Sutton v. Marshall

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

LENA SUTTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:19-CV-660-KOB

)

STEVE MARSHALL, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General of the State )

of Alabama, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In one of the most enduring songs from the 1960s, Aretha Franklin sang, “R-E-S-P-E-C-

T find out what it means to me.” ARETHA FRANKLIN, Respect, I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY

I LOVE YOU (Atlantic Records 1967). To federal courts, respect—as memorialized in the

Younger abstention doctrine—means refraining from interfering with ongoing state court

proceedings that implicate important state interests. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45

(1971) (stating that courts of equity should not enjoin state criminal proceedings pursuant to the

notions of comity and respect). In this case, respect means abstaining from interfering with state

forfeiture proceedings about which Ms. Sutton complains.

This matter comes before the court on Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Lena Sutton’s amended complaint. (Doc. 17). In her amended

complaint, Ms. Sutton seeks to instigate a class action to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional

actions by the state during civil forfeiture proceedings. (Doc. 14). Attorney General Marshall

moves to dismiss Ms. Sutton’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6), arguing that Younger abstention applies and that Ms. Sutton fails to state a claim for

which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the court will GRANT Attorney

General Marshall’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.

I. Standard of Review

The law lacks clarity regarding whether courts should analyze the Younger abstention

doctrine under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), challenging jurisdiction, or 12(b)(6),

attacking the sufficiency of the complaint. Compare Fairfield Cmty. Clean Up Crew, Inc. v.

Hale, 2:17-CV-308-LSC, 2017 WL 4865545, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2017) (Coogler, J.)

(applying Rule 12(b)(1) standard), with Cano-Diaz v. City of Leeds, Ala., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1280,

1284–85 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (Hopkins, J.) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard). But, the choice of

which rule to apply makes little practical difference because the court applies a standard of

review akin to that of Rule 12(b)(6) when a defendant makes a facial, rather than a factual, attack

on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root

Services, Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). The Attorney General’s motion to dismiss

references both Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), and his argument against the court exercising jurisdiction

presents a facial attack, so the court applies Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards to the motion.

The Supreme Court explained that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).

In considering a Rule 12(b) motion, the rules generally limit the court to assessing the

face of the complaint and its attachments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272,

1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005). Where a court properly takes judicial notice of exhibits attached to

the pleadings, it may consider matters outside of the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b) motion

without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)–(d);

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1276-79 (11th Cir. 1999). The court may take

judicial notice of state court proceedings. Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1984).

As reflected in this Memorandum Opinion, Alabama state court proceedings influence

the considerations in this case. Attorney General Marshall provided the relevant state court

documents along with his motion to dismiss. The court takes judicial notice of the records of the

state court proceedings without converting his motion to a motion for summary judgment.

II. Factual Background

On February 20, 2019, Ms. Sutton loaned her car to a friend of hers, Roger Maze; police

pulled Mr. Maze over while he was driving Ms. Sutton’s car. (Doc. 14). During the traffic stop,

law enforcement found a trafficking amount of methamphetamine in Ms. Sutton’s car. Ms.

Sutton had no knowledge of the methamphetamine and faces no criminal charges. Nevertheless,

the state seized Ms. Sutton’s car because it was used to transport drugs and then instituted a civil

forfeiture action pursuant to Alabama’s Civil Forfeiture Act, Ala. Code § 20-2-93.

State court records show that the state served Ms. Sutton with a complaint in the civil

forfeiture action on March 12, 2019. (Doc. 17-3 at 14–28). After Ms. Sutton failed to

adequately respond to the complaint, the state entered a default judgement in April of 2019. (Id.

at 44). Ms. Sutton then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, in which she stated that

she was not accused of any crime and that the seizure of her car was unconstitutional. (Id. at 57–

58). In support of her motion to set aside the default, Ms. Sutton filed a memorandum in which

she argued that the default should be set aside because she had a meritorious defense to the case,

namely that the seizure and continued custody of her vehicle without a prompt post-deprivation

hearing violated her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 17-4 at 21–

24). The state court set aside the default and Ms. Sutton filed an answer in July 2019, raising

claims that the seizure of her car violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 103).

She did not raise her claims regarding the constitutionality of the retention of her vehicle. The

forfeiture proceedings have yet to go to trial.

In her amended complaint in this court, Ms. Sutton asserts that Alabama’s seizure of her

car and the subsequent civil forfeiture proceedings deprive her—and other similarly situated

putative class members—of her rights. Ms. Sutton seeks to bring a class action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. She argues that the state’s failure to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing after it

seizes property violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. She

further asserts that Alabama’s procedures do not provide defendants in civil forfeiture

proceedings with an opportunity to contest the deprivation of their property during the pendency

of the forfeiture litigation, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Ms.

Sutton also argues that Alabama’s civil forfeiture proceedings violate the Eighth Amendment.

Ms. Sutton requests multiple forms of relief. She requests that the court certify this

action as a class action, enter a declaratory judgment stating that Alabama’s civil forfeiture

proceedings are unconstitutional, hold the state liable for unconstitutional practices, enter

injunctions prohibiting the state from engaging in unconstitutional forfeiture practices, enter a

judgment requiring the state to immediately institute hearings in all similar civil forfeiture

proceedings, and award attorney’s fees.

III. Discussion

In his motion to dismiss, Attorney General Marshall argues that the court should refrain

from exercising jurisdiction over Ms. Sutton’s complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention

doctrine. (Docs. 17, 18). Of course, abstaining from exercising jurisdiction first requires the

court to have jurisdiction. While the Defendant does not challenge the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, the court notes that Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and multiple

constitutional amendments, giving this court federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

The Attorney General asserts that the court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction

because the Plaintiff asks this court to interfere in state court proceedings. The Attorney General

also asserts that Younger abstention applies because Ms. Sutton can raise her constitutional

claims in her state forfeiture proceedings, and, in fact, already has raised some of her

constitutional claims. The Attorney General notes that Ms. Sutton could pay a bond to have her

vehicle released or could file a motion in state court for the release of her seized vehicle, neither

of which she has done. He attaches an example motion for release of a vehicle that comes from

the Alabama Criminal Trial Practice Forms. Alternatively, Attorney General Marshall argues

that Ms. Sutton has not stated any claim for which relief can be granted. The Attorney General

attaches to his motion to dismiss documents from relevant state court proceedings, which show

that Ms. Sutton’s forfeiture action has yet to be resolved.

In her response in opposition to the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Sutton

argues that Younger abstention does not apply. (Doc. 20). Although she concedes that the

second prong of Younger abstention—the involvement of important state interests—applies, Ms.

Sutton narrowly focuses on the deprivation of her car during the pendency of the forfeiture

proceedings and asserts that Younger abstention does not apply to that specific issue. She

contends that federal relief will not interfere with an ongoing state proceeding and that she does

not have an opportunity to raise her constitutional claims in state court. In support of her

arguments, Ms. Sutton relies heavily on a case from the Southern District of New York,

Krimstock v. Safir, No. 99 CIV. 12041 MBM, 2000 WL 1702035 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000),

reversed on other grounds by Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002). Ms. Sutton also

argues that she has sufficiently pled her claims to survive a motion to dismiss.

The Attorney General replies that Krimstock does not apply to the case at hand and that

Ms. Sutton’s case meets the requirements for Younger abstention, as her requested relief would

interfere with ongoing state court proceedings and she could raise her constitutional claims in

state court. Attorney General Marshall also reasserts his argument that Ms. Sutton’s complaint

fails on the merits.

Under Alabama law, a conveyance used to transport drugs is subject to forfeiture. Ala.

Code § 20-2-93(a)(5). The state can seize property subject to forfeiture without process where

the seizure is instant to arrest. Id. § 20-2-93(b)(1). Where property is seized without process,

civil forfeiture proceedings must be instituted “promptly.” Id. § 20-2-93(c), (d). Owners can

reclaim their property if they can show that they did not know about and could not have

prevented the acts or omissions that led to the seizure of the property. Id. § 20-2-93(h). An

owner can also execute a bond to reclaim her vehicle during the pendency of the forfeiture

action. Id. § 20-2-93(h), 28-4-287.

Federal courts act circumspectly when dealing with state court proceedings. When first

setting forth the Younger abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court recognized “the national policy

forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special

circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. While abstention is the exception rather than the rule

when determining whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction, federal courts “may and

should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference in state proceedings” out of respect for the

principle of comity between state and federal governments. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329

F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).

Although Younger itself dealt with state criminal proceedings, “its principles are ‘fully

applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.’” Id.

(quoting Middlesex Ct. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized—while narrowing Younger’s general

applicability—that state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings are one of the “exceptional”

circumstances that fall within the Younger abstention doctrine. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013). Accordingly, Younger abstention potentially extends to the state-

initiated forfeiture proceedings in this case.

In determining whether to apply the Younger doctrine, a court must ask three questions:

“first, do the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the

proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the

state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274

(citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432).

Ms. Sutton argues that Younger abstention does not apply because her federal

proceedings would not interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding, as no ongoing state

proceeding exists regarding the specific issue of whether the state can retain her car during the

pendency of her forfeiture proceeding. She also argues that relief in this case will not interfere

with an ongoing state court proceeding, in part because the relief she requests would not

terminate the state forfeiture proceeding. In support of her argument that her case would not

interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding, Ms. Sutton cites Belevich v. Thomas, No. 2:17-

CV-01193-AKK, 2018 WL 1244493 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2018).

Ms. Sutton’s arguments fail to persuade the court. As an initial matter, the court finds

unconvincing Ms. Sutton’s argument that no ongoing state proceedings exist dealing with the

continued retention of her car during her forfeiture proceedings. Ms. Sutton construes the issue

too narrowly. While neither Ms. Sutton nor the state has instigated proceedings dealing

explicitly and solely with the issue of whether the state can retain her car during her forfeiture

proceedings without certain procedural measures, the forfeiture proceedings completely

encompass the issue of whether the state has a right to hold Ms. Sutton’s car, either permanently

or temporarily. Further, Ms. Sutton could take advantage of available methods within the state

court proceeding to challenge the state’s retention of her vehicle. Accordingly, she has not

shown that no ongoing state court proceeding exists.

Ms. Sutton also fails to show that federal relief will not interfere with the ongoing state

court proceeding. To assess whether a federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state

proceeding, the court must look at the effect that the relief requested would have on the state

proceeding. 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274. The federal proceeding need not directly

affect or terminate the state court proceedings to interfere with it; disruption of the state court

proceedings can suffice to show interference. Id. at 1276. Therefore, Ms. Sutton cannot rely on

the assertion that Younger does not apply because relief in this case would not terminate the

enforcement proceedings. See id. Rather, Ms. Sutton’s requested relief—which includes a

request that this court compel the state court to conduct hearings in cases like Ms. Sutton’s—

would change the course of state forfeiture proceedings, and, thus, would interfere. See id.

Additionally, Belevich does not preclude the application of Younger in this case. In

Belevich, the court determined that Younger abstention did not apply to a contract dispute where

relief could potentially have affected alimony in an ongoing state divorce proceeding because the

contract dispute was only “tangentially related” to the divorce proceeding. Belevich, No. 2:17-

CV-01193-AKK, 2018 WL 1244493, at *5. The court elaborated that nothing about deciding the

contract dispute would require the court to become a “grand overseer” of the divorce

proceedings. Id.

This court has no difficulty distinguishing Ms. Sutton’s case from Belevich. Unlike the

“tangentially related” proceedings in Belevich, this case directly involves the seizure and

retention of Ms. Sutton’s car at issue in state court. Although Ms. Sutton attempts to separate the

issue of retention from the issue of the seizure of her car and the ultimate outcome of the

forfeiture proceedings, she merely identifies one part of a chain of interrelated proceedings that

are inextricably intertwined. The seizure of her car, the subsequent forfeiture proceeding, and

the continued retention of the car—all at issue in state court—have far more than a tangential

connection with the case she seeks to bring in federal court.

Further, the relief that Ms. Sutton requests would require precisely the kind of oversight

of the state courts that Belevich conscientiously avoided. See Belevich, No. 2:17-CV-01193-

AKK, 2018 WL 1244493, at *5. Ms. Sutton requests that the court require the state to

immediately institute hearings in her own and all similar civil forfeiture proceedings. Issuing

and enforcing that sort of injunctive relief would “result in meticulous and burdensome federal

oversight of state court or court-like functions” or force the federal courts to become a “grand

overseer” of state court proceedings, both of which the Eleventh Circuit has proscribed. Wexler

v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, Ms. Sutton fails to show that her

requested relief will not interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.

Ms. Sutton also argues that Younger abstention does not apply because she does not have

an opportunity to raise her constitutional issues in the state court. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at

432. A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state procedural law bars the presentation of

her claims. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987). Further, “when a litigant has

not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court

should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of

unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Id. at 15. In this case, Ms. Sutton only raised her

claims regarding the retention of her car as potential defenses in her motion to set aside default;

she has not actually presented those claims in state court. Further, she cannot overcome the

assumption of an adequate state remedy. See id.

In this case, no unambiguous authority suggests that state procedures would not afford

Ms. Sutton an adequate remedy. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “Alabama

state procedural law does not ‘clearly bar the interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Old

Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has recently stated in a case

involving civil forfeiture that “Alabama case law shows that the proper avenue for seeking

redress for alleged constitutional injuries is in the state civil-forfeiture proceeding.” Fairfield

Cmty. Clean Up Crew Inc. v. Hale, 735 F. App’x 602, 606 (11th Cir. 2018). In fact, Alabama

case law shows that defendants in civil forfeiture cases have raised constitutional claims during

their forfeiture proceedings. See Ex parte Kelley, 766 So. 2d 837, 837 (Ala. 1999) (forfeiture

proceeding in which defendant argued that the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment).

Ms. Sutton argues that she cannot raise her claims because of a lack of prompt post-

deprivation process. In support of her position, Ms. Sutton relies almost exclusively on the

Southern District of New York’s decision in Krimstock. That case is not binding upon this court

and the court does not find it persuasive.

In Krimstock, the Southern District of New York found that Younger did not apply in a

case challenging the seizure of cars after DWI arrests in New York. Krimstock v. Safir, No. 99

CIV. 12041 MBM, 2000 WL 1702035, at *1. The New York City regulation at issue required

that, if a seized vehicle’s owner demanded its return, the police had to either return the vehicle or

institute forfeiture proceedings within 25 days. Id. Relying on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103

(1975), the Krimstock court found that the forfeiture proceedings at issue did not “provide an

adequate opportunity for plaintiffs to claim a due process right to a prompt probable cause

hearing” because the forfeiture proceedings were not instituted until 25 days later—after the time

for a prompt probable cause hearing had passed. Id. at 3. As explained by the Second Circuit,

which overruled Krimstock on grounds unrelated to Younger abstention, “neither New York

criminal procedure nor the City’s civil forfeiture law allow[ed] a DWI defendant or the owner of

a vehicle driven by a DWI defendant to challenge promptly the legitimacy of the City’s

continued custody of the vehicle.” Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 2002). The

Second Circuit also emphasized that much of the infirmity in New York’s process sprung from

the lack of an opportunity for defendants to post bond for their property. Id. at 56.

This court finds Krimstock’s reliance on Gerstein unconvincing. In Gerstein, the

Supreme Court held that a prompt determination of probable cause is a constitutionally required

prerequisite for pretrial detention. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126. The Supreme Court also affirmed

the lower court’s holding that Younger abstention did not apply because the only issue in the case

was “the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised

in defense of the criminal prosecution.” Id. at 108 n.9.

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently applied Gerstein and held—while emphasizing

the applicable abuse-of-discretion standard of review—that a district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that Younger abstention did not apply where a class of plaintiffs did not seek

to enjoin a criminal prosecution, but, rather, only sought prompt bail determinations. Walker v.

City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. City

of Calhoun, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). The Eleventh Circuit stated that the relief requested did not

require pervasive oversight of state criminal proceedings and that the plaintiffs asked for “a

prompt pretrial determination of a distinct issue, which will not interfere with subsequent

prosecution.” Walker, 901 F.3d at 1255 (emphasis added).

The facts in Gerstein and Walker differ from the type of facts involved in Krimstock and

in Ms. Sutton’s case. Gerstein and Walker dealt with the plaintiffs’ challenges to their pretrial

detention and bail. Bail and pretrial detention challenges fall under the purview of habeas corpus

proceedings, not criminal prosecutions. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)

(stating that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release

or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus”). The issues were so distinct from the ongoing prosecutions that they would have

required separate proceedings. Accordingly, a federal court hearing the bail or pretrial detention

issues could not interfere with the ongoing criminal prosecution.

But, unlike in Gerstein and Walker, no indication exists in this case that Ms. Sutton

cannot challenge the continued retention of her car within her state forfeiture proceedings

without instituting a separate action. The Attorney General even included an example of a

motion to do just that. Thus, Krimstock’s application of Gerstein does not convince the court

that Younger does not apply in this case.

Moreover, the court sees key differences between the Alabama legal framework at issue

in this case and the legal framework in Krimstock. Unlike the New York regulation in

Krimstock, Alabama law requires that civil forfeiture actions be instituted “promptly” and

provides defendants in forfeiture proceedings with the opportunity to post bond for their vehicle.

Ala. Code §§ 20-2-93(c), (h). Ms. Sutton argues that the bond provision does not comport with

due process because it does not require the state to show that it has a continued right to retain her

property and because the arbitrary amount of the required bond violates the Eighth Amendment.

However, Ms. Sutton fails to show why she cannot file a motion challenging the retention of her

car and/or challenge the statutory bail provision in state court. In fact, the law suggests that the

forfeiture proceedings are exactly the proper venue for such a challenge. See Fairfield Cmty.

Clean Up Crew Inc., 735 F. App’x at 606.

Finally, in light of the lack of factually similar caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit, the

court finds a case from the Sixth Circuit illuminating. In Loch v. Watkins, the Sixth Circuit held

that Younger foreclosed consideration of a suit about the constitutionality of a forfeiture while

the state proceedings were ongoing. 337 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2003). Like this case, Loch

dealt with the seizure and forfeiture of a vehicle belonging to an innocent owner. Id. at 577.

Although the plaintiff in Loch did not specifically raise the issue of the lack of a prompt hearing,

she did argue that, based on the specific law at issue, she was being deprived of a forfeiture

hearing and extorted for a settlement in violation of her due process rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit

found “no impediment to Loch raising the constitutional issues of this case in the state

proceedings,” which rendered Younger abstention appropriate. Id. at 579.

Ms. Sutton’s complaint is similar to the plaintiff’s complaint in Loch; they both raise an

issue about the lack of an adequate hearing. Like the plaintiff in Loch, Ms. Sutton has not shown

any actual impediment to raising her constitutional issues in her state forfeiture proceedings. In

fact, she has raised some constitutional claims challenging the seizure of her vehicle in her state

court proceedings. Thus, she has not met her burden of showing that she cannot effectively raise

her constitutional claims in state court. See Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. Accordingly, the court

finds that all three Middlesex factors exist in this case and that Younger abstention applies. See

31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the court will give the state court more than “a little

respect” and abstain from hearing this case under the Younger abstention doctrine. ARETHA

FRANKLIN, Respect, I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY I LOVE YOU (Atlantic Records 1967).

Accordingly, the court will GRANT, by separate order, Attorney General Marshall’s motion to

dismiss.

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2019.

____________________________________

KARON OWEN BOWDRE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE