Towing took his property by impounding his

“automobile” after fraudulently misapplying a state statute. (Doc. 9 at 3). According

to Mr. Rogers, the state statute applied only to “vehicles.” (Id.). Mr. Rogers

maintains that he was not driving a “vehicle,” but that he was driving an

“automobile” at the time that he was pulled over by Officer Suddeth. (Id.). In Count

Seven, Mr. Rogers alleges that Officer Suddeth made fraudulent misrepresentations

to the court by stating on a citation that Mr. Rogers “unlawfully operate[d] a motor

vehicle or other vehicle” in Oneonta City limits. (Id. at 4). Mr. Rogers contends

that Officer Suddeth “has no proof” of his statement. (Id.).

The court has its doubts about whether a claim alleging “fraudulent

misapplication of a law” has ever been acknowledged, much less clearly established,

by the Alabama Supreme Court, United States Supreme Court, or Eleventh Circuit.

But even if such a claim did exist, Mr. Rogers’ allegations are insufficient. The

Oneonta Defendants argue that Mr. Rogers fails to identify “what, if any, acts

purportedly constitute fraudulent conduct.” (Doc. 11 at 19–20). The court agrees.

Mr. Rogers does identify the alleged misrepresentation—that he was driving a

“vehicle” instead of an “automobile”—and the individual who allegedly made that

representation—Officer Suddeth. (Doc. 9 at 3–4). But Mr. Rogers provides no legal

basis for his contention that there is a distinction between a “vehicle” and an

“automobile.” Moreover, Mr. Rogers does not allege that he relied on Officer

Suddeth’s alleged misrepresentation, nor does he state what—if anything—the

Defendants gained from the alleged misstatements. Put differently, Mr. Rogers

identifies statements that he perceives as untrue, but he fails to demonstrate how

those alleged misstatements constitute fraud.

Mr. Rogers fails to plead his fraud claims in Counts Three and Seven with the

requisite particularity. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Counts Three and Seven

against Officer Suddeth in his individual capacity WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

iii. Mr. Rogers’ Negligent Training Claim

In Count Twelve, Mr. Rogers asserts a failure to train claim against Chief

Clifton under a theory of respondeat superior. (Doc. 9 at 6). The Oneonta

Defendants move to dismiss Count Twelve, arguing that “no cause of action exists

in Alabama against an individual supervisor for the torts of wrongful hiring, training,

or supervision.” (Doc. 11 at 20). In support of this argument, the Oneonta

Defendants cite to several district court cases, including Ott v. City of Mobile, 169

F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Ala. 2001). (See doc. 11 at 20–24).

In Ott, an off-duty police officer struck an individual in the head and shot

another individual, killing him. Id. at 1305–06. Those individuals filed suit against

the officer, the chief of police, and the City of Mobile. Id. at 1306. Among other

things, the plaintiffs sought to hold the City liable through Alabama Code § 11-47-

190 for its employees’ negligence in hiring, training, and supervising the Defendant

officer. Id. at 1314.

The court dismissed this claim against the City and determined that “no such

cause of action exists.” Id. In so doing, the court looked to Alabama law, which “is

clear that the tort of negligent supervision or training requires as an element the

existence of a master-servant relationship.” Ott, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. Further,

under Alabama law, “[a] supervisor is not the master of a subordinate, nor is the

subordinate the servant of the supervisor . . . the status of ‘master’ is restricted to

one who is actually or essentially the employer of the servant.” Id. Therefore, no

cause of action for negligent hiring, training, or supervision existed against the City’s

supervisory employees, and accordingly the plaintiffs could not hold the City liable

under § 11-47-190, which “generally allows a plaintiff to sue a municipal defendant

for the negligence of its employee.” Id. at 1314.

Though Ott is not a precedential case, the court finds its reasoning persuasive

and adopts it here. Mr. Rogers seeks to hold Chief Clifton liable under a theory of

respondeat superior for negligently training Oneonta police officers. (Doc. 9 at 6).

Like the court in Ott, this court is satisfied that, based on a review of Alabama

caselaw, no such cause of action exists.

Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Count Twelve WITH PREJUDICE.

III. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS the State of Alabama’s motion to dismiss the amended

complaint WITH PREJUDICE.

The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Oneonta

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The court GRANTS the

motion and DISMISSES Counts Four and Five against Defendants in their

individual and official capacities WITH PREJUDICE. The court GRANTS the

motion and DISMISSES Counts One, Three, Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen

against Defendants in their official capacities WITH PREJUDICE. The court

GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES Counts Three and Seven against the

Defendants in their individual capacities WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court

GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES Count Twelve against the Defendants in

their individual and official capacities WITH PREJUDICE. The court DENIES

the motion with respect to Counts Two, Six, and Eight. The court DENIES the

motion with respect to Counts One, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen against Defendants

in their individual capacities.

DONE and ORDERED this April 6, 2022.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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