Kindred v. O'Malley (CONSENT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

HENRY KINDRED, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-502-CWB

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY, 1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction and Administrative Proceedings

Henry Kindred, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed both an application for Disability Insurance Benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act and an application for Supplemental Security Income

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on August 22, 2019—alleging disability onset as of

February 5, 2018 due to rib problems, osteoarthritis (neck, both hands, both wrists), cataracts

(both eyes), lower back problem, and right knee problem. (Tr. 58, 76-77, 83-84).2 Plaintiff’s

claims were denied at the initial level on January 9, 2020 and again after reconsideration on

December 10, 2020. (Tr. 58, 82, 89-91, 107-08, 124-27, 132). Plaintiff then requested de novo

review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 58, 149-51). The ALJ subsequently heard

the case on August 19, 2021 (Tr. 1-39, 58), at which time testimony was given by Plaintiff

(Tr. 5-31, 38) and by a vocational expert (Tr. 32-37). The ALJ took the matter under advisement

and issued a written decision on September 8, 2021 that found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 58-70).

1 Martin O’Malley became Commissioner for the Social Security Administration on

December 20, 2023 and is automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 References to pages in the transcript are denoted by the abbreviation “Tr.”

The ALJ’s written decision contained the following enumerated findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through June 30, 2018.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 5,

2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: right wrist degenerative

arthritis, right wrist four corner fusion, multilevel cervical degenerative disc

disease, lumbar degenerative disc disease, right ankle osteoarthritis, right knee

osteoarthritis, obesity, bilateral cataract surgery, corneal dystrophy, and myopia

(20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in

20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined

in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can never climb ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl; he can frequently handle and finger with the right

dominant upper extremity; and he must avoid all exposure to work place

hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as an apartment

maintenance worker and small parts assembler. This work does not require the

performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from February 5, 2018, through the date of this decision (20 CFR

404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

(Tr. 60, 61, 63, 68, 69). On April 7, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review of the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 44-48), thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision

of the Commissioner. See, e.g., Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

On appeal, Plaintiff asks the court to remand the case for a new hearing and further

consideration. (Doc. 15 at p. 15). The court construes Plaintiff’s supporting brief (Doc. 15) as a

motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s opposition brief (Doc. 18) as a competing

motion for summary judgment. As contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have consented to the exercise of full civil jurisdiction

by a United States Magistrate Judge (Docs. 10, 11), and the undersigned finds that the case

is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Upon consideration of the

parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court concludes that

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is due to be denied, that the Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment is due to be granted, and that the final decision is due to be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review and Regulatory Framework

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. Assuming the proper

legal standards were applied by the ALJ, the court is required to treat the ALJ’s findings of fact as

conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v.

Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla,”

but less than a preponderance, “and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings,

[a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”)

(citations omitted). The court thus may reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is convinced that the

decision was not supported by substantial evidence or that the proper legal standards were not

applied. See Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). Reversal is not warranted

simply because the court itself would have reached a different result. See Edwards v. Sullivan,

937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). Despite the deferential nature of its review, however, the

court must look beyond those parts of the record that support the decision, must view the record

in its entirety, and must take account of evidence that detracts from the evidence relied on in the

decision. See Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Walker v. Bowen,

826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

To qualify for disability benefits and establish entitlement for a period of disability, a

person must be unable to:

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).3 To make such a determination, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments set

forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of Impairments]?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer

to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).4

3 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

4 McDaniel is an SSI case. Nonetheless, because the same sequence applies to claims for

disability insurance benefits brought under Title II, SSI cases arising under Title XVI are

appropriately cited as authority in Title II cases, and vice versa. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker,

651 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 876 n.*

(11th Cir. 2012) (“The definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has

The burden of proof rests on the claimant through step four. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).

A claimant establishes a prima facie case of a qualifying disability once he or she has carried the

burden of proof from step one through step four. Id. At step five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner, who must then show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. Id.

In order to assess the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39. The RFC is what the

claimant is still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-

43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience

to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.

at 1239. To do so, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”), see

20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2, or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. The grids

allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or light work, inability to

speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each factor can independently

limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual, and combinations of these factors

yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. at 1240.

III. Issues on Appeal

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ’s RFC finding was based upon

substantial evidence; (2) whether the ALJ properly investigated the facts in determining Plaintiff’s

a disability is the same for claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security

income.”).

past relevant work; and (3) whether the ALJ failed to pose complete hypotheticals to the VE.

(See Doc. 15 at p. 1).

IV. Discussion

A. Whether the ALJ’s RFC finding was based upon substantial evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for his severe ocular/visual impairments in

the RFC or discuss how such severe impairments impacted his ability to return to his past relevant

work. (Doc. 15 at pp. 8-9). An RFC determination is an assessment of what a claimant is still able

to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence.

See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39; Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.1997);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (“Your residual functional capacity is the most you can still

do despite your limitations.”). “[T]he task of determining a claimant’s [RFC] and ability to work

rests with the [ALJ], not a doctor.” Moore v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 649 F. App’x 941, 945

(11th Cir. 2016); Hollingsworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 846 F. App’x 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2021)

(“A claimant’s RFC is a matter reserved for the ALJ’s determination, and while a physician’s

opinion on the matter is considered, it is not dispositive.”); Bouie v. Astrue, 226 F. App’x 892,

894 (11th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician when the record

supports a contrary conclusion. The resolution of conflicting evidence is the function of

the ALJ, not the Court.”) (citation omitted); Frank v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-962,

2022 WL 598036 at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 2:20-CV-962, 2022 WL 596833 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2022) (“[T]here is no requirement that an

ALJ base the RFC finding on a medical source’s opinion.”); Tolbert v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-33,

2022 WL 4591646 at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2022) (“An ALJ may ‘distill a claimant’s RFC from

an amalgamation of the record as a whole, without requiring a specific medical opinion to articulate

a specific functional limitation.’”) (citation omitted). “It is ‘solely the province of the

[Commissioner]’ to resolve conflicts in the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses.”

Lacina v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 606 F. App’x 520, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

“To find that an ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must be

shown that the ALJ has ‘provide[d] a sufficient rationale to link’ substantial record evidence

‘to the legal conclusions reached.’” Eaton v. Colvin, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1055 (S.D. Ala. 2016)

(citations omitted). Although an RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence,

the ALJ “is not required to specifically address every aspect of an opinion or every piece of

evidence in the record” in order for the determination to be affirmed. See Coley v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 771 F. App’x 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2019); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211

(11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of

evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision ... is not a broad rejection which is ‘not

enough to enable [the district court ... ] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered [the claimant’s]

medical condition as a whole.’”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “to find that the ALJ’s RFC

assessment is supported by substantial evidence, it is not necessary for the ALJ’s assessment to

be supported by the assessment of an examining or treating physician.” Smoke v. Kijakazi,

No. CV 21-0206, 2022 WL 721532 at *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2022).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “right wrist

degenerative arthritis, right wrist four corner fusion, multilevel cervical degenerative disc disease,

lumbar degenerative disc disease, right ankle osteoarthritis, right knee osteoarthritis, obesity,

bilateral cataract surgery, corneal dystrophy, and myopia.” (Tr. 61). In fashioning Plaintiff’s RFC,

the ALJ determined, after “consideration of the entire record,” that Plaintiff had the RFC to

perform light work5 except he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, that he could

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, that he could

frequently handle and finger with the right dominant upper extremity, and that he must avoid all

exposure to work place hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery.

(Tr. 63). With specific respect to visual impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “visual

impairments as well as his reports of occasional balance issues restrict[ed] him to avoiding all

exposure to hazards.” (Tr. 66).

A plaintiff “bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he

is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1276.

Citing a list of possible symptoms, such as “glare,” “seeing halos around lights,” “pain or grittiness

from tiny blisters on the surface of the cornea,” and “headaches,” along with “the likelihood

of having effects on [his] vision” due to his visual impairments, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

improperly failed to account for any limitations. (Doc. 15 at pp. 8-9). However, Plaintiff fails to

cite to any objective medical records documenting such an array of symptoms. Nor does Plaintiff

cite any opinion evidence supporting limitations based upon his visual impairments. The ALJ

considered the entire record when determining Plaintiff’s RFC, as the ALJ properly discussed both

the medical and non-medical evidence of record.

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged in his function report that he had problems with,

among other things, seeing (Tr. 64, 295-96) but that “[w]hen questioned at the hearing as to what

precluded him from working, [Plaintiff] testified he was unable to work due to knee and wrist

5 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying

of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in

this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most

of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),

416.967(b).

problems.” (Tr. 18-20, 26-27, 31, 64). In that regard, the ALJ specifically asked Plaintiff the

following questions: “A good place to start for me is if you could put it in your own words, sir,

why do you believe you’re disabled?”; “[W]hat do you understand is that you’ve been diagnosed

with? You go to the doctor, you give them your symptoms, the doctor diagnoses you. What’s your

understanding of what’s wrong with the different parts in your body?”; “Okay, so, if you were to

sum it up for me, you know, what are your medical problems that keep you from working

fulltime?”; and “Okay, are there any other symptoms, conditions or limitations, sir, that you

haven’t told me about yet but also contribute to why you believe you’re disabled?” (Tr. 18-20,

26-27). At no time did Plaintiff state that his visual impairments or any symptoms stemming

from his visual impairments affected his ability to work. Further, when Plaintiff’s attorney asked,

“Mr. Kindred, is there anything else you want to tell the Judge about your medical conditions?

Anything we haven’t discussed yet?”, Plaintiff answered, “I think we summed everything up

besides my arthritis in my neck and all that I told her.” (Tr. 31). The ALJ additionally noted that

Plaintiff reported, among other things, that he had dizzy spells with vertigo and balance issues,

that he could not lift over 20 pounds, and, regarding his daily activities,6 that he could drive and

use a cellphone. (Tr. 22, 29, 30, 64).7

6 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (stating that an ALJ should consider a

claimant’s daily activities in evaluating the limiting effects of her impairments).

7 In his reply, Plaintiff makes the assertion that in his function report he only stated that he

“ride[s] in a car.” (Doc. 21 at p. 2). However, Plaintiff specifically testified that he drives unless

he is hurting, apparently from one of his nonvisual impairments. (Tr. 29). Moreover, Plaintiff

argues that “while his function report is checked with ‘yes’ next to whether or not he drives, below

is an explanation as to why he does not drive his car” (Doc. 21 at p. 2) (emphasis in original)—

implying that his visual impairment was the reason for his not driving. The explanation actually

provided in the function report clearly lists the reason as “Car blown head gasket $750.00 don’t

have the money car in shop.” (Tr. 293).

As to the objective medical evidence, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff received treatment

for blurred vision in February 2019. (Tr. 65). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff underwent a

cataract phacoemulsification of the right eye with posterior chamber intraocular lens implant of

the right eye on March 7, 2019, that he reported improved right eye functioning on April 12, 2019,

that he underwent a cataract extraction on his left eye on April 30, 2019, and that he continued

with follow-up care in the subsequent months. (Tr. 65, 499). The records cited by the ALJ showed

that on July 26, 2019 Plaintiff reported that both his eyes were doing well, that he had no pain or

irritation, and that he was recommended to get over-the-counter readers as needed. (Tr. 65, 499).

Plaintiff’s uncorrected distance vision was 20/25 in his right eye and 20/30-1 in his left eye.

(Tr. 65, 499). The ALJ further stated that in May 2021 Plaintiff complained of blurred vision,

was found to have presbyopia,8 and was recommended for a follow-up in twelve months. (Tr. 65,

615-17). The records cited by the ALJ indicated that the history of Plaintiff’s eye complaints

involved blurred vision in mild severity in both eyes, that Plaintiff drove in the daytime and

nighttime, that Plaintiff’s distant and near visual acuity were 20/60 in each eye, and that Plaintiff

was advised wearing glasses could be helpful. (Tr. 65, 615, 617).

In considering the administrative findings of the State agency consultant at the

reconsideration level, the ALJ found that the State agency assessment was inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s continued complaints of chronic pain in 2021 and reports of blurred vision.

The ALJ ultimately concluded as follows:

8 “Presbyopia is a refractive error that makes it hard for middle-aged and older adults to see

things up close. ... Presbyopia is a normal part of aging. Everyone gets presbyopia as they get

older—usually after age 45.” https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/eye-conditions-

and-diseases/presbyopia (last viewed January 4, 2024).

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the

claimant’s oral and written testimony, the objective medical evidence, and the

opinions of medical professionals. A thorough assessment of all of the evidence

shows that the claimant is able to perform work at the light exertional level with

additional postural, environmental, and manipulative limitations as described [in

the decision].

(Tr. 68). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly incorporate his severe ocular/visual

impairment into the RFC. (Doc. 15 at p. 9). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, however, he ALJ

was not required to incorporate limitations for his ocular/visual impairment merely on the

basis that the ALJ found it to be a severe impairment. See Scott v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-293,

2023 WL 2292582 at *6 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2023). “‘Severe impairments do not necessarily

result in specific functional limitations ... [and i]f no specific functional limitations from a severe

impairment exist, the ALJ need not include a corresponding limitation for that impairment in the

RFC.’” Id. (quoting Owens v. Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-409, 2015 WL 12856780 at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 15, 2015) (citing Castel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App’x 260, 264 (11th Cir. 2009))

(per curiam); Davis–Grimplin v. Commr, Soc. Sec. Admin., 556 F. App’x 858, 863 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“The ALJ had ample evidence on which to conclude that Davis did not have functional limitations

of her hands notwithstanding that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is a severe impairment.”);

Mancini v. Commisioner of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-798, 2021 WL 1087270 at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Mar. 22, 2021) (“[T]he Court does not accept the proposition that a specific limitation

must always be attributed to a ‘severe impairment.’”); Fortner v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-00986,

2013 WL 3816551 at *6 (N.D. Ala. July 22, 2013) (citations omitted) (“The ALJ may thus

‘incorporate’ a claimant's severe impairments into an RFC by acknowledging and weighing those

impairments in his report, without the impairments necessarily resulting in an imposition of

impairment-specific work limitations in the RFC.”); Summerhill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Case No. 3:20-05055-CV-RK, 2021 WL 4432479 at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2021) (citation

omitted) (finding no error where the ALJ found that the claimant had several impairments but did

not include any limitations related to those severe impairments in his RFC determination: “[a]n

ALJ is not required to list and reject every possible limitation.”).9, 10

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of whether his visual impairments meet the

requirements of Listings 2.02, 2.03, and 2.04 indicates that Plaintiff’s impairments had a greater

impact on his functioning than the ALJ found. (Doc. 15 at p. 10). At the fourth step of the

9 Plaintiff’s reliance on Raduc v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 380 F. App’x 896, 898 (11th Cir. 2010)

to argue that “all severe impairments are to be incorporated into the RFC finding” (Doc. 5 at p. 8),

is misplaced. In Raduc, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”)

was a severe impairment but found that the plaintiff’s IBS did not affect her RFC. Id. at 898.

The Eleventh Circuit found that the ALJ’s analysis failed to properly discuss how IBS might affect

the plaintiff’s ability to perform her job duties, that the ALJ’s decision was unclear as to whether

and to what extent the ALJ discounted the plaintiff’s testimony about her IBS symptoms, and that

because the ALJ did not consider the effect of the plaintiff’s IBS on her RFC it was unclear whether

the ALJ had good cause to reject the treating physician’s medical opinion that the plaintiff could

not return to her past relevant work. Id. at 898-99. First, for the reasons discussed above, “[Raduc]

does not stand for the conclusion that an ALJ must include limitations in an RFC based on any

particular severe impairment.” See Scott, 2023 WL 2292582 at *6 n.5. Second, unlike here,

the plaintiff specifically testified about her limitation-causing IBS symptoms, and the plaintiff

presented a medical opinion from her treating physician stating that the plaintiff was limited

by her IBS—all of which the ALJ ignored. Raduc, 380 F. App’x at 898-99; see also Scott,

2023 WL 2292582 at *6 n.5 (distinguishing Raduc). Plaintiff, however, presented no similar

evidence here.

10 Plaintiff’s reliance on Kellerman v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV295, 2015 WL 927060 (M.D. Ala.

Mar. 4, 2015) is similarly misplaced. (Doc. 21 at pp. 2-3). In Kellerman, the court concluded that

the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record and that, as a result, the ALJ improperly

determined the plaintiff’s RFC without taking into consideration any limitations to the plaintiff’s

vision. Id. at *3-6. Unlike here, however, the plaintiff presented medical evidence from an

examining doctor who noted that the plaintiff had blurred vision and “holes in his vision,” and the

plaintiff testified regarding his blurred vision. Id. at *4. Additionally, the ALJ believed that there

was a necessity to secure additional evidence regarding the plaintiff’s visual acuity before

rendering a decision about his disability but later determined the plaintiff’s RFC without including

any such evidence into the administrative record. Id. at *5. Moreover, during the questioning of

the vocational expert, there was some confusion regarding the effects of the plaintiff’s blurred

vision on his ability to perform other work available in the national economy, and the ALJ

seemingly acknowledged that follow-up interrogatories on the issue might be needed. Id. at *6.

The facts in Kellerman thus are not similar to those in this case.

sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments,

not just the “severe” impairments identified at step two. Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

572 F. App’x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014); Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315,

1320 (11th Cir. 2021); Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). The ALJ’s responsibility is met when she considers

all medical evidence in the record by referencing the claimant’s “combination of impairments” at

step three and stating that she considered “all symptoms” in assessing the RFC. Tuggerson-Brown,

572 F. App’x at 951-52. However, impairments and limitations are not the same thing. Shipes v.

Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-80, 2022 WL 4116984 at *5 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2022) (citing Jacobs v.

Berryhill, No. 5-17-CV-429, 2018 WL 3323764 at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, No. SA-17-CV-429, 2018 WL 4688775 (W.D. Tex. July 24, 2018)

(citing Bordelon v. Astrue, 281 F. App’x 418, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In arguing that the step-two

and step-three findings on the severity of her mental impairments necessarily require imposition

of functional limitations, Jacobs conflates separate inquiries. ... [A]n impairment is not the same

thing as functional limitations on the ability to work that may be (or not) caused by an

impairment.”) (citations omitted)). “Thus, while an ALJ is required to consider all impairments,

he is not required to consider every possible limitation proposed by the administrative medical

findings.” Id. (citing Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (explaining that the ALJ need not discuss every piece

of evidence so long as the ALJ considers the claimant’s medical condition as a whole)); Fortner,

2013 WL 3816551 at *6 (“‘Severe’ impairments found at the second step of the analysis, however,

do not necessarily ‘impose significant work-related limitations’ for the purposes of the subsequent

RFC and hypothetical question steps.”); Ward v. Colvin, No. CV G–15–095, 2016 WL 3919665

at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3855871

(S.D. Tex. Jul. 15, 2016) (“[Claimant’s] argument that the ALJ’s evaluation at Steps 2 and 3

necessarily supports a decreased RFC [residual-functional-capacity] determination is improper.”).

Here, the record reflects that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s severe vision impairments in

accordance with the regulations, determined that the impairments did not rise to the severity

necessary to meet or equal a listed impairment, and proceeded in determining Plaintiff’s RFC upon

consideration of the record as a whole.

Plaintiff also argues that his past relevant jobs required occasional to frequent depth

perception and near acuity but that the ALJ did not assess any specific limitations in Plaintiff’s

depth perception or visual acuity when fashioning the RFC. (Doc. 15 at p. 10). As previously

discussed, the record reflects that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed Plaintiff's physical abilities by

discussing all the relevant evidence of record and that the ALJ limited Plaintiff from working

around hazards due to his visual impairments and occasional balance issues. (Tr. 66). Because

the ALJ accounted for all of Plaintiff’s impairments in fashioning the RFC, the court concludes

that the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ did not

commit reversible error.

B. Whether the ALJ properly investigated the facts in determining past relevant

work

At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ will consider a claimant’s RFC

and the claimant’s past relevant work to determine whether the claimant “can still engage in

the kind of gainful employment that [the claimant] has undertaken in the past.” Washington v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv). “At step four, the claimant carries a heavy burden of showing that his

impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work.” Id. “The claimant bears the

burden of showing that he cannot perform his past work as he actually performed it and as it is

generally performed in the national economy.” Simpson v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 423 F. App’x 882,

884 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387 at *1-2 (S.S.A. Jan. 1, 1982) and Jackson

v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1986)); Waldrop v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 379 F.

App’x 948, 953 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is the claimant’s burden to demonstrate not only that she

can no longer perform her past relevant work as she actually performed it, but also that she can

no longer perform this work as it is performed in the general economy.”); Scharber v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 411 F. App’x 281, 282 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If the ALJ finds that the claimant cannot

perform the functional demands and duties of her past job as she actually performed it, he will

consider whether the claimant can perform the functional demands and duties of the occupation as

generally required by employers throughout the national economy.”).

In considering whether a claimant can return to past relevant work, “[t]he ALJ must take

all the duties of a claimant’s past work into consideration and evaluate whether the claimant can

still perform them in spite of the severe impairment or combination of impairments.” McCormick

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 619 F. App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2015); Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d

1567, 1574 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). For such purposes, “[t]he claimant is the primary source for

vocational documentation, and statements by the claimant regarding past work are generally

sufficient for determining the skill level; exertional demands and nonexertional demands of such

work.” SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386 at *3 (S.S.A. Jan. 1, 1982); Cantu v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 2:19-CV-832, 2021 WL 960686 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2021). However, “[t]he ALJ may

rely on information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to determine

whether a claimant can perform his past relevant work.” Rivera-Cruzada v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

741 F. App’x 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2018). As Social Security Ruling 00-4p explains, the SSA

“rel[ies] primarily on the DOT (including its companion publication, the SCO) for information

about the requirements of work in the national economy. [The SSA] use[s] these publications at

steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process.” SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2 (S.S.A.

Dec. 4, 2000). “Similarly, [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d), 416.966(d)] explicitly names the DOT as

one of the main sources of jobs data the SSA relies on, and provides that ALJs ‘will take

administrative notice of reliable job information available’ in the DOT. This subsection places the

DOT first in its list of reliable government sources. What’s more, other SSA Rulings describe the

DOT as ‘authoritative.’ Plainly the DOT is integral to disability hearings.” Washington, 906 F.3d

at 1364-65 (citations omitted).

“The ALJ may also rely on the testimony of a VE, ‘an expert on the kinds of jobs an

individual can perform based on his or her capacity and impairments.’” Rivera-Cruzada,

741 F. App’x at 739 (citation omitted); SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2; 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2) (“We will ask you for information about work you have done in the

past. We may also ask other people who know about your work. ... We may use the services of

vocational experts or vocational specialists, or other resources, such as the ‘Dictionary of

Occupational Titles’ and its companion volumes and supplements, published by the Department

of Labor, to obtain evidence we need to help us determine whether you can do your past relevant

work, given your residual functional capacity.”). Nonetheless, “[g]enerally, vocational expert

testimony is not necessary to determine whether a claimant can perform his past relevant work.”

Hernandez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 433 F. App’x 821, 823 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Lucas, 918 F.2d

at 1573 n.2); Coley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F. App’x 913, 918 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The

testimony of a vocational expert is only required to determine whether the claimant’s RFC permits

her to do other work after she has met her initial burden of showing that she cannot do past work.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s RFC limited him to performing light work and included that he could

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, that he could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, that he could frequently handle and finger with the right dominant

upper extremity, and that he must avoid all exposure to work place hazards such as unprotected

heights and dangerous moving machinery. (Tr. 63). Even with those limitations, the ALJ found

after reviewing the evidence of record (including the VE’s testimony) that Plaintiff was capable of

performing past relevant work as an apartment maintenance worker and small parts assembler and

that such work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the RFC.

(Tr. 68). The ALJ expressly stated the following to that effect:

In comparing the claimant’s residual functional capacity with the physical and

mental demands of his past relevant work, the undersigned posed a hypothetical

question to the vocational expert in which she was to assume an individual of the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience, and who had the specific capacity

and limitations set forth above in the claimant’s residual functional capacity. The

vocational expert testified that such an individual would be able to perform the

claimant’s past relevant work as a small parts assembler as generally performed in

the national economy and as the claimant actually performed and as an apartment

maintenance worker as actually performed. Pursuant to Social Security Ruling

00-4p, the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information

contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Therefore, based on the

evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the claimant is able to perform his

past work as a small parts assembler as generally performed in the national

economy and as the claimant actually performed and as an apartment maintenance

worker as actually performed.

(Tr. 69).

Plaintiff argues that “there is no way to know how the VE” reached the conclusion that

Plaintiff performed the apartment maintenance worker job at the light exertional level. (Doc. 15

at pp. 11-12). Plaintiff asserts that the RFC failed to account for all of his severe impairments and

his inability to concentrate as mentioned in his function report (Tr. 292), that the hypothetical

questions posed to the VE failed to account for all of his severe impairments, including his visual

impairments, and that the ALJ ignored the VE’s responses to the hypothetical questions and did

not include any additional limitations from those responses into the RFC. (Doc. 15 at pp. 12-13).

In determining Plaintiff’s past relevant work, the VE testified that she listened to Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding his past work and reviewed Plaintiff’s work history forms that were in the

file. (Tr. 32-33).11 During the hearing, Plaintiff testified as to one of his prior jobs as a

maintenance technician where he conducted routine maintenance work at an apartment complex.

(Tr. 16). Plaintiff stated that he “did heating and air there too and patch[ed] holes in the walls,

sheetrock, and doorknobs” and that if any of the tenants “had a problem with the doorknob or

something, the lock or whatever, we’d go out and fix it.” (Tr. 16). Plaintiff testified that he

never lifted over fifteen pounds when performing the job of apartment maintenance worker.

(Tr. 16-17). Plaintiff also testified to another job where he worked on an assembly line and

mainly stood all day assembling struts for vehicles. (Tr. 17-18). The VE testified that Plaintiff’s

work as an apartment maintenance worker, DICOT 382.664-010, 1991 WL 673265, was medium

work according to the DOT, but based on Plaintiff’s testimony during the hearing, Plaintiff actually

performed the job at the light exertional level. (Tr. 33-34). The VE also testified that Plaintiff’s

past work as a small parts assembler, DICOT 706.684-022, 1991 WL 679050, was light work

based on the DOT and as Plaintiff performed it. (Tr. 34).12

11 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the “VE acknowledged [Plaintiff’s work history forms were]

... the only evidence of record she reviewed.” (Doc. 15 at p. 11).

12 Plaintiff asserts that: “Exhibit 4E suggests that none of Mr. Kindred’s past relevant work

required him to stand and/or walk for any time. Further, the exhibit is devoid of any time spent

walking, standing, sitting, climbing, stooping, crouching, crawling, reaching, or performing any

other type of activity. (R. 276). ... Moreso, Exhibit 4E provides no weight which was occasionally

or frequently lifted by Mr. Kindred when he performed such jobs.” (Id.). The court finds

Plaintiff’s argument confusing. In Exhibit E, Plaintiff listed the maintenance technician job along

with three other jobs. (Tr. 272-76). Plaintiff admits in his argument that the exhibit is devoid of

any information as to duration and weight regarding actions performed. Plaintiff clearly chose not

Because the ALJ properly considered the testimony of Plaintiff and the VE, as well as

the DOT descriptions, the court finds that there was sufficient information about the demands of

Plaintiff’s past work and that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work. Simpson, 423 F. App’x at 884; SSR 82-61,

1982 WL 31387 at *2 (“[W]here the evidence shows that a claimant retains the RFC to perform

the functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job as he or she actually

performed it, the claimant should be found to be ‘not disabled.’” ); Sexton v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Comm’r, No. 4:21-CV-00624, 2022 WL 4236629 at *10 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2022) (“Because the

ALJ relied upon [plaintiff’s] hearing testimony, the vocational expert’s testimony, and the DOT

classifications, the court finds she obtained sufficient information to appropriately classify

[plaintiff’s] past relevant work.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s hearing attorney did not challenge or

object to the classification of Plaintiff’s past work and did not ask any questions of the VE during

the hearing (Tr. 33-38). Thus, Plaintiff essentially waived his current argument. See Brock v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-368, 2023 WL 3815229 at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2023) (finding

that the plaintiff had effectively waived her argument by failing to challenge the VE’s alleged

misclassification of her past relevant work); Vickery v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-122,

2022 WL 16555990 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2022) (finding that the ALJ was not obliged to

to supply the requested information in describing each job; and Plaintiff provided testimony as to

the type of work he did as an apartment maintenance worker and that he could lift up to fifteen

pounds. (Tr. 16-17). Plaintiff further argues that: “Exhibit 5E provides multiple jobs, all of which

require walking and/or standing at least 8 hours a day. (R. 283-89). ... Exhibit 5E notates that

every job Mr. Kindred held required the lifting of 50 to 100 pounds. (R. 276, 283-89).” (Doc. 15

at p. 11). However, the ALJ asked Plaintiff about his job as a small parts assembler, which was

not listed in Exhibit 5E (Tr. 282-89) but was listed in Plaintiff’s detailed earning statements

(Tr. 232-33, 243). (Tr. 17-18). Plaintiff provided a description of the job at the hearing (Id.), and

the VE testified that he listened to Plaintiff’s testimony concerning his past work. (Tr. 33).

The court thus finds the “conflicting evidence” argument without merit.

further investigate whether plaintiff’s job as a real estate agent was past relevant work where the

VE specifically testified regarding plaintiff’s past work as a real estate agent and where plaintiff

was represented by counsel at the hearing and did not raise any issue as to whether her work as

a real estate agent was past relevant work); New v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:12-CV-211,

2013 WL 3804846 at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2013) (“[T]he Commissioner correctly notes that the

Plaintiff did not raise this issue to the ALJ, nor did her attorney object to the VE’s testimony

identifying Plaintiff's prior work as a housekeeper as past relevant work. Unfortunately for

Plaintiff, because she failed to raise this issue to the ALJ or even object to the VE’s testimony, the

ALJ was not obligated to specifically address the concerns—or rather, arguments—that Plaintiff

now raises.”); McDaniel v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-21201, 2023 WL 5510277 at *14 (S.D. Fla.

Aug. 10, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. McDaniel v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-

CV-21201, 2023 WL 5507774 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2023) (noting that several courts have found a

claimant’s failure to object or raise an argument before an ALJ relative to her past relevant work

forecloses the claimant’s ability to raise the issue for the first time on appeal; because plaintiff

“did not challenge the VE’s classification of her past relevant work as file supervisor, the ALJ

did not err in classifying her past work as such”); Sheila R. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-04180,

2022 WL 17078098 at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2022) (where plaintiff argued that the VE did not

properly classify any of plaintiff’s past relevant work, the court found this argument lacking and

noted, among other things, that plaintiff did not identify any DOT job number that was a closer

match to the job she performed and that plaintiff’s counsel did not object to the VE’s classification

of plaintiff’s past relevant work or question the VE about his classification at the hearing); Rivera

v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-146, 2016 WL 4424973 at *6 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2016), adopted at

2016 WL 4414792 (Aug. 18, 2016) (claimant failed to meet her burden at step four where she

offered no evidence to rebut the ALJ’s determination and where her counsel had the opportunity

to question both her and the VE regarding past relevant work); Kolozs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 2:22-CV-418, 2023 WL 4231630 at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2023); Hall v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 6:19-CV-1066, 2020 WL 1673053 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) (noting that where the

plaintiff did not challenge the VE’s designation of past relevant work, did not question the VE

about the designation, and did not provide evidence to rebut the designation or her ability to do

that work, and where that the plaintiff “should have offered to provide more information after the

VE found her past relevant work was dining room attendant or waiter-waitress informal,” the

plaintiff “failed to satisfy her burden at step four to demonstrate her work experience as a banquet

server, restaurant server, and lane waitress did not constitute past relevant work as a waiter-

waitress informal or was not properly classified by the VE”). See also Kolozs v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 2:22-CV-418, 2023 WL 4231630 at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2023) (“[W]ithout an

objection or other reason to doubt [the VE’s] credibility, the [VE’s] experience provides

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s reliance on [the VE’s] testimony.”) (citing Curcio v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2010)).

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC failed to account for all of his severe

impairments, Plaintiff failed to prove that he had additional limitations not reflected in the RFC.

Plaintiff cites subjective complaints regarding additional limitations but fails to present objective

evidence demonstrating how those symptoms limited his functional ability.13 The ALJ properly

considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found that those complaints were not consistent

13 Citing his function report where he marked that he was unable to pay bills or handle a savings

account (Tr. 293), Plaintiff asserts that “the ALJ provide[d] no mention of his ability to

concentrate.” (Doc. 15 at p. 12). However, in the section in the function report for explaining his

answer, Plaintiff stated, “don’t have money unless I go and try to do a little job etc. HVAC”

(Tr. 293), which does not show that a difficulty in concentration was the cause.

with the record. (Tr. 63-64).

As to the hypothetical questions posed to the VE, the ALJ was not required to include

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints or other unsupported limitations in the hypothetical questions or

accept the VE’s testimony that included such unsupported limitations. See Wilson v. Barnhart,

284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute

substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the

claimant’s impairments.”); Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d at 1161 (An ALJ is “not

required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected as

unsupported.”); Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 482 F. App’x 483, 487 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he

ALJ may disregard an answer to a hypothetical question where she finds that elements of the

hypothetical question are unsupported by the record.”). The ALJ properly considered the entire

record in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, which the ALJ then included in the relevant hypothetical

question to the VE. (Tr. 34-36, 63, 68-69). Plaintiff thus has failed to show that the ALJ erred.

C. Whether the ALJ posed complete hypotheticals to the Vocational Expert

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to craft an RFC that included severe

eye impairments and by failing to pose any hypotheticals to the VE that contained such

impairments. (Doc. 15 at pp. 13-15). For the reasons previously discussed, the ALJ properly

considered Plaintiff’s visual impairments along with the record as a whole in fashioning Plaintiff’s

RFC, and the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ thereafter

included the RFC’s limitations in the relevant hypothetical posed to the VE. As also previously

discussed, the ALJ was not required to include Plaintiff's subjective complaints or other

unsupported limitations into the hypothetical question or accept the VE’s response that included

any such unsupported limitations. See Section IV.B., supra; see also Carroll v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Com’r, 453 F. App’x 889, 894 (11th Cir. 2011) (“For a VE’s answer to a hypothetical question to

constitute substantial evidence, the question must encompass all of the claimant’s mental and

physical impairments. However, the ALJ is not required to include findings in the hypothetical

that the ALJ has found to be unsupported.”) (internal citations omitted).

V. Conclusion

Plaintiff “‘must do more than point to evidence in the record that supports [his] position;

[he] must show the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Thompkins

v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-216, 2022 WL 2517185 at *7 (M.D. Ala. July 6, 2022) (quoting Sims v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)); Lanier v. Colvin,

No. CV414-004, 2015 WL 3622619 at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 9, 2015) (“The fact that Plaintiff

disagrees with the ALJ’s decision, or that there is other evidence in the record that weighs against

the ALJ’s decision, does not mean that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence.”)

(citing Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158-59). Put more simply, “[t]o the extent Plaintiff disagrees with

the ALJ’s interpretation of that evidence, that is not a ground for remand.” Horne v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-181, 2021 WL 3023679 at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-181, 2021 WL 3022727 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2021)

(citing Sarria v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 579 F. App’x 722, 724 (11th Cir. 2014)); Mitchell v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (“‘We may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.’ ‘If the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm, even if the

proof preponderates against it.’”) (citations omitted).

After carefully and independently reviewing the record in light of the controlling legal

standard, the court hereby concludes as follows:

e that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is due to be DENIED;

e that the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18) is due to be

GRANTED; and

e that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment will issue.

DONE this the 22nd day of January 2024.

(| /s

WW

CHA . BRYAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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