Dillard v. Lauderdale County, Alabama

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

EDWARD RAY “CHIP” DILLARD and )

TIMOTHY WYLIE STAGGS, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-00295-HNJ

)

LAUDERDALE COUNTY, )

ALABAMA, ANGIE KING HAMILTON, )

CHARLES “CHUCK” HEARN, and )

LESLIE SHEFFIELD, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action proceeds before the court on Defendants Angie King Hamilton,

Charles “Chuck” Hearn, and Leslie Sheffield’s Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 12, 14, 16).1 Plaintiffs Edward Ray “Chip”

Dillard and Timothy Wylie Staggs lodge three counts in their First Amended Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the court determines Defendants merit dismissal of

them all. Count I’s alleged facts fail to sustain a Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim contending Hearn tendered a criminal complaint lacking probable

1 Plaintiffs also named Lauderdale County, Alabama, as a defendant in their First Amended Complaint,

in response to which the County filed a Motion to Dismiss due to Plaintiffs’ erroneous conclusion

that the County had any involvement in this case. (Doc. 10). Based upon the lack of any evidence

the County had any involvement in this case, the court GRANTS the County’s Motion to Dismiss

and dismisses the claims against it WITH PREJUDICE.

cause, or containing intentional misstatements or omissions material to a finding of

probable cause. Therefore, Hearn deserves qualified immunity as to that claim.

Defendants warrant absolute immunity against Count II’s Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim for a sexual abuse charge against Dillard: any alleged

unlawful detention arose from the Defendant’s grand jury testimony, and Dillard has

not alleged any other appropriate basis to hold Defendants liable for his detention. As

for Count III, Hamilton enjoys prosecutorial immunity against Plaintiffs’ procedural

due process claims regarding her alleged accession to the grand jury’s determination of

their bonds.

Therefore, based upon the following discussion, the court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint

if it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662 (2009), the Court revisited the applicable standard governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions

to dismiss. First, courts must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state

the applicable claims at issue. Id. at 675.

After establishing the elements of the claim at issue, the court identifies all well-

pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and assumes their veracity.

Id. at 679. Well-pleaded factual allegations do not encompass mere “labels and

conclusions,” legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or formulaic recitations and

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Id. at 678 (citations omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, the court may draw reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d

1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005).

Third, a court assesses the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations to determine if

they state a plausible cause of action based upon the identified claim’s elements. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility ensues “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged,” and the analysis involves a context-specific task requiring a court

“to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678, 679 (citations

omitted). The plausibility standard does not equate to a “probability requirement,” yet

it requires more than a “mere possibility of misconduct” or factual statements that are

“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Id. (citations omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint presents the following well-pleaded fact

allegations.

Dillard’s Alleged Sexual Abuse of Sheffield

On August 18, 2015, Leslie Sheffield, a sergeant for the Lawrence County Drug

Task Force, assisted the Lauderdale County Drug Task Force with an investigation of

Plaintiffs for committing alleged human trafficking. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 9; Doc. 5–7 at 2–3).2

Sheffield assumed an undercover role as “Britney Wilson,” an inmate arrested for drug

manufacturing, and wore an audio recording device. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 14, 108–10; Doc. 5–

7 at 2–3). Charles “Chuck” Hearn, an agent for the LCDTF, arranged for Sheffield to

appear before Judge Carol Medley for a “staged” initial appearance with Judge Medley’s

knowledge and participation. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 8, 14, 108; Doc. 5–7 at 2–3). Before being

transported to the courthouse, Sheffield’s collaborators shackled her hands and feet.

(Doc. 5 at ¶ 109; Doc. 5–7 at 3).

Plaintiff Edward Ray “Chip” Dillard, a criminal defense attorney unaware of the

undercover operation, represented Sheffield at the staged proceeding. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 14,

109). Hearn acted as the investigator for the fictious drug manufacturing case. (Id.).

Angie King Hamilton, the Chief Assistant District Attorney at the time, acted as the

prosecutor for the case. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 14, 109). At the initial appearance, Dillard stood

immediately to the right of Sheffield, who stood shackled with her hands in front of

her. (Id. at ¶ 109).

The audio recording device that Sheffield wore captured the entire proceeding.

(Id. at ¶ 110). The device captured Dillard “discussing with Sheffield matters pertinent

to her case and discussing with Judge Medley the lowering of Sheffield’s bond amount.”

2 Plaintiffs attached several documents to their complaint as exhibits, including documents central to

the disputes at issue. (See docs. 5–1 to 5–9). Courts may consider documents attached to a complaint

when analyzing a motion to dismiss. See Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted)

(Id. at ¶ 112). During the proceeding, Judge Medley handed Dillard a bond reduction

order. (Id. at ¶¶ 111, 113). Dillard stated he would place the order into the breast

pocket of Sheffield’s jail uniform and Sheffield replied, “Okay.” (Id. at ¶ 113). The

device then captured “a sound suggestive of paper being inserted into Sheffield’s

pocket.” (Id.). After the proceeding, Sheffield “casually talk[ed], jok[ed] and laugh[ed]

with individuals whom she encounter[ed] as she exit[ed] the courtroom.” (Id. at ¶ 114).

Later that day, Sheffield drafted a report regarding the undercover operation.

(Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 14, 117; Doc. 5–7 at 2–3). In her report, she alleged Dillard fondled her

breast as he placed the bond reduction order into the breast pocket of her jail uniform.

(Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 14, 111). Sheffield’s report, in relevant part, reads as follows:

On August 18th, 2015, I Sgt. Lesley Sheffield, with the Lawrence County

Drug Task Force, was assigned to assist Lauderdale County Drug Task Force

with a Human Trafficking case. While assisting, I acted in the official capacity as

an Undercover Employee.

During this investigation I was placed in the Lauderdale County jail as an inmate

that had been arrested earlier in the morning hours on this date. Following my

placement in the jail, a 72 hour hearing was arranged by the Agent Hearn.

Before I was transported to the courthouse by Jail Administration, I went

through the procedure of being shackled, my hands were placed in front of me

and my feet were shackled together.

We arrived at the courthouse, and I was escorted to the fourth floor of Judge

Medleys [sic] courtroom.

I sat in the courtroom until Judge Medley entered, and then I stood before her.

I exchanged a brief conversation with my attorney Chip Dillard,and [sic] the

hearing began to take place. When the hearing was finished, I was give [sic] a

copy of my paperwork from the Judge. Mr. Dillard took the paperwork, and

folded it in half. He made a remark to the effect of, here I’ll get that for you, and

started trying to put the paper in a pocket that covered my left breast. He then

put his hand down in the pocket with his palm facing my breast, and grabbed me

several times as he was putting the paper in my pocket. When [Dillard] turned

away from me I looked at Agent Chuck Hearn, who was sitting in the courtroom,

to make sure I had a witness to this incident. I was shackled at the time this

incident took place.

After the hearing I was escorted out of the courtroom and taken to the Sheriff’s

Officer, where I met with the other Agents involved in this case. They removed

the shackles and a recording device that I had on me.

(Doc. 5 at ¶ 116; Doc. 5–7 at 2–3).

Subsequently, Hearn drafted and filed an “Agent’s Memo” which included

Sheffield’s report.3 (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 14, 111). The memo, in relevant part, reads as follows:

My name is Chuck Hearn. I am a Police Officer for the Florence Police

Department, in Florence, Alabama. I am currently assigned as an Investigator for

the Lauderdale County Drug Task Force. I have been in law enforcement for

approximately sixteen (16) years.

On 08/18/2015 Sgt. Leslie Sheffield (Lawrence County DTF) was used

as an undercover officer for an operation with Lauderdale County Drug Task

Force. On this date, Sheffield met with “Chip” Dillard during her 72 hour

hearing in front of Judge Medley. The visit was recorded with audio. I requested

a report from Sgt. Sheffield on this incident. Due to the different ways agencies

complete their reports I was unable to open her report. Sgt [sic] Sheffield then

emailed me a narrative that she copied and pasted from her report. I then copied

her narrative and included [sic] in this report.

(Doc. 5 at ¶ 117; Doc. 5–7 at 2).

On May 26, 2016, Hamilton brought charges against the Plaintiffs before a grand

jury, which thereto issued a secret indictment and arrest warrants for Plaintiffs. (Doc.

5 at ¶¶ 5–6, 11, 27, 118–19, 180). Both Sheffield and Hearn testified before the grand

3 Hearn’s memo contains no date. (Doc. 5–7 at 2–3).

jury as to Dillard’s alleged fondling at the initial appearance, and based upon the

testimony the indictment lodged a second-degree sexual abuse charge contending

Dillard “intentionally subject[ed] another person to wit: L.S. a/k/a B.W., to sexual

contact while the said L.S. a/k/a B.W. was incapable of consent.” (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 118–

19; Doc. 5–1 at 4). Dillard avers Sheffield and Hearn rendered false statements as to

the alleged fondling. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 125–29).

Further, the grand jury charged Dillard with seven counts of human trafficking

in the second-degree, four counts of conspiracy to commit human trafficking in the

second-degree, and three counts of obstruction. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 5, 12; Doc. 5–1). It also

charged Staggs with five counts of human trafficking in the second-degree and four

counts of conspiracy to commit human trafficking in the second-degree. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶

6, 12; Doc. 5–1). Plaintiffs underwent arrest the same day pursuant to the issued arrest

warrants. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 5–6, 11, 16, 27, 180).

Defendants’ Bond Amounts

In addition, the grand jury set bond amounts and conditions as part of the

indictment and arrest warrants. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 15, 181–82, 198; Doc. 5–1 at 11; Doc. 5–

8 at 2). The grand jury set Dillard’s bond at $500,000 and required him to pay the full

amount in cash only. (Id.). Similarly, the grand jury set Stagg’s bond at $300,000 and

required him to pay the full amount in cash only as well. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 15, 181, 183;

Doc. 5–1 at 11).

On May 27, 2016, a Lauderdale County Circuit Judge convened an initial

appearance with Plaintiffs. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 184; Alabama v. Dillard, CC-2016-000340.00,

Doc. 2; Alabama v. Staggs, CC-2016-000342.00, Doc. 2).4 Adhering to the bond amounts

and conditions recorded in the indictment and arrest warrants, the judge determined

Dillard had to post a $500,000 cash only bond and Staggs had to post a $300,000 cash

only bond to accomplish their respective releases. (Id.).

A grand jury subsequently indicted Plaintiffs on additional charges. (Doc. 5 at

¶¶ 16, 27, 187; Doc. 5–9). The second grand jury charged Dillard with two counts of

human trafficking in the first-degree, one count of human trafficking in the second-

degree, and six counts of obstruction. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 16; Doc. 5–9). The grand jury set

the bond at $225,000 and required Dillard to pay the full amount in cash only, bringing

Dillard’s total bond amount for both indictments to $725,000. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 16, 187–

89; Doc. 5–9). Dillard could not post bond due to his indigency. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 20, 186,

189).

The same grand jury also indicted Staggs on additional charges: two counts of

human trafficking in the first-degree and one count of human trafficking in the second-

degree. (Id. at ¶ 16). The grand jury set Stagg’s bond for these additional charges at

$100,000 and required him to pay the full amount in cash only, bringing his total bond

4 The court may take judicial notice of Plaintiffs’ state court criminal records found at

www.alacourt.com. See Grider v. Cook, 522 F. App’x 544, 545 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation

omitted) (“[T]he district court was permitted to take judicial notice of Grider’s state court criminal

proceedings”); see also Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014) (taking

judicial notice of DeKalb County Superior Court Online Judicial System pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201).

amount for both indictments to $400,000. (Id.). Staggs posted his $400,000 cash only

bond and had to wear a GPS ankle monitor as a condition for his release. (Id.).

Dillard’s counsel filed a motion in state court to reduce Dillard’s bond and

convert it from a cash only bond to either a surety or property bond. (Id. at ¶ 190).

Pursuant to the motion, the state court lowered Dillard’s bond to a $300,000 cash only

bond. (Id.). The State of Alabama filed an emergency motion to reconsider Dillard’s

bond reduction and to stay the court’s order reducing Dillard’s bond. (Id.). The State

based its motion on allegations made by Dillard’s cellmate. (Id. at ¶ 190 n.22). The

cellmate alleged Dillard rendered statements “threatening in nature toward victims,

witnesses, law enforcement officers, and other State employees” involved in his

investigation. (Id.). The cellmate also stated that he wanted help getting a lesser charge

for his conveyance of Dillard’s threats. (Id.). The state court granted the emergency

motion and reinstated Dillard’s original, $725,000 cash only bond. (Id. at ¶ 190).

Dillard’s counsel filed another motion to reduce his bond. (Id. at ¶ 191). The

state court reduced Dillard’s bond to $648,000 with the requirement Dillard post

$360,000 of that total in cash and secure the remaining by either cash or surety. (Id.).

Dillard’s counsel then filed a habeas petition in state court, challenging the

constitutionality of his bond amount, the cash-only condition, and the setting of his

bond by a grand jury, amongst other contentions. (Id. at ¶ 192). The court denied

Dillard’s habeas petition. (Id.).

Hearn’s Criminal Complaint Against Staggs for Human Trafficking

On August 10, 2017, S.T., a neighbor of Staggs, called the Florence Police

Department to report she observed Staggs with a young girl riding in the back of his

open bed truck. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 66). Law enforcement officers, including Hearn,

responded to the call and proceeded to Staggs’s residence. (Id. at ¶ 29). At the

residence, Staggs declared to the officers the young girl was his five-year-old

granddaughter. (Id.). The officers detained Staggs as Hearn questioned S.T. (Id.).

During the interview, S.T. provided Hearn with a signed, handwritten statement

discussing a conversation that allegedly transpired between her and Staggs. (Id.). S.T.’s

written statement reads as follows:

Yesterday I went to the mailbox. My neighbor Mr. Staggs approach [sic] me and

ask [sic] me to find him two black girls that can suck a good dick but be a lady in

the street. Yesterday he pulled up but my husband didn’t answer. Today he

knocked on the door and was ask [sic] to leave and never come back. But he had

a little girl in the back of his truck and that’s when I flipped out totally and called

Florence Police. Also he offer [sic] to pay me $200 for the girls. He offer [sic] to

pay me $200.00 for two black girls and he wanted one of the black girls to go

live with him in Tenn. when his ankle bracelets get removed in December.

(Doc. 5 at ¶ 33; 5–2 at 2–3).

As a result of the foregoing circumstances, Hearn filed a criminal complaint

against Staggs for human trafficking in the first-degree. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 31). Hearn’s

complaint reads as follows:

On 08/09/2017 Timothy Staggs approached a female (S.T.) and asked her to

find two young girls for him. He stated that he would pay Taylor $200.00 if she

would locate two young girls and that they “needed to suck a good dick but be a

lady in the street.” He further told her that he would want one of them to live

with him and work for him but she could not have a boyfriend and could not see

anyone. He further stated that the girl would live with him in Tennessee. On

8/10/2017 the female (S.T.) saw Staggs with a small child in his truck and

became worried. She then called police.

(Doc. 5 at ¶ 34; 5–3 at 2).

Based upon Hearn’s complaint, a magistrate judge issued an arrest warrant for

Staggs. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 31; Doc. 5–4 at 2). The arrest warrant asserted Hearn’s complaint

established probable cause that Staggs engaged in human trafficking vis-à-vis Hearn’s

averments. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 32; Doc. 5–4 at 2). That same day, Staggs underwent arrest

pursuant to the warrant. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 6, 18, 35). In addition, the state court revoked

Staggs’s bond based upon the new charge. (Id.).

A grand jury then indicted Staggs for human trafficking based upon the alleged

August 2017 incident. (Doc. 5 at ¶ 36; Doc. 5–5 at 2). The indictment stated Staggs

“knowingly recruit[ed] and/or solicit[ed] a minor or minors for the purpose of causing

a minor or minors to engage in sexual servitude.” (Id.). Furthermore, the indictment

listed Hearn as the sole state witness. (Id.).

Procedural History

On February 11, 2019, Plaintiffs’ trial commenced on 27 charges and lasted

approximately three weeks (Dillard’s nine obstruction charges and Staggs’s August 2017

human trafficking charge had separate trial dates). (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 22, 37). During the

final week of the trial, the state court nol prossed three of Dillard’s human trafficking

charges from the July 2016 indictment. (Id. at ¶ 22). On March 1, 2019, the jury

acquitted Plaintiffs of all charges. (Id. at ¶¶ 5–6, 23, 37, 122).

Following the acquittal, the state court reduced Dillard’s bond to $117,000, and

it did not require a cash only payment. (Id. at ¶ 194). Subsequently, Dillard posted a

property bond, secured by the home of an extended family member, and the state court

released him on house arrest with a GPS ankle monitor. (Id.). On May 22, 2019, the

state court nol prossed Staggs’s August 2017 human trafficking charge. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 24,

38; Doc. 5–6 at 3).

Plaintiffs filed an initial Complaint followed by the operative First Amended

Complaint, alleging constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I,

Plaintiffs claim that Hearn’s criminal complaint against Staggs for Human Trafficking

lacked probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, and further, he intentionally lodged

material misstatements and omissions in the complaint. In Count II, Plaintiffs assert

Defendants did not have probable to cause to advance a sexual abuse charge against

Dillard based upon the alleged fondling of Sheffield, conspired to fabricate and present

false testimony to a grand jury, and fabricated evidence to institute a criminal

prosecution against Dillard. In Count III, Plaintiffs aver that Hamilton acquiesced in

the grand jury’s setting of their respective bond amounts.

DISCUSSION

I. Hearn’s Criminal Complaint Contained Sufficient Information to

Establish Probable Cause and Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege Hearn

Intentionally Rendered Misstatements or Omissions in his Complaint

In Count I of the First Amended Complaint, Staggs challenges his August 2017

arrest and detention for human trafficking as a malicious prosecution in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Staggs specifically claims that Hearn “should have known that his

[criminal complaint] failed to establish probable cause” for an arrest warrant and that

he “intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions [in his complaint] . . .

necessary to support the warrant.” (Doc. 5 at ¶ 42) (citing Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d

1147, 1165 (11th Cir. 2020)). Pursuant to Hearn’s motion to dismiss and the applicable

legal standards, Hearn enjoys qualified immunity to the count because Dillard’s

allegations fail to state a claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d

1047, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Simply put, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,

551 (2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted). To obtain qualified immunity, a government

official “must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary

authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1054

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There exists no dispute the Defendants

engaged in discretionary functions when performing all of the acts contested by

Plaintiffs.

After this showing, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified

immunity is not appropriate.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “‘Because

qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, but also from suit, it is important

for a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit

as possible.’” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). Officials who acted within their discretionary

authority “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was

‘clearly established at the time.’” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)

(citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). As the following analyses reveal,

Hearn did not violate Staggs’s Fourth Amendment rights vis-à-vis the August 2017

arrest and detention.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” and provides that “no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV.; see Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (“One of the [Fourth]

Amendment’s protections is the right to be free from arrest without probable cause.”

(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 2021 WL 666396 (U.S. 2021); Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285)

(“An arrest made without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure.” (citing Grider v.

City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010)); id (“[T]he law requires that a

warrant for an arrest be supported by ‘sufficient information to establish probable

cause.’” (citations omitted)). Staggs argues Hearn violated his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from an unreasonable seizure as a result of a malicious prosecution.

For a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, Staggs must prove “he

suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process that violated the Fourth Amendment . . .

and satisfy the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Luke v.

Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Noting a significant overlap exists between a Fourth Amendment violation

pursuant to legal process and a common law malicious prosecution claim, Luke, 975

F.3d at 1144, the Eleventh Circuit streamlined the Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution standard into two elements: “a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant

violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures pursuant to legal process

and (2) that the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor.” Washington

v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Luke, 975 F.3d at 1144) (internal

quotation marks omitted). There exists no dispute Staggs satisfied the second prong

because a jury acquitted him of the pertinent charge.

To establish the first prong of the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution

standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate “the legal process justifying his seizure was

constitutionally infirm,” and “his seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal

process.” Luke, 975 F.3d at 1144 (citing Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165). Staggs satisfied

the latter requirement because he was arrested on the criminal complaint, and his bond

revocation resulted in a prolonged detention that could not be justified without legal

process. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1167 (“Even if the officers had probable cause to

arrest [plaintiff] for attempted murder, [his] seizure was far too long to be justified

without legal process.” (citing Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991))).

Therefore, the analysis centers on whether the legal process causing the detention – the

legal proceeding underlying the arrest warrant – was constitutionally infirm.

The legal process prescription under the Fourth Amendment includes

proceedings to secure an arrest warrant. Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th

Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020)

(“Laskar alleges that he suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process. . . . Laskar alleges

that state law enforcement obtained a warrant for his seizure. He also alleges that he

was arrested and ‘deprived of his personal liberty.’ Taken together, these allegations

suffice to plead a seizure pursuant to legal process.”). To prove the constitutional

infirmity of an arrest warrant, a plaintiff may establish either “the officer who applied

for the warrant should have known that his application failed to establish probable

cause,” or “an official, including an individual who did not apply for the warrant,

intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to support the

warrant.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165 (citations omitted). The court will first analyze

whether Hearn should have known that his complaint failed to establish probable cause.

A. Hearn’s Criminal Complaint Established Probable Cause

For this species of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, the

question ensues “whether a reasonably well-trained officer in [Hearn’s] position would

have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not

have applied for the warrant.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (footnote

omitted). “Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause

as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable . . . will the shield of immunity

be lost.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984));

see also Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court held

that qualified immunity does not protect an officer who seeks a warrant on the basis of

an affidavit that does not show reasonably objective probable cause—even if the

magistrate erroneously issues the warrant.” (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45)).

This standard does not allow an officer to rehabilitate “an otherwise insufficient

affidavit” with information not disclosed to the issuing magistrate judge. Id. (citing

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971)). Thus, courts must consider “whether

‘the judicial officer issuing such a warrant [was] supplied with sufficient information to

support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.’” Williams,

965 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564); see also id. at 1162-63 (“[W]arrantless

arrests concern whether the facts known to the arresting officer establish probable

cause, while seizures pursuant to legal process concern whether the judicial officer who

approved the seizure had sufficient information to find probable cause.”); W. Point-

Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 959 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding judicial review of

whether an officer’s affidavit contains probable cause “must be strictly confined to the

information brought to the magistrate’s attention” (citations omitted)).

As for the probable cause standard itself, “the Supreme Court explained that

probable cause exists when the facts, considering the totality of the circumstances and

viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer, establish ‘a probability or

substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Washington, 25 F.4th at 898 (quoting Wesby,

138 S. Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Probable cause does not require

conclusive evidence and ‘is not a high bar.’” Id. at 899 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586

(internal quotation marks omitted)). A showing of probable cause “‘requires only a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such

activity.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (citations omitted). “A reviewing court must simply

ask ‘whether a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there was a substantial chance

of criminal activity.’” Washington, 25 F.4th at 899 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588)

(emphasis in original).

The existence of probable cause “‘depends on the elements of the alleged crime

and the operative fact pattern.’” Stallworth v. Hurst, No. 21-10731, 2021 WL 6143557,

at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (citing Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298

(11th Cir. 2018)). Courts must not examine facts in isolation but “‘consider the whole

picture’ because ‘the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.’” Manners v.

Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588). “Because

probable cause ‘deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the

circumstances,’ . . . it is ‘a fluid concept’ that is ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to

a neat set of legal rules.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (citations omitted). Lastly, “in

deciding whether probable cause exists, [officers] are not required to sift through

conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the

circumstances present a sufficient basis for [probable cause].” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Based upon the foregoing legal standard, the court must determine whether

Hearn’s criminal complaint contained sufficient information evincing probable cause

to arrest Staggs for human trafficking in the first-degree.5 In relevant part, the statute

provides:

(a) A person commits the crime of human trafficking in the first degree if:

(1) He or she knowingly subjects another person to labor servitude or

sexual servitude through use of coercion or deception.

(2) He or she knowingly obtains, recruits, entices, solicits, induces,

threatens, isolates, harbors, holds, restrains, transports, provides, or

maintains any minor for the purpose of causing a minor to engage in

5 “If the warrant stated that its issuance was based on probable cause shown, . . . [the court] might

presume that oral testimony was presented which supported the magistrate’s determination.” Garmon

v. Lumpkin Cty., Ga., 878 F.2d 1406, 1409 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989). The court does not consider such oral

testimony in this case, however, because “the warrant explicitly states that it is supported by

information . . . [in Hearn’s complaint].” Id.; c.f., Stefani v. City of Grovetown, 780 F. App’x 842, 851 n.4

(11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Because the arrest warrants were expressly issued based on the affidavit

and ‘oral testimony given under oath,’ we consider both the affidavit and [the officer’s] oral

testimony.” (citations omitted)).

sexual servitude.

(3) For purposes of this section, it is not required that the defendant have

knowledge of a minor victim’s age, nor is reasonable mistake of age a

defense to liability under this section.

2010 Ala. Laws Act 2010-705, Ala. Code § 13A-6-152 (2010) (amended 2018).6 The

pertinent statutory definitions provide as follows:

(1) COERCION. Any of the following:

a. Causing or threatening to cause physical injury or mental suffering to

any person, physically restraining or confining any person, or threatening

to physically restrain or confine any person or otherwise causing the

person performing or providing labor or services to believe that the

person or another person will suffer physical injury or mental suffering.

b. Implementing any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person

to believe that failure to perform an act would result in physical injury,

mental suffering, or physical restraint of any person.

. . .

g. Rape or sodomy or threatened rape or sodomy of any person, as defined

in Title 13A.7

. . .

6 Alabama amended the statute in 2018, and thus, the court provides the statue and all relevant

definitions as they existed in August 2017.

7 At the time of the alleged offense, Alabama defined rape in the first-degree, in part, as a person,

“being 16 years old or older, [who] engages in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex

who is less than 12 years old.” 2000 Ala. Laws Act 2000-726, Ala. Code § 13A-6-61 (2000) (amended

2019). In addition, at the time of the alleged offense Alabama defined sodomy in the first-degree as a

person, “being 16 years old or older, [who] engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a person who is

less than 12 years old.” 1977 Ala. Laws 1977-607, Ala. Code § 13A-6-63 (1977) (amended 2019).

Alabama defined “deviate sexual intercourse” at the time as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification between

persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of

another.” 1977 Ala. Laws 1977-607, Ala. Code § 13A-6-60 (1977) (repealed 2019).

(3) LABOR SERVITUDE. Work or service of economic or financial value

which is performed or provided by another person and is induced or obtained

by coercion or deception.

. . .

(5) MINOR. A person under the age of 18.

. . .

(7) SEXUAL SERVITUDE. Any of the following:

a. Any sexual conduct . . . for which anything of value is directly or

indirectly given, promised to, or received by any person, which conduct is

induced or obtained by coercion or deception from a person.

2010 Ala. Laws Act 2010-705, Ala. Code § 13A-6-151 (2010) (amended 2018).

Hearn’s criminal complaint readily evinces probable cause that Staggs violated

the foregoing provisions. Distilling the pertinent provisions, a perpetrator commits

human trafficking in the first degree by recruiting, soliciting, inducing, or transporting

a minor to engage in sexual servitude. The statutes define sexual servitude alternately

as giving someone money to engage in coerced sexual conduct (i.e., rape or sodomy)

with a minor.

Hearn declared in his criminal complaint that on August 9, 2017, Staggs

approached S.T. and offered her $200 to find him “two young girls” that “needed to

suck a good dick but be a lady in the street.” These statements demonstrate Hearn’s

assessment that Staggs offered money to S.T. to recruit or solicit “young girls” to engage

in sexual conduct. A reasonable officer could also maintain that by alleging the

procurement of “young girls,” the complaint averred Staggs desired to obtain minors

to engage in such sexual conduct, which would violate the rape or sodomy statutes.

The complaint also averred Staggs desired one of the girls to live with and work

for him in Tennessee, but the girl could not have a boyfriend or see anyone. This

averment reasonably establishes Staggs planned to transport a minor from Alabama to

Tennessee to engage in sexual conduct given the other averments. In addition, a

reasonable officer could maintain that Staggs would threaten physical injury and

emotional suffering to confine the minor so that she could not have a boyfriend or see

anyone. Staggs even admits that such an allegation “lend[s] the impression of the

controlling behavior frequently associated with human traffickers.” (Doc. 5 at ¶ 52).

Lastly, the complaint discussed that on August 10, 2017, S.T. became worried

when she observed Staggs with a small child in his truck and called the police. Based

on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could discern a “probability or

substantial chance” that Staggs procured this child in exchange for money and intended

to subject the child to sexual servitude through the use of either physical confinement,

emotional suffering, rape, or sodomy. Thus, Hearn’s complaint established probable

cause to arrest Staggs for human trafficking in the first-degree under Alabama Code §

13A-6-152. Accordingly, Staggs failed to demonstrate that Hearn should have known

that his complaint failed to establish probable cause.

Staggs’s representation that the five-year-old girl in the truck was his

granddaughter does not mar the probable cause finding. Hearn sustained “no

obligation to give any credence to [Staggs’s] story.” Andrews v. Marshall, No.

216CV814FTM99MRM, 2019 WL 11638833, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2019), aff’d, 845

F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Williams v. City

of Homestead, Fla., 206 F. App’x 886, 888–89 (11th Cir. 2006)); see Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588

(“[P]robable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation

for suspicious facts.”); Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“[Officer] was ‘not required to forego arresting’ [the plaintiff] ‘based on initially

discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [the plaintiff] offered a

different explanation.’” (citations omitted)).

Furthermore, S.T. does not constitute an unreliable source simply because she

offered a lone, signed, handwritten statement detailing her allegations. Davis v. Orange

Cty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 620CV1400ORL37DCI, 2020 WL 6144654, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.

6, 2020) (“The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that a single witness’[s] statements are

enough to establish probable cause.” (citing Martin v. Wood, 648 F. App’x 911, 916 (11th

Cir. 2016)); see United States v. Hodge, 714 F.3d 380, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Statements

from a source named in a warrant application . . . are generally sufficient to establish

probable cause without further corroboration because the legal consequences of lying

to law enforcement officials tend to ensure reliability.” (citation omitted)). Moreover,

Hearn’s knowledge that Staggs faced several charges for human trafficking buttressed

the reliability of S.T.’s statement, and more concretely, the reasonableness of the

probable cause determination. See Mears v. McCulley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1323–24

(N.D. Ala. 2012) (“An individual’s prior convictions support a finding of probable cause

to arrest, so long as the prior conviction had probative value to the arresting officer in

concluding that the arrestee committed a crime.” (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 172–78 (1949) (holding a police officer’s knowledge of an individual’s prior arrest

and pending charges contributed to a finding of probable cause); United States v. Lindsey,

482 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the knowledge of police officers that

the defendant was previously convicted of armed robbery added to a finding of

probable cause to arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm))); see also 2 Wayne

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d) (6th ed. Dec. 2021 Update) (“[A] suspect’s prior

convictions and prior arrests or charges are not barred from consideration on the issue

of probable cause) (footnotes omitted); id. at § 3.4(c) (“[A] person’s past criminal record

and other similar facts may be taken into account in making a probable cause

determination.”).

Plaintiffs argue that Hearn “elect[ed] not to obtain easily discoverable facts” that

could have exculpated Staggs because Hearn “could have easily and quickly acquired

the GPS data from Staggs’s ankle monitor to verify S.T.’s claims of Staggs’s being on

her property . . . .” (Doc. 5 at ¶ 69) (citing Cozzi v. City of Birmingham, 892 F.3d 1288,

1294 (11th Cir. 2018)). Based on the facts known to Hearn at the time, probable cause

existed to conclude Staggs had committed human trafficking, and thus, the law did not

require Hearn “to sift through conflicting evidence” because “the totality of the

circumstances [already] present[ed] a sufficient basis for believing that an offense ha[d]

been committed.” Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted); Davis, 2020 WL, at *2

(“If it is reasonable to conclude from the body of evidence as a whole that a crime was

committed, the presence of some conflicting evidence or a possible defense will not

vitiate a finding of probable cause.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The circumstances do not depict a situation in which Staggs conducted an investigation

in a biased manner, deliberately elected not to obtain the GPS date, or consciously

ignored any GPS data that he already possessed. See Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239,

1248 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining prior Eleventh Circuit case law found officers liable

when they “conduct an investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily

discoverable facts,” or “consciously ignore[ ] information they already possessed that

cast significant doubt on whether a [person] was guilty” (citations omitted)).

Therefore, a reasonable officer in Hearn’s position would not have known his

criminal complaint failed to establish probable cause.

B. Hearn Did Not Lodge Any Intentional or Reckless Misstatements or

Omissions in His Criminal Complaint

In the same fashion, Hearn did not intentionally or recklessly lodge any material

misstatements or omissions in his criminal complaint. To prevail on his allegations,

Staggs must “‘identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that’” Hearn

lied in his criminal complaint. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1166 (citation omitted). “Negligent

misstatements or omissions” do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Paez, 915 F.3d at

1287 (citing Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1555). The Eleventh Circuit deploys a two-part test for

the inquiry at bar. “First, we ask whether there was an intentional or reckless

misstatement or omission.” Id. “Then, we examine the materiality of the information

by inquiring whether probable cause would be negated if the offending statement was

removed or the omitted information included.” Id. (citations omitted).

As for the first part of the test, “qualified immunity bars such claims unless ‘the

plaintiff can prove that the officer perjured himself -- that is, put forth information he did

not believe or accept as true -- in order to obtain a search warrant.’” Woodring v. Hart, No.

614-CV-1067-ORL-37, 2015 WL 2238056, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2015) (emphasis in

original) (quoting Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App’x 904, 908 (11th Cir. 2014)). “Accordingly,

at the motion to dismiss stage, viably alleging a perjurious-statement malicious-

prosecution claim requires factual allegations bearing on the officer’s ‘subjective belief

about the veracity of the assertions made in his affidavit.’” Id. (citing Carter, 557 F.

App’x at 910). “‘General attacks upon a defendant’s credibility’ are not enough to meet

this burden. . . . Nor are conclusory allegations and speculation.” Williams, 965 F.3d at

1165–66 (citations omitted).

Staggs alleges Hearn’s complaint “is based on—and directly quotes from—S.T.’s

[handwritten] statement” and contains “material misstatements, omissions and

fabrications” as to what S.T.’s statement alleged. (Doc. 5 at ¶¶ 50–51, 54). Specifically,

Staggs alleges that Hearn “intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions

necessary to” establish probable cause to arrest Staggs for human trafficking. (Id. at ¶¶

49, 54) (citing Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165).

Staggs identify the following statements in the criminal complaint as material

misstatements or omissions. In S.T.’s statement, she alleged Staggs offered her $200 to

find him two “black” girls, whereas Hearn declared in his complaint that Staggs offered

S.T. $200 to find him two “young” girls. Next, S.T. alleged in her statement that Staggs

“wanted one of the black girls to go live with him in [Tennessee]” upon removal of his

ankle monitor. In comparison, Hearn’s complaint declares Staggs “want[ed] one of [the

girls] to live with him and work for him [in Tennessee] but she could not have a

boyfriend and could not see anyone.” Lastly, S.T. alleged Staggs “had a little girl in the

back of his truck” while Hearn’s complaint states S.T. “saw Staggs with a small child in

his truck.”

Staggs does not sufficiently allege that Hearn intentionally or recklessly lodged

misstatements and omissions in his complaint. The foregoing statements do not

constitute material misstatements or omissions. As for the first contested statement,

Hearn’s reference to “young girls” rather than “black girls” does not represent a

misstatement or omission. The race or ethnicity of a minor bears no relevance for a

human trafficking charge. And adding the descriptor “young” to the noun “girls” does

not materially misstate any of S.T.’s declarations. Alabama’s human trafficking statute

applied to any type of minor, including “girls,” whether “young,” teen, or any other

designation. The same conclusion applies to the third, contested statement referenced

previously: the distinction between “little girl in the back of his truck” and “small child

in his trick” reflects a trivial concern when either formulation supports the finding of

probable cause.

The second, alleged misstatement or omission – Hearn’s allusion that Staggs did

not want the minor to “have a boyfriend and could not see anyone” – reflects a flaw in

Staggs’s reasoning. The crux of Staggs’s argument hinges on his allegation that Hearn

based his complaint on S.T.’s handwritten statement, and thus, any deviation from her

statement signals Hearn intentionally lied in his complaint in an effort to establish

probable cause. The court disagrees.

As recounted previously, Hearn questioned and interviewed S.T. when he

responded to her 911 emergency call. Therefore, in addition to S.T.’s written statement,

Hearn obtained information from S.T. during the interview. And other than conclusory

allegations and speculation, Staggs does not allege S.T. never made such allegations; he

only alleges that she did not make such allegations in her handwritten statement. That

Hearn included information not found in S.T.’s handwritten statement does not

plausibly suggest the additional information reflects an intentional misrepresentation

given the interview he conducted with S.T.

Notwithstanding Staggs’s allegation that Hearn based his complaint on S.T.’s

handwritten statement, the court does not find it plausible that Hearn solely based his

complaint on the information contained within S.T.’s handwritten statement given that

he also interviewed her. Therefore, Staggs fails to plausibly suggest that Hearn

subjectively did not believe the veracity of the allegations in his complaint. See Carter,

557 F. App’x at 910 (dismissing a malicious prosecution claim based on an alleged

Franks violation because the plaintiff failed to “allege facts to plausibly suggest that [the

affiant-officer] did not believe or appropriately accept as true his ultimate assertion that

[the plaintiff] was guilty”); c.f. Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1548 (finding a police officer submitted

an affidavit for an arrest warrant against the plaintiff for possession of cocaine,

notwithstanding the fact that the officer knew plaintiff did not possess a controlled

substance). Therefore, Hearn’s criminal complaint did not contain any intentional or

reckless misstatements or omissions.

Based upon the foregoing review, Hearn deserves qualified immunity to the

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim in Count I of the Amended

Complaint.

II. Hamilton, Hearn, and Sheffield Enjoy Absolute Immunity Against

Dillard’s Fourth Amendment Claim Regarding the Sexual Abuse Charge.

In Count II of the Complaint, Dillard claims Hamilton, Hearn, and Sheffield

violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures and unlawful

detentions (termed a malicious prosecution) because they fabricated the facts

underlying the sexual abuse charge levied against him. All three Defendants enjoy

absolute immunity to this claim because it rests upon Hamilton’s acts as a prosecutor

and the other Defendants’ testimony during a grand jury proceeding. There exists no

other conduct supporting a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.

As an initial matter, the nature of the claim at issue guides the focus upon the

pertinent conduct. Dillard advances a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious

prosecution. Fundamentally for the allegations at bar, a Fourth Amendment claim

requires an unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process. Laskar, 972 F.3d at 1284; Williams,

965 F.3d at 1157–59. The alleged, unlawful seizure Dillard suffered constitutes his

arrest and pretrial detention pursuant to the grand jury’s indictment and the arrest

warrant issued thereto. And the role Defendants played in effecting Dillard’s arrest and

pretrial detention rests upon Hamilton’s conduct in securing the sexual abuse charge

from the grand jury, and Hearn’s and Sheffield’s testimony rendered during the grand

jury proceedings. All of their conduct warrants absolute immunity from Dillard’s

Fourth Amendment claim.

As for Hamilton’s conduct, “prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the

initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281

(11th Cir. 1999) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). “The official seeking

absolute immunity bears the burden of showing such immunity is justified.” Id.

(citations omitted). Prosecutors only have absolute immunity for activities “‘intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d

828, 837 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012). “This functional

approach looks to ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor

who performed it.” Id. (citations omitted).

Therefore, “[p]rosecutors are immune for appearances in judicial proceedings,

including prosecutorial conduct before grand juries, statements made during trial,

examination of witnesses, and presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant

during a probable cause hearing.” Rehberg, at 837–38 (citations omitted). In addition,

absolute immunity also “extends to a prosecutor’s acts undertaken . . . in preparing for

the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his

role as an advocate for the State.” Id. at 838 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Thus, regardless whether probable cause existed to charge Dillard with sexual

abuse, Hamilton enjoys absolute immunity for acting as an advocate for the State and

for presenting the State’s case before the grand jury. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

259, 274 n.5 (1993) (explaining “a prosecutor would be entitled to absolute immunity

for the malicious prosecution of someone whom he lacked probable cause to indict”

because the Court “found a common-law tradition of immunity for a prosecutor’s

decision to bring an indictment, whether he has probable cause or not”); Rowe v. City of

Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is clear that, even if [a

prosecutor] knowingly proffered perjured testimony . . ., [s]he is entitled to absolute

immunity from liability for doing so.”); Watkins v. Dubreuil, 820 F. App’x 940, 945 (11th

Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (finding prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity when plaintiff

alleged prosecutors initiated and pursued a baseless prosecution); id. (“A prosecutor is

entitled to absolute immunity for . . . the filing of charges.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

As for Hearn and Sheffield, Dillard asserts the grand jury issued an indictment

“predicated solely” on Sheffield’s false allegations that he fondled her breast during a

staged initial appearance. He contends Hearn and Sheffield (along with Hamilton)

conspired to present false testimony to the grand jury and prevailed in doing so by

testifying at the grand jury proceeding.

Witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from claims stemming from their grand jury

testimony. Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 367 (“[A] grand jury witness has absolute immunity from

any § 1983 claim based on the witness’[s] testimony.”). “Police officers enjoy the same

absolute immunity as lay witnesses for their testimony . . . in front of the grand jury.”

Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281; see Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 367 (“Neither is there any reason to

distinguish law enforcement witnesses from lay witnesses.”). In addition, witnesses

enjoy absolute immunity for claims of conspiracy to present false testimony and any

preparatory activity to render the testimony. See Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369–70 (finding

absolute immunity “may not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness

conspired to present false testimony” or attempting to bring a claim for “preparatory

activity” regarding grand jury testimony); Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 841 (finding a prosecutor

and officer “immune for their alleged conspiracy to fabricate and present false

testimony to the grand jury). Thus, the law entitles Hearn and Sheffield to absolute

immunity for any alleged conspiracy to present false testimony and any alleged, false

testimony proffered before the grand jury.

Notwithstanding the clear applicability of the absolute immunity doctrine to

Dillard’s claim, he latches his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim onto the

report and memo Sheffield and Hearn respectively drafted regarding the alleged

incident underlying the sexual abuse charge. At first blush, these documents

conceivably fall within Rehberg’s admonition that a § 1983 litigant cannot maintain a

claim regarding a witness’s preparatory activity for rendering allegedly fabricated grand

jury testimony. As Dillard indicates, however, Defendants drafted these statements

several months before the grand jury proceedings;8 therefore, the statements may fall

within the Rehberg directive that absolute immunity does not extend to “all activity that

a witness conducts outside of the grand jury room,” such as the falsification of affidavits

and the fabrication of evidence. Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 370 n.1 (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 129–131 (1997); Malley, 475 U.S. 335, 340–345; Buckley, 509 U.S., at 272–276).

For those reasons, Dillard seeks to hold Defendants liable for instituting a malicious

prosecution by fabricating evidence.

Dillard’s entreaty in this regard likewise fails. As an initial matter, the Supreme

Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process doctrine as a

foundation for a malicious prosecution claim vis-à-vis pre-trial conduct9: the Court

reminded litigants “the accused is not ‘entitled to judicial oversight or review of the

decision to prosecute.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (citations omitted).

Rather, the Court identified the Fourth Amendment as the source of constitutional

8 Sheffield’s report reflected a date of August 18, 2015, Hearn indicated he drafted his memo around

the same time, and the grand jury convened on May 26, 2016.

9 “[O]nce a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 n.8

(2017). Therefore, a litigant may maintain a claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause if there ensues a wrongful conviction or imprisonment based upon fabricated evidence.

rights for “deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” Id.

(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 381 (11th Cir.

1996) (“[A]n allegation of prosecution without probable cause must . . . be analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”(citation omitted)); Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 853

(“[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no substantive due process right to be

free from malicious prosecution without probable cause. . . . A malicious prosecution

claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process.”(citation omitted)); Jordan v. Mosley, 298 F. App’x 803, 806 (11th Cir. 2008)

(Malicious prosecution “is an independent cause of action that potentially is cognizable

under the Fourth Amendment.”(citing Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002–03 n.4 (11th

Cir. 1998) (holding if malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed by state

actors and results in the arrest or other seizure of defendant, the defendant’s only

remedy is under the Fourth Amendment), abrogated on other grounds by Nieves v. Bartlett,

139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019)). Therefore, as countenanced previously, to advance his

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim Dillard needs to demonstrate he

suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process. Luke, 975 F.3d at 1143.

And Dillard fails that standard vis-à-vis his attempt to use Sheffield’s report and

Hearn’s memo as a basis for his claim. First, there exists no averments Defendants

used those documents during any form of legal process. Pursuant to the First Amended

Complaint and prevailing facts, the grand jury indictment for sexual abuse rested upon

Sheffield’s and Hearn’s testimony, not their documents. A Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim requires that the offending conduct affect a legal process,

and Dillard’s allegations regarding the mere drafting of fallacious documents do not

satisfy this requirement. In the prevailing cases cited by the Rehberg decision, authorities

violated the Fourth Amendment by tendering false complaints to secure arrest warrants.

See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 122 (use of alleged fabricated evidence during the course of a

legal proceeding); Malley, 475 U.S. at 338, 340–41 (same).10

More importantly, Dillard’s allegations do not reveal how Hearn’s and Sheffield’s

documents led to any alleged, unlawful seizure. The Fourth Amendment proscribes

unreasonable seizures, and as delineated previously, the seizure at issue here resulted

from the grand jury process, particularly Hearn’s and Sheffield’s testimony at the grand

jury proceeding and Hamilton’s prosecutorial duties. Dillard cannot sustain his claim

upon a theory that Hearn and Sheffield merely memorialized fabricated evidence in a

couple of documents. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1167 (“Because Williams complains he

was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the relevant injury is the seizure that

followed the arrest warrant, not the broader prosecution.” (emphasis added) (citing Whiting v.

10 And Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), does not aid Dillard in this regard either. In Buckley,

the Court determined that prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity when they allegedly fabricated

evidence while exercising investigative functions, not prosecutorial functions. Id. at 272–76. And

importantly, the Court acknowledged an important assumption about its decision: the prosecutors

perpetrated “constitutional violations for which § 1983 provides a remedy.” Id. at 261. As the Court

admonished, evaluators should not “conflate the question whether a § 1983 plaintiff has stated a cause

of action with the question whether the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions.”

Id. at 275 n.5. Thus, the Court emphasized that precluding a prosecutor from enjoying absolute

immunity for fabricating evidence in performing an investigative role does not translate into § 1983

liability for the alleged fabrication. That is, the Buckley decision addressed the contours of absolute

prosecutorial immunity, not a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.

Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects against

‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ (and not ‘prosecutions’) . . . .”), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90 (2007))); Laskar, 972 F.3d at 1297 (“In Williams, we held

that ‘the relevant injury’ for a claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, ‘is the

seizure that followed the arrest warrant, not the broader prosecution.’” (emphasis added) (quoting

Williams, 965 F.3d at 1167)).

Essentially, Dillard’s entreaty in this regard elicits a causation determination:

principally, Hearn and Sheffield’s creation of the documents at issue did not cause his

detention. Rather, their testimony during the grand jury proceeding, and Hamilton’s

solicitation of such testimony, caused the detention at issue. See Williams, 965 F.3d at

1167 (delineating causation as an issue for malicious prosecution claims (citing Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (“[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to [a] deprivation of his constitutional rights.”); Paez,

915 F.3d at 1285 (explaining that the common-law elements of malicious prosecution

require the plaintiff to prove that the defendants “caused damage to” him))). And those

actions garner absolute immunity as to the alleged Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim.

To be sure, the Supreme Court posited that if a grand jury proceeding is tainted

by fabricated evidence, “and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing

pretrial detention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Manuel v.

City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 n.8 (2017). However, the Court set forth this

understanding based upon an unlawful detention that commenced with the use of

fabricated evidence for a warrantless arrest, and continued with the inclusion of such

evidence in a criminal complaint relied upon in a probable cause determination to

continue detention. Id. at 915–916, 919. Thus, the grand jury’s consideration of

fabricated evidence to issue an indictment failed to extinguish the lack of probable cause

underlying the litigant’s pretrial detention. Id. at 920 n.8. Notably, the Manuel decision

did not abrogate Rehberg in this regard. Therefore, although unlawful detention claims

stemming from other uses of fabricated evidence at legal proceedings may still garner

relief, absolute immunity still precludes a claim for the tainted testimony rendered

during a grand jury proceeding.

In a similar vein, the afore-discussed precept in Manuel may countenance “a claim

under the Fourth Amendment for a seizure that followed an indictment.” Williams, 965

F.3d at 1168 (citing Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8). In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit

declined to delineate such a claim, yet in Washington the Court reviewed the contours of

such a “continued detention” claim, that is, where detention continues unlawfully after

the conclusion of legal process. In that decision, the Court clarified that “a police

officer cannot intentionally or recklessly make material misstatements or omissions in

later testimony to continue detention, such as at an arraignment, indictment, or bond

hearing.” Washington, 25 F.4th at 907 (citing Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8). As revealed,

a continued detention claim requires that a defendant affirmatively act to continue a

prosecution, such as by rendering evidence at a legal proceeding. Id. at 906–07; see id.

at 912 (“To succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim for a seizure pursuant to legal

process in this context, a plaintiff must prove that the officer took an affirmative act to

continue the prosecution . . . .’”(citation omitted)). Dillard’s allegations do not contain

any references to Sheffield’s and Hearn’s affirmative participation in any further

proceedings after the grand jury indictment that continued his detention.11

Therefore, the court will dismiss Dillard’s Fourth Amendment claim stemming

from the sexual abuse charge.

III. Absolute Immunity Bars Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Claim

Against Hamilton

In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs pursue a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim to challenge the procedure used to set the

conditions and amounts of their bonds. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Hamilton

violated their procedural due process rights because she requested a grand jury set the

11 Finally, the Manuel precept in the decision’s footnote may actually countenance a broad unlawful

detention claim regardless of process, particularly for the failure to take affirmative action to rectify

the taint of fabricated evidence utilized at a legal proceeding. See Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920 n.8

(“Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable cause makes a difference for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment: Whatever its precise form, if the proceeding is tainted—as here,

by fabricated evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial

detention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights . . . .”). In those situations,

however, the claim would not present a malicious prosecution claim. Rather, the claim would

constitute a Fourth Amendment unlawful detention due to lack of probable cause, yet the any-crime

rule – which insulates officers from Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims so long as probable

cause existed to arrest an aggrieved for some crime, Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir.

2020) – may apply to such a claim. And in these circumstances, the any-crime rule may readily apply

because the grand jury indicted Dillard on several other charges. Further, the contours of such a claim

and the applicability of the any-crime rule reveals that any such claim may not be clearly established

for qualified immunity purposes. Therefore, the court will not evaluate the viability of such a claim

given that Dillard did not raise it.

conditions and amounts of their bonds, which purportedly contravenes Alabama law

requiring a judicial officer undertake such functions. Hamilton enjoys the protection

of absolute immunity against Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.12

As previously noted, “[a]bsolute immunity . . . applies to the prosecutor’s actions

‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.’” Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 837

(citing Imber, 424 U.S. at 431). Accordingly, the law entitles prosecutors to absolute

immunity for their prosecutorial conduct before grand juries. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at

837–38. “To the extent Plaintiff[s] contends that the prosecution improperly sought .

. . bail, prosecutors are absolutely immune for actions taken in connection with a bail

application which are best understood as components of the initiation and presentation

12 Hamilton argues the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ procedural due process

claim pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “[U]nder what has come to be known as the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final

state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam). Notably, “Rooker–

Feldman . . . is a narrow doctrine, confined to ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Id. at 464 (citation omitted).

However, “Rooker–Feldman does not prohibit a ‘district court from exercising subject-matter

jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in

state court.’” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corporation

v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005).

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge does not implicate any state court judgments, and their

claim does not inextricably intertwine with a state court judgment. To be sure, Plaintiffs express

chagrin with the bonds issued against them. Yet, their procedural due process claim arises from the

grand jury’s purported setting of their bond conditions at the behest of Hamilton, a measure they

deem violates Alabama state law. As characterized, Plaintiffs’ challenge incites the grand jury

procedure purportedly used to determine their bond conditions, not any state court judgments. See,

e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018) (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that

the process by which the amount and conditions of bail are set is unconstitutional); Schultz v. State, 330

F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1366 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (analyzing whether county’s bail procedures violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process).

of a prosecution.” Jones v. Clark, No. 2:05-CV-005-F, 2005 WL 1126778, at *1 (M.D.

Ala. May 4, 2005) (citing Pinaud v. Cty. of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e

cannot disagree with the holding of other circuits that actions in connection with a bail

application are best understood as components of the initiation and presentation of a

prosecution, and therefore are protected by absolute immunity.” (collecting cases))); see

also Harmon v. Lux, No. 220CV165FTM29MRM, 2020 WL 1873583, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Apr. 15, 2020) (“Actions taken in connection with bail applications are prosecutorial

and protected by absolute immunity.” (citing Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1149)). Hamilton’s

actions in purportedly requesting bond amounts from the grand jury occurred in the

course of her “role as an advocate for the State.” Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363,

1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley 509 U.S. at 273).13

Although absolute immunity protects Hamilton from this procedural due

process claim, it also appears the claim lacks merit. To be sure, the applicable provisions

do not mention the setting of bond conditions by a grand jury, which is Plaintiffs’ chief

complaint, and Hamilton has not pointed to any viable provisions. See Ala. Code § 15-

13-6(a) (“When an indictment is filed in court charging the defendant with a bailable

felony and the defendant fails to give bail in open court, the judge of the court must

forthwith endorse on such indictment the amount of bail to be required of the

13 Of course, Plaintiffs cannot hold the grand jurors at fault for a myriad of reasons, yet principally

because prosecutorial immunity “is derived from the absolute immunity accorded judges and grand

jurors . . . .” Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 510 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 & n.20 (1976)).

defendant.”); Ala. Code § 15-13-103 (“Admission to bail is the order of a judicial officer

of any court of the State of Alabama, or one of its subdivisions, that the defendant be

discharged from actual custody on bail. . . . The amount of bail shall be set in the amount

that the judicial officer feels, in his or her discretion, is sufficient to guarantee the

appearance of the defendant.”); Ala. Code § 15-13-104 (“Judicial officers shall see that

the amount of bail is affixed to any warrants of arrests issued by the judicial officer at

the time of their issuance for which the defendant is arrested and taken into custody. .

. . Judicial officers may delegate the affixation to lawful employees of the court, but the

amount shall be set by the judicial officer.”); Ala. Code § 15-13-101(2) (“Judicial officer.

Any supreme court, appellate court, circuit court, district court, or municipal court

judge or any magistrate of any court in this state.”).

However, the filings before the court do not describe the exact procedure at

issue, so the grand jury may actually just recommend bond conditions and amounts at

the behest of a prosecutor for a judge’s consideration, not actually set the bond.

Furthermore, the filings do not clearly indicate that the grand jury’s denotation of bond

conditions on the indictment actually caused Plaintiffs’ detention. The arrest warrants

caused the initial deprivation of liberty, and a state judge convened their initial

appearances within 24 hours of their arrests and addressed bond at that time. So

admittedly, this claim fosters some ambiguity as to its exact nature.

In any event, even if Plaintiffs accurately aver that the grand jury set their bond

amounts and conditions, then the procedural due process claim still may fail due to the

availability of an adequate, post-deprivation process in the state court to remedy the

alleged deprivation. A litigant may pursue a § 1983 claim for a procedural due process

violation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. “In procedural due

process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in

‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the

deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,

125 (1990). “The constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when

the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due

process.” Id. at 126. A procedural due process claim “‘requires proof of three elements:

(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state

action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.’” Lakoskey v. Floro, No. 19-12401,

2021 WL 5860460, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)).

The focus herein lies upon the third requirement, as Plaintiffs essentially contend

the setting of bail by the grand jury, at the request of Hamilton, represented a

constitutionally-inadequate process. Generally, pertinent state actors “must attempt to

provide a hearing before it deprives one of life, liberty, or property,” typically in

“‘situations where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing . . . regardless

of the adequacy of a postdeprivation . . . remedy.’” Barr v. Johnson, 777 F. App’x 298,

302 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132). However, there exists “no

procedural due process violation when the act complained of is the random and

unauthorized act of a state employee for which adequate postdeprivation process is

available.” Powell v. Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Res., 114 F.3d 1074, 1081 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). Most critically, as a general matter conduct presents as “random

and unauthorized” when a state actor fails to follow an established law, policy, protocol,

etc. See id. at 1080–82 (finding state welfare agency caseworkers’ alleged failure to follow

county protocols represented random and unauthorized conduct subject to adequate

postdeprivation procedures); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562–63 (11th Cir. 1994)

(en banc) (finding predeprivation remedy not necessary for claim involving state actor

who acts contrary to established state customs or policies: “As any bias on the part of

the Board was not sanctioned by the state and was the product of the intentional acts

of the commissioners, . . . only the state’s refusal to provide a means to correct any

error resulting from the bias would engender a procedural due process violation.”);

Bowman v. Alabama Dep’t of Hum. Res., 857 F. Supp. 1524, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (holding

procedural due process claims “‘should not be employed to remedy deprivations which

occur at the hands of a state employee who is acting in direct contravention of the

state’s established policies and procedures which have been designed to guarantee the

very protections which the employee now has chosen to ignore.’” (quoting Easter House

v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir. 1990))); 1 Nahmod, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties

Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 3:55 (“In effect, if the state has formally

established policies and procedures through statutes, rules, or regulations, the conduct

of policymakers in violation of those policies and procedures will be considered random

and unauthorized.”).

In this case, Plaintiffs aver Hamilton violated Alabama laws by securing the grand

jury’s setting of their bond conditions. Based upon the foregoing review, if such

conduct actually occurred (which is not obvious based upon the filings before the

court), then such conduct constitutes random and unauthorized acts to which Plaintiffs

must demonstrate an inadequate, postdeprivation remedy. And eschewing the analysis

required by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), for such determinations given the

posture of this inquiry, Plaintiffs received adequate postdeprivation remedies as

evidenced by their initial appearances before a state court judge who required the same

bond conditions purportedly established by the grand jury (docs. 14–1, 14–2); the state

judge’s consideration of Dillard’s motion to reduce bond, in which he actually

considered the argument set forth by Plaintiffs here and found the issue moot because

a state circuit judge set the bond amounts at the initial appearances (doc. 14–4 at 6); and

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ review of the decision regarding the motion

to reduce bond (doc. 14–5).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the County’s Motion to Dismiss

(doc. 10), Sheffield’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 12), Hamilton’s Motion to Dismiss (doc.

14), and Hearn’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 16).

DONE and ORDERED this 31* day of March, 2022.

ff N. paces JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

45