Colburn v. Odom

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

TIMOTHY JARROD COLBURN, )

et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:15-cv-1789-GMB

)

SUSAN ODOM, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction

of a United States Magistrate Judge. Pending before the court is Defendant Susan

Odom’s Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 66. Plaintiffs Timothy Jarrod Colburn, Gary Lynn

Blackwell, Howard Derrick Butler, Daniel Rudolph Cassels, Landa L. Clark, Joseph

Anthony Elliott, Todd Michael Harrison, and David Edward Rhodes have filed a

response in opposition to the motion. Doc. 72. Odom has filed a reply brief in

support of her motion. Doc. 74. After careful consideration of the parties’

submissions and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the court

concludes that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has jurisdiction over the claims in this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction, nor do they contest that

venue is proper in the Northern District of Alabama. The court finds adequate

allegations to support the propriety of both.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The plaintiffs are seven individuals who allege that they were arrested without

a warrant in Walker County, Alabama, and then detained in the county jail. They

claim that these actions denied them a proper determination of whether probable

cause supported their arrests in violation of Alabama law and the Fourth

Amendment. Doc. 60. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court on October 13,

2015 against Susan Odom, the Circuit Clerk of Walker County, along with Lela

Yahn, Carol Haggard, and Debra Courington, all of whom were employed by the

Walker County Circuit Clerk’s Office as magistrates. Five of the plaintiffs––

Colburn, Rhodes, Elliott, Cassels, and Harrison––previously brought suit against the

Sheriff of Walker County and deputy sheriff John Blair Huddleston based on the

same underlying facts. See Colburn v. Huddleston, 2015 WL 1494554 (N.D. Ala.

Mar. 30, 2015). That case has been dismissed. Id. at *10.

The plaintiffs specifically allege that they were arrested by Huddleston in a

series of warrantless arrests in Walker County between October 2013 and June 2014.

Doc. 60 at 8–10. In each case, Huddleston transported one of the plaintiffs to the

Walker County Jail in Jasper, Alabama, without first obtaining a determination of

probable cause from a judge or magistrate. Doc. 60 at 8–10. The plaintiffs claim

that Odom had the “administrative responsibility for and supervision of the records

and clerical services” at the Walker County Circuit Court and that she served as the

immediate supervisor for Yahn, Haggard, and Courington. Doc. 60 at 11–12. In

addition to her administrative duties, Odom was “responsible for insuring that the

magistrates she assigned were properly trained and that [they] conducted themselves

in accordance with the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution of 1901

and the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Doc. 60 at 12 (citing Ala. R. Crim.

P. 2.4, 3.1, 4.3, 4.4 & 7.2).

B. Procedural History

In the instant suit, the plaintiffs seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Circuit Clerk Susan Odom and magistrates Yahn, Haggard, and Courington. On

February 27, 2017, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the three

magistrates under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Doc. 36 at 10. The court also

dismissed certain claims against Odom in her official capacity. Doc. 36 at 16–17.

The court denied Odom’s motion to dismiss, however, with respect to the remaining

claims against her, finding that she was not entitled to judicial immunity or qualified

immunity. Doc. 36 at 9 & 16. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs could

“seek relief against Odom in her official capacity . . . in the form of prospective

injunctive relief.” Doc. 36 at 17.

Odom appealed the denial of immunity, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals held that it could not meaningfully review the appeal because it was unable

to “identify from the allegations of the complaint, answer, or motion to dismiss,

which of the magistrates purportedly denied the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

rights.” Colburn v. Odom, 911 F.3d 1110, 1113 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the

Eleventh Circuit vacated this court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings

pursuant to a series of specific instructions.1

In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the original complaint in this

case failed to identify the crimes for which the plaintiffs were arrested and “refused

to indicate whether [the plaintiffs] had been taken before a magistrate for an initial

appearance.” Id. at 1120. Instead, the plaintiffs merely alleged that, as to each of

them, “one of the magistrates (unidentified) at some point in time (undisclosed)

failed to determine that the client’s arrest was supported by probable cause.” Id. In

the face of these pleading deficiencies, the Eleventh Circuit held that this court

should have dismissed the complaint sua sponte “because it failed to state a

cognizable claim for relief.” Id. Remanding for further proceedings, the Eleventh

Circuit directed this court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against Odom with

1 The plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the dismissal of their claims against the magistrates, and the

court finds no basis for reconsidering the dismissal of these claims following the Eleventh Circuit’s

reversal of the district court denial of immunity to Odum. See id. at 1120 n.31 (noting that the

plaintiffs did not cross-appeal).

prejudice if they chose not to amend their complaint. Id. If they did choose to amend,

the court held that the amended complaint must include the following allegations

with respect to each plaintiff:

• The date of the Plaintiff’s arrest, the crimes for which the arrest was

made, and the identity of the arresting officer (presumably Deputy

Huddleston).

• The date and time the Plaintiff was booked into the Walker County

Jail.

• The date and time of the Plaintiff’s initial appearance, if the plaintiff

received one.

• If an initial appearance was held, the identity of the magistrate who

presided.

• The magistrate’s failure to determine probable cause for the Plaintiff’s

arrest for the crimes indicated above.

• The magistrate’s bail decision and that it was made without a probable

cause determination having been made.

• The date and time of the Plaintiff’s release from custody.

• The legal basis for the Plaintiff’s release from custody.

Id. (footnote omitted).

Additionally, and crucially for the purpose of the motion currently before the

court, the Eleventh Circuit mandated that “the amended complaint shall cite the

Alabama law which charges the Clerks of the Circuit Courts with the responsibility

of reviewing a magistrate’s initial appearance decisions and, in particular, the

magistrate’s probable cause determinations.” Id. at 1120–21. On remand, the

Eleventh Circuit further directed the district court to “determine whether the

plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim as required by Iqbal

and Twombly and, if so,” to consider whether the case should be dismissed without

leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 1121. Concluding that the amended complaint

does not comply with the Eleventh Circuit’s instructions and thus fails to state a

plausible claim, the court grants Odom’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the

plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must “take the factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim

is “plausible on its face” if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations need not be

detailed, but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”

id., and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not

suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. DISCUSSION

While Odom presents a number of arguments in her motion to dismiss, the

resolution of the motion boils down to one central issue: whether the amended

complaint “cite[s] the Alabama law which charges the Clerks of the Circuit Courts

with the responsibility of reviewing a magistrate’s initial appearance decisions and,

in particular, the magistrate’s probable cause determinations.” Colburn, 911 F.3d at

1120–21. The amended complaint does not do so.2

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when a

person is arrested without a warrant, he or she “must promptly be brought before a

neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause, generally within

forty-eight hours.” Id. at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). Each state has

“discretion in how to integrate these prompt probable cause determinations into their

differing systems of pretrial procedures.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In

Alabama, after a person is arrested without a warrant, he or she “must receive an

initial appearance at which a judge or magistrate (collectively, ‘magistrate’)

determines probable cause and sets bail.” Id.; see also Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3(a)(1)(iii)

2 Because the amended complaint fails to address this core concern, the court does not reach the

question of whether the plaintiffs heeded the Eleventh Circuit’s other instructions. See Colburn,

911 F.3d at 1120.

(providing that a judge or magistrate must make a probable cause determination

following a warrantless arrest and the arrestee “shall proceed . . . for initial

appearance”); Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4(a) (providing procedure for initial appearances);

Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(a) (providing procedure for pretrial release on personal

recognizance or bond).

The plaintiffs’ sole remaining claims invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in alleging both

an unlawful detention and confinement and a failure to train and supervise. They

also request a permanent injunction ordering Odom to “compose, implement, and/or

enforce proper existing policies or alternatively restrain[] [her] from continuing to

engage in a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference and/or implicit approval of

detaining and confining citizens” without a warrant and a proper probable cause

determination. Doc. 60 at 38–45; see also Doc. 36 at 16–17. Odom argues, among

other things, that she is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the § 1983

claims and that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged their entitlement to

injunctive relief. Doc. 72 at 13–15. Because the plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged

that Odom violated their Fourth Amendment rights either directly or on a

supervisory basis in the absence of any statutory authority establishing her

responsibility for reviewing the magistrates’ probable cause determinations, the

court concludes that the amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for

relief. The court also finds that further amendment would be futile.

A. Section 1983 Claims

The plaintiffs have two potential paths to relief against Odom under § 1983.

They must either set forth sufficient factual allegations (1) that Odom has personally

participated in the alleged Fourth Amendment violations or (2) that she is liable on

a supervisory basis. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.”); Keith v. DeKalb County, Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the

supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal

connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional

violation.”). The plaintiffs also assert a claim under § 1983 for failure to train, which

“implicates a different, albeit very similar, rule” for supervisory liability: “a

supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or her employees ‘only where the

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom

the [magistrates] come into contact.’” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052 (quoting City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). In light of this kinship, the court

will address the plaintiffs’ supervisory liability and failure-to-train claims together.

1. Direct Participation

As implied by the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the plaintiffs have failed to

allege that Odom violated the Constitution through her own actions. Both in the

complaint and amended complaint the plaintiffs allege that probable cause

determinations are a duty of the magistrates. See Doc. 60 at 12 (alleging that “the

duties of a magistrate include . . . determining whether probable cause existed in

accordance with Rules 2.4 and 4.3”). The plaintiffs also claim that Odom “from

time to time assigned Yahn, Haggard, and Courington the duties of magistrate,” and

“selected Yahn, Haggard, and Courington and assigned them to perform the duties

of magistrate and during the performance of that duty one of them travelled to the

Jail almost daily.” Doc. 60 at 13. They further claim that Odom, in addition to the

three magistrates, had knowledge that the plaintiffs’ arrests were warrantless and,

where she did not know, she had a “duty to make that determination within forty-

eight (48) hours thereafter.” Doc. 60 at 14–17. With no citation to any state law or

rule of criminal procedure, the amended complaint alleges that Odom and the three

magistrates “had an obligation imposed upon them by state law . . . to release each

of the Plaintiffs upon the execution of an appearance bond in the amount of the

minimum bond set in Rule 7.2,” and that their failure to do so was a Fourth

Amendment violation. Doc. 60 at 17–18.

None of these allegations suggest that Odom personally violated the plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment rights. The same goes for the reference to Odom’s

“administrative responsibility for and supervision of the records and clerical

services” of the Walker County courts. Doc. 60 at 11. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claims

can be salvaged only if they allege facts sufficient to support a claim that Odom was

liable on a supervisory basis or for a failure to train.

2. Supervisory Liability or Failure to Train

Problematically for the plaintiffs, their allegations that Odom (in addition to

the three magistrates) had a duty both to make probable cause determinations and

release the plaintiffs upon the execution of an appearance bond are implausible in

light of the Alabama statutory provisions and rules of criminal procedure cited—and

those not cited—in the amended complaint. In both the complaint and amended

complaint, the plaintiffs implausibly claim, without citation to any rule or law

providing support, that Odom’s position as the magistrates’ “immediate supervisor”

makes her “responsible for their respective training and supervision of their

performance.” Doc. 60 at 11–12.

Perhaps in an attempt to account for this shortcoming, the plaintiffs claim that

Odom “had actual and/or constructive notice of” the magistrates’ failure to provide

timely probable cause determinations, and that Odom was on notice of prior

constitutional violations because of the three magistrates’ “obvious, flagrant, and

rampant behavior . . . across a lengthy period of time[.]” Doc. 60 at 42–43. The

plaintiffs often conflate the legal standards for § 1983 supervisory liability and a

failure to train, but their claims are flawed regardless of how they are classified

because they are supported by allegations that are scant and conclusory––the type of

“legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” insufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). “While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs

fail to explain how Odom was on notice of prior constitutional violations or the three

magistrates’ alleged propensity to engage in unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs

also neglect to offer any factual support for the legal conclusion that Odom has, “as

a matter of custom and practice, [and] with deliberate indifference, failed to

adequately discipline, sanction, train, and supervise the day-to-day activities of the

[magistrates].” Doc. 60 at 41.

Moreover, the alleged “complaints” made to Odom by family members of

warrantless arrestees, see Doc. 60 at 33, cannot give rise to liability where the

plaintiffs have not alleged what Odom could or should have done under Alabama

law to address the complaints. Put simply, the plaintiffs have failed to allege any

facts showing a direct connection between Odom and the probable cause

determinations or a causal connection that could subject her to liability on a

supervisory basis. Without Odom’s direct participation in a constitutional violation

or a sufficient causal connection between her actions as a supervisory official and

the alleged constitutional wrongdoing, the plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim

under § 1983.

The plaintiffs argue that they have complied with the Eleventh Circuit’s

direction by alleging in the amended complaint that “Odom has ‘administrative

responsibility for and supervision of’ the records and clerical services of the circuit

and district courts and that she is responsible for the training and supervision of the

magistrates she assigned, accompanied by citations to the pertinent parts of the Code

of Alabama, 1975.” Doc. 72 at 4 (citing Doc. 60 at 11–12). But none of the Alabama

laws or rules of criminal procedure on which the plaintiffs rely specifically provides

that circuit court clerks are responsible for reviewing a magistrate’s probable cause

determinations or for training and supervising magistrates in any other way.

The plaintiffs identify five statutory provisions. The first, Alabama Code

§ 12-17-93, grants circuit court clerks the authority to “administer oaths and take

acknowledgements and affidavits”; to appoint deputy clerks; to receive judgments;

and to “exercise such other powers as are, or may be, conferred by law, including

administrative rules of procedure promulgated by order of the Supreme Court of

Alabama.” The second provision, Alabama Code § 12-17-94, establishes the duties

of circuit court clerks. These include the issuance of summons, subpoenas, writs,

and executions; the maintenance of docket sheets; the maintenance of court records;

the provision of records to the public; the monitoring of compliance with court

orders; and the exercise of “such duties as are, or may be, conferred upon [the clerks]

by law, including administrative rules promulgated by order of the Supreme Court

of Alabama.” Third, Alabama Code § 12-17-160 establishes that circuit court clerks

are “ex officio clerks” of the district courts within their circuits and “shall have

administrative responsibility for and supervision of the records and clerical services

of the district court in accordance with applicable general laws and rules.” Fourth,

Alabama Code § 12-17-161 provides, among other things, that a separate clerk’s

office for a district court may be established, that a district court clerk is appointed

by the Administrative Director of Courts, and that a district court clerk’s office may

be abolished by the Alabama Supreme Court.3 Finally, Alabama Code § 12-17-162

merely provides that clerical employees serving a district court “shall be a

component of the office of the clerk for the circuit court for the county in which they

serve.”

As Odom noted in briefing, none of these provisions establishes, even

indirectly, the circuit clerk’s “responsibility of reviewing a magistrate’s initial

appearance decisions and, in particular, the magistrate’s probable cause

determinations.” Colburn, 911 F.3d at 1120–21. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has

already found the plaintiffs’ allegations to be deficient since the relevant language

is unchanged from the original complaint. Compare Doc. 1 at 8–9, with Doc. 60 at

11–12. Because the magistrates’ alleged failure to determine whether the plaintiffs’

3 This section also includes a provision regarding a district court’s participation in the state

retirement system.

arrests were supported by probable cause is the “sine qua non of Plaintiffs’ claims,”

Colburn, 911 F.3d at 1120, the lack of any statutory provision providing that the

circuit clerk shares the responsibility for determining probable cause is fatal to the

plaintiffs’ claims against Odom.4

B. Injunctive Relief

The plaintiffs’ request for “declaratory relief and a preliminary and a

permanent injunction” requiring Odom to “compose, implement, and/or enforce

proper existing policies or alternatively restraining [her] from continuing to engage

in a pattern and practice of deliberate indifference and/or implicit approval of

detaining and confining citizens without seeking a warrant and without a

constitutional adjudication of guilt” also fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Doc. 60 at 45. Because the plaintiffs have not properly alleged in the

amended complaint the basis for Odom’s authority over the magistrates’ probable

cause determinations, their request for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Indeed,

far from establishing this affirmative duty, the plaintiffs have not even alleged how

4 Because the plaintiffs have not claimed that Odom was acting outside the scope of her

discretionary authority and have not sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation against Odom,

she also is entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Chandler v. Sec. of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695

F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2012) (“To survive a motion to dismiss based upon qualified immunity,

the plaintiff must have alleged sufficient facts to support a finding of a constitutional violation of

a clearly established law.”).

Odom could establish such a policy or otherwise effect the relief they seek.5

C. Leave to Amend

The Eleventh Circuit also instructed this court to “consider whether dismissal

of the complaint without leave to amend is warranted.” Colburn, 911 F.3d at 1121.

The court concludes that it is warranted. The plaintiffs, of course, have already been

granted leave to amend the complaint with specific instructions to cure the

deficiencies the Eleventh Circuit identified. They were unable to do so despite the

Eleventh Circuit’s clear mandate, and the court concludes that this inability signifies

the futility of any future attempt to amend. Accordingly, the court will not sua

sponte grant the plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint, and instead

dismisses their claims with prejudice. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962) (citing a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed” and “futility of amendment” as justifications for denying leave to amend).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant Susan Odom’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 66) is GRANTED, and all claims asserted by the plaintiffs

against her are DISMISSED with prejudice.

5 Even if the plaintiffs had made such a showing, they have fallen well short of the requirements

for a preliminary or permanent injunction, particularly with respect to the success-on-the-merits

and irreparable-injury elements. See, e.g., Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097

(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that to demonstrate their entitlement to injunctive relief the plaintiffs

must sufficiently allege, among other things, “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits”

and that “irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues”).

A final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE and ORDERED on September 23, 2019.

re AN.

GRAY <i oo

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17